

**The Representation of the Question of
Jerusalem in the
British Press 1967–2000
The Times, the *Guardian* and the *Daily
Telegraph***

Abeer Ismael al-Najjar

**Thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies**

University of Edinburgh

2003

Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that this thesis is written by myself and any references made to the sources are duly acknowledged.

Abeer al-Najjar

Table of Contents

DECLARATION	II
TABLE OF CONTENTS	III
FIGURES & TABLES	VIII
ABSTRACT	IX
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	X
INTRODUCTION	1
0.1 THE TOPIC	1
0.1.2 THE NEWSPAPERS: <i>THE TIMES</i> , <i>THE GUARDIAN</i> & <i>THE DAILY TELEGRAPH</i> :	13
0.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY	19
0.2.1 INDUCTIVE	19
0.2.2 QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS	20
0.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS	27
CHAPTER ONE	30
REPORTING NEWS ABOUT JERUSALEM (JUNE 1967)	30
INTRODUCTION	30
1.1 <i>THE TIMES</i>	31
1.1.1 OCCUPATION	34
1.1.2 LEGISLATION AND ANNEXATION	35
1.1.3 DEMOLITION OF THE DIVIDING WALL	35
1.1.4 THE TWO PARTIES	36
1.1.5 INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDE	37
1.1.6 SOURCES	38
1.1.7 FOCUS OF ATTENTION	41
1.1.8 INVESTIGATION	42
1.1.9 CONCLUSION	42
1.2 <i>GUARDIAN</i>	43
1.2.1 OCCUPATION	44

1.2.2 LEGISLATION AND ANNEXATION	46
1.2.3 DEMOLITION OF THE DIVIDING WALL	47
1.2.4 THE TWO PARTIES	47
1.2.5 RELIGION AND CULTURE	49
1.2.6 SOURCES	50
1.2.7 INVESTIGATION	51
1.2.8 FOCUS OF ATTENTION	52
1.2.9 CONCLUSION	53
1.3 DAILY TELEGRAPH	54
1.3.1 OCCUPATION	56
1.3.2 LEGISLATION AND ANNEXATION	57
1.3.3 DEMOLITION OF THE DIVIDING WALL	57
1.3.4 THE TWO PARTIES	58
3.5 RELIGION AND CULTURE	59
1.3.6 INTERNATIONAL NEWS	59
1.3.7 SOURCES	60
1.3.8 INTERPRETATION AND JUSTIFICATION	60
1.3.9 FOCUS OF ATTENTION	61
1.3.10 INVESTIGATION	61
1.3.11 CONCLUSION	62
1.4 THE TIMES, THE GUARDIAN AND THE DAILY TELEGRAPH: AN OVERVIEW	62

REPORTING NEWS ABOUT JERUSALEM (AUGUST 1980)	64
---	-----------

2.0 INTRODUCTION	64
2.1 THE TIMES	67
2.1.1 THE BILL	68
2.1.2 JERUSALEM	69
2.1.3 ARAB REACTION	73
2.1.4 INTERNATIONAL REACTION	74
2.1.5 SOURCES	75
2.1.6 CONTEXTUALIZATION AND DECONTEXTUALIZATION	76
2.1.7 INFORMATIVE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	76
2.1.8 DESCRIPTION AND COMMENT	77
2.1.9 TERMINOLOGY	78
2.1.10 CONCLUSION	79
2.2 GUARDIAN	79
2.2.1 THE BILL	81
2.2.2 JERUSALEM	82
2.2.3 ARAB REACTION	83
2.2.4 INTERNATIONAL REACTION	84
2.2.4.1 UNSC RESOLUTION 478	86
2.2.6 SOURCES	87
2.2.7 CONTEXTUALIZATION AND DECONTEXTUALIZATION	88
2.2.8 HISTORICAL AND GENERAL BACKGROUND	89
2.2.9 TERMINOLOGY	90
2.2.13 CONCLUSION	91
2.3 DAILY TELEGRAPH	92
2.3.1 THE BILL ON JERUSALEM	93
2.3.2 REACTION FROM THE ARABS	94
2.3.3 INTERNATIONAL REACTION	95
2.3.4 JERUSALEM	97
2.3.5 SOURCES	97
2.3.5 CONTEXTUALIZATION AND DECONTEXTUALIZATION	98
2.3.6 INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND	100
2.3.9 TERMINOLOGY	101

2.3.10 CONCLUSION	101
2.4 CONCLUSION	103

CHAPTER THREE	106
---------------	-----

INITIAL OBSERVATION: JULY- OCTOBER 2000	106
---	-----

0. INTRODUCTION	106
3.1 <i>THE TIMES</i>	107
3.1.1 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT II PROPOSALS	108
3.1.2 THE NEW INTIFADA	111
3.1.3 JERUSALEM	115
3.1.4 HOLY SITES	116
3.1.5 SOURCES	118
3.1.6 SUGGESTIONS, JUSTIFICATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS	119
3.1.7 FOCUS OF ATTENTION	120
3.2 <i>GUARDIAN</i>	121
3.2.1 CAMP DAVID	123
3.2.2 THE CAMP DAVID PROPOSALS	124
3.2.3 THE NEW INTIFADA	126
3.2.4 JERUSALEM	129
3.2.5 HOLY SITES	130
3.2.6 INTERNATIONAL	132
3.2.7 SOURCES	133
3.2.8 COMMENT AND CONTEXT	133
3.2.9 SUGGESTIONS, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND INTERPRETATION	136
3.3 <i>DAILY TELEGRAPH</i>	137
3.3.1 CAMP DAVID	138
3.3.2 THE CAMP DAVID PROPOSALS	139
3.3.3 THE NEW INTIFADA	142
3.3.4 THE CITY OF JERUSALEM	146
3.3.5 HOLY PLACES	147
3.3.6 INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDE	148
3.3.7 SOURCES	148
3.3.8 FOCUS OF ATTENTION	150
3.4 CONCLUSION	151

CHAPTER FOUR	156
--------------	-----

OBSERVATION: REPORTING NEWS ABOUT JERUSALEM 1967-2000	156
---	-----

4.0 INTRODUCTION	156
4.1 COVERAGE OF NEWS ABOUT JERUSALEM	158
4.2 CATEGORIES OF ITEMS	165
4.3 AUTHOR OF ITEMS	168
4.4 THE PLACE OF REPORTING	173
4.5 LOCATION OF NEWS ITEMS IN NEWSPAPERS	175
4.6 <i>THE TIMES</i> , <i>THE GUARDIAN</i> AND <i>THE DAILY TELEGRAPH</i> : A SURVEY	179

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF JERUSALEM: NEWS SELECTION AND FRAMING

182

INTRODUCTION	182
5.1 NEWS SELECTION AND THE CONCEPT OF “NEWSWORTHINESS”	183
5.2 DOMINANT TENDENCIES IN NEWS SELECTION	185
5.2.1 DRAMA-ORIENTED COVERAGE (NEWS SELECTION)	186
5.2.2 ISRAELI-ORIENTED COVERAGE (NEWS SELECTION)	189
5.2.3 CHANGES IN NEWS COVERAGE OF THE PALESTINIANS 1967–2000	192
5.2.4 INTERNATIONAL MOVES REGARDING JERUSALEM: INCONSISTENCY IN NEWS SELECTION	198
5.2.5 INCONSISTENCY IN REPORTING ON THE ARABS	200
5.2.6 ELITE-ORIENTED SELECTION OF NEWS	203
5.2.7 POLITICAL/RELIGIOUS-ORIENTED COVERAGE	206
5.2.8 ABSENCE OF NEWS STORIES RE LEGALITY	208
5.2.9 NEWS SELECTION: AN OVERVIEW	209
5.3 NEWS FRAMING	211
5.3.1 DOMINANT TENDENCIES IN NEWS FRAMING	214
5.3.3 NEWS FRAMING: AN OVERVIEW	224
5.4 CHARACTERIZING JERUSALEM: DIFFERENCES IN PRESENTATION	225
5.4.1 NEGOTIATING PRESENTATION	226
5.4.2 THE CHARACTERIZATION OF JERUSALEM	231
5.4.3 SEQUENCE AND CONTEXTUALIZATION OF EVENTS	239
5.4.4 PORTRAYAL OF THE ACTORS	243

CHAPTER SIX

250

FORCES IN THE PROCESS OF NEWS PRODUCTION

250

INTRODUCTION	250
6.1 FORCES IN DETERMINING NEWS SELECTION	251
6.1.1 NEWS ACTOR & EVENT	252
6.1.2 NEWS WORKERS: JOURNALISTS	257
6.1.3 ACCESS TO NEWS: POWER AND LEGITIMACY	261
6.1.4 NEWS SOURCES AS A FORCE IN NEWS SELECTION	266
6.1.5 (IDEOLOGICAL) PROFESSIONAL FACTORS: NEWS VALUES & ROUTINES	270
6.1.6 NEWS ORGANIZATION, ROUTINE, BUDGET & OWNERSHIP	273
6.2 FORCES IN DETERMINING NEWS FRAMING	277
6.2.1 NEWS ACTOR AND EVENT AS A FORCE IN NEWS FRAMING	278
6.2.2 NEWS WORKERS (JOURNALISTS)	280
6.2.3 ACCESS TO NEWS AS A FORCE IN NEWS FRAMING	281
6.2.4 ROLE OF THE NEWS SOURCES IN FRAMING THE NEWS	283
6.2.5 NEWS VALUES AND ROUTINES	284
6.2.6 NEWS ORGANIZATION: BUDGET, PRIORITIES, ROUTINES, OWNERSHIP AND EDITORIAL POLICIES	286
6.3 CONCLUSION	288

CONCLUSION

291

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Theoretical Framework	10
3. Methodology	20
4. Data Collection	30
5. Results	40
6. Discussion	50
7. Conclusion	60
8. References	70
9. Appendix	80
10. Glossary	90
11. Index	100
12. Bibliography	110
13. List of Figures	120
14. List of Tables	130
15. Acknowledgments	140
16. Author's Note	150
17. Contact Information	160
18. Declaration of Interest	170
19. Funding Source	180
20. Data Availability Statement	190
21. Ethics Approval	200
22. Conflicts of Interest	210
23. Author Contributions	220
24. Supplementary Materials	230
25. References	240
26. Appendix	250
27. Glossary	260
28. Index	270
29. Bibliography	280
30. List of Figures	290
31. List of Tables	300
32. Acknowledgments	310
33. Author's Note	320
34. Contact Information	330
35. Declaration of Interest	340
36. Funding Source	350
37. Data Availability Statement	360
38. Ethics Approval	370
39. Conflicts of Interest	380
40. Author Contributions	390
41. Supplementary Materials	400
42. References	410
43. Appendix	420
44. Glossary	430
45. Index	440
46. Bibliography	450
47. List of Figures	460
48. List of Tables	470
49. Acknowledgments	480
50. Author's Note	490
51. Contact Information	500
52. Declaration of Interest	510
53. Funding Source	520
54. Data Availability Statement	530
55. Ethics Approval	540
56. Conflicts of Interest	550
57. Author Contributions	560
58. Supplementary Materials	570
59. References	580
60. Appendix	590
61. Glossary	600
62. Index	610
63. Bibliography	620
64. List of Figures	630
65. List of Tables	640
66. Acknowledgments	650
67. Author's Note	660
68. Contact Information	670
69. Declaration of Interest	680
70. Funding Source	690
71. Data Availability Statement	700
72. Ethics Approval	710
73. Conflicts of Interest	720
74. Author Contributions	730
75. Supplementary Materials	740
76. References	750
77. Appendix	760
78. Glossary	770
79. Index	780
80. Bibliography	790
81. List of Figures	800
82. List of Tables	810
83. Acknowledgments	820
84. Author's Note	830
85. Contact Information	840
86. Declaration of Interest	850
87. Funding Source	860
88. Data Availability Statement	870
89. Ethics Approval	880
90. Conflicts of Interest	890
91. Author Contributions	900
92. Supplementary Materials	910
93. References	920
94. Appendix	930
95. Glossary	940
96. Index	950
97. Bibliography	960
98. List of Figures	970
99. List of Tables	980
100. Acknowledgments	990
101. Author's Note	1000
102. Contact Information	1010
103. Declaration of Interest	1020
104. Funding Source	1030
105. Data Availability Statement	1040
106. Ethics Approval	1050
107. Conflicts of Interest	1060
108. Author Contributions	1070
109. Supplementary Materials	1080
110. References	1090
111. Appendix	1100
112. Glossary	1110
113. Index	1120
114. Bibliography	1130
115. List of Figures	1140
116. List of Tables	1150
117. Acknowledgments	1160
118. Author's Note	1170
119. Contact Information	1180
120. Declaration of Interest	1190
121. Funding Source	1200
122. Data Availability Statement	1210
123. Ethics Approval	1220
124. Conflicts of Interest	1230
125. Author Contributions	1240
126. Supplementary Materials	1250
127. References	1260
128. Appendix	1270
129. Glossary	1280
130. Index	1290
131. Bibliography	1300
132. List of Figures	1310
133. List of Tables	1320
134. Acknowledgments	1330
135. Author's Note	1340
136. Contact Information	1350
137. Declaration of Interest	1360
138. Funding Source	1370
139. Data Availability Statement	1380
140. Ethics Approval	1390
141. Conflicts of Interest	1400
142. Author Contributions	1410
143. Supplementary Materials	1420
144. References	1430
145. Appendix	1440
146. Glossary	1450
147. Index	1460
148. Bibliography	1470
149. List of Figures	1480
150. List of Tables	1490
151. Acknowledgments	1500
152. Author's Note	1510
153. Contact Information	1520
154. Declaration of Interest	1530
155. Funding Source	1540
156. Data Availability Statement	1550
157. Ethics Approval	1560
158. Conflicts of Interest	1570
159. Author Contributions	1580
160. Supplementary Materials	1590
161. References	1600
162. Appendix	1610
163. Glossary	1620
164. Index	1630
165. Bibliography	1640
166. List of Figures	1650
167. List of Tables	1660
168. Acknowledgments	1670
169. Author's Note	1680
170. Contact Information	1690
171. Declaration of Interest	1700
172. Funding Source	1710
173. Data Availability Statement	1720
174. Ethics Approval	1730
175. Conflicts of Interest	1740
176. Author Contributions	1750
177. Supplementary Materials	1760
178. References	1770
179. Appendix	1780
180. Glossary	1790
181. Index	1800
182. Bibliography	1810
183. List of Figures	1820
184. List of Tables	1830
185. Acknowledgments	1840
186. Author's Note	1850
187. Contact Information	1860
188. Declaration of Interest	1870
189. Funding Source	1880
190. Data Availability Statement	1890
191. Ethics Approval	1900
192. Conflicts of Interest	1910
193. Author Contributions	1920
194. Supplementary Materials	1930
195. References	1940
196. Appendix	1950
197. Glossary	1960
198. Index	1970
199. Bibliography	1980
200. List of Figures	1990
201. List of Tables	2000
202. Acknowledgments	2010
203. Author's Note	2020
204. Contact Information	2030
205. Declaration of Interest	2040
206. Funding Source	2050
207. Data Availability Statement	2060
208. Ethics Approval	2070
209. Conflicts of Interest	2080
210. Author Contributions	2090
211. Supplementary Materials	2100
212. References	2110
213. Appendix	2120
214. Glossary	2130
215. Index	2140
216. Bibliography	2150
217. List of Figures	2160
218. List of Tables	2170
219. Acknowledgments	2180
220. Author's Note	2190
221. Contact Information	2200
222. Declaration of Interest	2210
223. Funding Source	2220
224. Data Availability Statement	2230
225. Ethics Approval	2240
226. Conflicts of Interest	2250
227. Author Contributions	2260
228. Supplementary Materials	2270
229. References	2280
230. Appendix	2290
231. Glossary	2300
232. Index	2310
233. Bibliography	2320
234. List of Figures	2330
235. List of Tables	2340
236. Acknowledgments	2350
237. Author's Note	2360
238. Contact Information	2370
239. Declaration of Interest	2380
240. Funding Source	2390
241. Data Availability Statement	2400
242. Ethics Approval	2410
243. Conflicts of Interest	2420
244. Author Contributions	2430
245. Supplementary Materials	2440
246. References	2450
247. Appendix	2460
248. Glossary	2470
249. Index	2480
250. Bibliography	2490
251. List of Figures	2500
252. List of Tables	2510
253. Acknowledgments	2520
254. Author's Note	2530
255. Contact Information	2540
256. Declaration of Interest	2550
257. Funding Source	2560
258. Data Availability Statement	2570
259. Ethics Approval	2580
260. Conflicts of Interest	2590
261. Author Contributions	2600
262. Supplementary Materials	2610
263. References	2620
264. Appendix	2630
265. Glossary	2640
266. Index	2650
267. Bibliography	2660
268. List of Figures	2670
269. List of Tables	2680
270. Acknowledgments	2690
271. Author's Note	2700
272. Contact Information	2710
273. Declaration of Interest	2720
274. Funding Source	2730
275. Data Availability Statement	2740
276. Ethics Approval	2750
277. Conflicts of Interest	2760
278. Author Contributions	2770
279. Supplementary Materials	2780
280. References	2790
281. Appendix	2800
282. Glossary	2810
283. Index	2820
284. Bibliography	2830
285. List of Figures	2840
286. List of Tables	2850
287. Acknowledgments	2860
288. Author's Note	2870
289. Contact Information	2880
290. Declaration of Interest	2890
291. Funding Source	2900
292. Data Availability Statement	2910
293. Ethics Approval	2920
294. Conflicts of Interest	2930
295. Author Contributions	2940
296. Supplementary Materials	2950
297. References	2960
298. Appendix	2970
299. Glossary	2980
300. Index	2990
301. Bibliography	3000
302. List of Figures	3010
303. List of Tables	3020
304. Acknowledgments	3030
305. Author's Note	3040
306. Contact Information	3050
307. Declaration of Interest	3060
308. Funding Source	3070
309. Data Availability Statement	3080
310. Ethics Approval	3090
311. Conflicts of Interest	3100
312. Author Contributions	3110
313. Supplementary Materials	3120
314. References	3130
315. Appendix	3140
316. Glossary	3150
317. Index	3160
318. Bibliography	3170
319. List of Figures	3180
320. List of Tables	3190
321. Acknowledgments	3200
322. Author's Note	3210
323. Contact Information	3220
324. Declaration of Interest	3230
325. Funding Source	3240
326. Data Availability Statement	3250
327. Ethics Approval	3260
328. Conflicts of Interest	3270
329. Author Contributions	3280
330. Supplementary Materials	3290
331. References	3300
332. Appendix	3310
333. Glossary	3320
334. Index	3330
335. Bibliography	3340
336. List of Figures	3350
337. List of Tables	3360
338. Acknowledgments	3370
339. Author's Note	3380
340. Contact Information	3390
341. Declaration of Interest	3400
342. Funding Source	3410
343. Data Availability Statement	3420
344. Ethics Approval	3430
345. Conflicts of Interest	3440
346. Author Contributions	3450
347. Supplementary Materials	3460
348. References	3470
349. Appendix	3480
350. Glossary	3490
351. Index	3500
352. Bibliography	3510
353. List of Figures	3520
354. List of Tables	3530
355. Acknowledgments	3540
356. Author's Note	3550
357. Contact Information	3560
358. Declaration of Interest	3570
359. Funding Source	3580
360. Data Availability Statement	3590
361. Ethics Approval	3600
362. Conflicts of Interest	3610
363. Author Contributions	3620
364. Supplementary Materials	3630
365. References	3640
366. Appendix	3650
367. Glossary	3660
368. Index	3670
369. Bibliography	3680
370. List of Figures	3690
371. List of Tables	3700
372. Acknowledgments	3710
373. Author's Note	3720
374. Contact Information	3730
375. Declaration of Interest	3740
376. Funding Source	3750
377. Data Availability Statement	3760
378. Ethics Approval	3770
379. Conflicts of Interest	3780
380. Author Contributions	3790
381. Supplementary Materials	3800
382. References	3810
383. Appendix	3820
384. Glossary	3830
385. Index	3840
386. Bibliography	3850
387. List of Figures	3860
388. List of Tables	3870
389. Acknowledgments	3880
390. Author's Note	3890
391. Contact Information	3900
392. Declaration of Interest	3910
393. Funding Source	3920
394. Data Availability Statement	3930
395. Ethics Approval	3940
396. Conflicts of Interest	3950
397. Author Contributions	3960
398. Supplementary Materials	3970
399. References	3980
400. Appendix	3990
401. Glossary	4000
402. Index	4010
403. Bibliography	4020
404. List of Figures	4030
405. List of Tables	4040
406. Acknowledgments	4050
407. Author's Note	4060
408. Contact Information	4070
409. Declaration of Interest	4080
410. Funding Source	4090
411. Data Availability Statement	4100
412. Ethics Approval	4110
413. Conflicts of Interest	4120
414. Author Contributions	4130
415. Supplementary Materials	4140
416. References	4150
417. Appendix	4160
418. Glossary	4170
419. Index	4180
420. Bibliography	4190
421. List of Figures	4200
422. List of Tables	4210
423. Acknowledgments	4220
424. Author's Note	4230
425. Contact Information	4240
426.	

Figures & Tables

Table 0.1 Page nos. per event per newspaper	19
Figure 4.1 Total of Items on Each Event in All Three Newspapers	160
Figure 4.2 Percentage of Total Items Published by Each Newspaper	163
Figure 4.3 Total Items on Each Event in Each Newspaper	164
Figure 4.4 Categories of Items on Jerusalem	166
Table 4.1 Proportion of items in each category of each event: <i>The Times</i> , <i>Guardian</i> and <i>Daily Telegraph</i>	167
Figure 4.5 Types of Authors of Items in All Three Newspapers	169
Table 4.2 Categories of authors of published items (per cent)	170
Table 4.3 No. Of Items Contributed by Correspondents	172
Figure 4.6 Place of Reporting (All Newspapers)	174
Figure 4.7 Location of Items in All Three Newspapers	176
Figure 4.8 Front-Page Items vs. Time (All Newspapers)	177
Table 4.4 Front-Page Items in Each Newspaper (Per Cent of Total)	177
Figure 4.9 Location of Items on the Page (All Newspapers)	178
Figure 4.10 Location of Items in Columns (All Newspapers)	179
Figure 5.1 Proportion of Items per Party 1967-2000 (All Newspapers)	189
Figure 5.2 Proportion of News Items Published per Party vs. event (All Newspapers)	195

Abstract

This thesis is an exploratory study of the representation of the city of Jerusalem in the British broadsheet Press. It examines the published material of three dailies: *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* over thirty-three years. The material is analysed qualitatively and quantitatively according to various events.

The comparison in the thesis is made horizontally and vertically, that is, across the newspapers and over time. The reporting of news about the city and the conflict over it is interpreted as a pattern, the dynamics of change are monitored and the main trends are highlighted.

This study shows that Jerusalem was brought to the news media only by the actors in the conflict over the city. In an examination of what was and was not reported, the study explores the areas of interest and priorities of each newspaper. From a scrutiny of the material published about certain events (covering peace, war, diplomatic crisis and popular uprising), the study discusses the types of presentation of the city made available to the newspapers' readership. It examines the portrayal of the identity given to the city and the depiction of the actors in the conflict in all three newspapers, as well as the range of interpretations of the events reported.

The research demonstrates that various factors affected news production, including the selection and framing of news. These factors could be organizational, professional or external.

Chapter One of the thesis looks at the presentation of the city during and after the Six-Day War in June 1967, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem. It examines the coverage by the three newspapers of the events at that time and compares their presentations.

Chapter Two analyses the material published by the newspapers on the diplomatic crisis over Jerusalem. In particular, it covers the content and effects of the Basic Law passed by the Israeli Knesset in 1980, in which Israel officially annexed East Jerusalem and declared the whole city to be its capital.

Chapter Three examines the presentation of two particularly important events in 2000: the Camp David Peace Summit II and the Second Intifada.

Chapter Four provides a quantitative analysis of the material published during the whole period under examination.

Chapter Five highlights the main trends in the selection and framing of news about Jerusalem. It focuses on the characterization of the city and its identity as an area of diversity among the newspapers.

Chapter Six discusses the factors resulting in the consensus and diversity among the newspapers.

The study concludes that further investigation needs to be made into the factors influencing the presentation of Jerusalem. This research is the initial stage in developing an understanding of an interesting area in the creation of news about a very complicated issue.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my profound gratitude to all those who helped me prepare this thesis.

First of all, I wish to give my grateful thanks to His Highness Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktoum and to the Islamic Research Academy for granting me the Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktoum Jerusalem Studies Scholarship for Young Researchers. This work could never have been written had it not been for this grant. My thanks are also due to Professor Abdel Fatah al-Awisi and Mr Michael Andrews. I should like to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Yassir Suleiman. His guidance and support have been of immense help in the production of this work.

My gratitude also goes to my loving family for their unceasing support and encouragement. My parents, Ismael and Mariam al-Najjar, my sisters and brothers, and my parents-in-law, Izzat and Fatima Zahidah, have always been there for me. Last, but not least, my thanks are due to my loving and compassionate husband, Ahmad Zahidah.

I am most grateful to the journalists whom I interviewed for the interest that they showed in my work and their willingness to help. Particular thanks go to Brian Whitaker, the Middle East editor of the *Guardian*, and to Dr Greg Philo of the Glasgow Media Group for the advice that he gave me.

I also wish to thank the many friends that I have in Edinburgh. Special thanks go to Dr David Coffey for his affection and kind-heartedness; Iman Soliman for her devotion and concern; Ula Dabbagh and Ahmad Hammad for everything that we shared; and to Maria Harissi and Rosalia Casares for the enjoyable time that we spent together.

Introduction

0.1 The Topic

This thesis is an investigation into the portrayal of Jerusalem in three British broadsheet newspapers. It examines the content of the items published in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* concerning the city, comparing their portrayal of it with other possible representations in these newspapers over a period of 33 years.

The study is based on three main aspects of the presentation of Jerusalem in the British Press: (1) the factors that bring Jerusalem to the news agenda, the most influential being drama and the actors' "news promoters"; (2) broadsheet newspapers in Britain portray Jerusalem in accordance with various competing narratives,¹ which are presumably presented in a balanced manner; and (3) the presentation of the city is modified by a variety of factors, such as (a) the access given to the sources; (b) the professional ideology of the news workers; and (c) the routines and policy followed by the news organization in the production of news items.

The patterns of reporting are examined, as well as the diversity of the themes and sources, and the frequency of the frames. The frames are studied per unit and the presentation across units.

This thesis analyses the "message", though not the "sender" nor the "receiver" in the communication process. The sender is examined only in relation to the messages reported.² The selection of messages is discussed, in particular, the quality of those considered acceptable according to the news criteria,³ and the quality of the message that is finally transmitted, as well as the forces influencing the message itself.

¹ "Narrative" here refers to Thomas Roach's interpretation: "Generally, the term is used to refer to the larger discourse as it is documented by broadcast or print journalists." Thomas Roach, "Competing News Narratives, Consensus, and World Power", in Yahya R. Kamalipour (ed.), *The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception* (Lodon: Praeger Publishers, 1995), p.28.

² Denis McQuail, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, 4th edn (London: Sage, 2000) p.304.

³ As presented in Galtung & Ruge's formula for foreign news: J. Galtung & M. Ruge, "Structuring and Selecting News", in S. Cohen & J. Young (eds.), *The Manufacturing of News* (London: Sage, 1973).

News is a primal source of people's vision of the world outside their own experience. The significance of the ways in which the news media depict other countries or groups of people is believed to be self-evident. Moreover, it is argued that the news media influence individuals' perception of the world and its image in their minds.⁴ Schulz states: "One reason for this influence is that, in addition to affecting the issue priorities of the public, mass media is quite likely have an impact on the world vision of a country's élite."⁵ This influence increases when the news concerns people and places that are physically distant from the readers. Hartley suggests that news not only affects readers' image of the "world", but also modifies their "acts" in it, in addition to their "behavior" towards it and to other people in it.⁶

News media are ascribed a political function in any democratic political system. It is the first means by which citizens are informed about their national politics and about international issues. Indeed, David Mervin emphasises the informational role of the news media by stating,

Above all else the media, in their various guises, provide channels of information and means by which that information can be interpreted and placed in context. If the people are to govern themselves in any meaningful sense, they must be reasonably well-informed. They need help in identifying problems, in agenda setting and in weighing policy alternatives.⁷

Hence news media diagnose problems and provide interpretations for the events reported. Not do they inform and "set the agenda", but it is also believed that they have a power to influence any international struggle where public opinion is a factor,⁸ and the power to attract and direct public attention, persuasion in matters of opinion and belief, structuring definitions of reality and conferring status and legitimacy. In other words, news media determine what becomes a "public event"

⁴ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922).

⁵ Winfried Schulz, "Foreign News in Leading Newspapers of Western and Post-Communist Countries." Paper presented at the 51st Conference of the International Communication Association, Washington, DC: 24–28 May 2001, p.3.

⁶ John Hartley, *Understanding News* (London: Methuen, 1982), p.10.

⁷ David Mervin, "The News Media and Democracy in the United States." Vicky Randall (ed.) *Democratization and the Media* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998) p.6.

⁸ McQuail, *MCT*, p. 36.

and what becomes a “nonevent”.⁹ According to Miller and Philo the media “remain central to the exercise of power in society.”¹⁰

In totalitarian regimes, news media are seen as a governmental tool in broadcasting propaganda and advocacy discourses. The issue of legitimacy and news media is relevant to this discussion since the news media are understood to provide discourses by which institutions and groups of people can be legitimised or de-legitimised. Wolfsfeld goes further to propose that “[p]olitical antagonists often initiate political waves as a means of furthering political goals [including gaining legitimacy] and the news media plays a central role in this strategy.”¹¹ Accordingly, political waves bring political issues to the citizens’ attention and encourage them to “engage” in talking and “thinking about political issues”.¹²

However, many scholars argue that even in democracies media work in favour of the state, ruling classes or elites. This model of “hegemony” that the media fulfil suggests that media messages are formulated in a way to support the “status quo” as Gramsci, Giltin and Chomsky propose.¹³ Hence, hegemony is also considered the media’s “political function” in democracies.¹⁴

⁹ Mark Fishman, News and Nonevent: Making the Visible Invisible. In Dan Berkowitz (ed.) *Social Meanings of News: A Text-Reader* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997) p. 210.

¹⁰ Greg Philo & David Miller., Circuit of Communication and Power: Recent Developments in Media Sociology. In *Developments in Sociology*. (London: Causeway Press, 2002) p. 3

¹¹ G. Wolfsfeld., Political Waves and Democratic Discourse: Terrorism Waves during the Oslo Peace Process, pp. 226-251. In W. Bennett & R. Entman (eds.) *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 231.

¹² Ibid., p. 248.

¹³ T. Giltin, *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980) p.67; E. S. Herman & N. Chomsky., *Manufacturing Consent* (New York: Pantheon, 1988) p.54.

¹⁴ L. Huang & K. McAdams., Ideological Manipulation via Newspaper Accounts of Political Conflict: A Cross-National News Analysis of the 1991 Moscow Coup”, in Abbas Malek & Adnan Kavouri (eds.), *The Global Dynamics of News: Studies in International News Coverage and News Agenda* (Stamford, Connecticut: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 2000) p. 60.

It can be argued that this view is not consistent with the media's presumed role as a "watchdog" maintaining and protecting the democratic society.¹⁵ Soloski claims that news media "legitimize" and support the "existing politico-economic system"; in fact, he argues that "it is not true that journalists' selection of news stories reflects a conscious desire on their part to report the news in such a way that the status quo is maintained."¹⁶

The news media's presumed support of the state, elite or ruling class has been attributed to different factors, the most significant being the dependency of the quality news media on official sources in the newsgathering process.¹⁷ Olein suggests that the media are "structurally dependent upon dominant power institutions both for definitions of problems and for information."¹⁸

One of the main debatable issues concerning the relation between news media and politics is the question of "objectivity" and bias. For some scholars, "[p]olitical bias seems sometimes to be the only important issue in the relationship between politics and the mass media."¹⁹ Objectivity is one of the most significant criteria in terms of assessment of the quality of the news and the credibility of the news outlet and news organization as well. According to McQuail objectivity is,

A theoretically contested term applied to news, although in 'common-sense' terms it sums up a number of the qualities that make for trust and reliability on the part of the news audience. These include factual accuracy, lack of bias, separation of fact from comment, transparency about sources, [and] not taking sides.²⁰

¹⁵ Bonnie Brennen & Margret Duffy, "If A Problem Cannot Be Solved, Enlarge It": an ideological critique of the "Other" in Pearl Harbor and September 11 *New York Times* Coverage, pp. 3-14. *Journalism Studies*, Volume 4, Number 1, 2003, Routledge, <http://dandini.ingentaselect.com/vl=1591181/cl=108/nw=1/fm=docpdf/rpsv/catchword/routledge/1461670x/v4n1/s1/p3>

¹⁶ John Soloski., News Reporting and Professionalism: Some Constraints on the Reporting of the News, pp. 138-154. In Berkowitz (ed.) *Social Meanings of News*, p. 143

¹⁷ Leon Sigal., Sources Make the News. In *Reading the News*, Robert Karl Manoff & Michael Schudson (eds.) pp. 9-37 (New York: Pantheon, 1986) p. 18 & Gaye Tuchman., *Making News* (New York: Free Press, 1978) p. 15-38.

¹⁸ C. Olien, & G. Donohue., Media Coverage of Social Movements, pp. 139-163 in C. Salmon (ed.) *Information Campaigns* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989) p. 198.

¹⁹ John Street., *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy*. (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001) p. 15.

²⁰ McQuail, *MCT*, p. 500.

To Entman, objectivity includes practices that “sharply limit the ability of journalists to offer audiences explicit assessments of truth, distortion, and falsehood.”²¹ He considers that objectivity is an unattainable journalistic “ideal”,²² partly, because as a scheme, it refers to criteria that are difficult both to “define” and to “achieve”.²³ Other scholars claim that objectivity was “partially a marketing tool.”²⁴ Fowler suggests that news report is not objective by its nature as a linguistic structure. He states that,

[R]epresentation in a semiotic medium such as language is inevitably a structuring process; that values and implicit propositions are continuously articulated as discourse on a subject proceeds, so that discourse is always representation from a certain point of view.²⁵

Therefore, the media do not simply and objectively report the world, they rather “interpret” the world for us.²⁶ Not only “observability” what we get from news, but also “meaningfulness”.²⁷ According to Ralph Negrine, news values and the considerations of “newsworthiness”, “prioritize events and describe, establish, and reinforce images and relationships of order and power in society.”²⁸

The Arab-Israeli Conflict in the “Western media”:

It is argued that studying the presentation of any of the issues concerning the Middle East in the “Western” or British media requires examining the presentations of Islam since “[t]he media images of the Middle East to a great extent have their roots in the media’s image of Islam.”²⁹ Mowlana suggests that Islam’s image is “distorted” in the

²¹ Robert Entman, *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 22.

²² Ibid., p. 173.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Mark Pedelty., *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents* (New York, Routledge, 1995) p. 7.

²⁵ Roger Fowler, *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press* (London: Routledge, 1991) p. 208.

²⁶ Ralf Negrine., *Politics and the Mass Media in Britain* (London: Routledge, 1994) p. 4.

²⁷ H. Molotch., & M. Lester., “News as Purposive Behaviour: On the Strategic Use of Routine Events”. In Berkowitz (ed.), *Social Meanings of News*, pp.193-209, p. 193.

²⁸ Negrine, *Politics and the Mass Media*, p. 4.

²⁹ Mowlana., Images and the Crisis of Political Legitimacy, pp. 3-15. In Kamalipour (ed.) *The U.S. Media and the Middle East*, p. 4.

West because it is presented in the Cold War and Post Cold-War frameworks. He also adds that the image of Islam is distorted because Western journalists are influenced by their own secular ideology when reporting Islam.³⁰ He argues that Islamic countries and regimes like the Islamic Revolution in Iran resulted in a “Western propaganda” against Islam, as it was presented under labels like “fundamentalism”, “militarism” and “terrorism”.³¹ Thus, Islam is presented in the “Western” media as a “threat” or an “ally against”.³²

Other scholars have argued that Islam is misrepresented in the “west” primarily because it represents a different culture. Malek and Wiegand state that,

It seems that anything not deriving from Western tradition has been, and is still, perceived as inferior and substandard in the Western perception of other cultures.³³

As far as the Middle East is concerned, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one the most reported issues in the British and the American media. In their study of the BBC and ITV news coverage of the conflict, the Glasgow Media Group (GMG) concludes that news on these channels is focused “mainly on images of violence and conflict”.³⁴

In the American media the Palestinians were invisible for some time and then they were presented as “Arabs”.³⁵ During media’s news reports of 1948 and the aftermath this label “Arab” is argued to have “created for the Palestinians a dual image of both aggressor[s], “Arab” armies[and terrorists during the 1970s]-and victims, “Arab” refugees.”³⁶

³⁰ Ibid, p. 4-5&14.

³¹ Ibid, p. 6. & Hamid Mowlana., *The Renewal of the Global Media Debate: Implications for the Relationships between the West and the Islamic World*, pp. 105-118. In Kai Hafez (ed.) *Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World*. Gresskill, NJ: Hampton Press (2000) p. 108

³² Irmgard Pinn., *Right-Wing Movements, Islam, and the Media: the Influence of the Media on Ethnic –Religious Integration in Europe*, p. 89-104. In Hafez (ed.) *Islam and the West in the Mass Media*, p. 92

³³ Abbas Malek., & Krista E. Wiegand., *Islam and the West: Cultural Encounter*, pp.201-211. In Kamalipour (ed.) *The U.S Media and the Middle East*, p.201.

³⁴ Philo & Miller., *Circuit of Communication*, p. 6.

³⁵ R. Zaharna., *The Palestinian Leadership and the American Media: Changing Images, Conflicting Results*, pp. 37-49. In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East*, p. 38-39 & 47.

³⁶ Zaharnah., *The Palestinian Leadership*, p. 39.

Various conditions are believed to have affected the recognition of the Palestinians as a people and their presentations in the international media, particularly, in the U.S and Britain. The Palestinian Intifada of December 1987 and the Oslo Accord in September 13, 1993 are believed to be of the most significant ones.³⁷ However, it is proposed that the Intifada has not significantly changed the American public opinion and its support for Israel;³⁸ rather it is thought to have brought the “conventional wisdom”-of the American public about the Arab-Israeli conflict into question. Before the Intifada the “predominant conception” of Israel in the US and to some extent in Britain was that of a “tiny democracy surrounded by hostile forces and constantly threatened by Palestinian terrorists.”³⁹ Moreover, “David and Goliath has long been the especial metaphor of the Israeli-Arab conflict.”⁴⁰ It can be argued that the dramatic footage of the Intifada not only brought the Palestinian cause into international news outlets but also shifted the framing of their action and their presentations.⁴¹ It succeeded in shifting the “monolithic worldview of good and evil to a relativist consideration.”⁴²

It is also assumed that the Palestinian people and leadership started to take a “human face” in the American media only after the Intifada and the PLO’s call for a “two state solution” for the conflict with Israel.⁴³ Besides other evidence this indicates the possible influence of the Palestinian leadership’s action and discourse on the presentation of the Palestinian people in the media.⁴⁴ Hence, the Palestinian leader Arafat was quoted and stories about the Palestinian people were presented positively.⁴⁵ It is also argued that Israel’s counteractions have had adequate influence

³⁷John A. Noakes & Karin G. Wilkins, “Shifting Frames of the Palestinian Movement in the US News”, in *Media, Culture and Society*, vol.24 (2002) p. 653; Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 22; & Zaharnah., *The Palestinian Leadership*, p. 47

³⁸(Penn & Schoen, 1988; Gilboa, 1989, 1993; Brad, 1989; Safty, 1991) cited in AnneMarie A. Daniel., *U.S. Media Coverage of the Intifada and American Public Opinion*, pp. 62-72. In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East*, p. 63.

³⁹ Daniel., *U.S. Media Coverage of the Intifada*, p. 62.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 66.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 65.

⁴² Ibid., p. 70.

⁴³ Zaharnah., *The Palestinian Leadership*, p. 44-45.

⁴⁴ See Chapter Six of this thesis.

⁴⁵ Zaharnah., *The Palestinian Leadership*, p. 45.

on the news media. After Israel's restrictions on the journalists' access to the occupied territories, its official sources were more quoted and referred to in the news outlets in the US.⁴⁶ This thesis argues that, although Israel's actions have a significant influence over the ways in which not only the Palestinians but also the conflict and the question of Jerusalem are presented in the British Press, the level of this influence varies over the time.

One of the factors worth examining is the efficiency of Israeli bureaucracy in its day to day dealing with the news media in the U.S, Britain and other European countries. It can be argued that such efficiency helps any political actor to get to the news agenda. This can be done by different means including providing feeding the news media with different sorts of publishable material. This material can work as a promotion for particular events and can make them seen as "newsworthy events".

An event must have specific merits to be considered "newsworthy" by the news workers. Events selected for reporting require particular characteristics that are not necessarily relevant to their significance, but rather to their suitability for processing and transformation. McQuail emphasizes this point in the following statement:

Aside from their intrinsic content, some events are more likely to become news than others, because they lend themselves to the formal procedures of gathering and processing which often operate on a 24-hour (or more frequent) production cycle. For this reason, news organisations prefer events that fit a number of criteria related to time, place, and potential audience demand.⁴⁷

News as a source of people's image of the "world" is believed to view the world according to a set of criteria and routines. It is even argued that the news is shaped and forged by the journalists' "professional ideology", which specifies the news criteria and constitutes the basis of what the news workers regard as "newsworthy" and what makes a "good story".⁴⁸ This implies both the selectivity of aspects of "reality" in the news and the transformation of the chosen aspect of the "real world"

⁴⁶ Wolfsfeld., *Media and Political Conflict*; & Wilkins & Noakes., *Shifting Frames*, p. 655.

⁴⁷ McQuail, *MCT*, p.278.

⁴⁸ Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, & Brian Roberts, "Policing the Crisis" in Howard Tumber (ed.), *News: A Reader* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 256; Fowler, *Language in the News*, p. 14.

or a particular situation or event to fit the presentation in the product (news). Normally, not every event finds its way into the news. Hall et al. points out:

The media do not simply and transparently report events which are “naturally” newsworthy in *themselves*. “News” is the end-product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of criteria.⁴⁹

The systematic modifications, which are believed to be applied to any messages transmitted in the news format via the news media, are also believed to influence the content of the news.⁵⁰

In addition to these criteria, for an event to be reported as news, it needs to be promoted by an actor.⁵¹ According to Molotch & Lester, the news “promoter” is one of “three major agencies” constituting an event, the other two being the assembler and the consumer. The event account derived from the event promotion is usually based on the “purpose-at-hand which determines given event need”.⁵² Molotch & Lester assert that each success in promoting an event “closes off or inhibits a great number of event-creating possibilities.”⁵³ Furthermore, they assert that the authority of the *accessed* event promoter influences the particular content of the news as well as other possible versions:

To the degree to which individuals or collectivities have differing purposes, rooted in diverse biographies, statuses, cultures, class origins and specific situations, they will have differing and sometimes competing uses for occurrences. An issue arises when there are at least two such competing uses, involving at least two parties having access to event creating mechanisms. For public issues, these mechanisms are the mass media.

Conflicting purposes at hand lead to competing accounts of what happened or, what is a variant of the same question, to dispute over whether anything significant happened at all.⁵⁴

Consequently, news is not the event itself, but someone’s account of it.⁵⁵ In a political conflict, the news media are hardly seen as a neutral channel for images of

⁴⁹ Hall et al., “Policing the Crisis”, p.249.

⁵⁰ Hartley, *Understanding News*.

⁵¹ Molotch & Lester, “News as Purposive Behaviour”, pp. 196-8.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 197.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp.196–197.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.195.

⁵⁵ Hall et al., “Policing the Crisis”, p. 252.

reality.⁵⁶ There is no fixed way of seeing and interpreting events, for the same event can be seen differently by the opposing parties to the conflict. Therefore, the same event may have more than one account, and the same action has, if not conflicting, then differing interpretations by various participants and witnesses. According to the requirements of objectivity, the news should present all these accounts. As stated above, these accounts are prone to modification. The more closely the account matches the news criteria, the more it is considered acceptable and the fewer are the changes made to it.

In the newspapers, the question of Jerusalem was restricted to the news being reported, which was focused on the conflict over the city. This meant that other events concerning the city were unlikely to be reported. According to Lippmann, "The news is an account of the overt phases that are interesting."⁵⁷ That is why the news presents aspects of "reality" by describing events, which consist of deeds and statements. These deeds and statements have been promoted as events by news actors, who are the "news promoters", as suggested by Molotch & Lester.

Jerusalem is a city of international, historical, religious, political and territorial significance. Politically, it is claimed to be the capital of two states. Geographically, East Jerusalem is at the heart of any feasible Palestinian state, for it divides the north of the West Bank from the south. Jerusalem is one of the most ancient cities in the world. The city has

a unique position in the world as a place sacred to three monotheistic faiths – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. As a result the city was much coveted by kings, emperors, sultans, and presidents, since it provided a divine legitimisation of secular power when legitimisation was and is lacking under regimes without a popular mandate.⁵⁸

The significance of reporting news about the Arab–Israeli conflict and its presentation in the foreign media reached its peak during the Second Intifada (in 2000). Jerusalem was back in the heart of the conflict. Jerusalem is where "divine

⁵⁶ Wolfsfeld., *Media and Political Conflict*, p. 56.

⁵⁷ Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p.9; in Tumber (ed.), *News: A Reader*.

⁵⁸ Michael Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) pp.1–2.

right”⁵⁹ is mixed with national, political and human rights. The way in which the city is presented is of considerable significance, for it could justify an actor’s deed and make it seem comprehensible and therefore acceptable, or condemn it by making it seem improper, illegitimate and therefore unacceptable. News about Jerusalem is important because the legitimacy of any party should be recognized and approved internationally. Consequently, the parties to the conflict need to publicize their messages internationally to gain support – or at least to avoid criticism. This means that they need to “promote” events. The issues about the city are necessarily chosen for discussion at the expense of others. Every aspect of the city’s history or reality which is included or excluded is expected to have an impact on its image, even if this impact was not intended. The international community has not recognized Israel’s control of East Jerusalem since 1967, for this part of the city is regarded as occupied territory. The result is that the two parties – Israel and the Palestinians – have been waging a constant struggle to gain legitimacy over the city and the right to its political control. Historical as well as religious connections are brought every now and then into the public arena to support each party’s claims. Therefore, the religious and historical contextualizations of Jerusalem are important for each party’s legitimacy and rights in the city. The fact that Jerusalem is a “multicultural” and “multireligious” city⁶⁰ produces diverse possible contextualizations and interpretations of its present and its past, which might well overshadow expectations about its future. The situation in Jerusalem is in line with Molotch & Lester presentation of the choices of historical contextualization of news. They propose that:

Pasts and futures are constructed and reconstructed as a continuous process of daily routines. In such constructions an infinite number of available activities are not attended to, and a certain few become created observables. These few become resources – available as practically needed – to break up, demarcate, and fashion lifetime, history, and future.⁶¹

In the promotion of events, it can be presumed that the composition of the “narrative” is not restricted to the past or the future in the creation of an “image”. It is, therefore, to the advantage of any of the parties to the conflict to highlight the

⁵⁹ Menachem Klein, *Jerusalem: The Contested City* (London: C. Hurst, 2001) p. 57.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 9-18.

⁶¹ Molotch & Lester, “News as Purposive Behaviour”, p.194.

periods of history and aspects of reality that support its claims to the city. It is also to its advantage to promote events in such a way as to assure a sympathetic presentation of its cause. The portrayal of each party is crucial to the issue of control over East Jerusalem, including the Old City, which contains the holy places, because of international concern about access to that area by the followers of the three monotheistic faiths.⁶² In support of this argument, Menachem Klein states:

In addition to modulating religious tension, guaranteeing freedom of worship and access to holy sites serves as a political tool for the Israeli government in its struggle to obtain recognition of its sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount.⁶³

Influencing international public opinion concerning Jerusalem had much greater significance in 2000, when the city was described as an obstacle to the peace negotiations at Camp David, and as a motive for “bloodshed” during the Second Intifada.

The two events which begin and end this study each marked a watershed in the history of the Middle East, especially where the parties’ sensitivity to international public opinion was concerned. In the first event, Israel had occupied East Jerusalem as a result of the Six-Day War with Jordan, Egypt and Syria.

In the news about Jerusalem, the use of language, names, descriptions, sources and comments was important in formulating the readers’ image of the city. If Israel’s government and other official sources were more frequently reported on their actions and statements concerning the city or on their answers to questions about this topic, then the connection between Israel and Jerusalem was supposed to be strengthened. If there was a news report that a group of Israelis wished to pray at al-Aqsa Mosque, and the group was described as “Jewish” and the compound as “Temple Mount”, then there would not be any questioning of the legitimacy of the action, nor even any recognition of its problematic nature. The contextualization and decontextualization of the events concerning Jerusalem are important. When decontextualized, actions are more likely to appear strange and incomprehensible. The selection of the

⁶² Although, there were references in the newspapers to the Christian holy places in Jerusalem, it should be admitted that the Palestinian Christians are absent in the newspapers all over the period under examination.

⁶³ Klein, *Jerusalem*, p.60.

historical period when referring to the city's historical background is significant because it suggests a particular set of connections between the city on the one hand and the parties to the conflict or the international actors on the other. This kind of strategy in the news media has been highlighted and questioned by various scholars. Shoemaker & Reese comment as follows:

Media content may be based on what happened in the physical world but it singles out and highlights certain elements over others, and the media's own structural logic is imposed on these elements. Reality is necessarily manipulated when events and people are located into news or prime-time stories. The media can impose their own logic on assembled materials in a number of ways, including emphasizing certain behaviours and people and stereotyping...Rhetorically, people can be portrayed with different labels (freedom fighter or terrorist). One of the most obvious ways media content structures a symbolic environment is simply by giving greater attention (in the form of more time, greater prominence, and so on) to certain events, people, groups, and places than others.⁶⁴

0.1.2 The Newspapers: *The Times*, the *Guardian* & the *Daily Telegraph*:

It is argued that it is part of the British political culture to believe that the British Press is "one of the great instruments of liberty, an independent fourth estate, and the vital defender of public interests."⁶⁵ Then, the newspapers started being financially independent from both the state and the political parties.⁶⁶

Many British historians believed that:

the emergent, free press is also said to have made a vital contribution to Britain's maturing democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century by becoming more responsible and providing the factual information needed for people to make balanced and informed political judgements.⁶⁷

James Curran argues that the period around the middle of the nineteenth century "did not inaugurate a new era of press freedom and liberty: it introduced a new system of press censorship more effective than anything that had gone before. Market forces

⁶⁴ P.J. Shoemaker & S.D. Reese, *Mediating the Message: Theories of Mass Media Content* (New York: Longman, 1991), p.33.

⁶⁵ James Curran & Jean Seaton., *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain* (London: Routledge, 1997) p.1. This is particularly true since the second half of the nineteenth century.

⁶⁶ Roach, cited in Curran & Seaton., *Power Without Responsibility* p.7

⁶⁷ Curran & Seaton., *Power Without Responsibility*, p. 8.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 9

succeeded where legal repression had failed in conscripting the press to the social order.”⁶⁸

The above-mentioned “new system of censorship” was attributed to the profit-orientation and the concentration of ownership of the majority of the newspapers in Britain.

By the end of the 19th century, there was steady pressure towards a more ‘business-like’ attitude to newspaper publishing: newspapers, like all other commodities, would have to succumb to the market and to the logic and practices of business enterprises. This change in attitude to the newspaper had many important repercussions.⁶⁹

It can be suggested that this commercial attitude in the management of the newspapers affected the quality of the newspapers’ contents, particularly with regard to the news. “Sensationalization”, “personalization” and “trivialization” of the news are attributed to this commercialization of the media.⁷⁰

In the twentieth century, the British newspapers were not owned or allied to political parties any more. It is believed that conservative ideas and attitudes are more represented and preferred.⁷¹ This can be attributed to the political orientation of the new “barons” of the press who are believed to be “well to the right-of-centre” with the exception of Robert Maxwell. Furthermore, it is argued that during the 1970s onwards, the owners of the British newspapers lent their support to the Conservative Party.⁷² One of the obvious examples is Rupert Murdoch’s exchange of support with Thatcher’s Conservative Government during the late 1970s and the 1980s.⁷³ This may be seen as a contradiction to Koss’ argument that Murdoch, “whose ‘papers, both in Britain and elsewhere, lurched from one party persuasion to another for reasons that were seldom articulated and manifestly more commercial than

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 9

⁶⁹ Negrine, *Politics and Mass Media in Britain*. p. 45

⁷⁰ McQuail., *MCT*, p. 107. This applies to the news media in Britain, many other European countries and in the U.S.

⁷¹ Negrine, *Politics and Mass Media*; McNair, *News and Journalism*, p. 124, O. R. McGregor., *Royal Commission on the Press*, Final Report (London: HMSO, 1977) p. 99, cited in McNair, p. 126.

⁷² McNair., *News and Journalism*, p. 125.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 126.

ideological.”⁷⁴ The “self-interest” of the media barons and their pursuit of maximizing their profit were the owners’ values and motivation during the 1980s.⁷⁵

Seaton proposes that many of these owners are “interventionists” and not “pragmatists”, as other historians consider them.⁷⁶ Murdoch is known to intervene in the editorials of *The Times* and other newspapers that he owns. He even would come into the newspaper and write the editorial himself as Stafford Summerfield, a previous “long-service” editor of the *News of the World* declares. According to him, Murdoch “wanted to read proofs, write a leader if he felt like it, change the paper about and give instructions to his staff.”⁷⁷

Commercialization of the press and the “self-interest” orientation of the owners of the newspapers can be seen as influential forces when it comes to the news content. Their pursuit of attractive and interesting news can have an influence on the selection and the presentation of the news.

The up-market Press is believed to have a key role in forming an image of other countries and peoples in the minds of the readers and, to some extent, the élite and government officials. It may be assumed, therefore, that it also influences a country’s foreign policy and, consequently, international relations. This view is consistent with Schulz’s argument as follows:

Among all mass media a country’s leading newspapers have a central role in forming foreign images and influencing the character of international relations. The leading newspapers are an important news source of a country’s élite and opinion leaders. Quite often these papers serve as news leaders for other mass media (Larson, 1979), and as such they set the news agenda as well as the journalistic standards of a media system as a whole. For these reasons the leading newspapers may also serve as an indicator of the overall performance, or quality, of a country’s journalism.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Cited in Curran & Seaton., *Power Without Responsibility*, p. 71.

⁷⁵ Curran & Seaton., *Power Without Responsibility*, p. 319.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.71.

⁷⁷ Cited in Curran & Seaton., *Power Without Responsibility*, p. 74.

⁷⁸ Schulz, “Foreign News in Leading Newspapers”, p.249.

According to Hartley, 80 per cent of the newspapers' readership is from "non-manual" socio-economic groups. "Further, the same four papers [namely, *The Times*, the *Guardian*, the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Financial Times*] draw roughly half their readership from the top socio-economic group of businessmen, administrators and professionals."⁷⁹

Noakes & Wilkins go further in their study of the depiction of the Palestinians in the US media. In their view, where other means of access to information about the Palestinians' experience are not available, the way in which they are seen by US readers and the image produced by their presentation in the media does affect their political claims:

As a result, the framing of the Palestinian cause in the US news media plays a central role in how US residents understand and interpret Palestinian injustice claims. In the absence of positive depictions of the Palestinians in the US news media it is extremely unlikely that their political interests will resonate with many in the US.⁸⁰

Moreover, the up-market newspapers are thought to set the news agenda for other news outlets in the country. If any issue is highlighted by the broadsheet Press, it is likely to appear also in other areas of the media. The newspapers chosen for this study represent the country's broadsheet Press, besides being good-quality and highly respected international news outlets. They represent the whole political spectrum: the *Daily Telegraph* the Right, the *Guardian* the Left, and *The Times* the Right of Centre.⁸¹

The fact that all three newspapers were in existence throughout the thirty-three year period was another reason for their selection. The *Independent* was excluded from

⁷⁹ Hartley, *Understanding News*, p.132.

⁸⁰ Noakes & Wilkins, "Shifting Frames", p.649.

⁸¹ Until the General Election of 1997, *The Times*, like all the other newspapers owned by Rupert Murdoch, was biased towards the political Right. However, Rupert Murdoch then switched his support from the Conservative Party to New Labour, as cited by Marsha Jones & Emma Jones, *Mass Media* (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.19–20.

the study because it was not launched until 1986, almost twenty years after the occupation of East Jerusalem, which is chronologically the first event examined.⁸²

For the purpose of comparing the content of the items published about Jerusalem, the selected newspapers fulfil the criterion of sharing the following similarities: (1) All three newspapers are influential and prestigious national dailies with a wide circulation;⁸³ (2) they are published in the capital, London; and (3) it is presumed that they are widely read by government officials and other élites. In the sampling of news outlets for the rationale of content analysis, it is argued that “in comparative studies, the analyst is usually trying to match titles having similar characteristics.”⁸⁴

Moreover, *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* are significant in their own right. An analysis of the content of news items, commentaries and editorials in the newspapers owned by Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black indicates how Jerusalem might be presented in other prestigious and popular news outlets, not only in Britain but also in the United States, Canada, India, China, and European countries such as Italy.⁸⁵ Rupert Murdoch is even known as “the most powerful figure in English language media.”⁸⁶ In the *New York Times*, David D. Kirkpatrick commented on Rupert Murdoch’s personal influence on the policies and content of the news produced by his news organizations regarding the War on Iraq in March 2003:

Gene Kimmelman, a director of the Consumers Union, which is lobbying to preserve ownership limits in the United States, said of Mr. Murdoch: “He has extended the most blatant editorializing in the entire world through his media properties, and that is exactly the example of what we need to worry about when any one entrepreneur owns and controls too many media outlets.”⁸⁷

⁸² *Concise History of the British Newspaper in the 20th Century*, The British Library Newspaper Library: URL:<http://www.bl.uk/collections/nwspapers.html>.

⁸³ For details of the circulation of these newspapers, see Hartley, *Understand News*, p.131; and McNair, *News and Journalism*, p.9.

⁸⁴ R.W. Budd, R.K. Thorp & L. Donohew, *Content Analysis of Communications* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p.25.

⁸⁵ Rupert Murdoch bought *The Times* and the *Sunday Times* in 1980, and Conrad Black bought the *Daily Telegraph* in 1985.

⁸⁶ David D. Kirkpatrick, *New York Times*, 7 April 2003.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Rupert Murdoch's reputation for interfering with the newspapers' editorial policies makes the study of the content of the news even more valuable, for it enables the observer to predict the content of other news outlets owned by the same person.⁸⁸

Unlike the *Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Independent* "are both 'independent' in so far as they are not owned by any of the aforementioned corporations, but by shareholders organised in such a way as to guarantee the editorial integrity of the papers."⁸⁹ In addition, the *Guardian* on the one hand has a reputation of being "critical" and "liberal".⁹⁰ On the other hand, *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* are known to be controlled by individuals: Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black respectively.⁹¹

It has been assumed that the importance of the foreign news in the broadsheet Press in Britain declined in the 1990s. The distance between the page where international news is located and between the newspaper's Front Page can be an indication for the significance attributed to international news. For instance the section about Home News usually occupies Pages 2&3. From occupying Pages 4 and 5 in *The Times* in the 1960s, foreign news was moved to Pages 10–13 in the 1990s, as shown in Table 0.1. Nonetheless, page numbers over the years indicate that *The Times* used to give more attention to international news than did the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*.⁹²

⁸⁸ For further discussion of the influence of the news organization's ownership on the content of news, see Chapter Five, section 5.3, and Chapter Six.

⁸⁹ McNair, *News and Journalism*, p.11; and Greg Philo, Telephone Interview, 12 March 2003.

⁹⁰ Greg Philo, Telephone Interview, 12 March 2003.

⁹¹ Ibid.; Paul Manning, *News and News Sources: A Critical Introduction* (London: Sage, 2001), p.66.

⁹² For further information about the number of pages covering news about Jerusalem, see Chapter Four, section (4) of this thesis.

DATE	<i>THE TIMES</i> (PAGES)	<i>GUARDIAN</i> (PAGES)	<i>DAILY TELEGRAPH</i> (PAGES)
1967–9	4–5	6–9	4–5
1977	5–6	5–7	4–5
1980	4–7	7–9	4–6
1990	8–13	7–9	4–6
1993–6	10–13	9–16	12–14

Table 0.1 Page nos. per event per newspaper

0.2 Data and Methodology

0.2.1 Inductive

The examination begins with analysis of the material to extract and arrange what will be required to answer the questions posed by the study. First, it is necessary to explore how Jerusalem was portrayed on different occasions and under different circumstances in the three newspapers. Second, the influence of the many relevant factors needs to be investigated and mapped.

This is a descriptive study using an inductive approach and designed according to the method defined by Priest: “Inductive logic involves reasoning from a specific case to a general theoretical conclusion.”⁹³ Although the basic inquiry stems from news media theories, there is no intention to prove or refute any particular theory. Nor is any hypothesis stated or examined. The study is an exploration with the aim of developing an understanding of the portrayal of Jerusalem in the British broadsheet Press and an analysis of the factors influencing it.⁹⁴ The project is to outline the characteristics of the varied presentation of the city as well as the sources of the news, and to investigate the tendency of the presentation to change and the dynamics of that change according to different historical and international scenes and different organizational policies.

⁹³ Susan Priest, *Doing Media Research: An Introduction* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996) p.9.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

Deduction is not used in this study, for it is the first inquiry into the representation of Jerusalem in particular in the British Press. Studies to date have concentrated on the reporting of news about the Palestinians, the Israelis, the Arabs, Islam, Muslims and the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁹⁵ Furthermore, the researcher believes that no single theory can provide a comprehensive understanding of the case, so various theories are applied where appropriate.

Another significant feature of the study is its scope in time and content. It examines material published over thirty-three years and covers different types of events which might have provoked changes in the newspapers' presentation and agenda concerning Jerusalem.

0.2.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Methods

In presenting the case, the study combines qualitative and quantitative methods in the analysis of the data. Both approaches are believed to be important in investigating "any real-world problem".⁹⁶

The study of the presentation of Jerusalem entails aspects that cannot be meaningfully examined with quantitative methods, for the case is summarized statistically rather than in verbal form.⁹⁷ "Reductionism" and "simplification", which are said to accompany quantitative analysis, are two characteristics that the researcher has wished to avoid. Therefore, a qualitative analysis is made of the sample.⁹⁸ These two characteristics (reductionism and simplification) have been avoided so as to produce an understanding of the type of presentation selected by the newspapers when reporting on Jerusalem. Shoemaker & Reese support the use of the qualitative method and conclude as follows: "Reducing large amounts of text to quantitative data, however, does not provide a complete picture of meaning and contextual code,

⁹⁵ Sami Musallam, *Zum Araberbild in Der Bundesrepublikanischen Presse Am Beispiel Des IV. Nahostkriges* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat el-Wahdah al-Arabeyah, 1985); Hilmi Sari, *Sūrat al-'Arab fi'l Saḥāfa al Brītāniyya*. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wahdah al-'Arabeyya, 1988); Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How we See the Rest of the World* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985); Edmund Ghareeb, *Split Vision: the Portrayal of Arabs in the American Media* (Washington D.C.: American-Arab Affairs Council, 1983).

⁹⁶ Colin Robson, *Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) p.10.

⁹⁷ Priest, *Doing Media Research*, p.5.

since texts may contain many other forms of emphasis besides sheer repetition (Giltin, 1980).”⁹⁹ In response to the criticism of “subjectivity” concerning the qualitative analysis, a quantitative study is also made of the sample.¹⁰⁰

According to Priest, following a quantitative method simply means to “use numbers”.¹⁰¹ Quantities and ratios do need to be calculated to understand the extent of the newspapers’ interest in the city and the level of the attention given to it, in addition to comparing the newspapers and the news events. A quantitative method uses the number of items to evaluate the attention given to various events so as to highlight similarity and difference. The number and ratio of sources are calculated to discover the level of access given to each of the parties to the conflict. Other calculations are made to evaluate media coverage, including the number of lead stories and the location of the items in the layout of the newspapers. Another aspect of the analysis is the comparison of the proportion of items coming from different cities and countries in the region.¹⁰²

Although the quantitative approach is applied to all the events under examination, the qualitative approach is restricted to four: Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967; Israel’s legislation for Jerusalem in 1980; the Camp David Summit II in June 2000; and the Second Intifada in September 2000.

0.2.2.1 SAMPLE

Sampling is an important technique when applying the quantitative method to research, and it is the “standard procedure of social research.”¹⁰³ It entails “the process of choosing the research units” to be included in the study.¹⁰⁴ Samples are believed “to offer more detailed information and a high degree of accuracy because they deal with relatively small numbers of units.”¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.6.

⁹⁹ Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*, p.28.

¹⁰⁰ Priest, *Doing Media Research*, p.6.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 181.

¹⁰² See Chapter Four of this thesis.

¹⁰³ Sotirios Sarantakos., *Social Research* (Hampshire, UK: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1994) p.125.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p.126.

The unit of investigation in this research is the news item. Both verbal and visual items are counted as units in the study, which encompasses news reports, photographs, comments, analysis, maps and editorials. The sample covers a period of 33 years, beginning with the newspapers' presentation of Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967 and ending with their treatment of the Second Intifada in September 2000.

Budd, Thorp & Donohew state that there is no preferred method of sampling. All methods should be decided in accordance with the study and its conditions: "There is no best sampling plan that can or should be used in all circumstances. Much depends on the problem at hand, the materials with which the analyst is working and the characteristics of the content to be studied."¹⁰⁶

The sample does not include a continuous coverage of the whole 33-year period. It comprises items published about chosen events concerning Jerusalem in issues of the newspapers during the event itself and the days immediately preceding and following it. The inclusion and exclusion of the issues of the newspapers have been determined by the witnessing of one of the events under examination. The sample includes every item about Jerusalem published on any page in all three newspapers during each period.

Two methods have been used to identify the relevance of the items to Jerusalem. Where the city has been the main focus of the event, every single item published during the short period about that event has been considered relevant and therefore included in the examination. The news coverage during that time is believed to illustrate the relationship between Jerusalem and various regional and international news actors. However, in other events where the city has been one of several issues, only those items with headlines containing the name "Jerusalem" or indicating the city have been investigated. The first method is exemplified in the analysis of the diplomatic crisis of 1980, and the second in the news about the Six-Day War of 1967 as well as other events.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Budd et al., *Content Analysis*, pp.21–22.

¹⁰⁷ Further details of the sample can be found in Chapter Four of this thesis.

A qualitative analysis is made of the material published in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* about the four main events. Two of these events preceded the Oslo Accords of 1993, and two took place afterwards. Therefore, it is argued that the sample represents two phases of the conflict over the city. The events prior to the Oslo Accords are Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967,¹⁰⁸ and the Israeli Bill which officially annexed East Jerusalem and claimed the whole city to be Israel's "united and eternal capital" in 1980.¹⁰⁹ The two events following the Oslo Accords both took place in 2000: the Camp David Summit II in July, and the Second Intifada, which erupted at the end of September.¹¹⁰

These four events, which are qualitatively and quantitatively investigated and analysed are chosen to represent different historical and regional circumstances as well as various types of actual events. Therefore, the study examines the newspapers' reporting of news about war, peace, political crisis, and the Intifada.

The study begins with 1967 because Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem marks a historical, territorial, demographic and political watershed in the life of the city and its population. The other event prior to the Oslo Accords was a diplomatic crisis which reverberated around the world and which caused the Arabs and Muslims to be officially recognized and presented as parties to the conflict over the city, a status already accorded to Israel.¹¹¹ The third event to be examined constituted peace negotiations, during which time the reported news discourse was completely focused on the city. Finally, the fourth event was the Second Intifada, which provoked serious consequences that changed the whole scene. It was called "al-Aqsa Intifada" by the Palestinians.

The reporting of other events has been analysed quantitatively. It should be noted that the first three chapters do not include any theories so as to avoid repetition in the mapping of the mainstream news coverage in Chapter Five.

¹⁰⁸ See Chapter One of this thesis.

¹⁰⁹ See Chapter Two of this thesis.

¹¹⁰ See Chapter Three of this thesis.

¹¹¹ Chapter One shows that Israel was presented as the chief actor concerning the city during the newspapers' coverage of the Six-Day War.

To limit the possibility of bias in the selection and highlighting of expressions and terms used in the analysis, the first three chapters have been designed to give a broad and neutral presentation of material that is rich in content and open to interpretation.

These three chapters are devoted to the qualitative analysis, which, at this stage, is essentially a description of the material. Therefore, the theoretical aspect of the research appears at the end of the thesis rather than at the beginning. The description of the material is a normal part of the procedure followed in qualitative analysis, for it is necessary to set the scene where the findings of the thesis are to be developed. According to Priest:

Qualitative data must be presented in a way that appropriately represents what has been discovered. ... for qualitative study use description to communicate research results. Only your verbal descriptions are available to the reader as an explanation of the conclusions drawn. So, putting together a descriptive account is almost inseparable, in qualitative work, from the actual analysis of data.¹¹²

Although various methods are used, the study is largely based on content analysis to answer the questions posed by the research.

0.2.2.2 CONTENT ANALYSIS

Content analysis is seen as “the most direct evidence of what the media actually do.”¹¹³ It is also believed to be,

[for] the most part, open and accessible for study – the most obvious part of the mass communication process – unlike the behind-the-scenes decisions made by producers, writers, and editors and the behaviours of media consumers.

Communications content is of interest not only in its own right, but also as an indicator of many other underlying forces. Studying content helps us infer things about phenomena that are less open and visible: the people and organizations that produce the content.¹¹⁴

Moreover, McQuails argues that:

News content can be used for several purposes including the assessment of the “organizational bias”, the quality of the news as a product, the performance of the news personnel and news organisations, examining of organisational policy, the access and the presentations that are given to

¹¹² Priest, *Doing Media Research*, p.195.

¹¹³ McQuail, “Media Performance Assessment in the Public Interest”, *Communication Yearbook/14*, p.114.

¹¹⁴ Shoemaker & Reese., *Mediating the Message*, p.23.

various social and political groups and institutions, besides other aspects of the news researchers' concerns.¹¹⁵

The content of a newspaper's items helps us to find out what was and was not available to its readers regarding a particular issue or subject. The content of news helps us to answer various questions about the case under examination. Content analysis of the news items clarifies *what makes news* about other countries and peoples. It specifies the newspaper's interests and its priorities when reporting news. At the micro level, content analysis identifies the news sources as well as explaining the overall meaning of the story and its connection to the readership.

Analysing the content of the news items in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* over 33 years has helped to explore the following areas: what makes news about the city, what brings the city to these newspapers' news agenda, and which aspects of the city's reality are considered important enough to be transmitted and highlighted, and which are not. In addition, it reveals whose messages are allowed to pass to the newspaper's readership and it defines their qualities.

The analysis is applied to the material described in the earlier chapters. In each newspaper, it is trended in accordance with the method of reporting and commenting on the events. The content analysis is guided by the content of the items examined. For instance, when there is a tendency to comment frequently on the news, a discussion of this point is included.

The analysis is made at various levels, such as the textual analysis of inclusion and exclusion. Different aspects of the same event are examined, including points of view, emphasis and prominence.

Different techniques were used to search for and collect the data.¹¹⁶ The newspapers' manual indexes and web sites were accessed to search for the news items. The hard copies, electronic copies and microfiches of the newspapers were used to collect material covering the periods investigated in the thesis.

0.2.2.3 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

¹¹⁵ McQuail., *MCT*, p. 327.

¹¹⁶ According to Priest (1996), a technique is a "more specific procedure" that can be part of a particular method, p.5.

Interviews were conducted with journalists, the editors of Middle East or foreign news sections in the newspapers investigated, and correspondents employed by these newspapers in Jerusalem either currently or during the period under examination. However, not all the correspondents could be interviewed owing to limitations of time and resources. Since the journalists are the originators of news content, the main objective of the interviews was to reveal the constraints on their work, the level of their autonomy in collecting information and the strength of their influence over the content of their reports. The results of the interviews could verify or refute the findings of the content analysis.

When information needs to be elicited from journalists, the semi-structured interview is seen as a useful method. It is valued for its “openness”, “qualitative nature”, and for being an “interviewee-guided mode”.¹¹⁷ The semi-structured interview can be used in both qualitative and quantitative techniques.¹¹⁸ Robson (1996) gives the following definition:

[The] *semi-structured* interview [is one] where the interviewer has worked out a set of questions in advance, but is free to modify their order based upon her perception of what seems most appropriate in the context of the “conversation”, can change the way they are worded, give explanations, leave out particular questions which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee or include additional ones.¹¹⁹

However, there is a commonly used middle-ground, based on the semi-structured interviews, “where the interviewer has clearly defined purposes, but seeks to achieve them through some flexibility in the wording and in the order of the presentation of questions.”¹²⁰ Consequently, the style of the interview varied according to the interviewee: the order of the questions, the precise wording of the questions, and the amount of time and attention devoted to a particular topic.

Unstandardized interviews and open-ended questions are used in qualitative research and therefore form part of this study.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Sarantakos., *Social Research*, p.177.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.179.

¹¹⁹ Robson, *Real World Research*, p.231.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.227.

¹²¹ Sarantakos, *Social Research*, p.179.

¹²³ Ibid., p.181.

In quantitative research, however, the telephone interview is a common practice.¹²² It was used in this study owing to the limitations on time and resources, and the fact that many of the correspondents were abroad when they were interviewed. Here, the free-response questions were the basis of the interviews.

0.3 Organization of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One, comprising Chapters One, Two and Three, is devoted to the empirical data. It provides a detailed comparative description of the presentation by all three newspapers of the events concerning Jerusalem, including as much detail as possible to ensure the accurate tracking of the attention paid to the events both quantitatively and qualitatively. The data indicate a variation between the selection of the sources of news and the events considered suitable for

reporting, the contexts, meanings and interpretations attached to the events, and finally, the number of items actually devoted by each newspaper to each event.

Part Two, comprising Chapters Four, Five and Six, focuses on the macro portrayal of Jerusalem via the news reports of the city. It brings news about other events into the discussion, as well as the application of other theories. The aim of this part is to provide a broad and detailed understanding of the presentation of Jerusalem, the conditions affecting the news of the city, and the forces at work in manipulating the news as a final product to give one particular interpretation while ignoring the others.

The content analysis in Part One of the thesis includes the meaning of agenda-setting, and the selection and prioritizing of news. Therefore, the interest or lack of interest shown by the newspapers when a particular event is analysed. The importance of an event or the focus of attention is indicated by the lead story, its headline, length, lead paragraph, and the editorials and commentaries related to it. The analysis of the news items includes a comparison of many of these elements between the three newspapers.

The presentation of Jerusalem, the events connected to the city, and the actors are considered from the descriptive point of view in Chapters One, Two and Three. The diversity of the sources of news is examined as well. These three chapters, in looking at the presentation of the four main events, also give a basic review of the material and a comparison between the three newspapers during the period under examination.

In Chapter One, the news coverage of East Jerusalem and the measures imposed on the city following its occupation are analysed, in particular, the overwhelming dominance of Israel's official narrative of these events. It is suggested that the presence of Jerusalem in or its absence from the news depended on the level of attention that Israel wished to draw to the city and to the arrangement of its administration. The same conclusion can be drawn from an examination of the news about Israel's official annexation of East Jerusalem in Chapter Two, although here, Arab leaders and diplomats generated more news about the city.

Chapter Three analyses the news in the last phase of the period under examination. It reviews the presentation and discussion of the Camp David Summit II and the Second Intifada. These events are the focus of the study, particularly in Part Two, for the following reasons. First, there was a dispute over the news published about these two events. The parties to the conflict, especially Israel, criticized the quality of the news reported about them, accusing the news media in Britain of subjective reporting and being pro-Palestinian. Second, these events took place during the construction of this study, which emphasizes the researcher's awareness of detail as well as the exposure to different news outlets with different agendas. Third, there was the availability of a wide range of relevant material concerning these two events.

Chapter Four draws the overall quantitative picture of the period under examination, including events that have not been covered in Chapters One, Two and Three.

Chapter Five presents the macro picture of the mainstream method of reporting news about Jerusalem, depending on both the quantitative and the qualitative analyses of various events concerning the city. It maps the main trends and charac-

teristics of the way in which Jerusalem was reported most of the time. These trends and characteristics are investigated in the two main stages of news production: the selection and framing of the news.

Finally, Chapter Six looks at various forces influencing the presentation of Jerusalem by the way in which the city is reported and promoted. These factors vary and include the environment of the news organization, such as the news sources and news actors, the standardization of the news as a product based on a range of sets of criteria, routines and procedures that affect the quality and objectivity of the news transmitted. There is also an examination of the influence of other forces related to the news organization and its policy, as shown in the empirical data in the previous chapters.

Chapter One

Reporting News about Jerusalem (June 1967)

Introduction

This chapter examines the British Press reports on Jerusalem and Israeli action in the city during the Six-Day War of June 1967. Particular attention is given to all the published material in the national broadsheets – *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* – between 6 and 30 June 1967.¹ This period was chosen for various reasons, though initially because of the abundance of relevant material in the British Press at that time.

The reporting on Jerusalem during June 1967 was especially important because it was a crucial time for the city. Numerous legal, administrative and physical changes were made concerning East Jerusalem, the holy places and the distribution of the city's inhabitants, and this attracted the first international attention since 1948. It is even believed that only in 1967, after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, did the city become “the centre of Israeli national hopes and aspirations”.²

On 6 June 1967 Israeli forces occupied East Jerusalem, which was Jordanian territory at the time. On 11 June six thousand Palestinian inhabitants were evicted from their homes in the Magharebah quarter of the occupied area. A few days after the human clearance, the whole area was blown up by the Israelis. It was then divided into two sections: a Jewish quarter and a courtyard for the Western Wall. On 28 June 1967 the Israeli Knesset passed the Jerusalem Law, which enabled the Israeli government to annex the newly occupied East Jerusalem and paved the way for further measures to be taken concerning that area. One was the demolition of the wall dividing East and West Jerusalem (al-Mesrara Wall), and another was the expansion of the municipal boundary.

The newspaper material to be analysed is that published under the headline “Jerusalem” or a headline indicating the city, such as “Holy Places” or “Wailing Wall”. The aim of restricting the analysis to only those items containing headlines

¹ See the Introduction for the reasons why these newspapers were chosen.

² Marshal J. Berger & Ora Ahimier (eds.), *Jerusalem: A City and its Future*. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002) p. 11.

referring to Jerusalem is to keep the focus of the study on the city. The initial observation of the newspapers' coverage of the Six-Day War shows that it was intensively reported. Much of this material is considered to be beyond the scope of this study, despite its apparent attraction and interest.

Neither *The Times*, the *Guardian* nor the *Daily Telegraph* published any special items about Jerusalem in that year until 6 June, when fighting broke out between the Jordanians and the Israelis. Following the demolition of the wall dividing the city, Jerusalem was in the headlines only occasionally in these newspapers.³ This could indicate that the city was brought into the news by the conflict.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Each of the first three sections presents the coverage, commentaries and editorials about Jerusalem by one of the newspapers during the Six-Day War. Similarities and differences between the newspapers' coverage and presentations of the events are highlighted and summarized in the fourth section as well.

It is worth mentioning that changes may be made to the organization of each section according to the emphasis and interest of each newspaper examined, as shown in the content of the analysed items. The lack of emphasis on the religious significance of the city in *The Times* meant that it was unnecessary to devote a sub-section to a discussion of it in the first section, in which the newspaper's coverage is studied. However, it is discussed in individual sub-sections in the second and the third sections dealing with the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, these two newspapers gave a particular attention to this aspect.

1.1 *The Times*

³ For example, one brief news item by Harold Jackson, "Role of Pope in Dispute over the Holy Places", *Guardian*, 1 July 1967.

“Anything that happens in Jerusalem, particularly in the Old City, is of worldwide concern”.⁴ This was the opening sentence of *The Times*’ leader about Jerusalem, which was published two weeks after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem. The statement indicates that theoretically the newspaper was concerned about events in Jerusalem and was responsible for informing its readers accordingly.

Between 6 and 30 June 1967, 26 items were published in *The Times*. They comprised news, reports, comments, leaders, maps and photographs under the headline of Jerusalem. The majority of the items were contributed by the newspaper’s correspondents or news agencies.⁵

The Times was interested in reporting, interpreting and justifying the Israeli actions, statements and measures regarding the city. It discussed the measures expected to be taken and their potential effect on Israel itself. Out of a total of 26 items in the newspaper, 16 – that is, 72 per cent of the reports, news items, photographs and maps – referred to the Israeli measures and statements. Eighteen per cent of the items presented the international attitude towards Jerusalem and about 4 per cent the regional view. Fewer than 4 per cent – which means one item – reported on the city’s inhabitants after the Israeli occupation.

On 12 June 1967 *The Times* published a front-page report by its correspondent in Tel Aviv, Charles Douglas, on a meeting held by the Israeli Cabinet the previous day. Under the headline “Bring Down Jerusalem Wall”, it reported a suggestion by David Ben-Gurion that the wall dividing the city be demolished, just a week before the demolition was carried out.

No news was reported about the reaction of the Arab and Muslim countries or that of their leaders to the occupation of East Jerusalem. *The Times* did not present Arabs and Muslims as people having rights and holy places in that area. Moreover, the present-day Islamic places, like al-Aqsa Mosque, were given biblical names such

⁴ *The Times*, 23 June 1967, p. 11.

⁵ *The Times*’ correspondents in the Middle East included Nicholas Herbert and Patrick Brogan, who reported on Jerusalem from the city itself, or Tel Aviv, or sometimes Beirut, during and after the Six-Day War. During the war the newspaper also published news from Reuters and Agence France Presse. See *The Times*, 6, 7, 10, 24, 28, 29 and 30 June 1967.

as the Temple Mount.⁶ The Western Wall⁷ in Jerusalem was called the Wailing Wall.⁸ The new biblical names were used not only in the news items and reports, but also repeated in the comments and analyses.⁹ Elsewhere, captions to the photographs reinforced the new names.¹⁰ However, these names as printed in *The Times* were not internationally recognized at the time, being merely Israeli usage.¹¹ The name of Palestine was not mentioned in the newspaper apart from a reference to “Palestine” in a quotation from a clause in an Israeli law.¹²

Even on the rare occasions when *The Times* mentioned an Islamic place, there was no indication that it was a mosque or a place of worship having any connection with or importance for Muslims.¹³ Nor was there any description of the historical importance or aesthetic aspect of such places.¹⁴ One could argue that this was the newspaper’s policy during the war, when priority was given to political and military action, since other aspects were not seen as “newsworthy”. However, even during that period, *The Times* published many items on Jewish religious activities, such as the half-page photograph on 15 June 1967, showing the Harvest Thanksgiving. In addition, much historical background and description were included in the report on the Israeli shelling of the Crusader Church of St. Anne in the Old City of Jerusalem.¹⁵

The Times was silent on the eviction of the six thousand Palestinians from the Magharebah Quarter on 11 June 1967 and the subsequent demolition of that area until the event was mentioned in a report from Beirut more than ten days later.¹⁶

⁶ Al-Aqsa Mosque was mentioned in the report on the Crusader Church of St Anne, but without any comment or illustration; see *The Times*, 10 June 1967.

⁷ This study makes use of the name the Western Wall because the latter is believed to be a neutral term for the particular geographical area.

⁸ *The Times*, 8 June 1967, p. 1; *The Times*, Diary, 10 June 1967, p. 21.

⁹ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 11.

¹⁰ *The Times*, 8 June 1967, p. 1; 9 June 1967, p. 10; and 15 June 1967, p. 7.

¹¹ See Chapter Five, section 3.

¹² *The Times*, 28 June 1967, p. 1.

¹³ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, Diary.

¹⁴ It should be noted that there was a brief reference to the religious significance of the holy places; see *The Times*, 10 June 1967, ‘Diary’, p.4.

¹⁵ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, Diary.

¹⁶ *The Times*, 24 June 1967, p. 4.

Furthermore, not much attention was given to it, since it was regarded as a doubtful story whose source was two “Arab doctors” who had travelled from Jerusalem to Beirut. On the previous day, there had been a hint of the story in a leader, which discussed what was described as the “ultimately undecided fate of the city”.¹⁷ Evidently, the newspaper knew of the event. It had probably received the report or news item from its correspondent or a news agency before 24 June 1967, when the story was reported for the first time. It can therefore be concluded that *The Times* was not interested in this story. This can be attributed to the fact that events concerning the population in East Jerusalem during this period were not seen as “newsworthy” by the newspaper and hence they were not reported.¹⁸

1.1.1 Occupation

The first news item in *The Times*, under the headline of Jerusalem, was a report sent by Charles Douglas from the city itself on the first day of the Israeli occupation. He described the fighting between the Jordanians and the Israelis around the city and reviewed the current situation. On the same day the newspaper published Reuters’ account, which described the occupation as the end of the division of the city: “Jerusalem now an Undivided City”.¹⁹

Neither Reuters News Agency nor Charles Douglas used the word “occupation” in their accounts. This term was not used in *The Times*’ headlines at all during the last phase of the war nor in the reports directly after the occupation. There was merely a hint in a report by Nicholas Herbert, which was said to have come from “Israel-occupied East Jerusalem”. While Reuters described the Israeli occupation as a “unification” of the city, Charles Douglas used the term “take-over”.

The Times interpreted the occupation as a “unification” of the Holy City, which was a “torn city”,²⁰ and described occupied East Jerusalem as “captured territories”.²¹ From that time onward, the newspaper included much discussion in its

¹⁷*The Times*, 23 June 1967, p. 11.

¹⁸ See sub-section 4 in this chapter and Chapter Five, section 1.

¹⁹*The Times*, 7 June 1967, p. 11.

²⁰*The Times*, 7 June 1967, p. 1; 8 June 1967, p. 1; 30 June 1967, p. 1.

²¹*The Times*, 12 June 1967, p. 1; 28 June 1967, p. 1

news items and reports on the holy places and the Israeli promises of protection for them.²²

1.1.2 Legislation and Annexation

Israeli legislation on Jerusalem was reported in *The Times* under the headline "Israel Legislates for Palestine",²³ omitting to mention the name of the city. It was described as "an incorporation" of the Old City of Jerusalem with the "Jewish sector in a single municipality."²⁴ In the final report the West part of the city was defined as "Jewish", whereas East Jerusalem was deprived of any definition apart from the geographical "East". In addition, the reporter did not attempt to interpret the Israeli action, nor did he make any comment on it. No further details nor information about the historical background of the "incorporated" part of the city was given.

The annexation of Jerusalem was not even allocated a report to itself, but was included in a contribution by Nicholas Herbert from Beirut a day later. Under the headline "Anger over Jerusalem",²⁵ the report described the reaction of President Gamal 'Abd el-Nasser of Egypt and the Lebanese Minister of Information, Mr Michael Edde. In the last paragraph the annexation was mentioned as the "prime cause of the renewed anger". It was the only time that *The Times* presented the Arabs as a party in the conflict over Jerusalem. The reference was brief and named many Arab newspapers as the source of information.²⁶ Only the term "annexation" was used, without any interpretation of or justification for this event, unlike the reports on other Israeli action.

1.1.3 Demolition of the Dividing Wall

The Times' report represented and interpreted Israel's demolition of al Mesrasah Wall dividing East and West Jerusalem, and the motive for this action, in a positive and emotive way. The destruction of the wall by the Israelis was described as a

²² *The Times*, 10 June 1967, pp. 3 & 4; 28 June 1967, p. 1.

²³ *The Times*, 28 June 1967, p. 1

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ *The Times*, 29 June 1967 p. 4.

²⁶ For example, *al-ânw r* (Beirut), *al-Muharar* (Egypt) and *al-Jumh rya* (Baghdad). See *The Times*, 29 June 1967, p. 4.

“further step to unite Jerusalem”,²⁷ and given a positive perspective by the headline “Israel Opens Jerusalem Barriers”. The Israeli action “was concerned exclusively with repairing the ravages and dislocation of city life caused by the war”.

1.1.4 The Two Parties

The residents of the city were rarely mentioned, except when one of the Israeli politicians or military spokespeople wished to highlight a particular point, or when *The Times*’ correspondents wanted to praise the Israelis or their actions in the city.²⁸ In *The Times*’ report on the demolition of Jerusalem’s dividing wall, Mr Teddy Kollek, the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem was quoted as saying: “Within a brief period we hope to establish complete equality between all inhabitants of the city ... We want all Jerusalemites to feel equal.”²⁹ In the same report the correspondent wrote: “With today’s removal of all barriers dividing Jerusalem thousands of Israelis and Jordanians crossed into sectors of the city from which they had been barred for 19 years.”³⁰ Moreover, the Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, were described as “Arabs”, without any indication of their roots, residence, nationality or even property and status in Jerusalem. Occasionally they were referred to as Jordanians.³¹

The two parties were treated differently. The Israeli troops in front of the Wailing Wall the day after their occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem were reported in *The Times* as people “seen sobbing with emotion”.³² Two days later, the newspaper’s correspondent, Nicholas Herbert, referred to the Arabs as the other party in the war and described them as “frustrated people” prone to “inferiority complexes”.³³

The Times did not focus on the controversies of the sovereignty over the holy places and who would control the city. Its reports were confined to the Israeli promises to protect the holy places and the guarantee of free access for the followers

²⁷ *The Times*, 30 June 1967, p. 1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.* See also *The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 13; 17 June 1967, p.12; 21 June 1967, p. 1; 23 June 1967, p.11; 24 June 1967, p. 4.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1; 8 June 1967, p. 1.

³² *The Times*, 8 June 1967, p. 1.

³³ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, Diary.

of the three faiths to their shrines.³⁴ Whenever these promises were discussed in the newspaper, it was also pointed out that the Jews had been forbidden to visit their shrines in the East sector of the city during the period of Jordanian rule.³⁵

The Times also compared the behaviour of the Israeli forces towards the holy places with that of the “Arabs” or the “Jordanians”. The Israelis did not shell East Jerusalem, and even when they did shell the Crusader Church of St. Anne there was a justification, for “it was heavily defended.” On the other hand, the Jordanians had shelled and damaged many Jewish shrines in that part even before the outbreak of the 1967 War. However, the newspaper’s correspondent made no comment on the Israeli shelling of the Crusader Church of St Anne in comparison.³⁶ This item was not placed on the front page or even in the overseas section, but in the News Diary.

1.1.5 International Attitude

The Times’ reports from Washington, New York and Rome described the international reaction to the Israeli occupation of the Holy City. They focused on the opinions of the Pope,³⁷ Vatican officials,³⁸ and the American President, Lyndon Johnson.³⁹ They also included the Israeli argument regarding Jerusalem in the United Nations General Assembly.⁴⁰

On the first day of the 1967 War, *The Times* reported that the Pope appealed to many countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Israel and Jordan, and to the United Nations’ representative in the region, U Thant, to “save Jerusalem”. The Pope’s words in his message to U Thant concerning Jerusalem were quoted in *The Times* as follows:

We express in the name of Christianity the fervent hope that in the unfortunate eventuality of an aggravation of the situation -which we firmly trust cannot ever happen Jerusalem, because of its uniquely sacred and holy nature, can be declared an open and inviolable city.⁴¹

³⁴Ibid, p. 4.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid, p. 9.

³⁷*The Times*, 6 June 1967, p. 4.

³⁸*The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 4

³⁹*The Times*, 29 June 1967, p. 1.

⁴⁰*The Times*, 30 June 1967, p. 4.

⁴¹*The Times*, 6 June 1967, p. 4.

After the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, and the declaration of the cease-fire in the Middle East, the Vatican spokesman's proposal suggesting the revival of the United Nations Resolution 181 was reported briefly in *The Times*. This resolution recommended Jerusalem and other holy places in the Middle East to be made into an international enclave.⁴² More details about the Vatican's proposal were reported under the headline "Refugee Problem" in the same issue of the newspaper. However, the whole report concentrated on the Vatican's attitude, and the refugees were mentioned in only two sentences.⁴³

President Johnson's "call for consultation" concerning Jerusalem, during his meeting with King Hussein of Jordan was also reported in *The Times*. The statement issued by the White House was quoted in this report as follows:

The world must find an answer that is fair and recognised to be fair. That could not be achieved by hasty unilateral action, and the President is confident that the wisdom and good judgement of those now in control in Jerusalem will prevent any such action.⁴⁴

1.1.6 Sources

The total number and the origin of the published items could be interpreted in different ways. They could indicate the newspaper's financial situation, the level of interest in foreign news in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular, the amount of attention given to the different actors regarding the question of Jerusalem at the time, and the significance of the area in its newsworthiness. How were reports compiled? Did the newspaper depend on formal or informal sources of information? Where did the correspondents expect to find their news stories?

Of the 17 reports and news items published in *The Times*, 59 per cent were contributed by correspondents, 23 per cent by news agencies (mostly Reuters), and 17 per cent made no reference to the source of information. Out of the total of these contributions, 29 per cent were reported from Jerusalem, 11.7 per cent from Tel

⁴² *The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *The Times*, 29 June 1967, p. 1.

Aviv, 29 per cent from Washington, New York and Rome, 6 per cent from Beirut, and 1.6 per cent had no indication of their origin.

All the news items and reports from Jerusalem were concerned with Israel's actions and measures. One report covered the war,⁴⁵ and another described the Israeli victory and the occupation of Jerusalem.⁴⁶ These were followed by the talks held by General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Minister of Defence, and other Israeli leaders in front of the Western Wall in celebration of their victory,⁴⁷ the Israeli government's promises to protect the holy places in Jerusalem,⁴⁸ and the new Israeli law enabling the Israeli government to annex East Jerusalem.⁴⁹

The Times' correspondents provided readers with interpretations of and justification for current events as well as suggestions and predictions for the expected Israeli measures concerning the future of the city. The newspaper's main source of information on interpretation and expectation was Israeli officials and military spokespeople. Israel was reported to be the victorious party, whereas Jordan was described as the party that had begun the fighting in Jerusalem. Nicholas Herbert reported in *The Times*: "Israel today thrust deep into the Sinai Peninsula against Egypt, while along her second front with Jordan, a report from the Israeli Command indicated the collapse of the Arab line."⁵⁰ Although the occupied Jordanian cities such as Jenin, Qalqeelya and others were reported in *The Times* as "occupied cities", the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem was presented as follows: "In the divided holy city of Jerusalem, Israeli forces appeared to be in full control."⁵¹

In *The Times'* report about the celebration of Israel's victory in front of the Western Wall, the talks made by General Moshe Dayan and other Israeli politicians were quoted six times. In these quotations terms like "reunited" and "liberated Jerusalem"

⁴⁵*The Times*, 6 June 1967, p. 1.

⁴⁶*The Times*, 7 June 1967, p. 1.

⁴⁷*The Times*, 8 June 1967, p. 1.

⁴⁸*The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 4.

⁴⁹*The Times*, 28 June 1967, p. 1.

⁵⁰*The Times*, 7 June 1967, p. 1. Reuters was the source of this report.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

were used to describe the city after Israel's occupation of its East part.⁵² Brigadier-General Hayyim Hertzog was reported to have addressed the heads of the Christian Churches in Jerusalem concerning the Israeli pledge to protect the holy places in the city. Patrick Brogan wrote from Jerusalem as follows:

Mgr. Benediktos, the Greek Orthodox Bishop, speaking for all prelates there, expressed his gratitude for the General's promises and to the Israeli Army, which had respected the holy places and convents.⁵³

A few days after the occupation, Charles Douglas reported that the Israeli government was expected to keep control of all the "frontier territories, which would present a military threat to Israel". No more information was given in the report about these "frontier territories".⁵⁴ The justification for this action was the military threat to Israel if these areas were not under its authority.⁵⁵ The newspaper also depended on the Israelis' estimate of the damage to the Crusader Church and their justification for shelling the building. In their view, their forces were "compelled to shell the area as it was heavily defended".⁵⁶ Finally, the discussion in the Israeli Cabinet, its decision to take a "hard line" in the peace negotiations on the status of Jerusalem, its point of view of and justification for this action were described by Charles Douglas.⁵⁷ All these news items were reported from Tel Aviv. Moreover, it seems that *The Times*' correspondents were passing messages on behalf of the Israeli politicians to their readership and to international public opinion. In the celebration of the Israeli triumph in the war General Dayan was quoted in *The Times*' report as follows:

[S]peaking calmly to the ranks of troops, many of whom were seen sobbing with emotion, General Dayan added: "To our Arab neighbours we offer even now -perhaps more firmly now- our hands to peace."⁵⁸

In fact, *The Times* seemed to have been largely dependent on the Israelis for news of the city. However, the newspaper did publish one report contributed by Arab

⁵²*The Times*, 8 June 1967, p. 1. Reuters was the source of this report.

⁵³*The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 4.

⁵⁴ Presumably, in using the term "frontier territory", the Israeli officials meant the land that had been taken from Jordan in the war, though this was not clarified in the report.

⁵⁵*The Times*, 7 June 1967, p. 1.

⁵⁶*The Times*, 10 June 1967, Diary.

⁵⁷*The Times*, 12 June 1967, p. 1.

⁵⁸*The Times*, 8 June 1967, p. 1.

sources. It was about the food shortage in Jerusalem, and it contained a discussion of the statements made by the Arab doctors, Osama Khalidi and Najib Abu Haidar, at the Press conference. On the reported Israeli shelling of the Augusta Victoria Hospital, the correspondent commented:

The men, who were working at the Augusta Victoria Hospital for a sabbatical year, described their experiences in the Hospital under fire from the Israelis. They claimed that there were only a dozen Jordanian soldiers in the area and they were convinced that the Israelis were for some reason trying to burn the Hospital.⁵⁹

1.1.7 Focus of Attention

As *The Times* correspondents reported Israeli action in Jerusalem, so they quoted Israeli politicians in their contributions. The newspaper's analysis of and comment on the situation depended on the Israeli politicians, official talks and the Israeli government's public statements.⁶⁰

During the period under examination here, the newspaper published two articles under the headline of Jerusalem. The first appeared a few days after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, and examined the possibility of the internationalization of the Holy City in the light of the latest changes.⁶¹ Although the article was headed "The Case of an International Jerusalem", it began by quoting General Moshe Dayan's words at the Western Wall, which were interpreted as the declaration of Israel's intention to keep the city under Israeli control. Moreover, the event was described as a "moment of intensive and understandable emotion."

Another Israeli action was treated in a similar way in the same article, namely, the eviction of the six thousand residents of the Magharebah Quarter in East Jerusalem: "Arab families have been evicted from some of the houses in the Old City to make room for Israeli families. This is understandable."⁶² According to *The Times*'

⁵⁹ *The Times*, 24 June 1967, p. 4.

⁶⁰ The reasons for this trend are discussed in Chapter Two.

⁶¹ E. C. Hodgkin, "The Case for an International Jerusalem" inc. map, *The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 11.

⁶² *The Times*, 23 June 1967, p.11

analysis, the Jordanian government was responsible for the continuation of the refugee problem.⁶³ The writer continued:

Outside the Old City, the Arabs, Muslim and Christian, still live. Many of the richer ones have left, and many more may be expected to leave now that they have been officially told that collaborating with the occupying Israelis will be treated as a traitor. It may be doubted whether the Jordanian government was wise to make this ruling.⁶⁴

It seems that *The Times*' article was more concerned with interpreting and justifying Israeli actions than with discussing the possibility of the internationalization of Jerusalem. This article began by giving an interpretation of General Dayan's speech at the Israeli troops celebration in front of the Walling Wall. It was commented as follows:

Speaking at the Walling Wall on Wednesday, with the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Eshkol, by his side, General Dayan said: "We have returned here never to part with Jerusalem". It was a moment of intense and understandable emotion. Exclusion of Jews from the old city, where the last surrounding stones of Herod's Temple had for centuries been a place of mourning and pilgrimage.⁶⁵

1.1.8 Investigation

The Israeli interpretation of events was predominant in *The Times* during the period under examination. Israeli politicians such as Abba Eban, Moshe Dayan, David Ben-Gurion, Hayyim Hertzog and others were widely quoted in the newspaper's news items and reports.⁶⁶ *The Times*' report about the Israeli shelling of the Crusader Church in East Jerusalem was not followed by any comment.⁶⁷ Indeed, the news stories in *The Times* were seldom investigated. One example of an investigation was to find an excuse for the Israeli shelling of the Augusta Victoria Hospital in East Jerusalem. It was asserted that the existence of a strong Jordanian military position near the Hospital was the reason why the "main Israeli attack was launched at [it]".⁶⁸

1.1.9 Conclusion

⁶³ *The Times*, 23 June 1967, p. 11

⁶⁴ *The Times*, 23 June 1967, p. 11.

⁶⁵ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 13.

⁶⁶ For example, *The Times*, 8 June 1967, p. 1; 10 June 1967, p. 3; 12 June 1967, p. 1; 21 June 1967, p. 1; 28 June 1967, p. 1; 30 June 1967, p. 4.

⁶⁷ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, Diary.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

From the analysis of *The Times* reporting on Jerusalem during June 1967, it can be concluded that the newspaper's correspondents depended mainly on the official Israeli sources for their information and news stories about events in the city. Consequently, high proportion of the news and discussions concentrated on Israel's celebrations, measures and statements.

Unlike the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, *The Times* reported a considerable amount of international news. However, it depended on American and Vatican officials in its reports about the international moves concerning Jerusalem.⁶⁹ The Arab leaders were seldom quoted regarding Jerusalem, and the Palestinian Muslim and Christian residents of that city were rarely even mentioned.

1.2 *Guardian*

The *Guardian* reported the most prominent events in Jerusalem during June 1967: the occupation, legislation, annexation, and demolition of the dividing wall. Moreover, it reported every Israeli statement or declaration during the last phase of the war, from the general declaration of the occupation of East Jerusalem⁷⁰ to the destruction of the wall dividing the East and West sides of the city.⁷¹ Local events were also given attention, such as the Israeli government's census of East Jerusalem.⁷² One report described the Jordanian shelling of the "Israeli sector" of Jerusalem and included a detailed map.⁷³

Between 6 and 30 June 1967 two long articles were published in the newspaper. One described the Jewish Feast of Shavuoth and contained much Israeli terminology, particularly religious expressions and information. The Feast itself was defined as a celebration of "the days of giving laws to Moses".⁷⁴ The *Guardian's* Middle East correspondent, Harold Jackson, wrote:

They [the Jews] arrived at the newly cleared concourse before the wall with tears streaming down. They leaned their foreheads against its uncomfortable

⁶⁹ *The Times*, 29 June 1967, p. 1, and 6 and 10 June 1967, p. 4.

⁷⁰ *Guardian*, 7 June 1967, p. 9.

⁷¹ *Guardian*, 30 June 1967, p. 1.

⁷² *Guardian*, 19 June 1967, p. 9.

⁷³ *Guardian*, 7 June 1967, p. 9.

⁷⁴ *Guardian*, 15 June 1967, p. 9.

bulk... Some sang their praises loud; others stood silently mouthing the sacred Hebrew texts that this wall has heard since 520 B.C. ... And all along its length the Chassidim bowed and jiggled their piety... Jerusalem was returned to Judah, and the right arm of the Lord could rest.⁷⁵

The other article reported the eviction of the Palestinian residents from their homes in the “Old Jewish Quarter” in the Old City.⁷⁶ The *Guardian* was the only broadsheet daily of the three analysed in this study to cover the event.

The *Guardian* published more visual material about Jerusalem, such as photographs and maps, as well as pictures by Papas, the newspaper’s artist. Unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian* provided its readers with much more detail and background information on the city’s daily life and culture. One illustrated map cited the main areas of Jerusalem, including Mount Scopus, the Western Wall, the Holy Sepulchre, Damascus Gate and Jabal el-Mokaber.⁷⁷ The *Guardian* also published a series of sketches by Papas depicting the cease-fire, Jerusalem, the Old City of Jerusalem, the Wailing Wall, and Mea Sherim. The pictures of Jerusalem included the Damascus Gate, al-Aqsa mosque, the Mount of Olives, Mount Zion, and Mea Shearim in addition to the Knesset building, the Hebrew University, New Hadasa and others.⁷⁸ This indicates Papas’ considerable familiarity with Jerusalem, besides the newspaper’s interest in visualizing the city.

However, Harold Jackson demonstrated an even greater knowledge of the area. In one of his reports on the forthcoming Israeli measures regarding the occupied territories, he wrote: “The assumption is that Israel is likely to try to hold on to the main through route from Jenin to Jerusalem and then south through Bethlehem and Hebron to Beersheba.”⁷⁹

1.2.1 Occupation

The *Guardian* produced a positive presentation and interpretation of the Israeli government’s actions and policies in Jerusalem, including the occupation. The

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ *Guardian*, 19 June 1967, p. 9.

⁷⁷ *Guardian*, 6 June 1967, p. 1.

⁷⁸ *Guardian*, 24 June 1967, p.

⁷⁹ *Guardian*, 12 June 1967, p. 1.

occupation itself was reported with a quotation from Brig.-Gen. Hayyim Hertzog's speech to the Israelis on the eve of the Israeli victory. Under the heading of "A Dream Come True", the report began with a description of Brig.-Gen. Hertzog's "tense voice" and his words about the realization of the Jewish dream which had been "sustained for 2,000 years". The report continued with the quotation: "The clock of history is advancing and we are all living it." Readers were treated to a historical description of the city as if to legitimize the Israeli occupation of its East part. In his speech, Brig.-Gen. Hertzog referred to the "Old City of Jerusalem" as "the capital of the Jewish kings from the time of David".⁸⁰

The following day the occupation was described in the *Guardian* as a "capture", and Brig.-Gen. Hertzog, who became the Military Governor of the occupied territories including Jerusalem after the war, was quoted as saying: "The Israeli defence forces today liberated Jerusalem. We have reunited the Holy City." Harold Jackson reported the Israelis' celebration of their "victory" under the headline "Dance of Praise and Thanks at the Wailing Wall": "But the war was won and the holiest monument of Judaism was once more available to the faithful...who poured through the gates from early morning."⁸¹

Following the end of the war, there were numerous news items covering Israeli festivals and celebrations of the occupation of East Jerusalem, especially the Western Wall. These reports began with a front-page news item about the Israeli troops and Gen. Dayan's celebration of their victory in front of the Wailing Wall the day after the occupation.⁸² A few days later, the *Guardian's* current correspondent in Tel Aviv, Terence Prittie, wrote an informative article, in which he returned to the writings of Moses Maimonides, the twelfth-century Jewish thinker, who defined what Terence Prittie called the "ten degrees of sanctity" of the "land of Israel" – and especially the Western Wall. Although these ten degrees were not clearly defined in the article, readers were provided with some reasons for the sanctity of the "Jewish Jerusalem":

⁸⁰ *Guardian*, 8 June 1967, p. 1. The source of this item was Reuters news agency.

⁸¹ *Guardian*, 15 June 1967, p. 9.

⁸² *Guardian*, 14 June 1967, p. 9.

Jerusalem was more sacred than any other city because of the special fulfilment there of the laws. In Jerusalem a dead person had to be buried on the day of death, a custom still observed in present-day Jewish Jerusalem.⁸³

The article continued to explain the significance of Jerusalem for the Jews: “Three times a day Orthodox Jews the world over and for the past 2,000 years have prayed: ‘And to Jerusalem, the city, return in mercy, and dwell therein ... rebuild it soon in our days as an everlasting building.’” Other Jewish prayers concerning Jerusalem and the Temple Mount were also included in this article.

Nevertheless, the report was not purely spiritual, for it contained political references. Prittie quoted General Dayan’s statement of the impossibility of the “re-division” or the separation of the Old City from Israel “again”. It was a kind of transformation of the Jews’ religious rights into political rights and gave Israeli action in the city a spiritual character. It would indeed be asked whether the last article in the *Guardian* represented the Israeli position towards Jerusalem.⁸⁴

In the same article, Terence Prittie criticized the suggestion to internationalize Jerusalem, describing it as an “observers’ idea”, meaning that it was created not by a UN resolution,⁸⁵ but merely by “observers”, although these observers were not identified. In his view, the “observers” ignored “the emotional and the symbolic significance of the Old City of Jerusalem to Israel and to the whole Jewish people”, and then he went on to clarify the religious “significance”, by quoting from Jewish prayers concerning Jerusalem.⁸⁶ Clearly, Prittie was arguing against the internationalization of Jerusalem, while preferring to keep Jerusalem “united” under Israel’s control.

1.2.2 Legislation and Annexation

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ The factors governing the reporting on Jerusalem are discussed in chapter 2.

⁸⁵ Ref. UN Resolution 181(II) dated 29 November 1947, which defined Jerusalem as an “International Zone”.

⁸⁶ *Guardian*, 14 June 1967, p. 9.

According to the *Guardian*'s account, the Israeli legislation⁸⁷ which enabled Israel to annex occupied East Jerusalem was paving the way for the merger of the two parts of the city. No comment was included.⁸⁸ The only interpretation was presented as follows: "The Israeli parliament today passed three laws that observers said would enable Israel to incorporate the Old City of Jerusalem with the Jewish sector in a single municipality."⁸⁹

The concept of internationalization was attributed to the unidentified observers, who thought that the Israeli government intended to reinforce its control of the Old City, especially the holy places.⁹⁰

The *Guardian* presented a wide context for the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. One could expect to read in the newspaper about a sharp reaction from foreign countries to the Israeli action. Expressions such as "incorporation" and "merger" were used in addition to "annexation", and the newspaper's view was that "Jerusalem was the Israelis' greatest prize in the war."⁹¹

1.2.3 Demolition of the Dividing Wall

The Israeli destruction of the wall dividing the East and West sides of Jerusalem was reported in the *Guardian* as a "reunification" of the city with the result that "thousands of Jews and Arabs streamed both ways through the Mandelbaum Gate". The *Guardian*'s correspondent, Eric Silver, went on to describe the benefits of the event in greater detail: "It was like a great Bank Holiday of sightseeing. Gangs of excited, smiling boys led the way into the Jewish new town." There was no reference in the report to whoever was responsible for the demolition. It was simply stated at the beginning: "The barriers came down at noon today in this reunited city."⁹²

1.2.4 The Two Parties

⁸⁷ The first law –according to *The Time*– authorized the Israeli government to apply Israel law and administration to "any area in Palestine". The second assured freedom of access to Jerusalem's holy places by members of all religions. And the third authorized the government to extend the area of municipal Jurisdiction.

⁸⁸ *Guardian*, 28 June 1967, p. 1.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, ref. Reuters' report.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Guardian*, 30 June 1967, p. 1.

News about East Jerusalem focused on the Israeli actions and policies in the city. The first news item about Jerusalem during the period under examination reported the Israeli government's official statement about its occupation of East Jerusalem as follows: "In a voice tense with emotion an Israeli General tonight told the nation that a dream which had sustained Jews for 2,000 years had come true and Israelis knew he meant the capture of the old city of Jerusalem." Then the report went on to quote the General's own words.⁹³ The second report in the *Guardian* covered the Israeli casualties in West Jerusalem, caused by the Jordanian forces' shelling of the city according to the official Israeli account.⁹⁴ This was followed by a description of the Israeli victory and complete occupation of East Jerusalem.⁹⁵ A few days later, Harold Jackson reported the Jews going to the Western Wall to celebrate their victory in the war, and to give thanks at the holy shrine.⁹⁶ Israel's census of East Jerusalem was reported in the *Guardian*.⁹⁷ Then, the newspaper focused on the Israeli legislation concerning Jerusalem, the annexation of East Jerusalem, and other news.⁹⁸

Reference to the Arabs was made only where they were the other party in the battle with the Israelis, or to complete a news story about the Israelis. The few statements in which Arabs were mentioned gave no details about them as residents of Jerusalem. In a description of the end of a battle between the two sides, it was stated: "Arab bodies were strewn over roads in the Old City."

Another example shows that while the Israelis were characterized during the war by their attitude towards Jerusalem and their reverence for it as a holy city, the Jordanians lacked that respect for the holy places and the desire to protect them.⁹⁹

On various occasions the *Guardian* followed the Israeli lead in referring to the residents of the city. General Dayan's speech to the Israeli troops at the Western Wall was reported, including his pledge: "He promised that the rights of Arabs now

⁹³*Guardian*, 7 June 1967, p. 9. The report was headed "A dream come true...". It repeated the Israeli General words.

⁹⁴*Guardian*, 7 June 1967, p. 9.

⁹⁵*Guardian*, 8 June 1967, p. 1.

⁹⁶*Guardian*, 15 June 1967, p. 9.

⁹⁷*Guardian*, 27 June 1967, p. 7.

⁹⁸*Guardian*, 28, 29 and 30 June 1967, p. 1.

⁹⁹*Guardian*, 8 June 1967, p. 1.

under the flag of Israel would be fully protected.”¹⁰⁰ The “Arabs”, meaning the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, were given the description of “population” in only one report on the Israelis’ hopes to gain the Arabs’ confidence in “western Jordan”.¹⁰¹

1.2.5 Religion and Culture

Unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian* gave more attention to the religious aspects of Jerusalem.¹⁰² Of the 21 articles, reports and comments published in the newspaper between 6 and 30 June 1967, 9 referred to religion. Papas, the newspaper’s artist, contributed four drawings from Jerusalem, depicting the “Walled City” and the “Jewish ultra-Orthodox quarter in East Jerusalem, Mea Sherim”. These were included in an explanatory article about Judaism, Jewish customs and the holiness of the city in this religion. The same article also contained references to the significance of the Old City of Jerusalem for the Christians and Muslims. However, briefly, the writer gave the following explanation:

The Holy City... for the Jews it is King David’s capital, the city where King Solomon built his temple, the home that Jews remembered during their exile in Babylon and in the later Diaspora...For the Christians it is the scene of Christ’s trial, passion, crucifixion, and resurrection, and of the birth of Church at the first Whitsuntide, ...For Muslims it is the place where their patriarch Abraham was ordered by God to sacrifice his son Isaac; and from the same spot where the Dome of the Rock has stood for nearly thirteen centuries, Muhammad ascended into heaven by the horse Borak.¹⁰³

The *Guardian* published a three-column report by Harold Jackson under the headline “Dance of Praise and Thanks at the Wailing Wall”. In it the correspondent focused on explaining the religious “value” and “meaning” of the “Mount of Zion” in Judaism, and in presenting the Jewish feelings, songs and texts about Jerusalem. The report began by describing the “thousands of Jews” going to the “Wailing Wall” to celebrate the “return of the Old City of Jerusalem” into their hands. Then it went on to examine the impact of the war on the city. Harold Jackson finished his report with

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹*Guardian*, 28 June 1967, p. 15.

¹⁰² This difference between the *Guardian* on the one hand and *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* on the other is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, section 3. ¹⁰²*Guardian*, 10 June 1967, p.6.

¹⁰³*Guardian*, 10 June 1967, p.6.

a portrait of the Jewish pilgrims performing their prayers in front of the Western Wall.¹⁰⁴ A few days after the occupation of the Old City, Terence Prittie wrote an article about the religious and historical importance of the Wailing Wall in Judaism.¹⁰⁵ The article was headed “Wailing Wall – Apex of Sanctity and Jewish Hopes”.¹⁰⁶

1.2.6 Sources

Of all the items published in the *Guardian*, 71 per cent mentioned the source of the information. Half were contributed by the newspaper’s correspondents, and half by news agencies, especially Reuters and the United British Press. About 14 per cent of the news items and reports were sent from Jerusalem, 14 per cent from Tel Aviv and 14 per cent from Rome and the Vatican.¹⁰⁷

Out of the 28 recorded sources of information about Jerusalem, there were 22 references to the Israelis¹⁰⁸ and three references to the Arabs: “Arab families claimed”,¹⁰⁹ “Arab suburbs”¹¹⁰ and an “Arab said”.¹¹¹ One reference was to “observers”,¹¹² another to U Thant, the United Nations delegate to the Middle East during the war.¹¹³ The third reference was to Mr Aiken, the Irish Foreign Minister, demanding at the United Nations a complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the “occupied territories”.¹¹⁴

The *Guardian* did not receive any particular reports or news items from its correspondent in Jerusalem during the first few days of the occupation. It depended

¹⁰⁴*Guardian*, 15 June 1967, p. 9.

¹⁰⁵ For more details about the article, see above, sub-section 2.1 of this chapter.

¹⁰⁶*Guardian*, 14 June 1967, p. 9. For more information about this article, see above.

¹⁰⁷ The significance of the Jerusalem question to the Vatican is based on its support for the internationalization of the city by the UN. This view is shared by several Roman Catholic countries who are members of the UN according to Michael Dumper *The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

¹⁰⁸*Guardian*, 12 June 1967, p. 9; 13 June 1967, p. 1; 15 June 1967, p. 9; 19 June 1967, p. 9; 24 June 1967, p. 7; 26 June 1967, p. 7; 28 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹*Guardian*, 19 June 1967, p. 9.

¹¹⁰*Guardian*, 28 June 1967, p. 1.

¹¹¹*Guardian*, 19 June 1967, p. 9.

¹¹²*Guardian*, 28 June 1967, p. 1.

¹¹³*Ibid.*

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*

on Reuters News Agency until 10 June 1967, when Papas sent a report and photographs from the city. Again, unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*'s correspondents, the *Guardian*'s correspondents depended not only on formal sources of information, but also on informal sources from the ordinary people. They reported what was happening in the streets. Harold Jackson wrote after the end of the war: "There is still a large number of burned-out cars and other rubble lying in the streets", and then went on to describe the streets and daily life in Jerusalem.¹¹⁵

Another report dated 12 June 1967 from the same correspondent contained more details of the people: "Then people poured out into the streets for weekend walks and cars reappeared to jam the streets...." He added: "If the speed of this war has been startling, the speed of the return to peace is completely baffling."¹¹⁶

1.2.7 Investigation

Unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian* published a report sent by the United British Press from Jerusalem. It described the eviction of eighty Arab families from their homes in East Jerusalem and included investigation, historical background and geographical information.

This report demonstrated more detail of and interest in the Arab residents of Jerusalem, more investigation of the news stories and apparent ability to communicate with people. It was headed "Arabs are 'Evicted' in Jerusalem". This report was the only report published in the three newspapers in June 1967 whose text showed a connection between the "Arabs" and their status in the city: "Last week the

Israeli authorities cleared away a large number of Arab houses built near the Wailing Wall and created in their place a large square to accommodate Israelis going to the Wall to pray."¹¹⁷ It was clear that the reporter had collected and investigated the

¹¹⁵*Guardian*, 15 June 1967, p. 9.

¹¹⁵*Guardian*, 12 June 1967, p.1.

¹¹⁶*Guardian*, 12 June 1967, p.1.

¹¹⁷*Guardian*, 19 June 1967, p. 9.

material for the story by talking to the ordinary people. After describing the event and referring to Israel's formal response, he added:

It appeared from a tour of the area that considerably more than 80 families were involved and that the Arabs were not leaving of their own free will.¹¹⁸
... Many said that they would move in with relatives in other parts of the city, but others said that they had no place to go.¹¹⁹

Moreover, the report included historical background and geographical information. "No Jews have lived in the old Jewish quarter since the city was divided in 1948 ... the old Jewish quarter is located on Mount Zion, near the Wailing Wall."¹²⁰ This was the only report in the three newspapers during this period to have contradicted information provided previously by official Israeli sources. This contradiction was the Palestinian families' "claim" that they had been given 48 hours' notice by the Israeli authorities to leave their homes, despite the official Israeli denial of this action. The Israeli government spokesman was quoted as stating: "There is absolutely nothing to it." However, the account given by the spokesman of the Israeli army contradicted that of the Israeli government. The report continued: "An Israeli army spokesman said that about 80 families who had been living in synagogues and had desecrated them were being moved."¹²¹

1.2.8 Focus of Attention

Although the *Guardian* informed its readers of the multi-religious atmosphere of Jerusalem, it continued to reiterate and emphasize Jewish rights and beliefs regarding the East part of the city. Reference was made to the Jordanians preventing the Jews from visiting "their shrines" in the Old City before 1967. The description of the Jewish celebrations of the "unification" of Jerusalem included the statement: "there were the old and the middle-aged whose flames still burned after 19 years' separation."¹²²

¹¹⁸ *Guardian*, 12 June 1967, p. 9.

¹¹⁹ *Guardian*, 19 June 1967, p. 9.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Guardian*, 19 June 1967, p. 9.

¹²² *Guardian*, 12 June 1967, p. 1; 15 June 1967, p. 9; 19 June 1967, p. 9; 30 June 1967, p. 1.

There was also repetition of other pieces of information such as the Jordanians' "randomly" or "blindly" shelling the "Israeli sector" of Jerusalem, the Israelis' concern about the holy places in the East sector during the fighting,¹²³ and their guarantee of free access to them after the war.¹²⁴

The most descriptive article was about the Orthodox Jewish quarter, Mea Sherim,¹²⁵ in West Jerusalem. Papas wrote as follows:

Its inhabitants dress and act in the ways of the ghettos of Europe around the turn of the century. Synagogues and schools saturate the quarter. The rumbling of prayers can be heard at every other alley and doorway. The predominant colour is black: black frock coats, black hats, even black beards. Young and old grow their hair long on the sides and curl them.¹²⁶

This depiction was followed by Papas' comments:

In the guides Mea Sherim is described as the most picturesque part of Jerusalem. I found it the most depressing. It was not the notices. Nor the people-they had character, even the youngest side-curved toddler. Nor the fact that tourists have had their cameras and portables smashed by angry inhabitants. Maybe it was the tinge of backwardness and poverty that clung to the streets, or the word ghetto.¹²⁷

Despite the critical nature of the *Guardian's* article, it was clear from its length that attention was focused on the Jews, their residence and their lifestyle in Jerusalem. A whole page was devoted to Papas' contribution, of which three long columns described the "Jewish quarter", and only one paragraph informed readers of the holy sites of other religions in the city. Moreover, this paragraph was placed at the end of the article. However, although Papas' article demonstrated a detailed interest in the culture and daily life of the Jews in that quarter, no interest was shown in any Arab, Islamic or Christian aspects or customs, not even for the sake of comparison.

1.2.9 Conclusion

¹²³ *Guardian*, 6 June 1967, p. 9; 8 June 1967, p. 1; 14 June 1967, p. 9.

¹²⁴ *Guardian*, 28 June 1967, pp. 1 & 15.

¹²⁵ *Guardian*, 24 June 1967, p. 9.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

Whereas the news stories in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* focused on the Israeli government's deeds and statements about Jerusalem, the *Guardian* was interested in both official and unofficial news stories. A large amount of description of the people, streets, and other places in Jerusalem was contributed by Harold Jackson and Papas to the newspaper.¹²⁸

On 12 June 1967, *The Times'* correspondent, Charles Douglas, reported the Israeli government's decision of "no 'concessions' on Jerusalem". The decision had been taken at the first meeting held by the Israeli government after the end of the war. The *Guardian's* correspondent, Harold Jackson, reported a different story from Tel Aviv without any reference to the Israeli Cabinet's meeting.¹²⁹ While Charles Douglas was reporting formal news, Harold Jackson was collecting the material for his story from people in the street and from official sources as well.¹³⁰

Whereas the *Guardian's* correspondents would comment on or criticize the Israeli actions or talks, *The Times'* correspondents did not follow this line. The day after the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, Eric Silver, correspondent for the *Guardian*, wrote: "Israel today annexed the Old City of Jerusalem. The Government is carefully avoiding the use of the word, yet that is the effect of new laws brought into operation this morning."¹³¹ Clearly, the *Guardian's* reports were more informative and descriptive than those of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* as clarified in the next section.

1.3 *Daily Telegraph*

It seems that the *Daily Telegraph*, like the *Guardian* and *The Times*, concentrated on Israeli decisions, statements and measures concerning East Jerusalem. Moreover, the newspaper was interested in the Jewish festivals and celebrations. Of the 17 items about Jerusalem published during June 1967, 15 were devoted to Israeli statements

¹²⁸ *Guardian*, 12 June 1967, p. 1; 15 June 1967, p. 9; 10 June 1967, p. 6.

¹²⁹ *The Times*, 12 June 1967, p. 1. The subject of the meeting was a report on the political discussion in Israel about the expected peace negotiations with the Arabs, and the Israeli position concerning the occupied territories, especially Jerusalem.

¹³⁰ *The Times*, 12 June 1967, p. 1; *Guardian*, 12 June 1967, p. 1.

¹³¹ *Guardian*, 29 June 1967, p. 1. Eric Silver is a Jew, lives in Israel, and writes for the *Independent* and the *Jewish Chronicle*.

and actions regarding the city.¹³² The first of two reports described the fighting in Jerusalem,¹³³ while the second discussed President Johnson's meeting with King Hussein.¹³⁴

Between 6 and 30 June 1967 the *Daily Telegraph* published 9 news items and 3 reports under the headline of Jerusalem. All 3 reports were devoted to Israeli actions and declarations. One covered the Israeli troops' victory celebrations at the Western Wall in the Old City and General Dayan's speech there.¹³⁵ Another described the advantages of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and the new Israeli measures for the city: for example, Gen-Brig. Hertzog's assertion of the freedom of worship for the followers of the three religions. David Ben-Gurion's tour to the Western Wall was also included in the account.¹³⁶ The third report focused on the harmony between the Arabs and the Jews in East Jerusalem after the Israelis had demolished the wall dividing the city. David Loshak, the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent in Jerusalem, wrote: "Thousands of Arabs and Jews today mingled freely in Jerusalem, following yesterday's Israeli order unifying the Israeli and the former Jordanian sectors of Jerusalem."¹³⁷

All the *Daily Telegraph* reports used emotive expressions when referring to Jews, Jerusalem and Israeli actions. The first report carried the headline "Gen. Dayan at Jews' Shrine: Exultant Jews Flock to Wailing Wall". The second report was headed "Cheering Jews Stroll through Jerusalem: Pledge on Holy Places". And the third report followed the headline "Arabs and Jews Mixed in Jerusalem: City Barriers Removed".¹³⁸ The photographs showed the same trend in expressing the *Daily Telegraph's* delight, and included religious symbols and names. Similar expressions were used in the content of the reports themselves, such as "Jerusalem was *en fête*

¹³²*Daily Telegraph*, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 28, 29 and 30 June 1967.

¹³³*Daily Telegraph*, 7 June 1967, p. 1.

¹³⁴*Daily Telegraph*, 29 June 1967, p.1.

¹³⁵*Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1967, p. 1.

¹³⁶*Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1967, p. 17.

¹³⁷*Daily Telegraph*, 30 June 1967, p. 22.

¹³⁸*Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1967, p. 1; 9 June 1967, p. 17; 30 June 1967, p. 29.

today as thousands of people walked through the flag-bedecked streets".¹³⁹ All three reports were contributed by David Loshak.

The headlines, news items, comments and terminology gave the impression that the *Daily Telegraph* fully supported Israel. The Arabs, Jordanians, Syrians and Egyptians were referred to as the "enemy" in one of the newspaper's news reports during the war. This description was not part of an Israeli quotation but the newspaper's own vocabulary. The *Daily Telegraph* published a report during the war under the headline, "Israeli Forces Prove More Efficient".¹⁴⁰ The day before, the *Daily Telegraph's* leading article had concluded: "On the whole the west must be profoundly grateful to Israeli for doing against its earnest advice, what it shrank from doing by itself."¹⁴¹ In fact, the Arabs, including the Palestinians, were seen as anti-Western in the newspapers during the Cold War, whereas Israel was considered the West's ally. This explains the newspapers' interests, priorities and tone in presenting the actors.

1.3.1 Occupation

The *Daily Telegraph*, unlike the *Guardian* and *The Times*, concentrated on the Israeli victory in the war, whereas it largely ignored Jerusalem, for it did not publish any leader, comment, analysis or historical background about the city during that time. However, two leaders on the Israeli victory were published within two days.¹⁴² It was described in one report as an "amazing victory".

Although the *Daily Telegraph* used the terms "conquest" and "capture" when discussing the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem,¹⁴³ it did not use the word "occupation". The occupation itself was presented as a cheerful event bringing many advantages. David Loshak wrote: "Jerusalem was *en fête* today as thousands of

¹³⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1967, p.17. *The Times*, 6 June 1967, p. 1; 15 June 1967, p. 11; *Guardian*, 7 June 1967, p. 9; 28 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁴⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 7 June 1967, pp. 16 & 17.

¹⁴¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1967, p. 16.

¹⁴² *Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1967, p. 16; 9 June 1967, p. 16.

¹⁴³ *Daily Telegraph*, 12 June 1967, p. 12; 8 June 1967, p. 1

people walked through the flag-bedecked streets. They cheered as news came through of further victories.”¹⁴⁴

1.3.2 Legislation and Annexation

Shortly after Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem, the “Knesset passed an amendment to the 1948 law stating that ‘the law, jurisdiction and administration of the state shall extend to any area of Eretz Israel designated by the government by order.’”¹⁴⁵ This amendment was the basis of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank. The passing of the new Israeli law, on 27 June 1967, was interpreted in the *Daily Telegraph* as follows: “Israel rushed through a Bill yesterday paving the way to the incorporation of the Old City of Jerusalem within Israel's boundaries.”¹⁴⁶ It was a very brief piece of news, consisting of only four lines. The same expression “pave the way” was used in the *Guardian's* headline “Israel Paves Way for Merger of Two Jerusalems”.¹⁴⁷ On the same day the Israeli Bill on “safeguarding” the holy places was reported in the *Daily Telegraph* in detail.

The annexation of Jerusalem was reported on the back page of the *Daily Telegraph* as a “formal unification of Israel and former Jordanian Jerusalem”.¹⁴⁸ It was stated that the “unification” was carried out on the “basis of a law voted” by the Israeli Parliament. So it was presented as a legal action under the headline “Jerusalem is Proclaimed Single City”.¹⁴⁹

1.3.3 Demolition of the Dividing Wall

In the *Daily Telegraph* the demolition of the wall dividing Jerusalem, like other Israeli actions, was interpreted as a positive measure having many advantages. David Loshak began his report with the headline “Arabs and Jews Mixed in East Jerusalem: City Barriers Removed”, and continued:

Thousands of Arabs and Jews today mixed freely in Jerusalem...sights inconceivable even up to last week were taken for granted – frock-coated Hasidic (ultra-Orthodox) Jews haggled good-humouredly with Arab

¹⁴⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1967. p. 17.

¹⁴⁵ Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem*, p. 39.

¹⁴⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 28 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁴⁷ *Guardian*, 28 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁴⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 29 June 1967, back page.

¹⁴⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 29 June 1967, p. 32.

merchants in the teeming street markets of the Old City; in New Jerusalem Jordanians in caftans strolled casually.¹⁵⁰

So occupied East Jerusalem was apparently good, safe and peaceful. Jews, Arabs, Muslims and Christians were living together and treating one another kindly. No objection or discomfiture was reported.

1.3.4 The Two Parties

Terms like “population”, “people” or “inhabitants” were rarely mentioned in the *Daily Telegraph* when referring to the Palestinians or the residents of East Jerusalem. They were described simply as “Arabs”.

According to David Loshak’s report, the Jews were “the people of Jerusalem” and the Israelis assured “complete freedom of worship” for the followers of the three religions.¹⁵¹ Arabs, on the other hand, were described in a leader as “Arab mobs run amok, wrecking British and American buildings and looking for easy victims.”¹⁵² The newspaper even referred to the Jordanians, Syrians and Egyptians as the “enemy” – and this was likely to be the reporter’s description, for it was not contained in an Israeli quotation.

The Israeli officials were approached to broadcast their propaganda and self-approbation in the *Daily Telegraph*. A few days after the Six-Day War, Brig-Gen. Hayyim Hertzog was quoted as saying: “Nineteen years ago our population in the Old City was driven out in a struggle with the Arab forces. I regret to say that all our places of worship except the Wailing Wall were completely destroyed.”¹⁵³

On the front page of the newspaper there was a full report on the war with a special headline “Fighting in Jerusalem”. The Jordanians, according to the report, laid siege to the United Nations truce headquarters in “No Man’s Land” in Jerusalem and the Israelis broke it. Furthermore, the Israeli troops returned the control of the area to the United Nations forces. Many of the UN Gurkhan troops defending the headquarters “had been killed during the Jordanians’ attack”. One could argue that the reference

¹⁵⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 30 June 1967, p. 22.

¹⁵¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1967, p. 17.

¹⁵² *Daily Telegraph*, 12 June 1967, p. 12.

¹⁵³ *Daily Telegraph*, 27 June 1967, p. 4.

to the Gurkhas, who serve in the British Army, was not accidental. It might have been intended to gain the readers' sympathy for the Israelis, and prevail hostility towards the Jordanians.¹⁵⁴

3.5 Religion and Culture

Of all the items published in the *Daily Telegraph*, 44 per cent were of an overwhelmingly religious character. The term "Jew" was included in 31 per cent of the headlines in combination with "Jerusalem" or the "Wailing Wall".¹⁵⁵ All the religious items were about Judaism, mostly the Western Wall, which was described as a "Jewish shrine" and called by the Jewish name of the "Wailing Wall".¹⁵⁶ The newspaper also published two photographs with captions showing the same Jewish/religious slant: "Gen. Dayan at Jews' shrine: Exultant Jews flock to Wailing Wall", and "Thousands of Israelis making pilgrimage to the Wailing Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem yesterday to celebrate the festival of the Feast at the First Fruits".

Subjects of cultural importance such as the Rockefeller Museum of Antiquities and the Dead Sea Scrolls were not given much attention in any of the three newspapers. The *Daily Telegraph* reported that the buildings of the Museum, like many other buildings outside Jerusalem, had suffered some damage from shelling, and there were fears in Jerusalem that the Dead Sea Scrolls, which were kept there, might also have been damaged. However, there was no further information on the matter, not even who was responsible for the shelling.¹⁵⁷

1.3.6 International News

It seems that at the time the *Daily Telegraph* was not interested in the international attitude towards Jerusalem. Neither the Pope's appeal for peace nor the Vatican's statement on the situation was reported in the newspaper.¹⁵⁸ Only President Lyndon

¹⁵⁴*Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁵⁵*Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1967, p. 1 & back page; 9 June 1967, p. 17; 15 June 1967, p. 1; 23 June 1967, p. 22; 30 June 1967, p. 22.

¹⁵⁶*Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1967, p. 1; 9 June 1967, p. 17; 15 June 1967, pp. 1 & 23.

¹⁵⁷*Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1967, p. 17.

¹⁵⁸*The Times*, 6 June 1967, p. 4; 10 June 1967, p. 4; *Guardian*, 7 June 1967, pp. 7 & 9; 27 June 1967, pp. 7 & 9; 1 July 1967, p. 1.

Johnson's reaction was quoted in a report on his meeting in Washington with King Hussein of Jordan.¹⁵⁹ The American attitude appeared stronger in the *Daily Telegraph*, for it was interpreted as a "rejection" of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. *The Times* presented it as a "warning on Jerusalem". Unlike the news stories in *The Times* and the *Guardian*, the *Daily Telegraph's* report quoted two American statements issued by the State Department and the White House concerning the Israeli unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem:

It was made clear that the annexation would not be recognised. The more strongly worded of the two came from the State Department. It said the "hasty administrative action" taken in merging the Jordanian and the Israeli sectors of Jerusalem. "Cannot be regarded as determining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them."¹⁶⁰

Apparently, only news about the American President was seen as newsworthy by the *Daily Telegraph*.¹⁶¹

1.3.7 Sources

The *Daily Telegraph* depended for its reports and news of Jerusalem on its own correspondents, especially David Loshak. It did not refer to any news agencies during that time. Of all the items published in the newspaper, 83 per cent contained a reference to the correspondent, and 16.6 per cent did not contain any reference to the source of information. Of the reports and news items, 75 per cent came from Jerusalem, 8 per cent from Washington and 16.6 per cent contained no reference to their origins. Like *The Times*, the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondents sought their information from Israeli officials and spokespersons for the government and military.

1.3.8 Interpretation and Justification

The *Daily Telegraph* interpreted the Israeli control of the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, as a measure for peace. It published a leader under the headline "Holding out for Peace".¹⁶² When the newspaper reported the food crisis in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, which followed the end of the war,

¹⁵⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 29 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁶⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 29 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁶¹ See Chapter Five, section 1.

¹⁶² *Daily Telegraph*, 12 June 1967, p. 12.

David Loshak was interested in Israel's new "responsibilities". He wrote: "Israel is now responsible for feeding 1,500,000 Arabs largely at her own expense."¹⁶³ He did not express any fears about the effects of this crisis on the people, nor did he consider it important to ask what kind of help or solution might be available.¹⁶⁴ The expression "at her expense" is intended to portray Israel in a positive light as a responsible state and generous country.

1.3.9 Focus of Attention

The same story about Jordan's banning of the Jews from "their shrines" in East Jerusalem since 1948 was repeated in the *Daily Telegraph*. There was particular emphasis on that fact during the first stage of the Israeli occupation of the city.¹⁶⁵ Sometimes it was used to legitimize the Israeli action and to highlight the Israelis' view of the situation. David Loshak described the entrance of "thousands of Jews into the Old City...particularly to visit the Wailing Wall...which was strictly forbidden".¹⁶⁶ It was mentioned twice in the same report. Neither comment nor explanation was given to the readers. It was not made clear in the reports that access was "forbidden" for political, not religious reasons.¹⁶⁷ In addition, there was no mention of the Israeli ban the Christian Palestinians and Arabs visiting their holy places in Nazareth during that period.

1.3.10 Investigation

The noticeable investigation in the *Daily Telegraph* regarding Jerusalem was the day after the cease-fire. David Loshak reported that the holy places in the "walled city" were "undamaged". This report opened with the statement: "Detailed investigation amply confirmed the Israeli claim that damage to holy places was almost nil." He continued to discuss the Israeli concern for the holy places: "The monks in Bethlehem praised the Israeli forces for the consideration shown to holy places." The report gave more details about the slight damage caused by a shell that hit "the

¹⁶³*Daily Telegraph*, 29 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁶⁴*Daily Telegraph*, 14 June 1967, p. 23.

¹⁶⁵*Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁶⁶*Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1967, p. 17.

¹⁶⁷Between the 1948 war and the Six-Day War Jordan and Israel were in a state of war.

Church of the Nativity". There was no mention of the damage to the Crusader Church of St Anne,¹⁶⁸ which had been wrecked by the Israeli forces and its destruction reported in *The Times*.¹⁶⁹

1.3.11 Conclusion

Apparently the *Daily Telegraph* had little interest in the international reaction towards Jerusalem at the time. Of the 17 items published in the newspaper, not one covered the people or places in the city apart from the Jews and the "Jewish shrines".¹⁷⁰ This gave the impression that other people had neither right of residence nor status in the city or else they were a party to the conflict. Jerusalem was regarded as a Jewish city and the Arabs were the "enemy", for no comment from any other party was published.

1.4 *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*: An Overview

It seems that *The Times* paid the most attention to the overseas news and news about Jerusalem during June 1967. The overseas news appeared on pages 3 and 4 of *The Times*, pages 7 and 8 of the *Guardian*, and pages 22 and 23 of the *Daily Telegraph*. *The Times* published 25 items regarding Jerusalem between 6 and 30 June 1967, compared with 21 by the *Guardian* and 16 by the *Daily Telegraph* during the same period.

The *Guardian* depended on news agencies for 36 per cent of the news items and reports, compared with only 23 per cent for *The Times*. The latter depended more on its correspondents, who contributed 46 per cent of the total items. Only 17 per cent of *The Times*' news items and reports contained no reference to the source, compared with 28.5 per cent for the *Guardian*.

From the initial observation of items published by *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, one has the impression that their correspondents like the news agencies, especially Reuters, were seeking their information mainly from formal

¹⁶⁸ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, News Diary.

¹⁶⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1967, p. 11.

¹⁶⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 6–30 June 1967.

¹⁷⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 6–30 June 1967.

sources, mostly the Israelis.¹⁷¹ They were interviewing Israeli government officials, quoting the Israeli generals, and reporting their statements, policies and actions.¹⁷²

Surprisingly, among the 11 reports and 31 news items published about Jerusalem during that time, the so-called Arabs were the source of information for just one item.¹⁷³ All the other items were solidly based on the Israelis' account of events in the city.

All the correspondents in the three newspapers during 1967 were interested in the actions of the Israeli government and its politicians and in the statements, discussions and even thoughts of the military officials and spokespersons. It was an opportunity for the Israelis and the politicians to broadcast their messages, suggestions, threats and justifications to the readers in Britain, as well as to the Jews and even the Arabs. Moreover, they could explain their point of view and justify their actions to the world and adapt world opinion for fresh actions. They decided what the world could expect. In addition, almost all the places mentioned in the three newspapers were given the Jewish names, for example, the "Wailing Wall" and the "Temple Mount".

Whereas the Israelis were defined as a "nation" in all three newspapers, the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem were deprived of any such description, even that of "people" or "residents". The impression given by the reports is that these people were there by accident. Moreover, the British Press referred to the residents of Jerusalem in the same way as the Israelis did, that is, "the Arabs", without any kind of connection with the area.

¹⁷¹See pages 8, 16 and 24.

¹⁷²*Guardian*, 8 June 1967, p. 1; 12 June 1967, p. 1; 13 June 1967, p. 1; 15 June 1967, p. 9; 19 June 1967, p. 9; 24 June 1967, p. 7; 26 June 1967, p. 7; 28 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁷³*Guardian*, 19 June 1967, p. 9.

Chapter Two

Reporting News about Jerusalem (August 1980)

2.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the reporting of the official Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem on 30 July 1980 and its consequences, including the passing of Resolution 487 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 20 August 1980. It examines the way in which the news was reported and the representation of the events and the city itself in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*. It comprises four sections: one for each newspaper plus a conclusion.

The study focuses on how the newspapers dealt with the legal dimension of the events. The annexation provoked regional reactions from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab and Muslim countries. In addition there was the reaction of the international community represented by the United Nations, and the decision that was to be taken by many countries, mostly those of Latin America, of whether to keep their embassies in Jerusalem or move them to Tel Aviv.

A few days after the passage of the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem, King Hussein of Jordan was reported to have warned of a disaster in the region over the Palestinian issue, especially Jerusalem.¹ Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), called for an Arab summit to challenge the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem. Moreover, President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt took action, beginning by sending a “protest note” to Israel. Next, he suspended the negotiations on autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Last, but not least, a statement by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia was issued regarding the Bill.

This chapter deals with all the newspapers’ items about Jerusalem – not only those containing the name of the city in their headlines – between 31 July and 29 August 1980. Jerusalem itself was rarely mentioned in the headlines and the news stories

¹ Interview in *US News and World Report*: see *The Times*, 3 August 1980, p. 7.

focused more on events outside its boundaries, except Israeli statements and diplomatic activity, which were reported from the city.

The analysis of the content of these news items, commentaries and editorials is of particular importance, for it highlights each newspaper's areas of interest. Moreover, the newspaper material of this period – August 1980 – is more useful than that of other dates and events concerning Jerusalem in giving an insight into the level of neutrality or bias in the reporting of the news stories, especially those of a legal or international nature.

Closer attention is given to the presentation of events, in addition to their interpretation, comments and the expected consequences detailed in all three newspapers. Where there is a clear reference, a differentiation is made between the interpretations and comments attributed to or made by politicians and those made by the newspapers' co-editors and correspondents.

From this, conclusions can be drawn to clarify the role of the newspapers in the presentation of events and the formulation of readers' attitudes towards them. In addition, it is interesting to note how much the events were put into their own context and to what extent they were connected to Jerusalem. Where there was a clear stance made by the international community, one could ask which point of view was introduced by means of separate messages and a UNSC resolution, when so many other UN resolutions had been ignored or had attracted little attention from the newspapers.²

Chapter Two does not investigate the arguments or the propaganda broadcast by the parties to the conflict, except where it was part of a news story or a description of the parties themselves, especially their connection with Jerusalem. The analysis draws attention to the interests of each newspaper in its reporting, with which part of the story it was particularly concerned, on which party it depended most for its information, which party it used most for its quotations and which point of view was given preference.

² See Chapter Four of this thesis, section 4.1, regarding the reporting by the British Press of the UN resolutions.

The Basic Law for Israel was its declaration of its control and standpoint on the question of Jerusalem. It emphasized its presence in the whole city and its wish to keep it as its “eternal and indivisible capital”. In this regard the Law was a message addressed to the international community. Moreover, it was a challenge to the Arabs’ Muslims’ and Christians’ aspirations to regain “their” occupied Holy City. The city was of particular significance not only for Jordan (since it had controlled the city before Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967), but also for Egypt because Jerusalem was one of the main questions in its negotiations with Israel after the Camp David Summit in 1979. The current Egyptian President Sadat and Vice-President Mubarak were trying their best to achieve some sort of progress in Egypt’s negotiations with Israel on Palestinian autonomy. The establishment of any type of Palestinian, Arab or Muslim sovereignty or institutionalized bureaucracy in East Jerusalem would have restored Egypt to its central role and place among the Arabs. In this way, the isolation of the country from the rest of the Arab and Muslim world after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and his peace agreement with Israel in 1978 would have been brought to an end. President Sadat believed that progress favouring the interests and aspirations of the Arabs, Muslims and Christians concerning the city, no matter how symbolic, would guarantee such an outcome.³ The city was also religiously, nationally and politically significant for other countries beside Egypt and Jordan. Saudi Arabia, as the “defender” of the Islamic holy places in Mecca and Medina, also had an interest in the future of Jerusalem.

For the Palestinians, Jerusalem, geographically and symbolically, is located in the heart of the future state designated by the United Nations’ Partition Plan of 1947. It is seen as the capital of this state and the essence of the Palestinians’ struggle for their self-determination and national identity.

These countries besides others are the presented actors in the conflict. It is important to note whose actions were considered significant and whose actions were not and for what reasons.

³ Menachem Klein, *Jerusalem: The Contested City* (London: Co Hurst, 2001), p. 96.

2.1 *The Times*

The Times had the largest number of news stories and leaders on the crisis, as well as the only analysis, of the three newspapers under examination.⁴ *The Times* began to show a particular interest in the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem after Crown Prince Fahd's statement on it.

In its first leader on the Israeli Bill, *The Times* insisted on the "un-necessity" of it, adding, "it alters nothing", and it was "largely symbolic". The article then discussed this step taken by Israel as a new difficulty in addition to those which already existed to prevent a peace agreement on Jerusalem.⁵

The second leader focused on the Saudis' consideration of their next move in respect of their relationship with the "West", especially the United States. A wider context was then presented by suggesting the possible effects of the Cold War. In other words, the risk of communism in the view of the Saudis was one of major importance to be taken into account by the Americans in the way in which they dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Further details were given about the influence of oil on the economy.⁶ The Cold War was a framework imposed on the perception as well as the presentation of international issues, particularly in the Middle East. This fact was highlighted by Sayigh & Shlaim's argument about the 1980s: "Here the exogenous rhetoric of the Cold War was superimposed upon a political culture, and in particular an approach to international issues."⁷

Interestingly, the third leader searched for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which might have attracted greater international interest in the course of events following the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem. The leader included a discussion of the possibility of establishing a state in "part of Palestine", which was to exist peacefully beside Israel. There was no direct mention of Jerusalem, only an implicit

⁴ *The Times*, 6 August 1980, p. 15, 15 August 1980, pp. 10 & 11, 18 August 1980, p. 13; *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10, and 15 August 1980, p. 10.

⁵ *The Times*, 6 August 1980, p. 15.

⁶ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p. 15.

⁷ Yezid Sayigh & Avi Shlaim (eds.) *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) p. 11

reference to the city as part of the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza as well as a major factor in the wider context.

According to the leaders, therefore, Jerusalem was of interest to *The Times* only as a factor, and sometimes as an obstacle, in reaching a peace agreement in the region, that is, between the Arabs – mainly the Palestinians – and the Israelis, the latter supported by the United States.⁸ In other words, the importance of Jerusalem in the view of the newspaper was its influence on the relationship between the Arabs and the Israelis, and consequently that between the Americans and the West Europeans on the one hand and between the Arab and Muslim states on the other. In a reference to the city as a cause of the move by Prince Fahd, which might have influenced his relationship with Europe and the United States, the leader commented:

The Israeli Law declaring the whole of Jerusalem Israel's inalienable and indivisible capital may have seemed to Prince Fahd like the ultimate gratuitous humiliation – an action which in his eyes could have no purpose but to remind the Arabs that Israel is in unchallenged control of the Holy Land and can dispose of it at her will.⁹

According to the leader, Prince Fahd in this case was obliged to “respond” with the “only weapon in his hand”: the oil that could be used against the main supporter of Israel, namely, the United States. However, the use of this weapon would cause “damage” to his country as well as to the others in the “West”.¹⁰

2.1.1 The Bill

The Times published the longest news story about the Bill, including details of the vote, the debate in the Knesset, the differences of opinion among the Israeli parties, and the reaction expected from Egypt. However, afterwards there was not much attention given in the news stories and leaders to the Bill as the cause of the continuing crisis in Jerusalem, even though it had been presented in the original news story as a “further severe setback” to the “faltering” peace process as well as “one of the most controversial pieces of legislation debated by the Knesset for many months.”¹¹

⁸ *The Times*, 6 August 1980, p. 15, 15 August 1980, p. 11, and 18 August 1980, p. 13.

⁹ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p. 11.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ *The Times*, 31 July 1980, p. 1

The Times' first news story about the Bill was a front-page item describing the Law as "formalising Israeli sovereignty over the former Arab sector of Jerusalem." Egypt's "strong opposition" to the Bill was considered to be "unnecessary provocation" by Sadat and senior Egyptian ministers.

In a news story from Reuters News Agency regarding President Sadat's first letter on Jerusalem to the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, the Bill was presented as an "absorption" of East Jerusalem. However, in the news story by Christopher Walker, *The Times*' correspondent in Jerusalem, and Moshe Brilliant, *The Times*' correspondent in Tel Aviv, the Bill was described as "formalising" the "incorporation" of East Jerusalem "as part of Israel's capital".¹² This indicates the influence of political discourse of the actor on the news discourse and textual choices when his/her actions are being reported.¹³

The following quotation from the statement by Prince Fahd was published in *The Times*: "Israel is declaring that Jerusalem is its united and eternal capital and thereby defying the feelings of the Arabs and the Muslims and United Nations resolutions'".¹⁴

Christopher Walker presumed that Israel's intention behind the Bill on Jerusalem was to "stress its sovereignty over East Jerusalem". This action "not only offended President Sadat's own religious beliefs, it also made him wary of the opposition elements in Egypt and of his standing among 800 million Muslims throughout the world."¹⁵

2.1.2 Jerusalem

Although Jerusalem was the focal point of and the declared motive for the Israeli claim to its sovereignty, as well as the reason for the Arabs' reaction and its consequences, there was little written in *The Times* about the city itself or its holy places. Interestingly, the historical and religious significance of the city was not

¹² *The Times*, 3 August 1980, p. 7, and 31 July 1980, p. 1.

¹³ See Chapter Five, section 3, and Chapter Six, section 2.

¹⁴ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p. 1.

¹⁵ Ibid.

proposed in the newspaper as a motivation or a justification for either the Israeli move (the Bill) or the Arabs' reaction, or the Bill's world-wide ramifications.

Jerusalem was mentioned in only two cases, either rhetorically by the politicians on both sides highlighting their cause, or by the correspondent when explaining the context of the action, letter or statement being reported. Sadat mentioned the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem as the reason for his "suspending" the negotiations on Palestinian autonomy.¹⁶ Prince Fahd also emphasized that Jerusalem was the reason for his statement.¹⁷ The only phrase that was attached to Jerusalem in all the news stories on the crisis was that the city had been "captured from Jordan" by Israel or "conquered" in 1967.¹⁸ However, no reference had been made to the residents of the city or the legitimacy of the Israeli Bill according to the publicized stance of the international community towards occupied East Jerusalem.¹⁹

The Times did not present any legal, moral or even historical comment by its journalists on Jerusalem, its residents, or its rights. The newspaper published two statements on the city without making any particular point. Jerusalem was described in a news story as "Israel's indivisible capital", and these words were said to be a "claim" made by Prime Minister Begin.²⁰ According to Prince Fahd's statement in the newspaper, the same city was presented as the Arabs' and Muslims' "holiest of the holy places [that needs to be] defended...against this Zionist religious and military campaign..²¹

As an explanation of President Sadat's "emphasis" on the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem in his second letter to Prime Minister Begin, the correspondent wrote: "The Old City hosts al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, a holy Islamic shrine."²² This news story dealt principally with Jerusalem as a complete entity, not as a city divided between East and West, which may be understood as the recognition and use of Israel's official discourse on the city. While, *The Times* accepted the Israeli control

¹⁶ *The Times*, 13 August 1980, p. 6, and 16 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁷ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p. 1

¹⁸ *The Times*, 1 August 1980, p. 5, and 16 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁹ According to UN Resolutions 252, 298 and 478, and the UNSC's 2253.

²⁰ *The Times*, 13 August 1980, p. 6.

²¹ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p. 1.

²² *The Times*, 16 August 1980, p. 4.

over the whole of Jerusalem as a fact, it disregarded other facts such as the international view of East Jerusalem, which considered it an occupied territory. Nevertheless, the international stance regarding the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem was made clear in UN Resolutions 252, 298 and 478, and the UNSC's Resolution 2253. In addition, the newspaper ignored the Palestinian, Muslim and Christian residents of the city, who had had been living there prior to the Israeli occupation in 1967.

In discussions of the Israeli Bill on the city, East Jerusalem was presented as "annexed East Jerusalem". However, the West Bank was described as an "occupied" territory in the same news story.²³ In another news story by *The Times'* correspondent, Christopher Walker, the city of Hebron in the West Bank was called "the occupied Arab town of Hebron".²⁴ It is interesting to note that the same correspondent used different terms for different cities having the same status in international law and in the various UN resolutions. This needs an explanation, possibly he believed that Jerusalem, including East Jerusalem, was different from the West Bank and Hebron. The researcher might further assume that the correspondent believed that Israel had the right to control East Jerusalem for one reason or another.

3.1.3 The residents of Jerusalem

At a time of crisis and dispute over Jerusalem, one may wonder why the only news story published about the residents in Jerusalem in *The Times* focused on the gypsies in the city rather than the Israelis or the Palestinians.²⁵ It might be assumed that the latter two groups, unlike the gypsies, were known to the newspaper's readership. Or that the selection of this news story was based on the complexity of the presentation of one of the two stories without considering the other's account. One can argue that the story about the gypsies was newsworthy, for it contained news value owing to the fact that it was unexpected and described interesting customs and behaviour.²⁶ When Christopher Walker was asked about this particular story, he answered that he did not

²³ *The Times*, 19 August 1980, p. 5.

²⁴ *The Times*, 20 August 1980, p. 4.

²⁵ *The Times*, 19 August 1980, p. 5.

²⁶ Shoemaker., & Reese., *Mediating the Message*, p. 91. See Chapter Five, section 5.1.

remember it, and when he was reminded of it he said, "It is interesting", meaning that he assumed that the story was interesting to the readers.²⁷

Christopher Walker's news story about the "300 gypsies" in Jerusalem could be considered the most informative contribution about Jerusalem. In this news story, Jerusalem was described as a city with "a myriad of ethnic and religious groups, which make up [its] population of about 400,000."²⁸ However, only three groups were mentioned in the story: the gypsies, the "Arabs" and the Jews. The numbers of gypsies and "Arabs" or "Palestinian Arabs" were included, but not the number of the Jews. This may indicate that the correspondent somehow assumed a link to exist between the "Arabs" and the gypsies.

One could also ask why the sizes of only the Arab and gypsy populations were mentioned, while excluding this information about the Jews and other "religious groups". This could appear to be a classification of the two groups in the city, implying an association between the Palestinians and the gypsies by differentiating between Arabs and gypsies on the one hand, and the Jews on the other. The correspondent stated that the gypsies came to Jerusalem only 300 years ago, which could imply that the Palestinians might have arrived there at that time or a little earlier. It was also apparently assumed that the newspaper's readers or most of them considered Jerusalem –from its location- to be part of the biblical Promised Land for the Jews. One can conclude that this presentation implied that the Israeli control over East Jerusalem was understandable. So, what was the similarity between these two groups that did not exist between them and the Jews? It might be the numbers of the two groups in proportion to the whole population of the city, which is untrue, for the Palestinian population was far bigger than that of the gypsies, and that of the Jews was not mentioned.

Although Christopher Walker connected the gypsies – who settled in Jerusalem in the eighteenth century – to the city, he did not connect the Palestinians in the same way. The gypsies, who inhabit a district of the Old City, were described as "the Jerusalem community", whereas the Palestinian citizens were presented as

²⁷ Christopher Walker, Telephone interview, 28 August 2002.

²⁸ *The Times*, 19 August 1980, p. 5.

“the 100,000 Arabs who are their [the gypsies’] neighbours in annexed East Jerusalem.”²⁹

The last news story was the only contribution about the population in East Jerusalem during the period under examination. In it the correspondent used the term “Arabs” when referring to the Muslim and Christian Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem.³⁰ He was apparently ignorant of the fact that East Jerusalem was an occupied territory. In addition, he included an item about the gypsies, with the implied association between the gypsies and the Palestinians. In short, the whole article created a confused and misleading impression of the identity of Jerusalem and its residents, as well as who had the right to control it. Furthermore, it could be considered a piece of misinformation for the readers and a misrepresentation of the city.³¹

2.1.3 Arab Reaction

Unlike its coverage of the events of 1967, *The Times* reported news about the official Arab reaction to the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem.³² Although it reported many of the consequences of the Bill in the Arab countries, it paid the most attention to the Saudi and Egyptian moves. *The Times* was the first of the three newspapers to publish a report, commentary, and editorial about Prince Fahd’s statement,³³ and its news story about was given leader status.

In addition to the Israeli view of the Bill, its effects on other politicians, particularly Arab leaders, were mentioned in *The Times*’ news reports and editorials. The Arab as well as the Muslim dimensions were highlighted first in a letter from President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin. At that time, Nabila Megalli, *The Times*’ correspondent in Cairo, wrote as follows:

But the letter said [that] unilateral action would ruin the chances of peace for the ‘foreseeable’ future and ‘provoke’ the feelings of 800 million

²⁹ The gypsies inhabit a district called Baab al-Huta.

³⁰ See section 1.9 below, “Terminology”.

³¹ The identity of the city of Jerusalem is discussed in Chapter Five, section 3.

³² See Chapter One, section 1.

³³ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, pp. 1 & 15.

The international dimension was highlighted in *The Times* by Prince Fahd's words, where he commented on the Israeli move, that is, the official annexation:

At this point, one must wonder: what has been the benefit of moderation and is this the way the West understands "just peace"? Where is the framework of comprehensive peace that they promised us, and which they wrongly imagined they laid down at Camp David?³⁵

The letter from King Hassan of Morocco was mentioned only in Christopher Walker's comment on the Saudi statement. In the letter, King Hassan, as President of the Jerusalem Committee of the Islamic Nations, was reported advising Sadat that "a proper Islamic response" by Egypt to recent Israeli moves on Jerusalem would "pave the way for mending the rift with the other Islamic nations."³⁶

This may be understood as an example of the considerable influence of, in particular, the elite sources such as Prince Fahd and President Sadat on the discourse of the news.³⁷ Nevertheless, one could ask why other elite sources as King Hussein of Jordan and King Hassan of Morocco and their responses were not given equal amount of attention by *The Times*.

2.1.4 International Reaction

Britain's reaction to the Israeli move was reported – without any comment – in *The Times*, though only after its reaction to Prince Fahd's statement. Leslie Plommer, one of the newspaper's journalists, reported the following statement by Britain's Foreign Office:

Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, has already told Israel that Britain's commitment to the country does not extend to Israel's activities as an occupying power and has been sharp in his criticism of the continued expansion of the West Bank settlements and moves to integrate further East Jerusalem.³⁸

³⁴ *The Times*, 13 August 1980, p. 6.

³⁵ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p. 1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10. President Sadat was the first Arab leader to have a peace agreement with Israel at Camp David in 1979, and Egypt was the only Arab country to do so at that time. The Camp David peace agreement was condemned by most of the Arab and Muslim states.

³⁷ Chapter Six, section 2.

³⁸ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p. 1.

The crisis over Jerusalem, which was a consequence of the passing of the Israeli Bill, was put in a wider context when *The Times*' editorial discussed it from the aspect of

Saudi-American or Arab-Western relations with regard to the oil. The article began with Prince Fahd's question "...what has been the benefit of moderation...? and ended with Yasser Arafat's proposed commitment to persuade the United States to change its attitude towards the "Palestinian problem". The connection between Palestine and the United States' relationship with the Arab world needed to be "strengthened", according to *The Times*.³⁹

Israeli "anger" at the American stance concerning the UN resolution was also of interest to *The Times*. "[D]iplomatic observers" were reported to point out the differences between the attitudes of Europe and the United States, whose opinions on the Middle East were reported in the newspaper. The explanation given for the differences was that the European nations had voted in favour of the resolution at the Security Council, whereas the United States had abstained.

2.1.5 Sources

While different news stories about the Arabs' reactions to Israel's Bill on Jerusalem were reported from Beirut, Cairo and Riyadh, many others were reported from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and were dependent on Israeli sources.

President Sadat's invitation to President Yitzhak Navon of Israel to visit Egypt was reported by Moshe Brilliant in Tel Aviv. However, the other two stories from Cairo, which were published in *The Times*, refer to "our correspondent". Why was the invitation not reported by *The Times*' correspondent in Cairo as well? Was it because the invitation was kept confidential in Cairo, although it was publicized in Israel? This seems to be a sensible explanation when we examine its timing. The invitation was issued after the Saudi statement. It would have embarrassed Sadat in front of the Arabs, and particularly the Egyptians, if the invitation had been

³⁹ *The Times*, 18 August 1980, p. 13.

publicized at that time of crisis. The same argument could be applied to Robert Fisk, *The Times*' correspondent in Beirut.⁴⁰

2.1.6 Contextualization and Decontextualization

Moshe Brilliant presented a justification for Sadat's reaction towards the Israeli Bill as well as explanations of the circumstances. However, they were taken from the Israeli newspaper, *Ma'ariv*. His comments were as follows:

The newspaper *Ma'ariv* expressed understanding of Mr. Sadat's dilemma. In an editorial, the paper said that the Muslim countries had manoeuvred the Egyptian President into a position where he must choose between joining the international clamour over Jerusalem and thus putting the autonomy talks into "deep freeze" or turning the talks to other subjects and risking denunciation for treason.⁴¹

According to this report, the reason for Sadat's dilemma was the position taken by the Arabs and Muslims, rather than Israel's Bill on Jerusalem. In his comment on Prince Fahd's statement on Jerusalem, Christopher Walker informed readers that Jerusalem was regarded as "sacred" in the eyes of "800 million Muslims throughout the world",⁴² and this fact was one of the pressures placed upon Sadat, according to the correspondent's analysis.

The UNSC Resolution concerning the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem was presented as a context for the Israeli reaction, though only whenever a word or sentence in the Israeli Foreign Ministry's statement needed explanation or justification. When reporting the Israeli reaction, it was stated: "last night's Security Council resolution which censored – Israel – ...". More information was provided when the news story went on to justify what was called Israel's "angry statement". It was "angry" because the resolution also "called on all states still having embassies in Jerusalem to withdraw them."

2.1.7 Informative and Historical Background

While Robert Fisk was commenting on Prince Fahd's statement and reporting the Arab reaction to it, he reminded readers of the call by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia

⁴⁰ *The Times*, 16 August 1980, p. 4.

⁴¹ *The Times*, 18 August 1980, p. 4.

⁴² *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p.1.

for war against Israel on the eve of the torching of al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem in August 1969. This historical example was brought to the readers' attention because of the supposed similarity of the action and its consequences. Both were calls for jihad in defence of Jerusalem's holy places against Israel.⁴³

The Palestinians were defined by *The Times* for the first time, though the definitions were clearly those suggested by the Israelis. Negotiations with the Palestinians about the West Bank and Gaza was a "phrase [which] has its ambiguities":

Some Israelis, when they use it, are thinking essentially of the present Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza. Others realise that they are speaking of an Arab people which defines itself as belonging to Palestine, meaning the whole of the land that bore that name under the British Mandate before 1948; a people of which the present Arab citizens of Israel are a part, as well as the refugees and the diaspora; a people which sees the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only political representative it has.⁴⁴

It was also the first time that the Palestinians were discussed as a people, although there was no direct connection made between them and Jerusalem, which was the focal point of the current crisis.

2.1.8 Description and Comment

The relocation of Prime Minister Begin's headquarters to East Jerusalem, following the annexation of that part of the city, was described by Christopher Walker as a "controversial, formal annexation", but not illegal.⁴⁵

Moshe Brilliant considered Navon "more moderate in the Middle East affairs" than Prime Minister Begin.⁴⁶ However, Christopher Walker described Prince Fahd's statement on Jerusalem as "belligerent" and Saudi Arabia as "reluctant".⁴⁷ Prince Fahd was a man with an "open rejection of moderation".⁴⁸

Moshe Brilliant, consistently, used the expression "hard-line" to describe Sadat's letter to Prime Minister Begin on the Bill. It was clear that it was not his

⁴³ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, p. 4.

⁴⁴ *The Times*, 18 August 1980, p. 13.

⁴⁵ *The Times*, 13 August 1980, p. 6, and 16 August 1980, p. 4.

⁴⁶ *The Times*, 16 August 1980, p.10.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

description but that of the Israeli “speakers”.⁴⁹ The same trend in describing the Arab leaders as “rejectionist”, “reluctant” and “hard-liner” appeared not only in *The Times*’ news stories, but also in its editorials. According to its second editorial about Jerusalem, the PLO was “so reluctant to talk about peace with Israel.”⁵⁰

2.1.9 Terminology

The term “Arabs” instead of “Palestinians” was used in *The Times*. The same name had been used to refer to the Palestinians since the occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967.⁵¹

Just a few days after the official Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, Christopher Walker referred to that part of the city as “the former Arab sector of Jerusalem”.⁵² In another report, he added that the East part of the city had been “conquered in 1967”.⁵³ Both of these expressions had been used in the first news story by him and Moshe Brilliant about the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem.⁵⁴ In his news story, Christopher Walker described the Palestinian citizens of East Jerusalem as “the 100,000 Arabs in East Jerusalem”.⁵⁵ This indicates no connection these people had to the place or its history.

Expressions such as “Saudis Lose Patience”, which was the headline of the editorial, were used by both Robert Fisk and Christopher Walker, and were probably their creation. However, a review of the other newspapers proved that the expression was used in all three of them. Had it been invented by one of the politicians? Yet, there was no reference to any connection of this kind in any of the newspapers.⁵⁶

The expression “jihad” was discussed in *The Times*’ leader as a concept, where the writer thought that “holy war” was not an accurate equivalent. Terms such as “campaign” and “effort” were suggested as better translations. The discussion was included to explain the meaning of Prince Fahd’s statement, not “textually”, where it

⁴⁹ *The Times*, 18 August 1980, p. 4.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁵¹ *The Times*, 19 August 1980, p. 5

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵³ *The Times*, 16 August 1980, p. 4.

⁵⁴ *The Times*, 31 July 1980, p. 1.

⁵⁵ *The Times*, 13 August 1980, p. 6.

was presented as a “holy war” against Israel. However, the expression “holy war” was used in three of the four headlines published in *The Times* on the same day.⁵⁷

The Israeli government’s terminology regarding Jerusalem was used in *The Times*, mostly cited in a quotation from a statement by an Israeli politician: “Jerusalem is Israel inalienable and indivisible”, and the “eternal capital” of “Israel” or the “Jewish state”.⁵⁸ Although *The Times*’ correspondent in Cairo⁵⁹ used Begin or Sadat’s words, nevertheless, they were not printed as quotations: “But Mr Begin defended his annexation and declared it [Jerusalem] would remain forever part of the united Jewish capital.”⁶⁰

The name “Temple Mount” was used several times in a news story about a group of Jews seeking access to pray at the complex of the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque. The latter two names were used only in *The Times* in this news story.⁶¹

2.1.10 Conclusion

The Times showed more interest than the other two newspapers in the international reaction to the Israeli Bill. It published three leaders and an analysis of the crisis, compared with the *Guardian*’s two leaders, while the *Daily Telegraph* carried neither leader nor comment nor analysis.⁶²

2.2 *Guardian*

Like *The Times*, the *Guardian*’s leaders presented the new Israeli Bill as a step that would not bring any actual change or benefit to Israel. Moreover, both newspapers based their analyses on the same fact: that Israel had already annexed East Jerusalem after occupying the city during the Six-Day War in June 1967.⁶³

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 11; *Guardian*, 15 August 1980, p. 10.

⁵⁷ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, pp. 1, 4, 10 & 15. See Chapter Five, section (2).

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 10 & 11; see also

⁵⁹ *The Times*’ correspondent in Cairo was anonymous.

⁶⁰ *The Times*, 16 August 1980, p. 4.

⁶¹ *The Times*, 8 August 1980, p. 6.

⁶² *The Times*, 6 August 1980, p. 15; 5 August 1980, pp. 10 & 11; 18 August 1980, p. 13; *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10; and 15 August 1980, p. 10.

⁶³ *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10; *The Times*, 6 August 1980, p. 15. See Chapter One.

Although the *Guardian* and *The Times* referred to 1967 as the starting-point, the former included more detail of the Israeli measures taken concerning Jerusalem after the end of the war. This was the *Guardian*'s evidence that since the 1967 War "there has not been any doubt that Israel considered East Jerusalem as much part of its territory as West Jerusalem."⁶⁴ The newspaper pointed out: "The supreme court moved its premises [to East Jerusalem], land was sequestered for new Jewish suburbs, and diplomatic missions were instructed to move to Jerusalem".⁶⁵

As in 1967, It was clear from the headlines and reporting priorities in the *Guardian* that internal Israeli policy and developments in the Israeli government were considered more newsworthy than the consequences of the Israeli Bill.⁶⁶ It is interesting to note that Jerusalem was mentioned in the *Guardian*'s news items, reports and leaders only when a context for current statements or developments was needed.

Unlike *The Times*, the *Guardian* reported that Syria and Jordan as well as other countries had raised objections to the Israeli Bill. The Syrian Foreign Ministry was reported to have called for an "immediate meeting of the Arab League to impose a political and economic boycott of states recognising Jerusalem" as Israel's capital. Moreover, it was said that Syria had given countries with embassies in Jerusalem one month to "condemn" the Israeli Bill and start moving their embassies from the city.⁶⁷

Like the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian* devoted less attention than *The Times* to Prince Fahd's statement on Jerusalem. Whereas *The Times* allocated a front-page special report to the topic, the *Guardian* confined it to a single paragraph in a news item about the Israeli approval of a new Justice Minister.⁶⁸

Unlike the *Daily Telegraph*, both *The Times*' and the *Guardian*'s second leader discussed Prince Fahd's reaction to the Israeli Bill concerning Jerusalem. Within the first few lines, the *Guardian* explained why a statement from Saudi

⁶⁴ *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ *Guardian*, 11 August 1980, p. 4.

⁶⁷ *Guardian*, 12 August 1980, p. 6.

⁶⁸ *Guardian*, 14 August 1980, p. 5.

Arabia was more important than one from Syria or Jordan. This indirectly indicated why the Prince's statement was the topic of a leader, although there were many other statements and actions by many other Arab governments regarding Jerusalem. According to the *Guardian*: "One word from Riyadh is still worth a thousand from Damascus."⁶⁹ What was of concern to the *Guardian* in its leader. It was the need for a new formula, and the newspaper suggested a "more comprehensive peace conference", where Europe could "pre-empt the Arab move for a trade embargo."⁷⁰

UN Resolution 478 was not reported in the *Guardian* apart from a reference to an expected or "imminent" UN resolution on Jerusalem the day after it was issued. It was a brief by the United Press International (UPI).⁷¹ However, the *Guardian* did publish a news story about the Israeli reaction to the Resolution.⁷² Presumably, this was due to the fact that the newspapers had two correspondents in Israel, but not at the UN in New York.

In the *Guardian*, the transfer of the embassies of The Netherlands and many Latin American countries was rated more important than the UN resolution. This was clear from the amount of space devoted to the topic, as well as the number of headlines and Israeli statements and quotations.⁷³

2.2.1 The Bill

According to the leader in the *Guardian*, the Bill caused "embarrassment" to the US Administration, and no explanation was given. The newspaper referred to the effect of the Bill on the question of possible autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza: "By formal annexation, however, the Knesset does pre-empt one of the arguments...which is whether the Arab population of East Jerusalem should take part in the autonomy election, supposing such an event should ever come about."⁷⁴ In its discussion of the possible agreement on Jerusalem, based on UN Resolution 242,

⁶⁹ *Guardian*, 15 August 1980, p. 10. This emphasizes the influence of the "Country Characteristics formula" over reporting international news, as shown in Chapter Six.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* See under "International Attitude",

⁷¹ *Guardian*, 21 August 1980, p. 4.

⁷² *Guardian*, 22 August 1980, p. 6.

⁷³ *Guardian*, 21 August 1980, p. 4; 22 August 1980, p. 6; and 27 August 1980, p. 4.

⁷⁴ *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10.

the *Guardian*'s leader commented: "All that matters is that Israel has created another fact."⁷⁵

In a news item by Arie Haskel, the Bill was presented as one "which makes united Jerusalem the capital of Israel."⁷⁶ This statement was neither preceded nor followed by any comment regarding the international stance concerning this matter apart from that of the United States. In Arie Haskel's report on the Israeli reaction to Sadat's suspension of the negotiations, the Bill was described as "the recent Israeli law sanctioning the annexation of Jerusalem as Israel's eternal and indivisible capital." So, according to the *Guardian*, Jerusalem was principally considered to be one city, for there was no reference to the East or West part, or even the occupation of East Jerusalem.⁷⁷

In one of the *Guardian*'s reports, the Israeli Bill was presented as the only reason for its consequences affecting the relationship between Egypt and Israel: "the Knesset enacted legislation proclaiming Jerusalem, including the annexed East sector, the 'eternal and indivisible' capital of the Jewish state."⁷⁸ Although the newspaper's leader did not consider the Bill to be the only motive for the Saudi statement, in its opinion, however, it stated that Israel had "supplied the Prince with the clearest reason for his action."⁷⁹

The Israeli Bill was interpreted in the *Guardian*'s leader as the Israeli way of "demonstrating to everybody concerned that certain things are non-negotiable and in particular that the United Nations' concept of an international city...has no force or validity in Israeli law."⁸⁰

2.2.2 Jerusalem

Although the phrase "eternal and indivisible capital" of the Jewish state, which was part of the Israeli Bill's text, was repeated frequently in the *Guardian*, it was not always placed inside quotation marks. It is also interesting to note that references to

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ *Guardian*, 2 August 1980, p. 4.

⁷⁷ *Guardian*, 4 August 1980, p. 4.

⁷⁸ *Guardian*, 7 August 1980, p. 7.

⁷⁹ *Guardian*, 15 August 1980, p. 10.

⁸⁰ *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10.

Israel with Jerusalem as its capital described it as “the Jewish state”.⁸¹ This can be interpreted as an indication of the biblical connection between the city as part of the Promised Land and Israel as the Jewish state, which is what Israel wanted to promote. To contextualize the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem in biblical terms could affect its presentation and make it seem more reasonable or acceptable.⁸²

However, although Jerusalem and, in particular, the Israeli Bill concerning it, were at least the direct cause of the actual and expected consequences described above, the city was seldom mentioned in the leader, apart from being part of the occupied West Bank.⁸³

The presentation of Jerusalem was influenced by the Israeli discourse, for the words of many Israeli politicians and diplomats concerning the city were reported and quoted. Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, was reported in the *Guardian* as having described Jerusalem as “the capital of Israel and the heart of the Jewish people for all time.”⁸⁴

East Jerusalem was not described as part of the occupied territories in the *Guardian*, although there was a reference to the fact that the Israeli annexation of that part after the 1967 War was “never recognised internationally”.⁸⁵ According to the *Guardian*, the decision of the United States and other countries to keep their embassies in Tel Aviv instead of Jerusalem meant that they were “underscoring their position that the status of Jerusalem must be determined through negotiations and not by Israel’s unilateral steps.”⁸⁶ So Israel’s aspirations regarding Jerusalem were not consistent with the stance of the international community.

2.2.3 Arab Reaction

⁸¹ *Guardian*, 7 August 1980, p. 7.

⁸² See Chapter Five, section 3.

⁸³ *Guardian*, 15 August 1980, p. 10

⁸⁴ *Guardian*, 21 August 1980, p. 4.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Arie Haskel reported from Jerusalem the following statement by the Israeli spokesman concerning the content of Sadat's – unpublished – letter to Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Jimmy Carter:⁸⁷

The text of President Sadat's letter...has not been published here in Jerusalem and official spokesmen would say nothing about it except that its tone was not hostile and that it did not generate an atmosphere of crisis. They also said that the letter covers 18 pages. But it is understood that in his letter the Egyptian President blames Israel for placing obstacles in the path of the peace negotiations and accuses Israel of having emptied the autonomy talks of all meaningful content with last week's passage of the Jerusalem law.⁸⁸

It was also reported from Israel that President Sadat had included the condition that the negotiations could be resumed only when Israel agreed "to drop its peremptory policies – particularly where Jerusalem is concerned."⁸⁹

The UPI in Cairo reported that a third letter was in preparation for despatch from Sadat to Begin. In the letter, Egypt was said to have repeated its stand on the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and to have asked Israel to "soften its policies" in the occupied territories.⁹⁰

2.2.4 International Reaction

More interest in the European reaction to the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem was shown by the *Guardian* than by *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*. Shortly after the passing of the Jerusalem Bill, the EEC (European Economic Community) governments were reported in the *Guardian* to have sent a message to Israel, pointing out the contradiction between the Bill and UN Resolution 242. The EEC was particularly concerned about Prime Minister Begin's plan to move the Israeli government's headquarters to East Jerusalem. However, this event was mentioned only in passing by Patrick Keatley, the *Guardian*'s diplomatic correspondent: "The joint message to Israel from the nine EEC governments in response to Mr. Begin's plan to..., will

⁸⁷ *Guardian*, 5 August 1980, p. 5.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Guardian*, 12 August 1980, p. 6. For further details about the consequences, see below in this thesis: "Contextualization and Decontextualization" and "International Reaction".

advise him that if he does so, he will be violating the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution 242.”⁹¹

The US Administration’s concern about the resumption of the negotiations was included in a report by Arie Haskel from Jerusalem: “The US State Department said yesterday it hoped that the talks could soon be resumed, but officials said privately that the latest crisis was serious and could lead to a suspension of the faltering negotiations.”⁹²

The American Secretary of State, Mr Edmund Muskie, was reported to have told the magazine *US News and World Report*: “Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem as part of its capital does not settle its status in the Palestinian autonomy talks with Egypt.”⁹³

In its leader, the *Guardian* suggested a “desirable path for Europe”, that is, working on a new peace formula in the Middle East. However, there was the possibility of more serious developments taking place in the region faster than the implementation of this formula. The *Guardian* suggested that Europe should wait for the new US Administration and the new Israeli government to take office, and then to encourage the United States to call for a “comprehensive” peace conference to develop a practical formula on the basis of UN Resolution 242.

It can be concluded that the cornerstone of the suggested formula was the amendment of the Camp David peace treaty. However, Europe would need to exercise “tact” in this regard. The *Guardian* made it clear – and it was “demonstrated” at Venice – that the value of the Camp David peace treaty needed to be acknowledged somehow.

Ecuador’s Ambassador was reported in the *Guardian* to have referred to the decision taken by Venezuela and Uruguay to transfer their embassies from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. The Israeli Foreign Minister was told that Ecuador was doing so “in protest at Israel’s” new Law on Jerusalem. However, the Israeli Foreign Minister was

⁹¹ *Guardian*, 30 August 1980, p. 5.

⁹² *Guardian*, 5 August 1980, p. 5.

⁹³ *Guardian*, 11 August 1980, p. 4.

reported to have blamed the Arabs' "heavy pressure" for the decision and their use of the Bill on Jerusalem as a "pretext" for influencing Ecuador's move.⁹⁴

Referring to the UN resolution, Israel was reported to have criticized Britain among other European countries for what the Israeli spokesman described as lending "their hand to decisions which they themselves know [are irrelevant to the] true reality [in Jerusalem]".

2.2.4.1 UNSC Resolution 478

No attention was given by the *Guardian* to the UNSC's resolution condemning the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem until the Israeli reaction (though not the text of the resolution) was reported by Eric Silver from that city on 22 August.⁹⁵ More details were to come later in the article, together with statements and comments.

Meanwhile, a news story reported Mr Shamir's message to the American Ambassador in Israel, M. Samuel Lewis, following the United States' abstention from the vote at the United Nations.⁹⁶ Israel's expression of its disappointment provided an opportunity to mention that Mr Muskie "had himself denounced as improper a section of the resolution calling on all governments with embassies in Israel to remove them."⁹⁷

The spokesperson for the Israeli Foreign Ministry was reported as "dismissing" the resolution, stating that it would not change Israel's stance on Jerusalem,⁹⁸ nor would it "undermine the status of Jerusalem."⁹⁹ He described the resolution as a decision made by others who had "nothing in common with the true reality prevailing in Jerusalem."¹⁰⁰ Probably, he was referring to the Arab leaders and diplomats at the UN and their assumed ignorance of the changes that took place in the city since the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967.¹⁰¹

⁹⁴ *Guardian*, 21 August 1980, p. 4.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁹⁷ See Chapter One.

2.2.6 Sources

Unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian* had no correspondent in Egypt while that country and Israel were exchanging letters on Jerusalem. The news from both sides was reported mostly by Arie Haskel from Jerusalem and sometimes from news agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press and UPI.¹⁰² Reuters reported the Arab reaction mainly from Beirut. However, the news of Sadat's letters was also reported from that city, though by David Hirst, six days before Reuters' contribution. Arie Haskel reported Prince Fahd's statement from Jerusalem.¹⁰³

Details of Sadat's letter to Prime Minister Begin concerning the suspension of the peace talks between the United States, Egypt and Israel regarding Palestinian autonomy and Jerusalem were reported by Arie Haskel from that city. However, the Israeli Cabinet did not publish the letter. Was this because the *Guardian* had no correspondent in Cairo at the time, or because the Egyptian government itself had not published anything about the letter.¹⁰⁴ There was no clear indication of the reason.

Statements by the US State Department and the US official were also reported from Jerusalem. However, there was no reference to the source of the news in Israel, whether it was a television channel, a newspaper, or an Israeli official.¹⁰⁵

The former Egyptian Foreign Minister's statement to the Egyptian daily newspaper *al-Sha'ab* about the Israeli reaction was quoted in a report by David Hirst – the *Guardian*'s Middle East correspondent in Beirut – about Sadat's conditions for the resumption of the talks with Israel.¹⁰⁶

The plans and movements of the Egyptian politicians were reported in the *Guardian* by Arie Haskel from Israel, and it was clear that the source was an Israeli official: "It was learned that Mr Mubarak would be going to Western Europe, the

¹⁰² *Guardian*, 11 August 1980, p. 4; 12 August 1980, p. 6; and 18 August 1980, p. 5.

¹⁰³ *Guardian*, 14 August 1980, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴ *Guardian*, 5 August 1980, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Guardian*, 6 August 1980, p. 4.

Foreign Minister, Mr Kamal Hassan Ali, to the United Nations, and the Minister of State, Mr Botrus Gali, to Romania.”¹⁰⁷

Between 14 and 22 August 1980, the *Guardian* had no news story about the Middle East from any of its correspondents. During this period, the *Guardian* published only a few articles about developments in the Middle East. All of these articles were contributed by the news agencies Reuters and UPI from Jerusalem, and AP from Cairo.¹⁰⁸ Like many other news stories, contributions covering the UNSC’s resolution were reported from Jerusalem.¹⁰⁹ This is probably due to the fact that the *Guardian* had had no correspondent at the United Nations at that time.

However, the Israeli reaction was reported in detail in the *Guardian*, ranging from the Foreign Minister to the Israeli spokespersons. There was no report of any other reaction or comment on the resolution. No one, apart from the Israeli politicians, was quoted in the news story, which was confined solely to Resolution 478. There was no reference to the Arabs or any reaction to the proposed neutral negotiator such as Europe or even the United States.¹¹⁰ This may be attributed to the absence of a correspondent in the Arab countries and in New York, the headquarters of the United Nations. Yet, there were other UN resolutions that were also not reported in the *Guardian*.

2.2.7 Contextualization and Decontextualization

Following Prince Fahd’s statement, a wider context for the Israeli Bill was given in the *Guardian*’s leader, highlighting the importance of the Prince’s speech and the weight of the Saudi action: “Saudi Arabia and Iraq can form a more convincing coalition to put pressure on the West than a Syrian-led hotch potch relying on the Soviet Union.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ *Guardian*, 12 August 1980, p. 6. The first corresponding between Cairo and Tel-Aviv was via Romania, when Begin during an official visit informed the Romanian President, Nicolae Ceausescu, of his interest in a direct dialogue with Egypt. According to Sayigh & Shlaim, this happened in late August 1977.

¹⁰⁸ *Guardian*, 18 August 1980, p. 5; 21 August 1980, p. 4; 27 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ *Guardian*, 22 August 1980, p. 6.

¹¹⁰ *Guardian*, 22 August 1980, p. 6.

¹¹¹ *Guardian*, 15 August 1980, p. 10.

The Arab states were expected to compare the American and European attitudes towards imposing economic sanctions on Iran for not complying with UN resolutions, but not on Israel despite the use of the veto at the UNSC by the UN. The *Guardian* also thought that Europe would be criticized for abstaining from the vote on the proposal presented to the UNGA, condemning the Israeli occupation and demanding that Israel begin withdrawing from the occupied territories. The newspaper argued that owing to the sanctions being ordered against Iran, in spite of the Soviet Union's veto in the Security Council, the West would be accused by the Arabs of having a "selective" interest in justice in the Middle East.¹¹² In giving this argument a practical meaning, the *Guardian* suggested that the "charge" made by the Arabs against the West had led to the "threat" of what was called "none too subtle fluctuations in the oil supply."¹¹³

2.2.8 Historical and General Background

The *Guardian*'s leader referred to Britain's role in the creation of Israel in 1948, in a discussion of the Israeli view of the UN's attitude towards and resolutions on Jerusalem: "[Israel] owes its de facto existence to the creation by Britain of a logical impossibility – a home for the Jews without disturbing the Arabs."¹¹⁴

Judging by his news story about Prime Minister Begin's decision to revive the "annual Jerusalem's march",¹¹⁵ it sounds as though Eric Silver had a reasonable amount of information and background knowledge about the topic. The correspondent included details such as that thousands of soldiers and civilians would participate in the march, which had been cancelled the year before owing to the enormous cost, but this year would take place on 30 September.¹¹⁶ This could indicate that the knowledge of the correspondent about a particular topic does influence the amount of information he/she provides in his or her news reports. Presumably, the Israeli government made this information available to him since he

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10.

¹¹⁵ No further details were provided about this march in the news story.

¹¹⁶ *Guardian*, 22 August 1980, p. 6.

was reporting from Israel. Therefore, it could be argued that the location of the correspondent does influence the presentation of the news.

Eric Silver also provided a historical background to the relationship between The Netherlands and Israel. However, he repeated the fact that The Netherlands was the only European country with an embassy in Jerusalem:

Holland...has been a consistent friend to Israel, standing by Israel in the days of the 1973 war and oil embargo, and continuing to present its interests. ...the Dutch established their embassy in Jerusalem after Israel attained independence in 1948.¹¹⁷

2.2.9 Terminology

Just a day or two after the passage of the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem, the *Guardian's* leader used the term "reunited" in its discussion of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem following its occupation in the 1967 War.¹¹⁸ Arie Haskel generally referred to "East Jerusalem" in his news stories about the crisis,¹¹⁹ although on several occasions he expanded it to "Arab East Jerusalem."¹²⁰ However, the description "occupied" was never applied to East Jerusalem, although it was linked indirectly to the West Bank and Gaza in a few of his news stories. In the news stories contributed by David Hirst in Beirut and Reuters in Jerusalem, the description "occupied" is used in the sense of the "settlements in occupied lands".¹²¹ "East Jerusalem" is described only once by the *Guardian* as a part of the "occupied Jordan West Bank" in a report on Egypt's position as presented by Mr Butros Gali, the Egyptian Foreign Minister.¹²²

The Israeli terminology describing Jerusalem as Israel's "indivisible and eternal capital" was used quite often in the *Guardian*, indeed, in almost every item. However, it was not enclosed by quotation marks on every occasion. UPI and

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10.

¹¹⁹ *Guardian*, 4 August 1980, p. 5; 12 August 1980, p. 6 (sourced from Reuters); 30 August 1980, p. 5.

¹²⁰ *Guardian*, 5 August 1980, p. 5; 11 August 1980, p. 4.

¹²¹ *Guardian*, 12 August 1980, p. 6; 18 August 1980, p. 5.

¹²² *Guardian*, 11 August 1980, p. 4.

Reuters did use quotation marks here, although Arie Haskel did not do so.¹²³ When Jerusalem was mentioned as the Israeli capital, Israel was called “the Jewish state”, and Jerusalem the “Jewish capital”.¹²⁴ These expressions seem to have been in general use not only by the *Guardian*’s correspondents, Arie Haskel and Eric Silver, but also by Reuters and the UPI.¹²⁵

Although it could be argued that the Press normally uses the words and terminology of politicians, it could be asked whether the high frequency of quotations could result in the over-promotion of claims and arguments of a particular actor. Consequently, the balance between this sort of news discourse and the principle of objectivity should also be questioned.

2.2.13 Conclusion

It was clearly stated in the *Guardian* that Israel would not comply with the UN resolutions unless they “coincide[d]” with Israel’s interests from the Israeli point of view. According to the newspaper, there was no possibility, explicit or implicit, of imposing any kind of sanctions or pressure on Israel. Nor was there any mention of the lack of legitimacy and legality of Israel’s policies, legislation and even actions.

In short, the *Guardian*’s argument could be interpreted as a new, wider formula for peace, which was in Europe’s economic interests. For this formula to be put into action, it was to be in Israel’s interests as understood by the Israelis. There was no emphasis on international law, the UN resolutions or even the interests of the Arabs to be taken into account. Nor were there any recommendations for the basis of the new formula or other conditions apart from “Israel’s interests” and the “comprehension” of the participants.¹²⁶ Since a comprehensive participation was “needed”, Jordan was the party proposed to play a leading role in the administration of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict was the

¹²³ *Guardian*, 11 August 1980, p. 4; 12 August 1980, p. 6; 18 August 1980, p. 5.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6; 30 August 1980, p. 5.

¹²⁵ *Guardian*, 12 August 1980, p. 6; 21 August 1980, p. 4; 22 August 1980, p. 6.

¹²⁶ *Guardian*, 15 August 1980, p. 10.

only aspect highlighted in the article, the Arab dimension being presented as a consequence of the Palestinian response.¹²⁷

2.3 *Daily Telegraph*

The *Daily Telegraph* published a front-page news story about the Israeli Bill just one day after it was passed by the Israeli Knesset. However, although the article presented the Israeli point of view, the internal opposition to the Bill, as well as the American argument, there was no mention of the Arab point of view or even any Arab connection with Jerusalem. There were no answers to the very simple questions: Why will the Bill upset the Arabs, or the “800 million” Muslims? And why is Egypt expected to be angry and to suspend negotiations with Israel? Even occupied East Jerusalem, which was sometimes called Arab East Jerusalem, was referred to here as “East Jerusalem” which was annexed by Israel. The information about the city stopped just there.¹²⁸

The *Daily Telegraph* was the only newspaper to publish a news story describing Britain’s opposition to Prime Minister Begin’s plan to relocate his government headquarters to East Jerusalem.¹²⁹

Like the *Guardian* and *The Times*, the *Daily Telegraph* published details of the Israeli government’s meeting to consider a reply to Sadat’s letter about Jerusalem and the discussions of the Special Committee, which had been charged with the task of writing the reply.¹³⁰

The *Daily Telegraph*’s leader sent a warning message to Israel to beware of its “time machine”, for it could not control the consequences of its policies in the West Bank and Gaza as well as in Jerusalem.

The *Daily Telegraph* was the first newspaper to publish a news story about the Arabs’ reaction to the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem. It was contributed by John

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 1980, p. 4.

¹²⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 2 August 1980, p. 5.

¹³⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 5 August 1980, p. 4.

Bullock of the newspaper's diplomatic staff six days before the topic appeared in the *Guardian* and seven days before it appeared in *The Times*.¹³¹

Of the three broadsheets, the *Daily Telegraph* was the only newspaper to publish a news story about the Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, calling on Muslims to wage a jihad against the Bill on Jerusalem.¹³² The *Daily Telegraph's* reporting of this story about Iran may be understood as an indication of its tendency in presenting the conflict as a religious conflict between Muslims and Jews rather than a national or political dispute. Other indications of this trend are pointed out throughout this section.¹³³

In line with its interest in reporting more news about the United States than about Europe, the *Daily Telegraph* was the only newspaper to publish a report, contributed by its correspondent in Jerusalem, Maier Asher, regarding Israel's request for aid from the United States.¹³⁴ It was also the only newspaper to report the thirteen American Senators' appeal to Mr Muskie to veto the UNSC's Resolution on Jerusalem.¹³⁵

2.3.1 The Bill on Jerusalem

Yuri Avenri, a left-wing Israeli MP, was quoted describing the Bill as a "worthless piece of paper" that would "close the doors to peace between Israel and the Middle East nations." Moreover, he interpreted it as a "declaration of war to 800 million Moslems."¹³⁶ This may be seen as another indication of the newspaper's emphasis on the religious side of the conflict.

In the *Daily Telegraph's* news story, Maier Asher gave further information on the circumstances in which the vote took place: "[the] vote cut across party lines", and although the opposition voted in favour of it, "many MPs...were against the law in principle."¹³⁷

¹³¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 8 August 1980, p. 4; *Guardian*, 14 August 1980, p. 5; *The Times*, 15 August 1980, pp. 1 & 4.

¹³² *Daily Telegraph*, 11 August 1980, p. 4.

¹³³ See Chapter Five, section 3.

¹³⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 21 August 1980, p. 4.

¹³⁵ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 August 1980, p. 4.

¹³⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 1980, p. 4.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

Mr Muskie was reported to be “accusing” Israel of “endangering peace by unilateral actions”, with reference to the Bill.¹³⁸ It was described as “the law sanctioning the annexation of East Jerusalem as part of Israel’s united capital.”¹³⁹

“Israel’s new law reaffirming East Jerusalem as part of the Israeli capital” was how the Bill was described in Maier Asher’s news story about the Israeli reply to Sadat’s letter a few days after the former was approved in the Knesset.¹⁴⁰

According to Begin in his letter to Sadat, the Bill “confirmed East Jerusalem as part of the ‘united Israeli capital’”.¹⁴¹ However, according to a quotation from Prince Fahd in the same news story, it was an act of “Zionist religious and racist arrogance”. The *Daily Telegraph* was the only newspaper to quote this part of the statement.¹⁴² This may be seen as another indication of the emphasis of religious presentation of the conflict in the newspaper.¹⁴³

Nabila Megalli described the new Bill as “the Israeli law annexing East Jerusalem”.¹⁴⁴ She quoted from Sadat’s first letter on the Bill: “the Israeli Government’s attitude was ‘poisoning’ the atmosphere”.¹⁴⁵ The inconsistencies of the descriptions given by the various correspondents reporting and quoting different sources indicate the influence of the news sources on the news discourse.¹⁴⁶

2.3.2 Reaction from the Arabs

John Bullock wrote: “Ten Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia and Iraq, have threatened economic reprisals against any country which accepts Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.”¹⁴⁷

Prince Fahd’s statement was quoted by David Adamson in the *Daily Telegraph*, and even comprised one of the subtitles of the news stories. However, the

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 5 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁴⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 6 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁴¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 12 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁴² *Daily Telegraph*, 15 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁴³ Chapter Five, section 2.

¹⁴⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 16 August 1980, p. 5.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ See Chapter Six, section 2; & Chapter Five, section 3.

¹⁴⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 8 August 1980, p. 4.

story itself was not located on the front page as in *The Times*. David Adamson attributed a religious significance to the Prince's statement: "The Prince was speaking in the role of spokesman for the country which is regarded as the chief defender of the faith."¹⁴⁸ According to the correspondent, whose contribution was the only article on this topic in the *Daily Telegraph*, the only reason for the importance of Prince Fahd's statement was the oil threat to the world, particularly the United States. He commented: "considerations lend weight to any statement coming from that quarter, even if the military potential of Iraq and Saudi Arabia is not highly regarded."¹⁴⁹

David Adamson presented the following interpretation of Prince Fahd's statement concerning the Israeli Bill – although without naming the interpreter: "Crown Prince Fahd's cautiously phrased call for a Jihad, or holy war against Israel, is being interpreted as a warning to the West, rather than as an attempt to launch a new Middle East war."¹⁵⁰ However, the correspondent himself explained the Prince's statement that the Arabs had "gained nothing [from being] moderate": "[This] remark...indicates that the Iraqi radicals and the Saudi monarchists have been brought together by Israel's incorporation of Arab East Jerusalem."¹⁵¹ This can be said to mark the first and only indirect reference to Israel's responsibility for the "threat" made by Prince Fahd to the "west".

2.3.3 International Reaction

David Adamson wrote in the *Daily Telegraph*: "American and west European pressure failed to prevent" the passing of the Israeli Bill.¹⁵² He reported the unpublicized intention of the Foreign Office to instruct the British Embassy in Tel Aviv to refrain from any involvement with Prime Minister Begin's plan to move his

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. For further details of what was written about the oil in these countries, see section 2.3.6 in this thesis: "Information and Background".

¹⁵⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 15 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 2 August 1980, p. 5.

government's headquarters to East Jerusalem. In addition, he reported that on the previous day Lord Hailsham had told the Foreign Secretary regarding Britain's position on the conflict over Jerusalem that "Israel's rights in East Jerusalem did not extend beyond those of an occupying power."¹⁵³

However, although Britain's reaction to Prime Minister Begin's removal plans was reported in the *Daily Telegraph*, there was no mention of the international reaction to the Bill itself apart from a general reference included in the United States and Europe's opposition to this latest action by the Israelis.¹⁵⁴

2.3.3.1 UNSC RESOLUTION 487

The *Daily Telegraph*'s leader described the UN vote, before it was passed, as a "huge extremist anti-Israel vote".¹⁵⁵ However, both *The Times* and the *Guardian* reported only the Israeli reaction.¹⁵⁶ The *Daily Telegraph*'s item was a brief front-page story under the heading "Late News".¹⁵⁷ There was no mention of the Israeli Bill concerning Jerusalem, which had provoked the passing of the resolution, nor that part of the resolution concerning Israel's official annexation of the city, including occupied East Jerusalem.

Two news stories were published two days after the UNSC resolution. Maier Asher reported from Jerusalem that the Jewish leaders were "angry" at the US stance at the UN vote, declaring that the resolution "condemn[ed]" the Israeli Bill.¹⁵⁸ A.J. McIlory from New York also reported Israel's "condemnation" of the United States for the same reason and that it was "attacking" the UN resolution as well. Israel was said to be "disappointed" with the American stance, for it did not match Israel's "expectations" of the United States.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 1980, p. 4; 2 August 1980, p. 5.

¹⁵⁵ *Daily Telegraph*, 5 August 1980, p. 12.

¹⁵⁶ *The Times*, 22 August 1980, p. 1; *Guardian*, 22 August 1980, p. 6.

¹⁵⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 21 August 1980, p. 1. The news item was not even noticeable, for it was quite small and set at the foot of the front page.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

In the appeal by the thirteen American senators to Mr Muskie, the resolution was defined as a “one-sided punitive action against Israel”.¹⁶⁰ A.J. McIlory reported Mr Muskie’s description of the resolution as “‘fundamentally flawed’ because it censured only Israel, without condemning ‘violence against Israel or efforts to undermine Israel’s security’.”¹⁶¹

2.3.4 Jerusalem

Nabila Megalli, in her news story about Sadat from Mount Sinai, reported that he had appealed “to the world to contribute to the three-in-one religious complex he hope[d] to build on that sacred spot and thereby symbolise ‘Peace on Earth’.” He “declined to enter into politics over Jerusalem”. Nevertheless, Jerusalem was the centre of interest for Sadat, Israel, Europe, the Arabs and the United States.¹⁶² It was the month of Ramadan and the Islamic ‘Eid was being celebrated, and Sadat could have commented on the connection between the holy city and the Muslims. However, there was no mention of that by either the President or the correspondent. Since the correspondent had an Arabic name, she should have been aware of the city and its significance for the Muslims.

Prime Minister Begin’s letter to Sadat was quoted regarding Jerusalem: “I have never misled you. I have repeatedly declared that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and is indivisible.”¹⁶³ In Maier Asher’s news story about Israel’s denunciation of America’s stance at the UNSC, East Jerusalem was described as being “mainly inhabited by Arabs” without any mention of the fact that it was an occupied territory.¹⁶⁴

In a quotation from Prince Fahd’s statement, Jerusalem was described as “the third most holy city in Islam, ranking after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia.”¹⁶⁵

2.3.5 Sources

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² *Daily Telegraph*, 7 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁶⁵ *Daily Telegraph*, 15 August 1980, p. 4.

Although the *Daily Telegraph* had a correspondent in Cairo, it had none in any of other Arab capitals such as Riyadh. The newspaper's story about Prince Fahd's statement on Jerusalem was reported by David Adamson, the diplomatic editor in London, without any reference to the origin of the report.¹⁶⁶

In the *Daily Telegraph*'s news story about Israel's anger at the United States' stance at the UNSC, Maier Asher reported the reactions and comments of many Israeli politicians. They included Mayor Teddy Kollek, Mr Yitzak Shamir and Mr Shimon Peres. The last-named, who was the Labour opposition leader, was reported to have said that the US abstention "had enabled [the] 'anti-Israel resolution to be adopted'".¹⁶⁷ However, the correspondent did not include any comments on the resolution from a UN spokesperson, or any Arab spokesperson or politician.¹⁶⁸

Mr Yitzak Shamir was reported to have attributed Egypt's "hard-line" attitude towards Israel – referring to President Sadat's comments and the postponement of the talks on Palestinian autonomy following the Israeli Bill – to the "decisions of the EEC in Venice". Another factor "encouraging" Egypt to pursue its "hard line over Jerusalem" and "make it harder to reach an agreement" with Israel was what Mr Shamir called "manifestations", such as the UNGA session "condemning Israel" and the International Women's Conference in Copenhagen.¹⁶⁹

2.3.5 Contextualization and Decontextualization

The *Daily Telegraph* placed the Bill in a wider context by quoting Mr Avenri's warning to Prime Minister Begin that the "800 million Moslems" might consider it to be a "declaration of war".¹⁷⁰ The reason given for the view of many Israeli MPs that the Bill was "against the law" was their "awareness" of President Carter's and Mr Muskie's "warnings".¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 15 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁶⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 12 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁷⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 1980, p. 4.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

According to Maier Asher, the US Administration had given the following “argument” or warning about the Bill. It had been difficult for the United States to persuade Sadat to resume the negotiations on Palestinian autonomy after their first suspension, that is, three months before the Bill. So it would be “impossible” for the United States to bring Sadat back to the negotiations if the Bill was passed.¹⁷²

However, the American argument was confronted with the Israeli argument in favour of the Bill, which was summarized in the following statement: “Israeli sources rejected the US line, saying that at Camp David, Israel had expressly refused to include Jerusalem in the Accords and had made it clear that the whole of Jerusalem was considered Israel’s capital.”¹⁷³

It was not clear whether what was described in Maier Asher’s story as a “conclusion” was “drawn” by the observers or by the correspondent himself. The conclusion referred to Sadat’s resumption of the talks on Palestinian autonomy. The Egyptian President was thought to hope that the United States would apply pressure on Israel concerning Jerusalem. However, this would not be possible before the US elections, for within the United States the influence of the Jewish vote had to be taken into consideration.¹⁷⁴

The *Daily Telegraph*’s leader presented the UN vote as “one example of how Russia is able to exploit the Arab–Israeli dispute to distract attention from Afghanistan.”¹⁷⁵ Here the *Daily Telegraph* was connecting the conflict over Jerusalem to the Cold War.

Prince Fahd’s statement and what was described as his call for a holy war against Israel was separated from the conflict over Jerusalem and, in particular, the Israeli Bill concerning the city. However, it was linked with the Prince’s new contact with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. According to David Adamson, “The

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 5 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 15 August 1980, p. 4.

Prince...issued his statement a week after the first visit to Riyadh of the Middle East's most formidable Arab hard-liner, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq."¹⁷⁶ As in

the *Guardian's* and *The Times's* news stories about Prince Fahd's statement, the *Daily Telegraph* made a direct connection between the statement and the oil threat. However, the *Guardian* and *The Times* gave more attention than did David Adamson in the *Daily Telegraph* to the relationship between the West and the Arabs.¹⁷⁷

The day after Sadat's letter was sent to Prime Minister Begin, Maier Asher contributed a news story about Israel's request to the United States for aid because of the Israeli government's "need [to] be ready to face Egypt in a future war with the Arabs." According to the correspondent,

Special attention is paid to the request for security and strategic needs, in view of the large arms deliveries to Arab countries not only by the Soviet Union but also by the United States and the need to maintain the arms balance.¹⁷⁸

This could be interpreted as yet another example of the influence of the Cold War on the news report in the *Daily Telegraph*.

2.3.6 Information and Background

When writing about Begin's reply to Sadat's letter concerning the Bill, Maier Asher described the basis of Egypt's demand, which referred to the earlier Camp David Accords. He discussed the "factual" reply expected by Israel, which was intended to separate the new conflict over Jerusalem from the talks on Palestinian autonomy.¹⁷⁹ One could ask whether it would have been out of context here for the correspondent to point out that East Jerusalem was part of the West Bank, which had been occupied by Israel in 1967, and ask where Palestinian autonomy was supposed to be implemented.

In the same article, Maier Asher stated that Egypt had suspended the talks with Israel on Palestinian autonomy once already since their beginning in May in the same year.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid; *The Times*, 15 August 1980, pp. 1, 10 & 11; *Guardian*, 15 August 1980, p. 10.

¹⁷⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 16 August 1980, p. 5.

¹⁷⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 5 August 1980, p. 4.

Both suspensions were the result of events affecting Jerusalem.¹⁸⁰ On the following day, Doctor Durg, the Minister of the Interior and a negotiator at the talks, was quoted as saying: "Egypt has suspended the autonomy talks three times this year."¹⁸¹ He blamed Egypt for the suspension of the talks, without any reference to Israel's new law on Jerusalem as one of the reasons for Egypt's action.

2.3.9 Terminology

Maier Asher, John Bullock and David Adamson all referred to "East Jerusalem". John Bullock and David Adamson, as members of the *Daily Telegraph's* Diplomatic Staff, added the description "Arab", which was not used by Maier Asher, the newspaper's correspondent in Jerusalem. Nabila Megalli also referred to "East Jerusalem" without the addition of "Arab" or "occupied". However, she used the expression "occupied Arab territory" when referring to the West Bank.¹⁸² Although the expression "occupied East Jerusalem" was used in the *Daily Telegraph's* leader on the Bill, the word "occupied" was not included in the news stories by the correspondents.¹⁸³ This may indicate a degree of independence that the correspondents enjoy over their textual choices in their news reports.

Moreover, in his report on Mr Kollek's comments on the governments who had ordered their embassies to move from Jerusalem, Maier Asher referred to Jerusalem as "the capital of Israel"; " [Israel's] united capital"; and "East Jerusalem" was presented as "part of Israel's capital".¹⁸⁴ In the same news story the Bill was described as "the incorporation of East Jerusalem".¹⁸⁵ One might ask whether the use of these expressions was due to the political discourse to which the correspondent was exposed, or whether it was an expression of his personal opinion.

2.3.10 Conclusion

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 6 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁸² *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 1980, p. 4; 6 August 1980, p. 4; 8 August 1980, p. 4; 12 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁸³ *Daily Telegraph*, 5 August 1980, p. 12.

¹⁸⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 August 1980, p. 4; 6 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁸⁵ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 August 1980, p. 4.

There was extensive coverage by the *Daily Telegraph* of the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem and its consequences. However, although Israel's argument concerning the city was well documented in most of the news stories, that of the Palestinians, the Arabs and the Muslims was not given the same coverage. Nor was there any answer to the question of why the Palestinians, the Arabs and the Muslims should be interested in the fate of the city or why they should object to the Israeli Bill. Sadat was concerned about Jerusalem and commented on it and the Israeli Bill. Yet, no clear connection or explanation was given regarding the President's comments by the newspaper's correspondent in Egypt, Nabila Megalli.¹⁸⁶

Israel's reference to the whole of Jerusalem as its "united capital" was repeated in almost every news story. Maier Asher used the same expression more than four times in a news story,¹⁸⁷ and many other members of the newspaper's staff repeated it as well.¹⁸⁸

All the Israeli news concentrated on the Israeli Bill and its consequences. The only news stories published about Yasser Arafat and the PLO, where the Palestinians were mentioned, were those highlighted by Israel. During the period under examination, the *Daily Telegraph* as well as the *Guardian* and *The Times* were reporting the same news story and discussing it in their leaders. It was the investigation into whether the PLO did or did not pass a resolution making their aim the destruction of Israel.¹⁸⁹ It also raised the question of whether Yasser Arafat and the PLO were moderates or extremists.

In its discussions of the Israeli Bill, the *Daily Telegraph* referred to Israeli "anger", "expectations", "suggestions" and needs. There was no mention of the rights or even the existence of the Palestinian Muslims and Christians in occupied East Jerusalem in more than 22 news stories published in August 1980.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 7 August 1980, p. 4; 16 August 1980, p. 5.

¹⁸⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 6 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁸⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 1980, p. 4; 2 August 1980, p. 5; 5 August 1980, p. 4; 8 August 1980, p. 4; 22 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 August 1980, p. 4.

2.4 Conclusion

In the ongoing news of the discussion about the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem, Yasser Arafat was reported to have been asked whether or not the PLO was committed to the “elimination” of Israel. This was the theme on which the reporting and assessment of the PLO leader was based in all three newspapers,¹⁹¹ despite the fact that the resolution¹⁹² was supposed to have been passed in May of that year at the annual general meeting of the Palestinian Congress.¹⁹³

It was clear that the Israeli government and, in particular, Mr Shamir were aware of public opinion and the possible influence of the media in the continuing conflict over Jerusalem. Mr Shamir was reported to have connected present-day politics with the way in which events were covered in the news. He was quoted telling Israel’s Ambassadors: “Whatever the case, Egypt is wrong if it believes it could wring concessions from Israel by using hostile propaganda.”¹⁹⁴ He made the following suggestion to solve Israel’s problems: “A balanced picture of the situation has to be presented to the world.”¹⁹⁵ One may wonder about his perception of this “balanced picture”.

It seems that the *Daily Telegraph*’s correspondent in Jerusalem shared Mr Shamir’s ideas concerning the possible influence of the media. In the first few lines of the above news story, he wrote:

The chances of renewing the Palestinian autonomy talks practically vanished yesterday when Israel and Egypt forsook diplomatic discretion and embarked on open mutual recriminations in the media, each claiming that the other was responsible for placing obstacles in the way of an agreement.¹⁹⁶

From the aspect of personalization, part of the stories about Jerusalem referred mainly to Begin, Sadat, and, to a lesser degree, Prince Fahd, followed by Mr Gaston

¹⁹¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 1 August 1980, p. 4; *The Times*, 8 August 1980, p. 13; *Guardian*, 1 August 1980, p. 10.

¹⁹² The PLO resolution on the organization’s dedication to the destruction of Israel.

¹⁹³ *Daily Telegraph*, 1 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁹⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 12 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

Thorn or President Carter.¹⁹⁷ However, the city of Jerusalem itself was seldom mentioned in the headline. In the *Daily Telegraph*, of the 23 headlines about the crisis, 12 items, or 52 per cent of the headlines, named one or two politicians. *The Times* held the same attitude though to a lesser degree: only 9 out of 25 headlines, or 36 per cent of the total, included names. The lowest level was in the *Guardian*, where only 4 of the 15 headlines, or 27 per cent carried one or more names.

Jerusalem and the Arabs were mentioned more often in *The Times*' headlines than in those of the other two daily broadsheets. The Palestinians were included once in a headline in *The Times*, although there was no reference to them, to Palestine or to the PLO in the *Daily Telegraph* or the *Guardian*.¹⁹⁸ Israel, with 52 per cent of the total names mentioned in the *Guardian*, had the highest rating, which equalled that of the Arabs in the *Daily Telegraph*, although it was lower than that of the Arabs in *The Times*.

Only four photographs were published in the three newspapers during the period under examination. There was one in the *Daily Telegraph* of Sadat at Mount Sinai, and one in the *Guardian* of the father of an Israeli soldier attending his son's funeral.¹⁹⁹ *The Times* was the only newspaper to publish a photograph of Jerusalem, although all three newspapers had included Jerusalem in the headlines of their news stories on the same day as the publication of the photographs.²⁰⁰

The *Daily Telegraph* and the *Guardian* published the news story about Prince Fahd's statement one day earlier than *The Times*, which gave more attention to the statement in terms of space, location and leader and comment.

The newspapers' coverage of the 1980 diplomatic crisis over Jerusalem shows the level of influence that the news sources may have had on the news discourse. Although there were references to Arab sources such as Sadat, Prince Fahd and

¹⁹⁷ See Chapter Five, section 2.

¹⁹⁸ *The Times*, 5 August 1980, p. 6; 18 August 1980, p. 13; *Daily Telegraph*, 2 August 1980, p. 5; 11 August 1980, p. 4.

¹⁹⁹ The Israeli soldier was reported to have been killed in an Israeli raid on South Lebanon a few days earlier.

²⁰⁰ *The Times*, 8 August 1980, p. 6; *Guardian*, 21 August 1980, p. 4; *Daily Telegraph*, 7 August 1980, p. 4.

others, unlike the newspapers' coverage of 1967, yet the Israeli sources were dominant in the news.

Concerning the Arab and Muslim aspects of the story, the focus of the three newspapers was on the oil trade, the threat against Israel, and the relationship between West and East. The last point was related to the "search for 'home town' angles" of the news.²⁰¹

The reporting of news about Jerusalem during these events is of particular importance. For the city is considered the crucial issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The dispute over Jerusalem was highlighted as the main cause of the failure of the peace negotiations at Camp David, and the peace initiative was rejected by the visit of Ariel Sharon, the leader of the Israeli right-wing Likud Party, to Haram al-Sharif.

Therefore, it is necessary to know what news was published or not published under the heading of Jerusalem, how it was reported and what picture of the city was portrayed by each newspaper.

This chapter examines the reporting of these events concerning Jerusalem. It discusses the presentation of the peace talks at Camp David, the Peace Initiative and, briefly, how the two parties, the Palestinians and the Israelis, were portrayed in the press. It pays particular attention to the presentation of the city of Jerusalem and its holy sites, and which part of the city was highlighted in the newspapers' reports, comments and leaders. It specifies which news stories were connected with Jerusalem by being reported under that heading, and which were not, what interested newspapers and their correspondents, and what was secondary in their view.

The chapter is divided into four sections, each of the earlier three sections is devoted to analyzing the published material during the period under examination in this chapter. In the last section, the fourth section is a comparison between the presentations of the events being reported between the three collected newspapers.

²⁰¹ Howard Tumber (ed.), *Media Power, Professionals and Policies* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 201.

Chapter Three

Initial observation: July- October 2000

0. Introduction

This chapter gives a general observation of what was reported about Jerusalem during the Camp David Summit II in July 2000 and the New Intifada in September and October 2000.

The reporting of news about Jerusalem during these events is of particular importance, for the city is considered the crucial issue in the Arab–Israeli conflict. The dispute over Jerusalem was highlighted as the main cause of the failure of the peace negotiations at Camp David, and the New Intifada was provoked by the visit of Ariel Sharon, the leader of the Israeli right-wing Likud Party, to Haram al-Sharif. Therefore, it is necessary to know what news was published or not published under the heading of Jerusalem, how it was reported and what picture of the city was presented by each newspaper.

This chapter focuses on the reporting of two events concerning Jerusalem. It discusses the presentation of the peace talks at Camp David, the New Intifada and, briefly, how the two parties, the Palestinians and the Israelis, were portrayed in the press. It pays particular attention to the presentation of the city of Jerusalem and its holy sites, and which part of the city was highlighted in the newspapers' reports, comments and leaders. It specifies which news stories were connected with Jerusalem by being reported under that heading, and which were not, what interested newspapers and their correspondents, and what was newsworthy in their view.

The chapter is divided into four sections; each of the earlier three sections is devoted to analyse the published material during the period under examination in this chapter in one of the newspapers; the fourth section is a comparison between the presentations of the event being reported between the three individual newspapers and a summary of the chapter.

3.1 *The Times*

The Times published 24 items under the heading of Jerusalem from July to October 2000, comprising 22 reports, 2 analyses, 3 maps and 8 photographs. Of these items, 58 per cent were published during the Camp David Summit II in July 2000, 29 per cent covered the first stage of the New Intifada – from 29 September 2000 to 31 October – and 12.5 per cent were published in August between the two events.

Unlike the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Guardian*, *The Times* began reporting on the Summit at an early stage in the talks. The first report headed by Jerusalem was published on 13 July, only two days after the beginning of the summit. It was contributed by Sam Killey, *The Times*' West Bank correspondent, and included a detailed map showing the three Arab villages of Abu Dis, Silwan and al-Azariah, which are close to Jerusalem. These villages were to be part of the Palestinian capital, according to the Beilin–Abu Mazen plan, as Sam Killey described in the report.

A week later, the last report – the Camp David “deadlock” over Jerusalem – was published. Ian Brodie, *The Times*' correspondent in Washington, presented many ideas about the ‘sovereignty’ over Jerusalem which were under discussion at the Summit.¹ Three days afterwards, he reported the Israeli “acceptance” of the “American proposal” with details of the “proposal” and the position of both sides. The end of the “15-day summit” was also reported in the newspaper.²

The first news story by Sam Killey after the failure of the Summit described the return of the “Jerusalem hero”, that is, Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader.³ In this report the welcome home for Arafat was compared with that for the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak. The news story by the same correspondent on the following day reported the announcement by Bill Clinton, the then President of the United States (1993–2001) of his intention to “consider moving” the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.⁴

¹*The Times*, 19 July 2000.

²*The Times*, 26 July 2000.

³*The Times*, 27 July 2000.

⁴*The Times*, 29 July 2000.

During the Camp David Summit II, *The Times* published a comment by Sam Kiley, which discussed the possibilities for the “future” of Jerusalem and the realities on the ground in the city.⁵ A leader was also published about the Summit after its failure.⁶ This time Jerusalem did not appear in the headline: “The Earth Moved: After Camp David, nothing can be the same”.⁷ Between the failure of the Summit and the outbreak of the confrontations or the “New Intifada” between the Israelis and the Palestinians at the end of September 2000, there appeared in *The Times* within a week two stories under the heading of Jerusalem. One reported a plan by the Israeli Rabbis to build a synagogue in the area of Haram al-Sharif in the Old City of Jerusalem.⁸ The other described the attempt by some right-wing fundamentalist Jews to enter al-Aqsa Mosque.⁹

Jerusalem reappeared in the headlines of three reports in the newspaper about the New Intifada, from its outbreak to the end of October.¹⁰ The first report related the events on the second day of the confrontations, the second covered the escalation on the “Day of Rage”, and the third described the Israelis preventing the West Bank Palestinian Muslims from entering Jerusalem for the Friday noon prayers.

“Mount of Sorrows” was the headline of *The Times’* only illustrative article by Michael Binyon,¹¹ which presented an analysis of the historical background of the controversial “compound” in Jerusalem. It included a photograph of Ariel Sharon, guarded by Israeli soldiers, during his visit to al-Aqsa Mosque.¹²

3.1.1 Camp David Summit II Proposals

The Camp David Summit II marked – according to the account in *The Times* – “the first time” when “the Israeli and the Palestinian negotiators discussed ... sharing

⁵*The Times*, 21 July 2000.

⁶*The Times*, 27 July 2000.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*The Times*, 8 August 2000.

⁹*The Times*, 11 August 2000.

¹⁰*The Times*, 30 September 2000; 7 & 14 October 2000.

¹¹*The Times*, 4 October 2000.

¹² More information is available about the same article later in the section, specifically in subsection 1.4.

sovereignty in Jerusalem and the future status of the city's holy places".¹³ During the Summit, the newspaper's correspondents mentioned the many possibilities, ideas and proposals for sharing Jerusalem. Sometimes they referred to "sovereignty", other times to "control" or the "administrative role" for the Palestinians in the city. Most of the negotiations concentrated, directly or indirectly, on East Jerusalem, and *The Times*' correspondents made numerous references to that part of the city. It seemed that West Jerusalem was not negotiable and that the only issue for discussion was East Jerusalem – at least from the point of view of the Israelis and the Americans.

Sam Kiley referred to the "Beilin–Abu Mazen plan" as "the basis" of the negotiations at Camp David concerning East Jerusalem. His report gave further details of the plan, which suggested that although some Palestinian areas in East Jerusalem would be under Palestinian administration, they would still be part of "a joint municipality" under Israeli sovereignty. What the report indicated – but did not say – was that the Palestinian capital would be in the area between the Dome of the Rock – where the Palestinians could "hoist their flag" – and the Arab village outside the present-day "municipality borders", that is, Abu Dis. This capital would be administered by the Palestinians under Israeli sovereignty.¹⁴

The first reference in *The Times* to an American plan was made by Ian Brodie. He reported that Clinton's assistants were trying to formulate "contingency" plan B, in which the Americans, the Israelis and the Palestinians would agree to a statement of principles if the talks broke down.¹⁵ There was no mention of any American ideas or plans regarding the future of Jerusalem apart from what was given to the negotiation teams. It is interesting to note that *The Times*' report dated 22 July 2000 carried the headline "Israel Accepts Compromise on Jerusalem". In this report one of the Israeli Cabinet Ministers – as he was described – announced the acceptance by Prime Minister Ehud Barak of the American plan for "sharing sovereignty" over Jerusalem.

¹³*The Times*, 11 August 2000.

¹⁴*The Times*, 13 July 2000.

¹⁵*The Times*, 19 July 2000.

More details were given, which were attributed to Israeli sources. The Israeli Minister was quoted as saying: "We are talking about a US proposal which accepts Israeli sovereignty over all Jerusalem as an undivided city and has some signs of joint sovereignty of Arab Muslim quarters in the outskirts of Jerusalem."¹⁶

Surprisingly, the Americans were not reported as describing or viewing any new proposal or even any progress in the negotiations. The reference to the plan and its acceptance came only from the Israelis. In the same report, a spokesman for the American State Department was quoted as describing a dinner held the previous evening for both Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat. However, he was not reported to give any news or even hope of progress, nor did he refer to any new plan or proposal. The report stated: "The proposal falls short of Palestinian demands for full sovereignty over East Jerusalem."¹⁷ This statement seems to have been made by the reporter or the Israeli Minister. A Palestinian spokesman was quoted as saying: "I am not aware of a formal US proposal on Jerusalem, unless Barak wants to consider the Israeli proposal an American one."¹⁸ This statement appears to answer the question. So the American proposal was announced and highlighted by the Israelis, the Americans did not confirm or refer to it, and the Palestinians absolutely denied any knowledge of it. One can assume that once Palestinian spokesman's use of the word "formal" means that there was an informal proposal. There was nothing in this report to confirm or reject this assumption.

There were references in other reports to another proposal or formula, which "offered" the Palestinians "only administrative powers" over the east part of the city.¹⁹ In the word of Azmi Bishara,²⁰ the Israelis referred to "Palestinian autonomy over the Arab areas of East Jerusalem".²¹ The Israeli version of the same proposal

¹⁶*The Times*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁷*The Times*, 19 July 2000.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰Azmi Bishara is an Arab Member of the Israeli Parliament.

²¹*The Times*, 19 July 2000.

was reported in Prime Minister Ehud Barak's words at the press conference after the failure of the Summit: "various ideas were raised, including the expansion of Jerusalem to include areas such as Maale Adumim, Givat Zeev and Gush Etzion in exchange for granting Palestinian sovereignty over a number of neighbourhoods within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem."²²

In another report, the American proposal was presented according to the Israeli source as "a form of Palestinian control".²³ So it was not clear whether it was a "form of control" or "sovereignty". Three months after the failure of the Camp David Summit II, *The Times* wrote: "Various suggestions have been put forward: joint sovereignty, international administration by the United Nations, even sovereignty in the hands of God."²⁴ So although both parties had numerous choices and suggestions to discuss at Camp David, no solution was reached. It should be noted that not all of these ideas were reported in *The Times*. A few days later, in a report on the confrontations inside Jerusalem, Sam Kiley attributed the failure of the Summit to the Palestinian position: "Peace talks have foundered on Palestinian demands to fly their flag over the site."²⁵ Interestingly, the failure of the Summit was reported as a whole in *The Times* in Ehud Barak's words. He was quoted seven times in the report.²⁶

3.1.2 The New Intifada

The first report about the New Intifada appeared in *The Times* under the headline "Muslims Shot in Clash at Jerusalem Site"²⁷ two days after the outbreak of the confrontations. In his report, Ross Dunn, *The Times'* correspondent in Jerusalem concentrated on the timing of the conflict, not the reasons for it: "The fighting began after Muslim Friday noon prayers at Islam's Haram Sharif" and "As thousands of

²²*The Times*, 26 July 2000.

²³*The Times*, 19 July 2000.

²⁴*The Times*, 4 October 2000.

²⁵*The Times*, 7 October 2000.

²⁶*The Times*, 26 July 2000.

²⁷*The Times*, 30 September 2000.

worshippers emerged from the mosque inside the walled city, witnesses said that some threw stones at Israeli policemen....”²⁸

Readers were informed about who began the confrontations and when, but not why. The only event associated with the confrontations was the “end of Friday’s prayers”. Then there followed a description of the Israeli “reaction”. Finally, about two-thirds of the way through the report, came enlightenment: “The second day of clashes followed Thursday’s visit to the site by Ariel Sharon, Israel’s opposition leader. He insists that Jews must have access to the area.”²⁹ So the confrontations “followed” Ariel Sharon’s visit; they were neither caused by it nor were the result of it. The visit itself was to the “site” or “area”, not to al-Aqsa Mosque where the Friday’s prayers take place.

Ross Dunn then gave further information about what he described as the “area, which they call the Temple Mount, the site of the Jewish temples in biblical times and the holiest place in the Jewish world”.³⁰ So Ariel Sharon visited the “Temple Mount”, and the same name was used in the caption for a photograph of Mr Sharon during his visit. However, still no connection had been made between the confrontations and the visit, nor was there any clarification of the relationship between the protesting worshippers and the “Temple Mount” or the “area”. In the last paragraph there was a hint of clarification in a quotation by the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat: “He said – [Arafat] – that Mr. Sharon had taken ‘a dangerous step which caused harm to Islamic holy places’.”³¹ No further comment or enlightenment was offered.

Ross Dunn then presented his analysis of the reasons for the confrontations: “The violence comes with the Israeli–Palestinian peace talks deadlock over the site. The Palestinians are demanding sovereignty at the shrine as part of a treaty with the

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

Jewish state.”³² The report ended with some description of the “site” and the “shrine” without any mention of it by name or any definition of it.

The same association between the “Friday prayers” and the confrontations or “violence” was made by Sam Kiley from the West Bank: “Friday prayers ended with a brief bout of stone-throwing from the mosque area to the Jewish Western Wall. Moments later, as Muslim worshippers left the mosque area, they set fire to a police station....”³³ Further hints along these lines were repeated in the report, though this time it was in Amman, the capital of Jordan: “violent confrontation that broke out after Friday prayers near the Israeli Embassy ...” and “[a]t least 2,000 demonstrators also filed out of the mosque in the Baqaa refugee camp north of Amman...”. The same association was repeated in a different way one week later:

Entry to Muslim Friday noon prayers at al-Aqsa mosque yesterday was restricted to men older than 45. The move worked. For the first time in three weeks of Friday prayers at the shrine, there were no riots inside the Old City.³⁴

There were numerous references to “violence” and “Friday prayers” in nearly all of *The Times*’ reports during September and October. The direct reason for the confrontations – Ariel Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sharif – was rarely mentioned until Sam Kiley’s report on 7 October 2000:

At least 77 people have died since Ariel Sharon, the Likud party leader, set off a wave of unrest across Israel and the Palestinian areas by insisting on touring the al-Aqsa mosque complex to assert Israel sovereignty over it.³⁵

It is remarkable that when *The Times*’ correspondents refer to the Israelis, they use vocabulary such as “unrest”. However, when they refer to the Palestinians, the vocabulary is changed to “violence” or “bloodshed”. Israelis are involved in “clashes”, whereas Palestinians take part in “battles” or a “gun fight”.³⁶

³³*The Times*, 7 October 2000.

³⁴*The Times*, 14 October 2000.

³⁵*The Times*, 7 October 2000.

³⁶*Ibid.*

Moreover, not much attention was paid to the Israeli attacks. They were not placed at the beginning of the reports and sometimes were only mentioned between the lines and within other stories. The Israeli attack on the Palestinian leader Arafat's Force 17 bodyguard was reported under the headline "Israelis Block Palestinians' Path to Old City".³⁷ About half of the report comprised detailed descriptions by Sam Kiley and Ross Dunn of the torching of the Windmill Hotel in Gaza City and the effects of the resulting loss of 2 million Jordanian dinars that is equal of 2 million sterling pound on the "cash-strapped Gaza economy". Only then was the Israeli attack reported as follows: "The day before, helicopter gun ships had used anti-tank missiles to destroy the headquarters of Yasser Arafat's Force 17 bodyguard."³⁸ The report went on to discuss other topics without any further reference to those responsible for the attack, that is, the Israeli Defence Forces.

3.1.2.1 THE PASSIVE AND ACTIVE VOICE

Of the events described by *The Times* as "clashes" or "violence", 57 per cent were reported in the passive voice or in some other impersonal manner: "At least 77 people have died"; "Five Palestinians were killed at..."; "Dozens more were injured", and so on.³⁹ Sometimes the people killed were identified by nationality. On most occasions, however, they were not identified either by name or by nationality, but simply represented as numbers. Again, in most of the reports, the killer was not identified. Even when the doer of the reported action is identified, he/she is placed in an "informationally de-emphasized position": "caught in a volley of rubber bullets from Israeli riot police, seven youths fell simultaneously."⁴⁰

In the remaining 43 per cent of the "clashes" or "violence" the active voice was used. For example, 55 per cent in this category were attributed to Palestinians or Muslims: "demonstrators first set fire to the Windmill Hotel".⁴¹ In another 11 per cent of these events described in the active voice, both Palestinians and Israelis shared the action:

³⁷*The Times*, 14 October 2000.

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹*The Times*, 7 October 2000.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹*The Times*, 14 October 2000.

“Israeli troops and Palestinians gunmen exchanged fire at several places.”⁴² In the final 34 per cent of the incidents, where the perpetrators were Israelis, the active voice was used as follows: “As the violence continued, police snipers used live ammunition.”⁴³

3.1.3 Jerusalem

In reporting and discussing issues like the refugees, settlements, borders and many other aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the focus of attention was usually on politics and realities. Such reports and discussions brought to mind Jerusalem’s role in religion, history and even mythology.

During the negotiations at Camp David, Jerusalem was presented as the soul of the conflict, the most sensitive and the most difficult problem to be solved. In their reports, *The Times*’ correspondents gave their audience the reasons for this much highlighted sensitivity. In the newspaper’s leader, Jerusalem was regarded as the “symbol of symbols”.⁴⁴ One report referred to Jerusalem as “the eternal city that is of such importance to the world’s three great monotheistic religions.”⁴⁵

Despite the repetition in *The Times* of the Israeli view of Jerusalem as an undivided city, Sam Kiley highlighted the real “division” of life in the city and its communities: “The moment the pavement starts to crumble and one crosses the ‘green line’, Jerusalem metamorphoses from a city trying to be western into an ancient oriental riot and colour, smell and culture.”⁴⁶

The status of Jerusalem was promoted in the newspaper by the two parties in the conflict as the “crucial sticking point”⁴⁷ in the negotiations at Camp David. On another occasion the city was described as “the biggest obstacle to peace”.⁴⁸ Such descriptions were frequently quoted from both parties.⁴⁹ “In all peace negotiations of

⁴²*The Times*, 7 October 2000.

⁴³*The Times*, 30 September 2000.

⁴⁴*The Times*, 27 July 2000.

⁴⁵*The Times*, 4 October 2000.

⁴⁶*The Times*, 21 July 2000.

⁴⁷*The Times*, 19 & 26 July 2000.

⁴⁸*The Times*, 21 July 2000.

⁴⁹*The Times*, 26 July 2000.

⁵⁰*The Times*, 4 October 2000.

the past decade, Palestinians and Israelis have recognised that Jerusalem will be the hardest issue.”⁵⁰

The Times offered two reasons for this recognised fact. The political reason was that each of the two parties claimed Jerusalem as its capital.⁵¹ Moreover, the “mantra” of the Israeli politicians was that Jerusalem was Israel’s “eternal and undivided capital”⁵² and therefore its partition was a non-negotiable issue. The second – and more important reason – was that Jerusalem, including the “compound” of holy sites, was sacred for Muslims, Jews and Christians. However, Jerusalem is the third holiest place for Muslims after Mecca and Medina, whereas “for the Jews, there is no debate: it is their most sacred city.”⁵³

East Jerusalem was defined in *The Times* as an occupied territory only once by Sam Kiley at the very beginning of the Camp David Summit II.⁵⁴ Afterwards, it was described once as a “seized city”⁵⁵ and twice as an “annexed city”.⁵⁶

3.1.4 Holy Sites

Of the 70 references by *The Times* to the holy places in the Old City of Jerusalem, 47 per cent were given the name Temple Mount, to include al-Aqsa mosque, the Dome of the Rock and the Western Wall. Al-Aqsa was mentioned by name in 17 per cent of the total references, the Dome of the Rock in 14 per cent and Haram al-Sharif or the Noble Sanctuary in 15 per cent. Surprisingly, the Western Wall was mentioned in 7 per cent, although by different names: Western Wall,⁵⁷ Wailing Wall,⁵⁸ and the Jewish Western Wall.⁵⁹ The holy compound in the Old City was also given different

⁵¹*The Times*, 19 July 2000.

⁵²*The Times*, 22 July 2000.

⁵³*The Times*, 22 July 2000.

⁵⁴*The Times*, 13 July 2000.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶*The Times*, 22 & 29 July 2000.

⁵⁷*The Times*, 13 July 2000.

⁵⁸*The Times*, 26 July 2000; 4 October 2000.

⁵⁹*The Times*, 7 October 2000.

names: the Second Temple,⁶⁰ King Solomon's Temple,⁶¹ the Jewish Temple,⁶² and the Holy Temple.⁶³ Sam Kiley created the hyphenated names of the Holy Dome/Temple Mount complex and the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount.⁶⁴ Other names such as Holy of Holies, King Solomon, and King Herod were also mentioned with reference to Jerusalem.⁶⁵

It is interesting to note that the holy compound was deprived of both name and definition in *The Times*' first report on the outbreak of the confrontations,⁶⁶ although it was customary for each report to include some historical or religious information about the holy places in East Jerusalem. It is noticeable that, unlike the *Guardian*, *The Times*' reports carried very little clarification of this kind during the Camp David Summit II. However, two reports by Ross Dunn were published during August 2000, both containing a large amount of religious and historical information. He wrote that when the right-wing fundamentalist Jews wished to pray in al-Aqsa Mosque, they "wanted to worship there on the annual day of sorrow for the destruction of their holy temples in biblical times."⁶⁷ He went on to give further details of the "Jewish temples": "The Temple Mount is the site of King Solomon's Temple, destroyed by Babylon in 586 BC, and the Second Temple, demolished by the Romans in AD 70."⁶⁸ More connections with present-day events were offered in the same report: "According to Jewish belief, both these holy structures fell on the ninth day of the Jewish month of Av."⁶⁹ It was also pointed out that this had been an Islamic holy place for the Muslims for "more than 1,000 years ... after the construction of the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque." After these historical clarifications, Ross

⁶⁰*The Times*, 11 August 2000.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶²*The Times*, 30 September 2000.

⁶³*The Times*, 14 October 2000.

⁶⁴*The Times*, 13 July & 7 October 2000.

⁶⁵*The Times*, 4 October 2000.

⁶⁶*The Times*, 30 September 2000.

⁶⁷*The Times*, 11 August 2000.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Dunn concluded: "The Temple Mount is the most holy place for the Jewish people, their heart and their soul."⁷⁰

On 4 October, in his analysis of the conflict over Jerusalem, especially following the latest confrontations, Michael Binyon concluded:

[T]he Temple Mount symbolises the majesty and history of Jerusalem.... Sadly the 35-acre site in the heart of the old walled city is also a symbol of the division and bloodshed, feuds and fanaticism.⁷¹

Usually *The Times*' correspondents and journalists begin with a detailed description of the "Temple Mount" and its importance for Jews, and then continue with a brief comment about its importance for Muslims. Michael Binyon's analysis, under the headline "Mount of Sorrow", was the only one of its kind published in *The Times*. Like many of the newspaper's reports, it initially determined the controversiality of the place by using the biblical names: it was a Jewish place in the writer's view.

3.1.5 Sources

From July to October 2000 *The Times* depended entirely for its news about Jerusalem on its own correspondents. Of its published reports on the city, 91.6 per cent were contributed by its correspondents in Washington, Jerusalem and the West Bank: Ian Brodie, Ross Dunn and Sam Kiley respectively. Damian Whitworth provided 8.4 per cent of the reports from Washington including the only report about the failure of the Summit.⁷² The newspaper also published Michael Binyon's analysis, described above, and a leader. All the reports during the Summit, which were sent from Jerusalem and the West Bank, were contributed by Sam Kiley until August, when the first report by Ross Dunn appeared in the newspaper.⁷³

Of the photographs published in *The Times*, 50 per cent were provided by the Associated Press, 25 per cent by Associated France Press, 12.5 per cent by Reuters and 12.5 per cent had no reference.

⁷¹*The Times*, 4 October 2000.

⁷²*The Times*, 26 July 2000.

⁷³*The Times*, 8 August 2000.

It should be noted that in *The Times* the Palestinian officials were interviewed and quoted more than the Israelis and Americans. Of the newspaper's sources, 48 per cent were Palestinian, only 34 per cent were Israelis and 12 per cent were American. Of the Palestinians, 62 per cent were interviewed or quoted during the Camp David Summit II, but only 6 per cent during the confrontations. The remaining 32 per cent were quoted during the period between the two events. Overall, the Palestinians provided the highest proportion of sources in *The Times*: 67 per cent were mentioned and quoted during the Summit in reports from the West Bank – not Washington – by Sam Kiley.

3.1.6 Suggestions, Justifications and Interpretations

The Times' correspondents reported the interpretations and predictions of both parties concerning Jerusalem during the period being studied. Occasionally, they offered their own interpretations and predictions. In his report on the Beilin–Abu Mazen plan,⁷⁴ Sam Kiley commented as follows:

To the Palestinians, Abu-Dis and Silwan, in the valley below, and al-Azariyah, which hugs the Western slopes of the Mount of Olives, are nothing more than booby prizes – white rosettes for the also-rans of the peace process. They would be turned into death warrants if they took them home.⁷⁵

In another report on the intention of the United States to reconsider moving its embassy to Jerusalem, Sam Kiley predicted: “The announcement will shock the Arab nations.”⁷⁶ Moreover, he expected an early failure to agree on Jerusalem – before the end of the negotiations at Camp David: President Clinton’s hopes to reach an agreement “look certain to be dashed.”⁷⁷ Damian Whitworth interpreted the threat to the Palestinians by Prime Minister Ehud Barak⁷⁸ as “implying that it would annex parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip inhabited by Jewish settlers.”⁷⁹

⁷⁴For further details, see under Camp David.

⁷⁵*The Times*, 13 July 2000.

⁷⁶*The Times*, 29 July 2000.

⁷⁷*The Times*, 13 July 2000.

⁷⁸At the failure of the Camp David Summit II Ehud Barak threatened the Palestinians that if they any “unilateral step” concerning the declaration of the Palestinian state, he would take a unilateral step as well.

⁷⁹*The Times*, 26 July 2000.

The spokesman for the Chief Rabbinical Council was quoted as explaining its decision to build a synagogue at Haram al-Sharif: “to realise our rights and sovereignty over the Temple Mount.”⁸⁰ Ross Dunn in Jerusalem interpreted the same decision as “an attempt to avoid confrontation with Muslims over what many regard as the most sensitive site in the Middle East.”⁸¹ In addition, during the confrontations, Ross Dunn reported the justification by the Israeli police spokesman for their firing at the Palestinians in Jerusalem: “The fire was aimed at protesters thought to be endangering the security forces.”⁸² He also interpreted the Israeli attack on Force 17, Arafat’s bodyguard, as an “intention to send an unmistakable message. ‘Next time,’ the Israelis were saying, ‘we might put a rocket through your front window, Mr. Arafat.’”⁸³

3.1.7 Focus of Attention

The Times published a leader about Jerusalem after the failure of the Camp David Summit II. As in the *Daily Telegraph*, the account was personalized. Much attention was given to the expected effects of the failure on the position of each of the three political leaders. *The Times* concluded with Barak’s words describing the failure of the Summit as “the end of a very important chapter.”⁸⁴

To evaluate the achievement of the Camp David negotiations, Clinton was quoted in *The Times*: “And within that process, there has been an event rare in all diplomacy, and almost unprecedented in concrete substance – in Mr. Clinton’s words, ‘how people would live’.”⁸⁵ The article then described Barak’s efforts and achievements in the process: “The decisive factor was Mr. Barak’s willingness to ignore almost every physical red line drawn by generations of Israeli politicians.” This was followed by some unpublished information about what was achieved by virtue of Barak’s “willingness” and “courage”:

⁸⁰*The Times*, 8 August 2000.

⁸¹*Ibid.*

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³*The Times*, 14 October 2000.

⁸⁴*The Times*, 27 July 2000.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

Even in Jerusalem, Mr. Arafat gained far, far more than he had the imagination to recognise – including, in a dramatic abandonment of Israel’s hitherto immovable position that Jerusalem is its undivided capital, Palestinian sovereignty over the city’s outer and inner suburbs and a large measure of control over the Muslim holy sites.⁸⁶

The article concluded with a discussion of Arafat’s losses and the planted “seeds of war” that could “sprout fast”.

3.2 *Guardian*

The *Guardian* reported many news stories about East Jerusalem, which did not appear in either *The Times* or the *Daily Telegraph*. The *Guardian*’s correspondents in New York and Jerusalem, Ewan MacAskill and Suzanne Goldenberge respectively, reported Clinton’s separate meetings with the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian leader at the UN Millennium Summit.⁸⁷ Martin Kettle, the *Guardian*’s correspondent in Washington, also reported the appeal by Martin Indyk, the US Ambassador in Israel, for Israel to share Jerusalem with the Palestinians.⁸⁸

During the whole period examined in this chapter, the *Guardian* published 14 reports and 3 comments under the heading of Jerusalem. Of the reports, 42.8 per cent appeared during the Camp David peace negotiations, 21.4 per cent before the New Intifada, and 35.7 per cent during the confrontations. These percentages indicate the attention devoted by the newspaper to the peace talks.

The first report about Jerusalem during the Summit was contributed by the *Guardian*’s correspondent in Washington, Julian Borger. It was the only report in the three newspapers to come from Camp David instead of Washington or Jerusalem.⁸⁹ It described the crisis in the peace talks about the “sovereignty” over East Jerusalem. The newspaper’s first comment, “A New Jerusalem”, discussed the position of both parties concerning the city and was presented in a historical context. It referred to the Yossi Beilin–Abu Mazen proposal in 1995 as the source of the main ideas that were

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷*Guardian*, 8 September 2000.

⁸⁸*Guardian*, 16 September 2000.

⁸⁹*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

the focus of the negotiations at Camp David⁹⁰ and expressed the hope that the outcome would bring peace to both sides. However, the *Guardian*'s report on the same day pointed out the difficulties of reaching a peaceful settlement: "to clinch a deal" in Jerusalem "would be political suicide" for Arafat and Barak. On the same day there appeared a news story about "Barak's compromise" on Jerusalem, the source of the information being an Israeli official in Israel. Neither the American nor the Palestinian spokespersons confirmed it or even gave any hint of new proposals or ideas, or any kind of progress achieved or expected to be achieved.⁹¹

Further details in another report revealed the contradiction in the Israeli officials' statements on the Israeli position towards Jerusalem. The *Guardian* was the only newspaper which reported the denial by the spokesman of the Israeli negotiation team at Camp David of what was called Barak's "compromise" on Jerusalem.⁹² The next day Suzanne Goldenberge reported an analysis of the Palestinian attitude.⁹³

In the *Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*, Clinton's statement – about reviewing the move of the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to East Jerusalem – was reported from Israel, whereas in the *Guardian* the information came from Washington. The *Guardian* report also included further information and predictions concerning the statement.⁹⁴ More attention was devoted in the *Guardian* to the Palestinian suggestion regarding Jerusalem, which was made by Ahmed Qureia Abu Ala', spokesman for the Palestinian Parliament, in his speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

The *Guardian* reported the "terminology revolution" regarding sovereignty in Israel.⁹⁵ It referred to the holy places in East Jerusalem by their present-day names. The *Guardian* also devoted much more attention to the Islamic holy places, particularly, the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²*Guardian, The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

⁹³*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

⁹⁴*Guardian*, 29 July 2000.

⁹⁵*Guardian*, 13 September 2000. More information about this article is available later in this section, in subsection 3.2.4.

3.2.1 Camp David

The negotiations at the Camp David Summit II turned to the subject of Jerusalem on 20 July 2000, when the politicians highlighted the dispute over the city. The next day, 2 reports and one analysis were published in the *Guardian*. There were numerous references to Barak's "compromise", the attitude of many Palestinians towards peace which was explored by Suzanne Goldenberge in a special report.

Two days after the failure of the Summit, the *Guardian* examined the scholars' suggestions for the future of Jerusalem.⁹⁶ The next day, Clinton's statement about moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to East Jerusalem was released and reported from Washington, unlike the same news story in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, which came from Israel.

Martin Kettle interviewed the American officials about the reasons for the statement. The Camp David Summit II was described in the *Guardian* as a "coronation" of seven years of talks.⁹⁷ At Camp David "52 years of Israeli–Palestinian conflict boiled down to its spiritual essence – a few acres of sacred soil."⁹⁸ The core of the conflict or the "spiritual essence" was the holy places in East Jerusalem. So there were no real problems on the ground. The conflict had now been symbolized and given a spiritual and religious character. That was why it was presented as a crucial time, when there was a "heavy atmosphere", according to Eldad Yaniv, Barak's adviser. The reason for this atmosphere, in his view, was that the negotiation teams "face[d] a historic decision" and that "there would be hard, painful concessions to be made at Camp David if the sides were to come to an agreement."⁹⁹

The Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister, Michael Melchior, was the first person to be reported as announcing "Barak's compromise" on Jerusalem, in which the Israeli Prime Minister had accepted a "US bridging proposal". However, there was no mention of it by either the Americans or the Palestinians on that day. Moreover, Eldad Yaniv, who was part of the Israeli negotiation team, denied that the Israeli

⁹⁶*Guardian*, 29 July 2000.

⁹⁷*Guardian*, 23 July 2000.

⁹⁸*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

⁹⁹*Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

Prime Minister had accepted any proposal. In the report following the failure of the Summit, Prime Minister Barak was constantly quoted.

3.2.2 The Camp David Proposals

The first proposal for the future of Jerusalem, which appeared in the *Guardian*, was the Beilin–Abu Mazen plan of 1995: “The Arafat–Barak talks are focusing on ideas first formulated by negotiators Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen back in 1995, involving land swaps, expanded city boundaries, flagpoles and local autonomy in East Jerusalem.”¹⁰⁰

The next – and well-known – plan was the “American bridging proposal”, which was reported from Israel while the negotiations were under way at Camp David. According to the Israeli Minister Michael Melchior: “We can accept under the framework of Israeli sovereignty over all Jerusalem ... a certain extended administrative autonomy solution for some of the Muslim quarters outside the old city, and only outside the old city.”¹⁰¹

It is not clear whether the second formula was that of the United States or a new offer from Israel. The conclusion drawn by the *Guardian*’s correspondent in the report was that the American proposal “would extend limited Palestinian sovereignty to parts of East Jerusalem.”¹⁰² There was no reference to any other source. Did the *Guardian*’s expression “limited sovereignty” mean the same as Minister Michael Melchior’s “certain administrative autonomy solution”? One could argue that the *Guardian* correspondent might have secret sources. The next day, Barak’s acceptance of the “American proposal” was changed to his “considering” it, and the “certain extended administrative autonomy” became “sharing sovereignty with the Palestinians in parts of East Jerusalem”.¹⁰³ Did that indicate a development of the American proposal, or was it just different information from a different source? In the same report from the same source, Mr Melchior was quoted as stating in an interview on BBC Television:

¹⁰⁰ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

We are talking about a US formula which accepts Israeli sovereignty over all Jerusalem as an undivided city and has some signs of joint sovereignty, expanded self-administration, in some of the Arab Muslim quarters on the outskirts of Jerusalem.¹⁰⁴

“Sharing sovereignty” in the first paragraph of the report had now become “some signs of joint sovereignty”, which did not seem to concur with “the Israeli sovereignty over all Jerusalem as an undivided city”.

Suzanne Goldenberge analysed the American proposal in these words: “In the scant details that emerged yesterday, the US formula appears virtually identical to proposals on sharing the city quietly put forward by liberal Israeli academics.”¹⁰⁵ There were no further details about the liberal Israeli academics. Then she continued: “It – the American proposal – would stave off the most continuous questions about the city’s future – control of the holy relics of Islam, Christianity and Judaism, within the old city walls – until a permanent settlement is reached.”¹⁰⁶

The whole report was based on information provided by Mr Melchior. None had yet been reported from American or Palestinian sources. The American version of the proposal did not appear until six weeks after the Israeli announcement. Suzanne Goldenberge wrote:¹⁰⁷ “The US version of these proposals would have Israel controlling the Wailing Wall, the holiest shrine of Judaism, and the Palestinians in control of the Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest site in Islam, with God the sovereign of the passage between them.”¹⁰⁸

That was the only information provided by the Americans on the proposal. The Palestinians’ suggestion was put forward after the failure of the Summit, although it did not appear in the *Guardian* until the spokesman of the Palestinian Parliament, Ahmed Qureia Abu Ala’ referred to it in his speech at the European Parliament: “Unless we can reach an agreement on Jerusalem, I have to declare that both parts of

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Suzanne Goldenberge referred to the American version of the proposal in her report on the Palestinian suggestion of the revival of the “internationalization of Jerusalem”.

¹⁰⁸ *Guardian*, 6 September 2000.

Jerusalem east and west should be a unified international Jerusalem ... not just the capital of Israel or Palestine, but a capital of the world.”¹⁰⁹ The suggestion was put forward as Clinton was trying to make progress by holding separate meetings with Arafat and Barak at the Millennium Summit in New York. However, not much attention was paid to the Palestinian suggestion by the United States and Israel, for it was regarded and reported as a “concession” or a “compromise”.¹¹⁰

On 13 September – the date for the proposed declaration of the Palestinian State – Suzanne Goldenberge reported the continuing suggestions and discussions between academics and politicians in Israel concerning sovereignty over Jerusalem:

... there is the birth of strange vocabulary, the creation of those trying to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Their offerings include: divided sovereignty, joint sovereignty, shared sovereignty, delayed sovereignty, suspended sovereignty, functional sovereignty, custodial sovereignty, and extraterritorial sovereignty.¹¹¹

3.2.3 The New Intifada

It seems that the *Guardian*’s correspondents presented a clearer, more detailed and more balanced account of the New Intifada and included more description. Suzanne Goldenberge, in the first paragraph of her first report of the event, is a good example: “Dozens of people were injured in rioting in the West Bank and Jerusalem yesterday as the hawkish Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, staged a provocative visit to a Muslim shrine at the heart of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.”¹¹² There followed much more detailed description, perhaps to clarify the “provocative” nature of the visit: “Surrounded by hundreds of Israeli riot police, Sharon and a handful of Likud politicians marched up to the Haram al-Sharif, the site of the golden Dome of the Rock that is the third holiest shrine in Islam.”¹¹³ So the visit was to an Islamic shrine – Haram al-Sharif – not to the Temple Mount as reported in the *Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*.¹¹⁴ The reference to Haram al-Sharif and its identification as an Islamic shrine provided a sensible reason for the Palestinian Muslims’ protest.¹¹⁵ If Ariel

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹*Guardian*, 13 September 2000.

¹¹²*Guardian*, 28 July 2000.

¹¹³*Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

¹¹⁴*Daily Telegraph*, 29 September 2000; *The Times*, 30 September 2000.

¹¹⁵ See Chapter Five, section 3.

Sharon – a Jew – had visited a Jewish shrine, then why would the Palestinians have protested?

Suzanne Goldenberge continued with an account of the confrontations on the ground:

He – Sharon – came down 45 minutes later, leaving a trail of fury. Young Palestinians heaved chairs, stones, rubbish bins, and whatever missiles came to hand at Israeli forces. Riot police retaliated with tear gas and rubber bullets, shooting one protester in the face.¹¹⁶

Such a detailed narrative indicates the correspondent's presence at the scene of the event. The report ended with statements by Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat.¹¹⁷

The same association between Muslim Friday prayers and the protests ("clashes" or "violence") was presented in the *Guardian*: "The violence erupted at the close of afternoon prayers when Israeli police stormed the Haram al-Sharif, the site of the Dome of the Rock ..., firing live rounds and rubber bullets at the stone-throwing Palestinian youths."¹¹⁸ In the same report other reasons – apart from Ariel Sharon's visit to the Islamic shrine – were given for the escalation of the protests in the area:

... with the negotiations locked for weeks over the future of the Haram al-Sharif ... and Israel mourning a border policeman who was killed by a member of the Palestinian security forces earlier yesterday, the clashes could escalate out of control.¹¹⁹

Suzanne Goldenberge's reports were rich in action and pictorial description. In the news story of the Israeli soldiers killing the "12-year-old" Muhammad al-Durruh, the stage was set as follows: "But the 15 craters in the patch of the wall where they were trapped – Rami and his father ...".¹²⁰ Then there was a description of Rami's house in the Bourij refugee camp in Gaza: "A few days ago in Rami's breeze block and corrugated tin-roofed home ...".¹²¹ Another picture of the camp was drawn in the same story: "In Bourij, where nearly all of the houses have a photograph of the

¹¹⁶*Guardian*, 29 September 2000

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹¹⁸*Guardian*, 30 September 2000.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*

¹²⁰*Guardian*, 2 October 2000. It is worth noting here that the correspondent got the boy's name wrong as she calls him "Rami", whereas his name is "Muhammad".

¹²¹*Ibid.*

Dome of the Rock, they are calling Rami a martyr for Jerusalem.”¹²² The correspondent was conveying feelings and thoughts as well as places and events.

A similar story of the New Intifada was contributed to the *Guardian* in the same day by Derek Brown, the newspaper’s correspondent in Jerusalem between 1993 and 1996. Derek Brown highlighted the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, which charged the “Palestinian anger” and which was defined as the main cause of both the Intifadas of 1987 and 2000. In his opinion, the “brutal reality of the occupation” is still there charging the Palestinians’ “non-too-secret weapon: their burning anger.”¹²³ With reference to the New Intifada, he commented that this time: “... the battle is rejoined: stones, fire bombs and Kalashnikovs on one side, and the Middle East’s most formidable army on the other.”¹²⁴ And that was an excellent example of the “world’s most lopsided conflict.”¹²⁵

3.2.2.1 The Passive and Active Voice

Like *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian* used the passive voice when describing the New Intifada. Although the death toll was frequently stated, it was usually without any identification of the dead by name or nationality. Moreover, sometimes the cause of “death” was not mentioned: “By nightfall, the toll from four days of rioting across the West Bank and Gaza stood at 28 dead, and more than 200 wounded.”¹²⁶

Of the accounts in the *Guardian* of the deaths and injuries, 83 per cent were reported in the passive voice and only 16.6 per cent in the active voice. In 33 per cent of the total reporting, both sides were identified. In another 33 per cent it was clear that the Palestinians were part of the event. In two out of three cases where the active voice was used, the actor was Palestinian: “Palestinians heaved chairs, stones...”¹²⁷ and “In

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷*Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

Nazareth, hundreds of masked youths threw stones at Israelis.”¹²⁸ The only occasion where the active voice was used, and in which the actor was Israeli, was reported as retaliation: “Riot police retaliated with tear gas and rubber bullets.”¹²⁹

3.2.4 Jerusalem

The core of what was called “the Palestinian–Israeli conflict” was described in the *Guardian* as the “status of Jerusalem”,¹³⁰ the “future of Jerusalem”,¹³¹ the “sovereignty over Jerusalem”,¹³² or the “control” of the city.¹³³ Jerusalem itself was presented as the “most explosive topic”,¹³⁴ the “most divisive”,¹³⁵ and “sensitive” issue at the Camp David Summit II;¹³⁶ even as the “most vexing problem” in the Middle East,¹³⁷ and “the last thin red line dividing the Arabs and the Jews”.¹³⁸ That was because both the Palestinians and the Israelis claimed Jerusalem as their capital.¹³⁹ Jerusalem for the Jews was “an undivided and eternal capital”.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, it is reported to be seen by them as “a biblical birthright”.¹⁴¹

All the achievements at Camp David depended on whether or not an agreement on Jerusalem would be reached: “But as ever all is contingent upon Jerusalem.”¹⁴² Jerusalem was not just for the Palestinians. Adnan Husseini, a Palestinian official in the Waqf in East Jerusalem, stated: “Jerusalem is not only for Palestine ... the Palestinian people will suffer the condemnation of the Islamic and Arab countries forever if they agree to a solution that only gives us East Jerusalem.”¹⁴³ On the day

¹²⁸*Guardian*, 2 October 2000.

¹²⁹*Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

¹³⁰*Guardian*, 21 & 23 July 2000; 6 & 8 September 2000.

¹³¹*Guardian*, 21 & 28 July 2000.

¹³²*Guardian*, 20, 21, 22 & 23 July 2000.

¹³³*Guardian*, 21 & 22 July 2000; 8 September 2000.

¹³⁴*Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

¹³⁵*Guardian*, 23 July 2000.

¹³⁶*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*

¹³⁸*Ibid.*

¹³⁹*Guardian*, 6 September 2000.

¹⁴⁰*Guardian*, 21, 22 & 23 July 2000.

¹⁴¹*Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁴²*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

¹⁴³*Guardian*, 23 July 2000.

following the confrontations, Palestine Radio was reported to be describing the New Intifada as “the battle for Jerusalem”.¹⁴⁴ It was really difficult to reach an agreement on Jerusalem where “religion, history, and sacred sites complicated everything.”¹⁴⁵

It was a long time before one could read a neutral opinion of Jerusalem which did not focus on the difficulties provoked by the topic. In his speech at the Hebrew University, Martin Indyk, the American ambassador to Israel, stated: “Jerusalem is not, and cannot be, the exclusive preserve of one religion and the solution cannot come from one side challenging another side’s beliefs.”¹⁴⁶ Brian Whitaker, the editor of the Middle Eastern news in the *Guardian*, and Julian Borger commented in their reports: “Eternal City or not, Jerusalem does not justify a perpetual strife.”¹⁴⁷

In 63.6 per cent of the *Guardian*’s references to East Jerusalem, it was defined as “occupied territory”.¹⁴⁸ Almost all these references were made by Suzanne Goldenberge. In the remaining 36.4 per cent, terms like “captured”,¹⁴⁹ “gained”,¹⁵⁰ “annexed”¹⁵¹ and “taken”¹⁵² were used to define that part of the city.

3.2.5 Holy Sites

The presence of the holy places in Jerusalem was highlighted in the *Guardian* as the main reason for the dispute over the city. A “few acres of sacred stone” in Jerusalem was “the spiritual essence” of “52 years” of Israeli–Palestinian conflict.”¹⁵³ The newspaper clarified why the city was the “spiritual essence” and the “single most formidable obstacle to peace”.¹⁵⁴ Michael Melchior was quoted as having announced to Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall after his declaration of Prime Minister Barak’s acceptance of the US proposal for Jerusalem: “This is the heart of Jerusalem

¹⁴⁴*Guardian*, 30 September 2000.

¹⁴⁵*Guardian*, 13 September 2000.

¹⁴⁶*Guardian*, 16 September 2000.

¹⁴⁷*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

¹⁴⁸*Guardian*, 6, 13, 16 & 29 September 2000; 2 & 31 October 2000.

¹⁴⁹*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

¹⁵⁰*Guardian*, 16 September 2000.

¹⁵¹*Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁵²*Guardian*, 23 July 2000.

¹⁵³*Guardian*, 20 July 2000.

¹⁵⁴*Guardian*, 13 September 2000.

and you cannot compromise on the heart.”¹⁵⁵ In the same report Suzanne Goldenberge commented: “Husseini’s heart is in the same place.”¹⁵⁶ More information was given on the sanctity of the holy sites in the walled city for Jews, Christians and Muslims:

...at Camp David, it all comes down to this patch of land, one kilometer square. The ancient walled city, which houses the most sacred relic of the Jews at the Wailing Wall, the burial place of Jesus at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, and al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam after Mecca and Medina.¹⁵⁷

Two months later, it became more specific, religious and intensive. Every report referred exactly to the “Haram al-Sharif”. It was not Jerusalem, nor East Jerusalem, nor even the Old City nor the holy sites. It was more precisely identified: “Haram al-Sharif, the point where history, religion and national aspirations converge.”¹⁵⁸ It was described as “the most hallowed ground in the Holy City – and the volatile core of the Israeli–Arab conflict.”¹⁵⁹ There was further clarification after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the site and his comments indicating his message: “‘The Temple Mount is in our hands and will remain in our hands. It is the holiest site in Jerusalem and it is the right of every Jew to visit the Temple Mount.’ He said this after his descent” from the mosque.¹⁶⁰ The spiritual aspect of the city began to dominate everything else. Terms like “Muslim Jerusalem”,¹⁶¹ “Angel Gabriel”,¹⁶² and “Prophet Mohammed”¹⁶³ began to appear. It was possible that the New Intifada following Ariel Sharon’s visit compelled the newspaper to clarify for its readers the religious importance of the holy sites.

Unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, 44 per cent of the *Guardian*’s references to the holy sites used the name of Haram al-Sharif or Haram. However, in 25 per

¹⁵⁵*Guardian*, 23 July 2000.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸*Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

¹⁵⁹*Guardian*, 30 September 2000.

¹⁶⁰*Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

¹⁶¹*Guardian*, 30 September 2000.

¹⁶²*Guardian*, 2 October 2000.

¹⁶³*Ibid.*

cent of them the biblical name of Temple Mount was used, 27 per cent of which were in quotations. Of the total references to the holy sites, 13.6 per cent were to al-Aqsa Mosque, and 11.4 per cent each to the Dome of the Rock and the Western Wall. Of the references to the Western Wall, 80 per cent used the biblical name the Wailing Wall.

3.2.6 International

There was little international initiative or action concerning Jerusalem reported during the period under examination, apart from Clinton's efforts at the Camp David Summit II. On the Arab and Islamic side, it was reported in the *Guardian*: "Many Arabs say that Arafat needs to hold firm onto Jerusalem, because the city is not for the Palestinians, but for hundreds of Muslims as well."¹⁶⁴ Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the leader of Hezbollah, was quoted in the newspaper's comment on the Palestinian position concerning Jerusalem at Camp David: "Any concessions ... amount to a betrayal of the historic trust that every Arab and Muslim carries with him."¹⁶⁵

After the failure of the Summit, Dr Uri Daris of the University of Exeter suggested reviving the United Nations Resolution 181 for the internationalization of Jerusalem: "Rather than attempt to broke a settlement for the question of Jerusalem that is illegal, the US would be better advised to seek the support of the international community for an international administration for Jerusalem."¹⁶⁶ The international community seemed to be a possible actor in the future of Jerusalem when a group of scholars were asked to give their opinions in the *Guardian*.¹⁶⁷ Julian Borger referred to the American and European attitude towards the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967: "After Israel gained control of the whole city in 1967, the US and Europe viewed the Eastern Palestinian districts as occupied territory."¹⁶⁸ The *Guardian* also reported Arafat's threat to Israel after the beginning of the last

¹⁶⁴*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶*Guardian*, 28 July 2000.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸*Guardian*, 16 September 2000.

confrontations that started with the al Aqsa Intifada: "He threatened to take several 'measures' if Israel did not stop the bloodshed in 24 hours, including an appeal to the United Nations Security Council."¹⁶⁹ However, nothing under the heading of Jerusalem was published in the newspaper about the demonstrations in Egypt, Jordan and many other Arab countries in support of the Palestinians during the Second Intifada.

3.2.7 Sources

Of the *Guardian's* sources of information, 38 per cent were Israeli, 32 per cent Palestinian, 15 per cent miscellaneous (mostly American) and 4 per cent undefined. During the Camp David Summit II, the *Guardian*, like *The Times*, depended on the Israelis for 45 per cent of the total sources, compared with only 13 per cent provided by the Palestinians. However, during the New Intifada the *Guardian* depended more on the Palestinians, who provided 70.5 per cent of the sources compared with only 23.5 per cent from the Israelis. The proportion of other sources, especially American officials and spokespeople, fell from 15 per cent of the total sources during the Summit to 0 per cent during the New Intifada. Of the *Guardian's* news about Jerusalem, 40 per cent was reported from the city itself, 33 per cent from the United States, 6.6 per cent from Gaza, and 13.3 per cent had no reference to the place of origin.

The *Guardian* was the only one of the three newspapers to publish a report about Jerusalem, sent by Julian Borger, from Camp David itself during the Summit. The newspaper depended on its correspondents for its news in 93.3 per cent of its reports. Suzanne Goldenberge contributed 53.3 per cent from Jerusalem, Julian Borger 20 per cent from the United States, and other correspondents also 20 per cent. Only 6.6 per cent of the reports were provided by news agencies.

3.2.8 Comment and Context

The *Guardian's* correspondents, unlike those of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, presented a wider context for their news stories. Martin Kettle wrote about the

¹⁶⁹*Guardian*, 2 October 2000.

United States' intention to reconsider moving its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem: "Moving the United States embassy has always been an aim for President Clinton, who first pledged himself to the idea while he was campaigning for the presidency in 1992."¹⁷⁰ Later, when Martin Indyk asked Israel to share Jerusalem with the Palestinians, Julian Borger commented that this was a "gambit" by the United States, and that it might have a "political price in the US, where Jewish voters have traditionally punished any attempt to put pressure on Israel to split the city."¹⁷¹ This was a reference to the pro-Israeli lobbies in the US and their influence over the presidential elections as well as the congress elections, as Hilary Clinton was about to be elected to the senate of New York.

Suzanne Goldenberge wrote about the announcement by Ahmed Qureia at the European Parliament of the Palestinian suggestion to reconsider the European position over the internationalisation of Jerusalem: "The proposal revives a formula by the United Nations in 1947 and since then repeated and rejected by Israel and opposed by Palestinians, though it still remains part of European foreign policy."¹⁷²

On most occasions, *Guardian* readers were given the full story, including clarification of historical and religious references. The day after Mr Michael Melchior's declaration of "Barak's compromise" on Jerusalem, Suzanne Goldenberge reported from East Jerusalem the Palestinians' reaction to the Israeli "move". She began with a description of the Palestinian areas of the city. Then she referred to the 1967 war and its consequences for the Palestinians in these areas: "Hundreds were robbed of their homes in 1967 when bulldozers levelled the land for a Jewish quarter. Some 2,500 Jews live where those houses stood."¹⁷³

The *Guardian* clarified what the "Temple Mount" actually comprised: "Although the Haram is part of Arab East Jerusalem, Jews revere the esplanade, which they call the Temple Mount as the site of a temple destroyed in AD 70."¹⁷⁴ In another report it

¹⁷⁰ *Guardian*, 29 July 2000.

¹⁷¹ *Guardian*, 16 September 2000.

¹⁷² *Guardian*, 6 July 2000.

¹⁷³ *Guardian*, 23 July 2000.

¹⁷⁴ *Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

was the “most sacred soil on the planet”.¹⁷⁵ Clearly, the Temple Mount referred to the area where al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock Mosques and the Western Wall were located.¹⁷⁶ Ariel Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sharif was described as “provocative” and readers were reminded of the “symbolism of the visit ... by Mr. Sharon ... reviled for his role in the 1982 massacre of Palestinians in a refugee camp in Lebanon.”¹⁷⁷

When the new terms of sovereignty were reported in the *Guardian*, and “God’s sovereignty” was mentioned as suggestion was made by some commentators in Israel’s radio, Suzanne Goldenberge wrote of the first occasion when this idea was suggested and the Israeli reaction at the time: “When the idea of God’s sovereignty, which was first raised by Jordan in the mid-90s, was raised in the Israeli press, some commentators were less than reverential.” According to Suzanne, “God’s sovereignty” or “divine sovereignty” means granting God “title to the Haram, leaving mere mortals with the task of delegating responsibility for such human concerns as policing, rubbish collection, and the issuing of renovation permits for the holy site.”¹⁷⁸ Then there followed a couple of the Israeli comments from the Israeli papers. Suzanne Goldenberge’s writing shows considerable and valuable knowledge of the places concerned, as well as the behaviour of the two sides and its meaning in the circumstances. She wrote about Netzarim Junction in Gaza: “The fortress, which guards the approach to the Jewish settlement of Netzarim, in the middle of Gaza, is the symbol for the frustrations of Palestinian self-rule, and a regular source of friction.”¹⁷⁹

The *Guardian* was the only newspaper which commented on the lack of information available during the Camp David Summit II. In her news report about the American

¹⁷⁵ *Guardian*, 13 September 2000.

¹⁷⁶ *Guardian*, 21 & 23 July 2000; 13 September 2000.

¹⁷⁷ *Guardian*, 29 September 2000. The reference here is for Sabra and Shatilla Massacre.

¹⁷⁸ *Guardian*, 13 September 2000.

¹⁷⁹ *Guardian*, 2 October 2000.

¹⁸⁰ *Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

proposal concerning “sharing Jerusalem”, Suzanne commented on the “scant details that emerged” then.¹⁸⁰

3.2.9 Suggestions, Justifications, and Interpretation

The *Guardian* gave its readers predictions for the future of Jerusalem and an interpretation of events and their justification. At other times it reported the predictions, justification and interpretation by both sides.

In his report on the United States’ review of the idea of moving its embassy to Jerusalem, Martin Kettle wrote: “Officials in Washington acknowledged two reasons for the review: support for Mr. Barak, and a warning for the Palestinians.”¹⁸¹ He interpreted President Clinton’s threat as a move to “bolster the Israeli Prime Minister ..., and to tighten the screws on the Palestinian leader.”¹⁸²

President Clinton’s interpretation of the possible “unilateral” declaration of the Palestinian State and his predictions of its consequences were reported in the *Guardian*: “I think it would be a big mistake to take a unilateral action and walk away from the peace process, and if it happens there will be inevitably consequences not just here but throughout the world.”¹⁸³

Meron Benvensiti, an Israeli historian and former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, interpreted Barak’s “compromise” on Jerusalem as follows: “That Mr. Barak would even dare to consider such an idea represents the crumbling of a taboo. ... he became the first Israeli ever to discuss the city’s future with the Palestinians.”¹⁸⁴ The Palestinians’ fears and expectations, as well as their worries about the pressure applied to Arafat during the Summit, were also reported: “Yesterday there was trepidation among the Palestinians that Arafat would come under intolerable pressure from Clinton and the Israeli Prime Minister ..., to swallow compromise proposals, or be cast as the Summit wrecker.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ *Guardian*, 29 July 2000.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁸⁵ *Guardian*, 23 July 2000.

Suzanne Goldenberge gave the following explanation of the inconsistency of the statements by Israeli officials concerning Prime Minister Barak's acceptance of the American proposal concerning Jerusalem: "Mr. Melchior's statement – speedily denied by a member of the negotiating team at Camp David – follows a now familiar pattern in seven years of peace talks of deliberate leaks from Israeli politicians meant to gauge domestic public opinion on possible compromises."¹⁸⁶

3.3 *Daily Telegraph*

Jerusalem began to appear in the *Daily Telegraph* headlines ten days after the outset of the Camp David Summit II. The first news story by the newspaper's Washington correspondent, Toby Harden, reported "Barak's compromise on Jerusalem".¹⁸⁷ In the same issue were published 3 items: 2 news stories from Toby Harden and a leader. The news stories described movement and development in the position of Prime Minister Ehud Barak and President Bill Clinton. The next day the newspaper published a comment by Keith Graves, Sky Television's Middle East correspondent. It included two maps showing the districts of Jerusalem and the demographic distribution and it also considered the religious perspective of the conflict.¹⁸⁸

Between the end of the Summit and the outbreak of the New Intifada, the *Daily Telegraph* published two news stories. One reported the resignation of David Levy, the Israeli Foreign Minister. He was reported to have made the decision in protest at Prime Minister Barak's new stance towards Jerusalem – what was described as the "Israeli readiness" to "concede" parts of the city.¹⁸⁹ The other news story appeared two weeks before the beginning of the New Intifada. It reported the "radical ideas to share the sovereignty of Jerusalem's holy places".¹⁹⁰ Alan Philips, the *Daily*

¹⁸⁶ *Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁸⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁸⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 23 July 2000.

¹⁸⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 3 August 2000.

¹⁹⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 15 September 2000.

Telegraph's Jerusalem correspondent, presented these ideas as Israel's initiative or new attitude.

Between 28 September and 31 October 2000, the first month of the New Intifada, the *Daily Telegraph* published 3 reports, 2 photographs, a comment and a leader under the headline of Jerusalem. After 3 October, neither report nor any news story had a headline containing Jerusalem or any reference to the city or its holy places. However, there was the comment by the newspaper's diplomatic editor, Antòn La Guardia.¹⁹¹

The *Daily Telegraph* presented the Israelis, and then the Americans, as the active partners and almost the leading actors at the Summit. During the New Intifada, however, the Palestinians were presented as the leading actor and the Israelis as the aggrieved victim. This attitude was most noticeable in the newspaper's headlines as well as in its news stories. Moreover, it was equally obvious in its sources of information. During the reporting of the developments at the Summit, there appeared headlines like "Barak Eases Hard Line Stance on Jerusalem", and "Clinton to Fly after Offer by Israel on Jerusalem".¹⁹² These headlines were combined with Barak's terms and phrases: "concede", "acceptance", "concessions", "shift", "dream of peace", "compromise", "gone further". On the other hand, terms such as "dismiss" and "refusal" were linked with Arafat or the Palestinians.¹⁹³

3.3.1 Camp David

On 22 July 2000 the *Daily Telegraph* published 2 reports and a leader under a "Camp David and David's city" headline on the same day.¹⁹⁴ It was the city's first appearance in the newspaper's headlines since the beginning of the Summit ten days earlier. The first report described Prime Minister Barak's "acceptance" of the "American plan" for the future of East Jerusalem and the sovereignty over the city. The second report discussed President Clinton's flight back to Camp David from

¹⁹¹*Daily Telegraph*, 13 September 2000.

¹⁹²*Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁹³*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴*Ibid.*

Japan.¹⁹⁵ His return home was attributed to the Israeli acceptance of the “American plan”. The headline indicated two positive actions by the political leaders. The *Daily Telegraph*’s editorial anticipated the possibilities of the future of Jerusalem at the Summit.¹⁹⁶ The next day the newspaper published Keith Graves’ comment, which included two detailed maps of Jerusalem. One map showed the holy places and the Arab Christian, Arab Muslim, American and Jewish quarters of the city. The other map showed the various communities of West Jerusalem, including the districts already mentioned and the holy places on a different scale. The whole area of the Dome of the Rock, al-Aqsa Mosque and the Western Wall was labeled “Temple Mount”.¹⁹⁷

3.3.2 The Camp David Proposals

There was no clear definition of the “American proposal”, although it had provoked much discussion. According to the *Daily Telegraph*, “The plan would give the Palestinians symbols of sovereignty and would present a certain administrative solution.” The newspaper gave no explanation of the meaning of “symbols of sovereignty” or “certain administrative solution”. The report went on to say that the American plan was about to “place East Jerusalem under Palestinian control.” It was not clear how sovereignty could be symbolized and actualized at the same time. Who would actually control Jerusalem if the Palestinians were to have “symbols of sovereignty” and Israeli control was to be “frozen” over the whole city? And what would happen to the other areas outside the Old City of Jerusalem?

Eventually, the *Daily Telegraph* reported that the American plan “stopped short of offering the Palestinians full sovereignty that can be shared over part of Jerusalem.” In the same report, sources at the talks were quoted as saying: “The United States’ plan was based on an Israeli proposal and Clinton expected Barak to give more ground before it could be turned into a formula acceptable to the Palestinians.” So what was the reason for the early announcement of a formula that was not yet

¹⁹⁵ He was attending the G8 Economic Summit in Okinawa.

¹⁹⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 23 July 2000.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

finalized? If it had developed no further than what the Israelis had suggested, why was it called the “American plan”? If it needed only polishing, why was that not mentioned? The correspondent, Toby Harden, considered the Israeli acceptance of the plan to be “a significant shift from the Israeli premier’s previous insistence that the city remain undivided.”¹⁹⁸

Other plans and suggestions for the future of Jerusalem were mentioned during the Summit. In the *Daily Telegraph*’s editorial, the writer referred to what he called “an idea” which “ha[d] been circulating that two large cities could be created within one municipal authority.” He continued in more detail: “To Israel would go the Jewish quarters plus a block of settlements in the West Bank; to the other side, the Palestinian districts of East Jerusalem plus more Arab villages outside the present city boundaries.”¹⁹⁹

In another account, Clinton had returned to Camp David after an Israeli Cabinet Minister had revealed that the Palestinians could be granted control over an autonomous East Jerusalem.²⁰⁰ It can be understood, therefore, that the US President returned to invest in the Israeli offer. Furthermore, it was reported that “Israel was prepared to accept an American plan on the future of Jerusalem.”²⁰¹

Readers were given no further details, although the situation was still not clear. Presumably, this was the outcome of either the scarcity of the information available or the nature of the Israeli “offer” or “acceptance”. There was no clarification of what does “prepared” mean here. And whether the Israelis accept it as it was reported or not. No further information was available to either confirm or refute the reported two different proposals: one from the United States and the other from Israel. As nothing was mentioned concerning the distinctive American proposal as regards East Jerusalem.

¹⁹⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

It was reported that from the point of view of the Palestinian officials, there was no new “formal” offer or proposal. Hannan Ashrawi, the Palestinian spokeswoman, was quoted in the *Daily Telegraph* as saying: “What the Israelis are trying to do is find formulations whereby they would maintain an illegal Israeli sovereignty over occupied Jerusalem.”²⁰² However, if there was no real American proposal, one may wonder why did members of the Palestinian negotiation team refer to the proposal as American. Why was there no differentiation in Hannan Ashrawi’s words between the “American plan” and the “Israeli offer”, and the reason behind the absence of clarification of either of them.

The American proposal was eventually clarified for the first time in the newspaper more than two months after the failure of the Summit: “The Americans have proposed dividing the Temple Mount site horizontally with the Muslims enjoying control of the mosques on the plaza and Israel having sovereignty over everything beneath, including what could be archaeological remains of the Jewish Temple.”²⁰³ This report was sent by Alan Philips in Jerusalem, who evaluated the latest formula as “not workable”.

After the eruption of the confrontations following the failure of the Summit, Alan Philips wrote: “A proposal to vest control of the site in the United Nations Security Council might be acceptable to the Palestinians, but it does not lie well with the Israelis.”²⁰⁴ So the proposals “[did] not lie well”, and not that the Israelis would reject it. It was not their doing. According to Antòn la Guardia, Israel at Camp David “for the first time expressed a readiness to dilute sovereignty over Jerusalem.”²⁰⁵

The causes for such ambiguity were not clear, as different factors may explain it. For example the lack of the information that was made available to the correspondents, the atmosphere of secrecy in Maryland and the distance between the

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ *Daily Telegraph*, 8 October 2000.

²⁰⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 3 October 2000.

²⁰⁵ *Daily Telegraph* 13 October 2000.

location of the journalists and that of the negotiators in Camp David besides other reasons.

The reports published during that time showed a deficiency in the information and details of the developments in the negotiations. Moreover, it seemed that the correspondents had little direct contact with the negotiators and officials from both sides. Contact seemed to be limited mainly to officials and spokespersons from the White House and their reports. The fact that Toby Harden at Camp David introduced Hannan Ashrawi as a spokesman instead of a spokeswoman and later referred to her by the pronoun “he” might indicate the distance between politicians and journalists.²⁰⁶

One may attribute this ambiguity to the negotiating partners’ fear of early popular protest against any possible agreement. This seems to be a sensible reason for the Israelis, but one wonders about whether it did apply to the Palestinians.

3.3.3 The New Intifada

“Violence”, “unrest”, “Intifada” and other terms were used to define the confrontations after Ariel Sharon’s visit to al-Aqsa Mosque on 28 September 2000. According to the *Daily Telegraph*, it was an expected development during the Summit should the talks fail.²⁰⁷ At other times it was predicted even if the Summit were to be successful.²⁰⁸

The first news story to be published in the *Daily Telegraph* about the New Intifada was contributed by Ohad Gozani from Tel Aviv. It was his only report for the newspaper and he was not given any designation. A photograph of Ariel Sharon touching the Western Wall was included. Two days later, Jerusalem was back in the headlines.²⁰⁹ Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to al-Aqsa Mosque was considered to be the direct cause of the confrontations that followed between the Palestinians and the Israelis. However, Ohad Gozani did not give a full and clear account of the event. Although he attributed the flare-up of the confrontations to Ariel Sharon’s visit, he

²⁰⁶*Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000, “Clinton to Fly...”.

²⁰⁷*Ibid.*, leader.

²⁰⁸*Daily Telegraph*, 23 July 2000: comment by Keith Graves.

²⁰⁹*Daily Telegraph*, 13 September 2000.

did not mention the direct connection between the protesters – the Palestinian Muslims – and the place, al-Aqsa Mosque. According to this report, Ariel Sharon, protected by his soldiers, visited the “compound”. They “were leaving the area when some 2000 Palestinian protesters shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ (God is Greater) started throwing stones, bottles and metal rubbish bins...”²¹⁰

So, Ariel Sharon and other Likud party members – according to Ohad Gozani – visited the “compound” and then they left the “area”. Therefore, why were these people – Palestinian Muslims – protesting and shouting? Arafat then condemned the visit as “provocative”. The report gave further clarification of the “area”, “site” or “compound”: “Muslims believe the site was the destination of the Prophet Mohammed’s Night Journey to the ‘Farthest Mosque’ as written in the Koran.”²¹¹

So what was the connection between Muslims and the “area”? Where was the ‘Farthest Mosque’? Did it have anything to do with Ariel Sharon’s visit to the “area”? At the very beginning of the story, readers were told: “clashes erupted yesterday at one of Jerusalem’s holiest shrines.” The report continued: “Officials said at least four Palestinian youths and 25 police were hurt at the hill top compound around the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock Mosque.”²¹² Then it was stated that these mosques were “built over the remains of the Jewish Temples”.²¹³ Such was Ohad Gozani’s account of the “clashes” that “erupted”. The caption for a photograph of Ariel Sharon read: “Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, touches the Western Wall following his visit to the Temple Mount”. In addition, the correspondent points out another reason why the “clashes erupted”: it was the death of an Israeli soldier from his wounds in “a bombing attack near the Gaza strip the night before.”²¹⁴

²¹⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 29 September 2000.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

Two days later, under the headline “16 Die in Battle of Jerusalem”, Alan Philips wrote: “The unrest was prompted by a visit on Thursday to the Temple Mount by Ariel Sharon.” The same name of Temple Mount was used again without any reference to a connection between the Palestinian Muslims and the place.²¹⁵ Some sort of clarification was given later:

The Temple Mount is the home of two of Islam’s sacred shrines – the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock – built on a platform where the Jewish Temple stood until it was destroyed by the Romans in AD 70.²¹⁶

Again, however, no full or clear account was given to explain why these people were protesting. What was the relationship between their protests and the “area” or “compound”? So it is “The Temple Mount” area with two other places upon it. Furthermore, the visit was to the “Temple Mount”, not to the mosques within it. The name of “Temple Mosque” was mentioned six times in the report and “Jewish Temple” was also used once, which made the Palestinian anger even more peculiar and perhaps unacceptable.

The name of Temple Mount was also used in the *Daily Telegraph*’s leader, when it was discussing “the proximate cause” which “provoked this sudden eruption”. Mr Sharon’s visit was described as “irresponsible behaviour”. Moreover, it is noticeable that in Alan Philips’ first report on the New Intifada, the confrontations were described as “battles”, “violence”, and then as “unrest” when the correspondent referred to Mr Sharon’s visit as being the cause. The resurgence of the conflict was attributed to what Alan Philips called “the first serious attempt to divide the Holy City.”²¹⁷ So it was a fuller analysis that delved deeper and investigated the reason for the New Intifada. Mr Sharon’s visit was itself a “consequence of a volte-face by Israel’s Prime Minister, Ehud Barak.”²¹⁸ It was provoked by Barak’s willingness to “concede” the “Temple Mount”.

²¹⁵ *Daily Telegraph*, 1 October 2000.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 3 October 2000.

²¹⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 2 October 2000.

In a wider context, there was some clarification of the religious and historical importance to both sides, the significance of which played a role in the New Intifada: "Jerusalem is too sensitive to be easily divided between Arabs and Jews." Alan Philips gave a very brief historical background of Jerusalem before relating the story of significance.

[The] spiritual heart of [The Old City of Jerusalem,] is the bitterly disputed Temple Mount. The Mount, known to the Muslim world as al-Haram al-Sharif, or the Noble Sanctuary, was the site of the Jewish Temple destroyed by the Romans. Now it is occupied by a complex of mosques, including al-Aqsa, the third holiest place in Islam. ... The presence of the mosques has united Arabs and Muslims all over the world, providing a rally cry for battle against the Israelis.²¹⁹

So the cause of the conflict was the presence of the mosques in the Temple Mount area, not Ariel Sharon's visit to al-Aqsa Mosque. These are the mosques which were thought to have "united Arabs and Muslims". Alan Philips continued: "the spiritual element has dissolved the differences between Palestinians." Because "[s]aving al-Aqsa is a different matter" for them. Then he began to discuss the significance of the Temple Mount for the Israelis: "For many Israelis the Temple Mount has been the center of their spiritual world for thousands of years, and no government has the right to give it up."²²⁰ That was Alan Philips' last word on Jerusalem at this time.

A new map of the conflict was drawn by the *Daily Telegraph*'s diplomatic editor, Antòn La Guardia. A similar story was the 1996 confrontations, which were caused by Israel's opening of the tunnel underneath al-Aqsa Mosque. His analysis was as follows: "Arafat is manipulating religious sentiment for political events to consolidate his support at home ...".²²¹ However, it was not only Arafat who was presented in the *Daily Telegraph* as manipulating religion to achieve political aims. Ariel Sharon's actions were subjected to the same analysis: "Likewise, Mr. Sharon's visit to the Haram al-Sharif was about politics."²²² Therefore, Arafat was on the same level as Ariel Sharon. Antòn La Guardia concluded: "Jerusalem may be the 'City of Peace' but religion and violence are old bedfellows in the Promised

²¹⁹*Daily Telegraph*, 3 October 2000.

²²⁰*Daily Telegraph*, 3 October 2000.

²²¹*Daily Telegraph*, 10 October 2000.

²²²*Daily Telegraph*, 13 October 2000.

Land.”²²³ On the other hand, he focused on other aspects of the events and tried to find other causes: “... the collapse of the talks resulted in an explosion of Palestinian anger. The sense of frustrated expectation, compounded by another delay in declaring statehood, was an explosive waiting to ignite.”²²⁴

3.3.3.1 Passive and Active Voice

Like *The Times* and the *Guardian*, it was noticeable that the *Daily Telegraph* used the passive voice when reporting the New Intifada. The active voice was used only occasionally in Alan Philips’ reports, usually to attribute the act to the Palestinians or when using neutral verbs such as “arrived”. The Israelis were portrayed as the reactor on nearly every occasion. However, events were frequently reported without defining the subject or the object. At other times, neither was defined. It should also be noted that the verb “killed” was replaced with “died” when referring to the Israelis killing Palestinians.

3.3.4 The City of Jerusalem

During the Camp David Summit II, Jerusalem was represented in the *Daily Telegraph* as the “chief stumbling block”²²⁵ and “the city that defies all solutions”. Moreover, it was “undoubtedly a time bomb”.²²⁶ In his comment, Keith Graves referred to Jerusalem as “the very heart of Judaism”, and considered it to be the main reason for the difficulty in suggesting any solution.²²⁷

Meanwhile, there was a discussion of Barak’s “concessions” on Jerusalem. There was emphasis on Jerusalem as the “eternal and undivided capital of Israel”.²²⁸ The “American plan” was acceptable – as it was reported – to the Israeli Prime Minister. According to the *Daily Telegraph*’s leader, “Barak will need all of his authority as a Prime Minister to sell any achieved agreement to the Israeli people.”²²⁹

²²³Ibid.

²²⁴Ibid.

²²⁵*Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

²²⁶*Daily Telegraph*, 23 July 2000.

²²⁷Ibid.

²²⁸*Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

²²⁹Ibid.

Jerusalem was defined twice as “occupied territory” during the Summit.²³⁰ It was also described in other ways, such as “annexed by Israel in 1967” or “captured” or “conquered”.²³¹

3.3.5 Holy Places

References to the holy places in Jerusalem were not frequent during the Camp David Summit II. However, they began to appear repeatedly at the outbreak of the New Intifada. In the whole period under examination, of the 25 occasions, the name of “Temple Mount” was mentioned only 3 times during the Summit; al-Aqsa Mosque, 2 out of 10 times; and the Dome of the Rock 2 out of 3 times. The Western Wall was mentioned 3 times during the whole period and was referred to as the “Wailing Wall” only once.²³² It was called by different names, such as the “Western Wall of the Temple Mount”,²³³ and twice as “the Wall” in the same report.

The Temple Mount was highlighted in the *Daily Telegraph* during the first month of the New Intifada. It appeared for the first time during this period as “The Jewish Temple”,²³⁴ or the “Second Temple”,²³⁵ and sometimes as the “Temple Mount mosque compound”.²³⁶ There were 25 references to the “Temple Mount”, 13 to al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock together. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre was mentioned just once during the whole period. In the first reference to al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock by Ohad Gozani after the “eruption of the clashes”, both were described as “built over the remains of the Jewish Temple”.²³⁷ It is interesting to note that the report clarified the difference between the names used by Muslims and Jews: “Called the Temple Mount by the Jews, Haram al-Sharif by the Muslims, ...”²³⁸ Meanwhile, the writer was neutral towards what Muslims believed about the present-day al-Aqsa Mosque. He shared with the Jews their belief

²³⁰Ibid. & 23 July 2000.

²³¹*Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000; 13 September 2000 & 1 October 2000.

²³²*Daily Telegraph*, 1 September 2000.

²³³*Daily Telegraph*, 23 July 2000.

²³⁴*Daily Telegraph*, 29 September 2000; 1 & 2 October 2000.

²³⁵*Daily Telegraph*, 29 September 2000.

²³⁶*Daily Telegraph*, 1 September 2000.

²³⁷*Daily Telegraph*, 19 September 2000.

²³⁸*Daily Telegraph*, 29 September 2000.

in the historic “Temple Mount”, which existed twenty centuries before the writer was born: “The destruction of the Second Temple, which was built on the ruins of King Solomon’s began 3000 years of mourning by Jews for the loss of Jerusalem.”²³⁹

3.3.6 International Attitude

Apart from the American proposal, no further attention was paid to Jerusalem by the international community. The only comment about an international move was made by Antòn La Guardian in the *Daily Telegraph*. He discussed the fruitlessness of the moves by the senior representative of the United Nations, the European Union, Britain, Russia and Norway, who had been cress-crossing the region.²⁴⁰ He also mentioned the diplomatic mission to the region by Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, and Kofi Anan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The only possible result of these moves – in his opinion – was the containment of the conflict inside the Palestinian territories and Israel: “But they will be lucky if they can prevent the conflict from spilling across the borders of Israel at the Palestinian territories.”²⁴¹

Arabs and Muslims were described as a united block facing the Israelis in the conflict over Jerusalem after Ariel Sharon’s visit.²⁴² Their attention, sentiments and sympathy were represented as a target for Arafat’s manipulation.²⁴³ On another occasion, Alan Philips referred to the United Nations Resolution of the Partition of Palestine 1947, which included an item indicating the internationalization of Jerusalem: “This solution – which was never put into practice – has a delightful simplicity.”²⁴⁴

3.3.7 Sources

Of the *Daily Telegraph*’s news stories about Jerusalem between July and October 2000, 85.7 per cent were reported by its correspondents, Toby Harden in Washington and Alan Philips in Jerusalem. The remaining 14.3 per cent were contributed by

²³⁹Ibid.

²⁴⁰*Daily Telegraph*, 13 October 2000.

²⁴¹Ibid.

²⁴²*Daily Telegraph*, 3 October 2000.

²⁴³*Daily Telegraph*, 10 October 2000.

²⁴⁴*Daily Telegraph*, 3 October 2000.

Ohad Gozani. No news was published with a reference to a news agency. The newspaper published 2 comments by Keith Graves and Antòn La Guardia,²⁴⁵ as well as 2 leaders. Surprisingly, the first report on the New Intifada was the only news story by a freelance correspondent. It was sent from Tel Aviv, despite the fact that the confrontations were in Jerusalem and, in particular, in the Old City. This was an indication of indirect reporting of the confrontations.

Of the total number of reports published in the *Daily Telegraph*, 42.8 per cent came from Jerusalem, 28.5 per cent from Washington, and 14.2 per cent from Tel Aviv. The remaining 14.5 per cent carried no reference to the place of origin.

Twenty-eight people were interviewed and quoted in the *Daily Telegraph*'s items on Jerusalem during the Camp David Summit II. Of the total, 46 per cent were Israelis, 23 per cent were Palestinians, and 15 per cent Americans. All these sources were reported on 22 and 23 July 2000. The remaining 16 per cent had no designation, that is, they were presented as "sources", "officials", or "witnesses".

It is surprising that 83 per cent of the Palestinian sources mentioned above were interviewed and quoted during the New Intifada, whereas only 13.3 per cent were interviewed and quoted during the peace negotiations at Camp David. On the one hand 66 per cent were the *Daily Telegraph*'s sources during the Summit, whereas 33 per cent of the Israeli sources were quoted during the New Intifada. Most of them were members of the Israeli military forces or police spokesmen. The Israeli politicians were rarely mentioned or quoted during the reporting of the "violence", whereas the Palestinian officials were frequently mentioned during that time.

These statistics might indicate that the *Daily Telegraph* had a policy on sources. The correspondents depended on Palestinian sources during the New Intifada, and Israeli sources during the peace negotiations. In particular, these sources were mentioned in the reports as well as in the comments and leaders. This policy attributed the "violence" or "unrest" to the Palestinians, who were interviewed and quoted during the New Intifada. However, the Israeli officials were mentioned and quoted during the Summit as the positive partner and peace lovers. The content of the leader on 22

²⁴⁵*Daily Telegraph*, 23 July 2000; 13 October 2000.

July could clarify this analysis. Following the headline of “Camp David and David’s City”, the writer presented the suggestions for an agreement on Jerusalem and the position of both parties. He concluded: “There, the Israelis appear tired of confrontation with the Arab world and anxious to reach a settlement. By contrast, the Palestinians, buoyed by the retreat of the Israeli army from Lebanon, are ready for renewed armed struggle.”²⁴⁶

3.3.8 Focus of Attention

During the period under examination, the *Daily Telegraph* published 3 leaders, 2 of which followed the headline of Jerusalem as a holy city.²⁴⁷ The first leader analysed the possibilities and difficulties of achieving an agreement on the “future” or “status” of Jerusalem, and what would motivate both parties to reach a settlement. The second leader began with discussing the influence of the photographs and television coverage of the confrontations. It ended with connecting the New Intifada with the impossibility of dividing Jerusalem: “But the status of Jerusalem is a matter that transcends politics. ‘Jerusalem was built as a city that is at unity in itself’, says the Psalmist. For most Jews, that is the end of the matter.”²⁴⁸

So the connection between the confrontations and Jerusalem was the Palestinians: “Many Palestinians have concluded that violence is the best way to pursue their claim, believing that it was only the Intifada that forced Israel to accept the concept of Palestinian statehood.”²⁴⁹ A similar story to the New Intifada was the Intifada 1987, the favourite way for the Palestinians to gain more from the Israelis. Moreover, it was not only the ordinary Palestinians who held that view, but also the Palestinian police, who backed the protesters, and “destroy[ed] the whole concept of land-for-peace”. There was further clarification of the “contrast” between the Palestinians and the Israelis: “Israel has ceded the land without enjoying the peace.”²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*; 2 October 2000.

²⁴⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 2 October 2000.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, see Chapter Five, section 3.

Ten days later the *Daily Telegraph*'s leader declared the death of the peace process. According to its writer, the responsibility clearly lay with the Palestinian Authority as well as with the Palestinian people.

The third leader was published directly after the "collapse" of the Summit. It was expected to analyse the reasons for as well as the consequences of the collapse. However, when discussing the effects of the failure, it was only concerned with the position of the three political leaders. Barak's political "survival" was "at stake", and the Summit ended with "humiliation" for Clinton. Arafat was described as the "interlocutor, who emerges least damaged". That was the "sad fact", according to the editorial. It then went on to describe the faults in the political leaders' assumptions. Remarkably, the personal aspect seemed to be given more attention in the newspaper's editorials on Jerusalem.

3.4 Conclusion

The total number of reports on Jerusalem in the *Guardian* (14) was greater than that in *The Times* (11) and the *Daily Telegraph* (7).

Although both the Palestinians and the Israelis highlighted the future of Jerusalem as the main sensitive topic and sticking point in the negotiations at Camp David, the expressions used by Barak in his letter to Clinton,²⁵¹ as well as those of other Israeli politicians were used in all three newspapers. Terms such as "historic decisions", "possible compromises" or "concessions"²⁵² appeared in nearly every report in the *Guardian* as well as in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*.

Unlike those of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, the reports of the *Guardian*'s correspondents seemed more neutral and balanced. Their neutrality was shown in the use of the names of the places concerned:²⁵³ "Haram al-Sharif, as the Muslims call it,

²⁵¹ *Guardian*, 20 July 2000.

²⁵² *Guardian*, 20, 22, 23 & 28 July 2000.

²⁵³ See the holy sites in this section.

or Temple Mount, as it is called by the Jews.”²⁵⁴ The Temple Mount was then described as the place “where the ruins of the temple are believed to lie.”²⁵⁵

Moreover, it was evident from the reports that there were more than one version of the events. Suzanne Goldenberge, in her report on the first day of the New Intifada, was interviewing people in the streets of Jerusalem as well as a doctor in the hospital where the injured were being treated. She also included a statement by the Israeli spokesman. Her report clearly showed that she was not sure of her information, for she used expressions like “there were reports” and “the Israelis say”.²⁵⁶

Unlike the correspondents of the *Daily Telegraph*, Ian Brodie and Damian Whitworth of *The Times* presented the Palestinians as a real partner during the Camp David Summit II, especially during the first few days. Ian Brodie reported the crisis in the negotiations over Jerusalem before the correspondents of the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, that is, when the Palestinians declared that Arafat was himself preparing to report the failure of the Summit, according to *The Times*.²⁵⁷ However, the *Daily Telegraph* began to report and discuss the crisis when the Israelis highlighted it in their statement about Barak’s willingness to compromise over Jerusalem.²⁵⁸

The *Guardian*, unlike *The Times*, did not report the Israeli rabbis’ plan to build a synagogue on the Haram al-Sharif site in the walled city.²⁵⁹ Nor did it report the attempt by the right-wing fundamentalist Jews to enter al-Aqsa Mosque.²⁶⁰ The *Guardian* was the only newspaper in the study which interviewed scholars for suggestions of possible solutions to the problem of the future of Jerusalem.²⁶¹ Four reports about the New Intifada were published in the *Guardian* under the headline of

²⁵⁴ *Guardian*, 13 September 2000.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁶ *Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

²⁵⁷ *The Times*, 19 July 2000.

²⁵⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

²⁵⁹ *The Times*, 8 August 2000.

²⁶⁰ *The Times*, 11 August 2000.

²⁶¹ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

Jerusalem.²⁶² Although Jerusalem did not appear in the headline along with “Palestinians”, “Muslim” or “Arafat”, it did appear with “Israel”,²⁶³ “Barak”,²⁶⁴ “Sharon”,²⁶⁵ “America”²⁶⁶ and “Clinton”.²⁶⁷

Generally, the Israelis appeared during the Summit as the party that demonstrated more flexibility, whereas the Palestinians seemed to be unyielding. Much praise was given to the Israelis, especially to Barak for his “concessions” and “compromise”. According to the *Guardian*, “Israeli Ministers abandoned the sacred shibboleth of Jerusalem as the ‘undivided and eternal capital of the Jewish people’.”²⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the Palestinians “insist on full sovereignty in East Jerusalem.”²⁶⁹

Although the *Guardian* presented the same attitude as that of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, it was at a much lower level. The newspaper showed greater neutrality in reporting the position of each party, as shown in the following quotation:

They agree that Jerusalem ... must remain undivided. They agree it must be an open city, its places of worship accessible to all. And they agree Jerusalem must be shared by all its people. What remains is the issue of sovereignty or, less inspirationally speaking, who has titular control of the real estate.²⁷⁰

The *Guardian*’s account revealed shared responsibility, for both parties were presented as having a neutral attitude. Although such neutrality was apparent sometimes, at other times the newspaper returned to the mainstream view: “Mr. Barak digs in, Mr. Arafat hesitates”.²⁷¹ The Palestinian leader was described on occasion as “unmoved” and “arguing”, whereas the Israelis “[might] be willing to bend on northern Palestinian neighborhoods”²⁷²

²⁶² See under the New Intifada.

²⁶³ *Guardian*, 22 July 2000; 16 September 2000.

²⁶⁴ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

²⁶⁵ *Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

²⁶⁶ *Guardian*, 29 July 2000; 16 September 2000.

²⁶⁷ *Guardian*, 8 September 2000.

²⁶⁸ *Guardian*, 13 September 2000.

²⁶⁹ *Guardian*, 21 & 22 July 2000.

²⁷⁰ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² *Guardian*, 23 July 2000.

Moreover, the Palestinians' "willingness" to reach an agreement was clearly shown in the *Guardian's* reports. It was the only newspaper to report the Palestinians' declaration of their readiness to "recognise Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem" during the Camp David Summit II. Hassan 'Abdel Rahman, the Palestinian Cabinet Secretary, stated: "Our position remains – that we recognise full Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem in return for full Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem."²⁷³

More details were given in the *Guardian* of the Israeli point of view, such as the comments of Mr Ariel Sharon regarding the negotiable control by the Palestinians of Arab neighbourhoods: "giving up such neighbourhoods would isolate Jewish areas and subject them to the degrees of Palestinian attack."²⁷⁴ The right-wing politicians' reaction to what was called Barak's "compromise" on Jerusalem was reported: "But the statements caused immediate outrage among right-wing Israelis, who accuse Mr. Barak of plotting to forsake the city they see as a biblical birthright."²⁷⁵

Israeli public opinion was also given great attention in the *Guardian*, which mentioned the opinion polls published in *Yediot Ahronot* and *Ma'ariv*, two Israeli newspapers: "In a survey in *Yediot Ahronot*, 70% of those polled opposed the return of any part of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians." And according to *Ma'ariv's* poll, "some 45% would still vote in favour of a peace agreement in a referendum."²⁷⁶

Unlike the first reports in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* about the New Intifada, the *Guardian* clarified from the start the connection between Ariel Sharon's visit to al-Aqsa Mosque and the protests. The so-called "site" in *The Times* was defined here as a "Muslim Shrine". Although it was defined by religion, it was deprived of a name. The headline had the same reference to Islam: "Rioting as Sharon Visits Islamic Holy Site".

²⁷³ *Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

²⁷⁴ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

²⁷⁵ *Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁴ *Guardian*, 30 September 2000.

The *Guardian* differed from *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* in associating the “violence” not only with the Friday prayers but also with the Israeli riot police. The “violence” was also boosted by the arrival of more than 22,000 people for prayer.”²⁷⁷ So it could be argued that the association between “the clashes” or “violence” and the Friday prayers was the *Guardian*’s straightforward description of what was happening on the ground.

Both the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* presented the Palestinian popular uprising – the Intifada of 1987 – as a story similar to that of the New Intifada. The *Guardian* attributed both of them to the continuation of the “brutal reality of the Israeli occupation”. Whereas the *Daily Telegraph* attributed the two Intifadas to the Palestinians’ belief in “violence” as the best way to achieve their demands from the Israelis.²⁷⁸ The same trend in personalizing the event appeared clearly in all three newspapers, especially during the Camp David Summit II. In the *Guardian* the negotiations were reported as “Arafat–Barak talks”.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸*Guardian* and *Daily Telegraph*, 2 October 2000.

²⁷⁹*Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

Chapter Four

Observation: Reporting News about Jerusalem 1967-2000

4.0 Introduction

This chapter examines which types of news items about Jerusalem are reported or not reported in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*. It describes the level of priority given by the correspondents and editors of the British broadsheets to events in the city and the conflict over the sovereignty of the holy places. The chapter covers the reporting of this topic by these three newspapers between 1967 and 2000.

The first date, June 1967, marked a turning-point in the history of Jerusalem, for that was when the city fell completely under Israeli occupation.¹ Since that date, Jerusalem and its holy places have been an arena for political, religious and symbolic conflict. It has witnessed waves of hope and tragedy, from peace talks and United Nations (UN) resolutions to violent confrontations and massacres. The holy places in East Jerusalem sometimes happen to be the arena for conflict, though they are usually the publicised cause of most of it.²

The year 2000 brought Jerusalem under the spotlight for two major events. First, the city was declared to be the main obstacle to peace, and therefore the chief reason for the failure of the peace talks at the Camp David Peace Summit II.³ Second, Ariel Sharon's visit to al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem was considered to be directly responsible for what is known as "al-Aqsa Intifada",⁴ which erupted towards the end of September 2000.⁵ This study examines the reporting of events in Jerusalem and news items concerning the city itself in chronological order.

¹ As Chapter One in this thesis demonstrates.

² This is exemplified in the different courses of event as the torching of al Aqsa mosque 1969, its massacre in 1990, and Sharon's visit to the same mosque in the end of September 2000.

³ See Chapter Three, section 1.

⁴ See Chapter Two, section 2.

⁵ Ariel Sharon was the leader of the right-wing Likud party in Israel at that time.

The attention that Jerusalem has been given by the three newspapers under study can be evaluated according to several criteria, for example, the number of items published on the topic, the page where the news items were located, and whether a leader or a commentary was included. Using these criteria, this chapter quantitatively analyses the occasions on which Jerusalem was treated as an important and newsworthy topic.

The chapter begins by analysing the items published about each event in each newspaper during the week concerned, or for longer if a newspaper continued to report on it. For example, events such as the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000, the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, the massacre at al-Haram al-Shareef in October 1990, and the confrontations over the tunnel in 1996 are examined until the newspapers ceased to publish numerous daily items about them. Regarding the Second Intifada at the end of September 2000, the chapter looks at the first month without following the development of the uprising on the ground.⁶ However, the analysis of events of short duration, such as UN resolutions and the confiscation of land, includes an examination of relevant issues for three days afterwards.

The study uses two methods for calculating the priority and proportion of items published, depending on the type of event.

1. All the items published about events and their consequences are classified as coverage of Jerusalem. This method is used for events such as the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif in 1990, and the confrontations over the tunnel in 1996. This is because the city and its holy places are regarded as the main cause of these events as well as the international reaction and regional consequences.
2. Only items containing in their headlines the name of the city or any of its places are classified as coverage of Jerusalem. This method is used to examine events of a broader nature that include other widely publicized causes and issues. Examples are the 1967 Six-Day War, the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000, and the Second Intifada in September and October 2000.

⁶ The newspapers go on reporting the Intifada for years to come.

The chapter then classifies the proportions and types of items published about the city of Jerusalem, the differences between the newspapers in the timing of publication, and in their treatment of the events.

Another means of evaluating the attention given to Jerusalem is the author of a news item: whether the report was provided by a newspaper correspondent or a news agency. This is useful for discovering whether an event and its timing were considered important enough by a newspaper to warrant sending a correspondent to the city. A relevant factor here is the place from which reports about Jerusalem were sent and the date when correspondents were moved to the city itself.⁷

Lastly, the chapter examines the pages of the newspaper where the items were published. What makes a lead story about the city? Were they printed on the front page or on the inside pages? Whereabouts on the page: in the upper section, in the middle section, in the lower section, on the right or on the left? Did the timing affect the positioning of an item in the newspaper?

4.1 Coverage of News about Jerusalem

This section looks at the numbers and proportions of items published about Jerusalem in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* between 1967 and 2000. In particular, it highlights both the similarity and diversity in the timing and evaluation of the events in the three newspapers.

All the newspapers reported the most significant events during this period. They also published important material on the following events: first; the occupation of East Jerusalem, and the Israeli measures concerning the city after the Six-Day War in 1967; Second; the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969; third; President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in September 1977; Fourth; (The passing of the Basic Law) Israel's official annexation of East Jerusalem as its united capital in July 1980;⁸ fifth; the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif in October 1990; sixth; Oslo Accord of

⁷ Chapter Six shows how these two factors are important in understanding the different policies that applied to reporting news about the city by different newspapers.

⁸ The Basic Law is a Bill that was passed in the Knesset that declares Jerusalem including East Jerusalem "Israel's united and eternal capital." See Chapter Two.

September 1993; seventh; the confrontations over the tunnel in September 1996; eighth; Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000; ninth; the Second Intifada from September to October 2000.

The study excludes two of these events, although they are both of importance to Jerusalem: President Sadat's visit to the city in 1977 and the Oslo Accord of 1993. President Sadat's visit was of symbolic importance, in that he was the first Arab leader to travel to Israel after its occupation of East Jerusalem during the Six-Day War of 1967. His action was condemned by Muslims in general, Arabs in particular, and by other countries for different reasons, though mainly because the visit was not to Tel-Aviv, the Israeli capital, but to Jerusalem. The President himself was aware of its sensitivity, which was clear in his speech to the Knesset when he referred to East Jerusalem as an occupied Arab territory.⁹

The Oslo Accord of September 1993 was of prospective importance to the city. During the negotiations, the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators delayed discussion about the future of Jerusalem until the final status negotiations. The same as during the newspapers' coverage of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, during the reporting of Oslo Accord Jerusalem was not mentioned or discussed in any of the newspapers under examination. The significance and the implication of ignoring Jerusalem in the negotiations was not discussed either by the journalists in their news reports, or by the commentators or the editors in the editorials. The silence of the politicians was followed with a silence by the newspapers and the journalists. Jerusalem was rarely in the headline or the lead paragraph of any of the items published in *The Times*, *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* during their coverage of these two events.

Although both of these events were reported extensively in all three newspapers, there were very few items about Jerusalem itself. In the first week of President Sadat's visit, coverage comprised around 40 items in each newspaper. Only 9 items out of a total of around 120 centred on the city. About 78 per cent of them were photographs of places in the Old City – especially during the visit itself – and these

⁹ Mira Aziz, *Analysing Arabic Political Discourse: Anwar Sadat's Speech in Israel, 1977* (Salford, Lancs, UK: University of Salford, 2001), p. 114.

were published in the *Daily Telegraph*.¹⁰ This newspaper has had the highest proportion of news items about this event between the other two under examination.




Figure 4.1 Total of Items on Each Event in All Three Newspapers

Figure 4.1 shows a marked difference in the number of items about Jerusalem. The highest number covered two events of the 1990s. The confrontations over the tunnel and their consequences comprised 24 per cent of the total items published about the seven most important events. The massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif on 8 October 1990 again comprised 24 per cent of the total published during the whole period. These two events and a third – the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque – resulted in particularly violent clashes. All three events comprised 65 per cent of the total items about the holy city. Al-Aqsa Mosque was the direct cause of the conflict in all of them, which led to regional consequences and international reaction.¹¹

It is worth mentioning here that the observation of these events stops after the day 10 following the first incident. Consequently, the sample does present the material in

¹⁰ The *Daily Telegraph*, 19 November 1977, p. 5; 21 November 1977, pp. 1, 4 & 5; and 22 November 1977, p. 4. The *Times*, 21 November 1977, p. 14. The *Guardian*, 19 November 1977, p. 6; and 21 November 1977, p. 6.

¹¹ After the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif, an inquiry was carried out by the UN, which condemned the action and Israel's policies in the occupied territories. Following the confrontations over the opening of the tunnel, the UN held a special session leading to the Summit in the United States.

first ten days and not all the published material, which suggests that more material was published in the three newspapers about these three events. There is a possibility that any further observation after these ten days would have increased the proportion of the material concerning these three events comparing to the rest. It could be argued that the drama in these events made them seen newsworthy and hence being extensively reported.¹²

In fact the highest two events reported were during the 1990s. During the 1980s the broadsheets in Britain witnessed severe competition. Various strategies were applied in different news organisations, one of these strategies was to “increase the size [of the newspaper] in physical terms, expanding with supplements and pull-out sections”.¹³ This policy is understood to have worked with different newspapers including the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*.¹⁴ It requires generating more material to occupy the space added to the newspapers in various sections. The data shows an increase in the proportions of photos during the 1990s in the three newspapers, which can be attributed to application of this strategy.¹⁵

Although these three events of 1969 and 1990s were extensively reported in all three newspapers, there were many important events that were not mentioned at all. Examples were the UN resolutions, the confiscation of land, and the establishment of new settlements in the city. One of the resolutions was the UNESCO’s announcement that Jerusalem was part of the universal human heritage, and, since it had an insecure status, it should have international protection as a cultural centre.¹⁶ Another was the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) resolution 452, which demanded an end to the continuing construction of new settlements by Israel on Arab land in East Jerusalem.¹⁷ Nor did the newspapers report the closure of the city gates

¹² See Chapter Five, Section 1.

¹³ Brian McNair, *News and Journalism in the UK: A Textbook* (London: Routledge, 1994) p. 143.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ See section 2 of this chapter.

¹⁶ UNESCO’s made the announcement on 28 November 1978, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) passed the resolution on 28 October 1981.

¹⁷ The UNSC resolution was issued on 20 July 1979.

by the Israeli authority on 31 March 1993 and the ban on Palestinians entering the city.

Other events were neither reported nor even mentioned in any of the three newspapers, for example, the continual confiscation by the Israeli authorities of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem. This included land where many of the Israeli settlements were established afterwards, despite UN Resolutions 254 and UNSC's 298.¹⁸

Although many of the UN resolutions were not reported, other discussions and resolutions concerning Jerusalem were reported. For example, the United Nations General Assembly's (UNGA) Resolution 2253 and the UN Security Council's (UNSC) Resolutions 298 and 478 were included in all three newspapers.¹⁹ Although the *Guardian* and *The Times* reported the UNSC's Resolution 252, there was no mention of it in the *Daily Telegraph*.²⁰ This was the only difference between the newspapers regarding the inclusion of events in or concerning Jerusalem. There were greater differences between the newspapers' treatment of particular events.

Between the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967 and the Second or al-Aqsa Intifada in September–October 2000, a total of 564 items were published about the city in all three newspapers. Each published a considerable amount of material

¹⁸ Land was illegally confiscated in East Jerusalem on 28 June 1967 in el-Sheikh Jarrah and Lefta, where the settlements of Ma'alout Dafna and Ramaat Ashkoul were constructed. On 30 August 1970 there was further confiscation of land in Shoufat, Beit Eksa, Lefta, Sour Baher, Beit Jala, Beit Safafa, Beit Hanina and in Qalandia by the city walls, followed by the establishment of the illegal settlements of Jello, Prophet Jacob, Tel Bietot, Atrout and Reikhs Shoufat. More land was confiscated on 3 February 1980 in Bait Hanina, Hazma, Anata and Beit Safafa for the construction of the illegal settlements of Besghat Za'eef and Besghat Oumar. Similar confiscation was carried out on 1 July 1982 and 12 June 1991.

¹⁹ The UNGA's Resolution 2253, issued on 4 July 1967, considered all of the Israeli measures in Jerusalem null and void. This statement was reinforced in the UNSC's Resolution 298 on 25 September 1971. The UNSC's Resolution 478, issued on 20 August 1980, considered the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and Israel's announcement of Jerusalem as its united capital to be null and void. The Resolution also demanded Israel to withdraw and reverse its policy.

²⁰ The UNSC's Resolution 252 was issued on 21 May 1968. It rejected the appropriation of land by force and expressed the Security Council's regret that Israel ignored the UN's resolutions.

and, as shown in Figure 4.2, there were only slight differences in the individual totals: *The Times* – 35 per cent; the *Daily Telegraph* – 34 per cent; and the *Guardian* – 31 per cent.




Figure 4.2 Percentage of Total Items Published by Each Newspaper

However, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* gave Jerusalem greater coverage in the 1990s, compared with *The Times*, which devoted more space to the city during the late 1960s, particularly the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque.²¹ *The Times*' coverage comprised 40 per cent of the total published by all three newspapers during that period. In the 1990s though, the proportion fell to 27 per cent. During the 1980s the newspaper's share of the coverage was high at 46 per cent, and remained high at 43 per cent during the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000. However, there was a large reduction to 26 per cent during the Second Intifada in September–October of that year.

Consistently, with its strategy of increasing its size the *Guardian*'s peak output of news on Jerusalem was during the 1990s, when it published 56 per cent of its total items during the whole period under study. The trough occurred in the 1980s, when the newspaper's coverage of this topic comprised only 6 per cent of its total output.

²¹ As Figure 4.3 shows.

This can be attributed to its circulation losses during the same period which might have affected its foreign news budget.²²




Figure 4.3 Total Items on Each Event in Each Newspaper

The *Daily Telegraph* also reached its peak during the 1990s, when it published 51 per cent of all its items on the city. Like *The Times*, it also hit a trough during the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000, when its proportion of the three newspapers' output of news on this event dropped to 24 per cent. However, its output rose to 41 per cent of the total published by all the newspapers on the Second Intifada.

The newspapers' and specially the *Daily Telegraph's* extensive coverage of the conflict, drama and violence in the recent history of Jerusalem indicates a notable interest in reporting violent events.²³ This trend is understandable, for it is the negative aspect of an event "bad news is good news" which makes it newsworthy from a journalistic point of view.²⁴

²² McNair, *News and Journalism*, p. 123.

²³ See Chapter Five, section 1.

²⁴ John Hartley, *Understanding News* (London: Methuen, 1982) p. 77.

4.2 Categories of Items

This section investigates the types of item about Jerusalem that were published more than others, the timing of their publication, the events covered by these items, the proportion of leaders, photographs, commentaries and analysis, and the themes of particular interest for editorials and commentaries.

Reports and news items comprised the highest proportion (64 per cent) of the total items published in all three newspapers. Photographs were of particular importance to all the newspapers, especially from the 1990s onwards. The increase in the number of photographs matched the increase in the written material during the same period, especially leaders, commentaries and analysis, which comprised the next largest proportion. Maps come next in the rating, followed by a very small proportion of items categorized as “others”. About 73 per cent of the “others” – cartoons, portraits and interviews – were published in the *Guardian*. Half of this newspaper’s illustrations appeared after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967,²⁵ followed by most of the remainder in 1990 and 1996.²⁶ The remaining 27 per cent of the “others” were published by the *Daily Telegraph* during the 1990s.²⁷ *The Times* did not publish any “others” or illustrations throughout the period under examination.

There were differences in the output of each category of items about Jerusalem according to the time and the newspaper. The publication of photographs, leaders, commentaries, analysis, maps and others reached their peak in October 1996.

²⁵ *Guardian*, 10 June 1967, p. 6, and 24 June 1967, p. 9.

²⁶ *Guardian*, 10 October 1990, p. 8.

²⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 28 September 1996, p. 16; and 3 October 1996, p. 22.




Figure 4.4 Categories of Items on Jerusalem

However, this was not the peak time for news items and reports about the city, which comprised only 18.1 per cent of the total published in this category as Table 4.1 shows. The publication of these items reached its highest rate of around 23 per cent in 1990 when covering the massacre at al-Haram al-Shareef. Leaders had two similar peaks. The first was reached in August 1969 when reporting the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque. The same number of leaders was published twenty-seven years later on the confrontations over the tunnel in 1996. It should be noted that significant events such as the occupation of Jerusalem followed by the Israeli measures concerning the city did not merit an editorial in any of the newspapers.

It could be argued that Jerusalem was not the main issue at that time, which was the defeat of the Arabs in the Six-Day War by Israel and Israel's victory and occupation of other Arab territories in Egypt, Syria and Jordan. On the other hand, Jerusalem was at the centre of later events such as the confrontations over the tunnel, the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif and the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque. The situation was much the same during the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000, where Jerusalem was just one issue among many others such as the Palestinian State, borders, settlements and others. It merited six leaders, many of which were published

in the *Daily Telegraph*.²⁸ It is interesting to note that the *Daily Telegraph* did not publish a leader on any other aspect of the Summit.

Events considered newsworthy, such as the confrontations over the tunnel in 1996 and the massacre at al-Haram al-Shareef in 1990, attracted high coverage in every category. However, similar events, such as the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, were reported at a much lower level, particularly with illustrations and maps. Generally, the number and proportion of photographs increase throughout the period, slightly in 1969 and then dramatically during the 1990s, when Jerusalem was the subject of about 69 per cent of the total photographs published. It is understandable that there is a large amount of photographic material when the subject is a massacre or a confrontation, for such events are dramatic in their display of conflict, injury and death, and therefore attract journalists' public attention. The high photographic coverage enables editors to fill whole pages about Jerusalem, or, more precisely, about the event being reported. Photographs are contributed by news agencies or freelance photographers. None carries a reference to a newspaper's photographer.

Table 4.1 Proportion of items in each category of each event: *The Times*, *Guardian* and *Daily Telegraph*

Category	1967	1969	1980	1990	1996	2000A, B	UN
News/ Report	12	21	12	23	18	7	7
Photographs	7	10	3	30	39	13	0
Leaders	0	23	15	19	23	19	0
Comment/Analyses	14	7	7	24	41	7	0
Maps	29	0	0	12	35	24	0
Others	36	0	0	18	36	9	0

²⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000, p. 25; 26 July 2000, p. 27; *Guardian*, 21 July 2000, p. 17; and *The Times*, 27 July 2000, p. 21.

Jerusalem attracted little commentary and analysis in the newspapers during 1969 and 1980. There was none in the *Guardian*, and *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* carried only two items about each event. During 2000, the *Guardian* has not included such items on the city during the Camp David Peace Summit II or the Second Intifada. However, *The Times* included one and the *Daily Telegraph* published three, all of which examined the Second Intifada.²⁹ The latter published a similar average of these items on each of the two events in the 1990s.³⁰ Conversely, the newspaper carried neither commentary nor analysis of Jerusalem in 1967. Of its total commentaries and analyses, 82 per cent appeared during the 1990s and October 2000, coinciding with the publication of 63 per cent of its leaders and 89 per cent of its maps at that time. Nevertheless, the *Daily Telegraph*'s number of leaders about the Second Intifada was higher than in the 1990s, which could indicate a recent marked increase in the newspaper's attention to Jerusalem. Indeed, this decade marked a turning-point in the amount of attention, in every aspect, given to the city by all three newspapers.

4.3 Author of Items

This section analyses the authors of the items published by each newspaper about Jerusalem and the events in that city, as described in section 4.1. It categorizes which items were contributed by correspondents or news agencies, and which carried no reference to an author at all. It does not differentiate between freelance correspondents and those employed by the newspapers. The section covers authors of news items, reports, photographs, commentaries, analysis and cartoons, but not leaders nor maps, which might not include the author's name.

Figure 4.5 shows that most of the items about Jerusalem published in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* are contributed by correspondents. Only 29 per cent of the total are contributed by news agencies (13 per cent) or "others" (16 per cent), that is, with no reference to the name of the author. News items, reports and

²⁹ *The Times*, 4 October 2000.

³⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 3 & 5 October 2000, pp. 17, 18 & 22; 13 September 2000, p. 4; 10 & 15 October 1990, pp. 25 & 18; 3 October 1996, p. 22; 28 & 30 September 1990, pp. 16 & 10.

photographs could come from correspondents or news agencies, whereas commentaries and analysis could be contributed by the newspapers and their writers.




Figure 4.5 Types of Authors of Items in All Three Newspapers

Most of the photographs were generally supplied by photographers from news agencies, especially Reuters, Agence France Presse and Associated Press.

In 1969, during the coverage of the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque, 65 per cent of the items were contributed by correspondents, most of whom were newspaper employees. Only 13 per cent of the items were supplied by news agencies. Many of the correspondents' items came from reporters in Tel Aviv and Arab capitals such as Beirut, Cairo and Amman.³¹ Unlike *The Times* and the *Guardian*, the *Daily Telegraph* was the only newspaper to have a correspondent in Jerusalem at that time.

The dependence on the newspapers' correspondents and sometimes on freelancers continued to increase until the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif in 1990. It decreased to about 10 per cent during the coverage of the confrontations over the tunnel in October 1996, and then maintained an average of around 69 per cent.

The dependence on news agencies declined from the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967 and hit a low point during the coverage of the massacre

³¹ See also section 4 of this chapter.

at al-Haram al-Sharif in 1990. It was followed by a peak in 1996, coinciding with the decrease in the dependence on correspondents, and then it fell again slightly.

The trend in publishing items without reference to an author followed a steady decline between 1967 and 1980. This was followed by small ups and downs until the coverage of the Second Intifada in October 2000. Table 4.2 shows the irregularities in the trend.

Table 4.2 Categories of authors of published items (per cent)

AUTHOR EVENT	1967	1969	1980	1990	1996	2000A	2000B
Correspondent	58	65	75	80	69	69	71
News agency	13	13	12	6	19	17	13
Others	28	22	13	15	12	13	16

With 80 per cent of its news items contributed by correspondents, the *Guardian* was far more dependent on them than were *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*. It depended completely on them during the Camp David Peace Summit II and the Second Intifada in 2000. However, 26 per cent of the total coverage in both *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* of the same events was contributed by Agence France Presse, Associated Press and Reuters. Most of this coverage consisted of photographs.³² Of the items published in the *Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*, 70 per cent and around 67 per cent respectively referred to correspondents. Of the total items provided by news agencies for all three newspapers, 47 per cent were published in the *Daily Telegraph*, and of the total items with no reference to an author, 49 per cent were published in *The Times*. It is interesting to note that of *The Times*' total items from news agencies, 57 per cent were contributed between October 1996 and October 2000, compared with only 2 per cent (coverage of the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif) in 1990. Only 14 per cent of the *Daily Telegraph*'s published items about Jerusalem contained no reference to an author, however, about 22 per cent of *The Times*' items included the authors' names.

³² *The Times*, 22 July 2000, p. 15; 24 July 2000, pp. 12, 15, 17, 26 & 27; 2 October 2000, pp. 7, 13, 21 & 24. See also the *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000, pp. 12, 16, 22 & 27; 29 September 2000, pp. 12, 18 & 30.

Although there is no indication that *The Times* maintained a correspondent in Jerusalem throughout the period under examination, it did employ correspondents in Israel, especially in Jerusalem during the events under study. On the first day of the fighting in Jerusalem in June 1967, the newspaper received a report from the city by Nicholas Herbert, its Middle East correspondent.³³ It seems that he left the city for Beirut two days after the Israeli occupation of the East Jerusalem. *The Times* also received a news story from Patrick Progan in Jerusalem.³⁴ Afterwards, the newspaper depended on Reuters for its news about the city.³⁵

The fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969 was reported by *The Times*' correspondent in Tel Aviv, Moshe Brilliant, yet the newspaper would not send him to Jerusalem.³⁶ Between July 1980 and the end of October 2000, *The Times* maintained correspondents in the city for reporting events throughout the period. It is not clear if this was because Israeli legislation concerning Jerusalem now allowed foreign correspondents to live there.

The Times certainly changed its foreign correspondents in the city from time to time. Christopher Walker reported the Basic Law of 1980, Richard Owen reported the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif in 1990, and Richard Beeston the Oslo Accord in 1993. Christopher Walker was back in Jerusalem during the confrontations over the tunnel in 1996. The events during 2000 were covered mainly by Sam Kiley and partly by Ross Dunn, both travelling between Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Gaza, as well as the West Bank cities of Ramallah, Nablus and Bethlehem. It seems that the correspondents followed the cycle of events.

However, the *Guardian* did not publish its first item by a correspondent on the occupation of East Jerusalem until a few days after the event.³⁷ The first report from Jerusalem appeared a few days after that, when Harold Jackson left Tel Aviv for the

³³ *The Times*, 6 June 1967, p. 10.

³⁴ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, p. 4; 29 June 1967, p. 1 (news story by Nicholas Herbert from Beirut).

³⁵ *The Times*, 30 June 1967, p. 4.

³⁶ *The Times*, 22 August 1969, pp. 1, 4, 5, 23, 24, 27 & 30; 2 September 1969, p. 5.

³⁷ *Guardian*, 10 June 1967, p. 6.

holy city to report Israel's victory celebration in front of the Wailing Wall.³⁸ There was no further publication of news items about Jerusalem from correspondents until the dismantling of the city's barriers by the Israelis at the end of June 1967. Eric Silver reported that event following a news story sent by him the previous day.³⁹

The fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969 was reported by David Hirst, the *Guardian's* Middle East correspondent in Beirut, and then by Walter Gross from Tel Aviv.⁴⁰ Unlike *The Times*, the *Guardian* did not maintain correspondents in Jerusalem until 1990. It had no correspondent there when Israel was passing laws concerning the city at the end of July 1980. In 1990, the newspaper received most of its reports about Jerusalem from Ian Black, followed by Derek Brown in 1996.⁴¹ In 2000, Suzanne Goldenberge was reporting for the newspaper from Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, the West Bank and Gaza.⁴²

In 1969, the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent, John Wallis, was in Jerusalem to report on the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque and its immediate repercussions.⁴³ In 1980, the newspaper's correspondent, Maier Asher, formerly of Tel Aviv, was reporting from Jerusalem throughout the time when the Israeli government was passing legislation on the city.⁴⁴

Table 4.3 No. Of Items Contributed by Correspondents

Correspondents'	1967	1969	1980	1990	1996	2000A	2000B
<i>The Times</i>	14	27	20	31	21	7	5
<i>Guardian</i>	11	7	5	48	38	11	12
<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	10	22	14	34	26	5	4

In the 1990s, most of the news items on Jerusalem were contributed by Anton la Guardia, who was based in the city, and then by Ohad Gozani in Tel Aviv. It seems

³⁸ *Guardian*, 15 June 1967, p. 9.

³⁹ *Guardian*, 28 & 29 June 1967, p. 1. Eric Silver is a Jew who was writing in the *Jewish Chronicle* after he left the *Guardian* and later he has been working in the *Independent*.

⁴⁰ *Guardian*, 22 & 25 August 1969, p. 1 and 3.

⁴¹ *Guardian*, 9 October 1990, pp. 1 & 20, 23 & 24; 26 September 1990, pp. 1, 8, 11 and others; 24 September 1996, p. 12; 26 September 1996, p. 1; 28 September 1996 p. 1; and others.

⁴² *Guardian*, 18, 21 & 22 July 2000, pp. 13, 12 & 2; 29 September 2000, pp. 16 and others.

⁴³ *Daily Telegraph* 22 August 1969, p. 24.

⁴⁴ Maier Asher was the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent in Tel Aviv in August 1969.

that the *Daily Telegraph*'s correspondents were more settled, for each reported from Jerusalem, or at least from Israel for a decade, or even longer, as did Maier Asher.

4.4 The Place of Reporting

This section examines the places from which news items about Jerusalem and events in that city were sent throughout the period being studied. It covers reports, news stories and photographs, which are regarded as items that need to refer to the place of reporting, but not leaders, commentaries, maps, illustrations, cartoons, or historical background, since these did not fall into the same category. The Gulf states and North African Arab states were considered for this purpose to be part of the Middle East. Where news items referred to more than one place of reporting, for example, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Cairo, each place was counted separately.

Figure 4.6 shows that only 41 per cent of the news items about Jerusalem were reported from the city itself, with 59 per cent reported from elsewhere. It could be argued that news about Jerusalem could come from capital and regional cities, especially during a crisis, such as the events being studied in this thesis. In addition, news items about UN resolutions usually came from New York. It is surprising that 19 per cent of the items carried no reference to the place of reporting. Of all the items from Jerusalem, 61 per cent were published during the 1990s and covered the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif and the confrontations over the tunnel.

The next highest rate for a place of reporting is the category "International", which means anywhere apart from Jerusalem, Israel, the West Bank and the Middle East. Of these items, many came from Washington, London, Paris, Brussels, Sydney, Moscow, Mogadishu, Athens, Kashmir and many other places.⁴⁵ Most of these items were published in 1969, 1990, and 1996.⁴⁶ However, the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif in 1990 accounted for 22 per cent of International news items, the highest proportion in that category to cover a single event in Jerusalem. The confrontations over the tunnel in 1996 and the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969 rated a lower

⁴⁵ This category includes news items for all three newspapers.

⁴⁶ In terms of the number of items.

international coverage than other events such as the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and the Camp David Peace Summit II and Second Intifada in 2000.




Figure 4.6 Place of Reporting (All Newspapers)

Of the news items about the UN resolutions, only 35 per cent were categorized as of International origin, although they are generally expected to be sent from New York, which is also classified as International in this study and is the headquarters of the United Nations Organization. A similar percentage of these news items about the UN's debates and resolutions concerning Jerusalem came from Israel, mostly from the city itself, and discussed Israel's reactions. Israel, mainly Tel Aviv, was the place of reporting for only 5 per cent of all the published news items, of which 67 per cent appeared in *The Times*, half of them in 1969 (the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque). That was when only one news item from there was reported in the *Daily Telegraph* and two in the *Guardian*. Unlike the *Daily Telegraph*, neither *The Times* nor the *Guardian* had correspondents in Jerusalem at the time of the event, which was reported from Tel Aviv and Beirut.⁴⁷ The *Guardian's* Middle East correspondent, David Hirst, sent a report from Beirut, which was followed by a report from Walter Gross in Tel Aviv.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ In August 1969, John Wallis was in Jerusalem for the *Daily Telegraph*, Moshe Brilliant in Tel Aviv for *The Times*, and David Hirst in Beirut for the *Guardian*.

⁴⁸ *Guardian*, 25 August 1969, p. 3. The newspaper did not mention the name of the correspondent in its news item from Tel Aviv, nor the author of the news item about Jerusalem.

Although there was no difference among the three newspapers in the timing of their peak rate of reports on Jerusalem from the city itself, which was during the 1990s, the trough in reporting did occur at different times for each newspaper.

4.5 Location of News Items in Newspapers

This section analyses the positioning of the news items about Jerusalem in all three newspapers over the period being studied. The location of the items indicates the level of importance attached to particular events by the newspaper. For example, items on the front page attract more attention than those on the inside pages, right hand inside page more than the left hand ones, and the upper section of the page catches the eye more readily than the middle and lower sections. The analysis describes the location of the items, the level of consistency in their location, and interprets from the findings the priority given to the events by the newspapers as a group and individually. In assessing the location of news items, each column is counted as a single score and an item beginning at the top of the page and continuing into the middle section is counted as an upper item.




Figure 4.7 Location of Items in All Three Newspapers

Many of the total news items about Jerusalem were printed on the front pages of the newspapers. One quarter of these front-page items covered the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif in October 1990, and 24 per cent reported the Israelis' occupation of East Jerusalem and the measures taken by them afterwards. The coverage of the confrontations over the tunnel in 1996 accounted for another 20 per cent, and the remainder comprised reports of all the other events, especially the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in August 1969.

Of the front-page items about Jerusalem, 46 per cent appeared in *The Times*. It seems, therefore, that the newspaper had more items on this topic than the *Guardian* or the *Daily Telegraph*.⁴⁹ However, the difference among all three newspapers in the content of their front-page items is more marked than the numbers of these items.

Figure 4.8 shows a high proportion of front-page news items during the 1990s and 1969. However, the coverage of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 was only about half of that of the massacre at al-Haram al-Sharif in 1990, the two events had equal proportions of front-page items. It is also noticeable that there were not many front-page items about Jerusalem during 2000.

⁴⁹ See Table 4.4.




Figure 4.8 Front-Page Items vs. Time (All Newspapers)

One of the front-page items on the Camp David Summit was the *Guardian*'s report of the collapse of the talks.⁵⁰ The *Daily Telegraph*'s item, published earlier, reported the American President Bill Clinton's return home after the so-called Israeli offer for Jerusalem.⁵¹

There was a marked diversity among the three newspapers in their rate of front-page items, especially in 1969, when *The Times* had 67 per cent compared with the *Guardian*'s 3 per cent of the total number published by all three newspapers. There was a similar difference later in 1980 during the Israeli legislation for Jerusalem. However, there was also a consistency in the high rate of front-page news items in all three newspapers in, for example, 1967 and 1990 (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 Front-Page Items in Each Newspaper (Per Cent of Total)

Newspaper	1967	1969	1980	1990	1996	2000A	2000B	UN
<i>The Times</i>	38	67	86	39	24	0	0	29
<i>Guardian</i>	31	3	0	36	38	50	0	43
<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	31	28	14	25	38	50	0	29

It should be noted that 49 per cent of the news items about Jerusalem were printed in the upper section of the page, compared with 7 per cent in the lower section (see

⁵⁰ *Guardian*, 26 July 2000, p. 1.

⁵¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000, p. 1.

Figure 4.9). The *Daily Telegraph* accounted for 40 per cent of the upper-section items. Where there was a high proportion of photographs, most of them were also placed in the upper section of the page, which is the usual position for this type of news item.




Figure 4.9 Location of Items on the Page (All Newspapers)

Figure 4.10 shows that the distribution of news items about Jerusalem over the right- and left-hand sides of the page were almost balanced, although the proportion of those on the right-hand side (columns E, F, G and H) was slightly less than those on the left-hand side. Columns C and D were preferred by both the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, compared with *The Times*' preference for Columns A and B, where 33 per cent of its news items about Jerusalem were printed. Columns G and H contained the smallest number of items on this topic in all three newspapers.




Figure 4.10 Location of Items in Columns (All Newspapers)

4.6 *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*: A Survey

This chapter has shown the increasing amount of attention given to Jerusalem after the Israeli occupation of the East part of the city in 1967. Violent events attracted more attention by all three newspapers in the number and type of items and the coverage by correspondents.

Unlike *The Times* and the *Guardian*, the *Daily Telegraph* had its own correspondents in Jerusalem for every event from the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967.⁵² This may indicate more interest of the newspaper besides a considerable budget for foreign news. During the Second Intifada on 29 September 2000, the *Daily Telegraph* received its first report from Ohad Gozani in Tel Aviv. In the early days of this event, another of the newspaper's correspondents, Alan Philips, was sending reports from Gaza. He was transferred to Jerusalem for the first time during the Intifada about a week after it began, although everyone had expected violent conflict in the city earlier.⁵³

Each of the three newspapers had a correspondent in Jerusalem in June 1967, although the *Guardian* sent its correspondent there a few days after the occupation,

⁵² *Daily Telegraph*, 7 & 8 June 1967, pp. 1, 9–12, 17 and others.

⁵³ *Daily Telegraph*, 29 September 2000, pp. 2 & 18; 4 October 2000, pp. 1 & 17.

and *The Times* sent its correspondent back to Beirut early. The *Daily Telegraph* had Maier Asher in Jerusalem to report on the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque and its consequences. Neither the *Guardian* nor *The Times* had anyone in the city, for their reports on the event were sent from Tel Aviv and Beirut. The Israeli government's legislation for Jerusalem was given more attention by *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, for both newspapers had correspondents on the spot, although there were no consequences to speak of in the city itself. The reaction to the consequences of this event was international, spreading across Europe, Asia, many Muslim countries and the United States. During the 1990s and 2000, all three newspapers had correspondents in Jerusalem, who covered the events of that period.

From the aspect of page coverage about Jerusalem, particularly the consequences of the events that occurred there, the topic was given more attention in 1969, 1990, 1996, and September–October 2000. However, it did not merit the same level of attention in 1967, 1980, and July 2000, although the latter events might have had greater political significance.

From the aspect of editorials, the city was given the greatest attention in 1969 and 1996, when 45 per cent of the total articles were devoted to this topic. Although each of the newspapers had the same number of leaders in total in 1969, the proportion in the *Guardian* was 67 per cent of the individual total on the event itself. Events of similar importance, such as the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the Israeli legislation for the city in 1980, and the Second Intifada in September–October 2000 merited a smaller number of leaders. The leaders in *The Times* and the *Guardian* in August 1969 focused on the possible consequences of the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque, whereas those in the *Daily Telegraph* discussed Islam and the reactions of President Gamal 'Abd el-Nasr of Egypt at the time.⁵⁴

This chapter demonstrates how political dilemmas, peace negotiations, have less significance and hence coverage than the violent confrontations and incidents in the

⁵⁴ *The Times*, 22 August 1969, p. 7, *Guardian*, 22 August 1969, p. 8; *Daily Telegraph*, 23 & 27 August 1969, pp. 10 and 14.

newspapers under examination. The negativity of the events in 1990s beside a technological change in communication led to an intensive reporting of the events happened in this decade. Yet not every negative event concerning the city was reported as Israel's recurrent illegal confiscation of the Palestinian land in East Jerusalem.

Moreover, the level of drama in the news affects the location of the items since a high per cent of the front-page items in the newspapers concerning the city were concentrated around the dramatic events. The chapter also shows that moves by international actors, such as the UN, were liable to be ignored by the news media.

The news that were reported regarding Jerusalem were either "spot" or "promoted" news. The spot news was almost dramatic, which is exemplified in the events of 1969, 1990s and the Second Intifada in September 2000. Dramatic events drew attention from basic issues to action, and counteraction, which in turn do not reflect the situation. One can argue that the news media's concentration on action is a genuine characteristic of news. News is described as "action-centred".

Chapter Five

The Characterization of Jerusalem: News Selection and Framing

Introduction

This chapter investigates the overall presentation of Jerusalem and the conflict over the city in the three newspapers under examination: *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*. It provides a theoretical framework of the portrayal by these newspapers of the city, the conflict over it, and the main rivals for its control between 1967 and 2000.

The study refers to the news items already analysed, beginning with the occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967 and ending with the first four weeks of the Second Intifada in October 2000. Chapters One to Three, covering the analysis of the portrayal of particular events, besides the quantitative analysis of newspapers' coverage of various events in Chapter Four form the basis of the overall picture upon which Chapter Five will draw.

This chapter conceptualizes the dominant tendencies in reporting the conflict over Jerusalem, the presentation of the city and the claims of the two rivals. The tendencies are categorized according to the two main stages of news production: news selection and news framing.

Section 5.1 analyses the selection of news about Jerusalem. It also lists the main criteria on which the "newsworthiness" of an event is based, thus defining what is included in and excluded from the newspapers' reports. Section 5.2 describes the dominant trends in the selection by the Press of news about Jerusalem, and this is followed by a summary and conclusion.

Section 5.3 examines the framing of news about Jerusalem, in particular the basic frames that were used in the mainstream reports on the city. And section 5.4 reviews the shifts and variations in the across the newspapers and over the time in portraying the city, the conflict and the players.

5.1 News Selection and the Concept of “Newsworthiness”

The portrayal of Jerusalem by *The Times*, *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* emerges from their reports on the conflict over the city as well as by other published items such as photographs, comments, analysis, and editorials. The fact that these newspapers continued to publish news items on this topic over thirty-three years shows that the city continued to be of great interest to the newspapers.

The events that were actually reported were those which were considered by news workers and news organizations to be “newsworthy”, that is, they were assumed to be particularly interesting or appealing to the newspapers’ readerships.

Many factors influence the selection of news. Some are common to both national and international news, others only to the latter. For an “event” to become a news item or even to be initially considered “newsworthy”, two factors relating to the news workers’ “professional ideology” need to be borne in mind: “convention” and “prior experience”.¹

This section examines the influences on the selection of news, and the routines and criteria followed in the reporting of the conflict over Jerusalem and the portrayal of the city. Section 5.2 looks at the main aspects of the reporting of Jerusalem. It traces the inclusion and exclusion of a range of events concerning the city and examines the pattern of news selection, based on the principle of access. The question is asked: Which of the rivals’ messages managed to pass through the gates to the readerships of *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* during the course of the events? The answer indicates the dominant source of news about the city.²

According to McQuail, the concept of “news selection” as a personal and organizational activity is “the sequence of decisions which extends from the choice of the ‘raw material’, to delivering the final product”.³ The fact that a given news item is considered “newsworthy” is the most common criterion for it to be seen as reportable or publishable. The assessment of “newsworthiness” is thought to be

¹ Denis McQuail, *McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory* (London: Sage, 2000), p. 231.

² See Chapter Six.

³ *Ibid.*, pp.276 & 343.

subjective, that is, based on the journalists' "intuition, feel and innate judgement".⁴ However, it is also based on a particular set of news values.⁵

A wide range of theories have been applied to the selection of news, and numerous points have been raised and discussed. The influential Gatekeeping Theory looks at the procedure of "news selection".⁶ The message itself is believed to reflect part of the "reality".⁷ Shoemaker has described the Gatekeeping Theory as "the process of reconstructing the essential framework of an event and turning it into news." The selection of news is considered to be not only an evaluation of an event, by picking up pieces of information ("messages"), allowing them to pass through the "gates", and then passing the product to the newspapers' readership, but also a kind of "transformation" of the original "message". This view could be interpreted to mean that when a particular event is selected as news, it is likely to lose part of its content and shape when passing through the "gates".⁸ Moreover, it has been argued that this transformation is, in fact, a "distortion" of the "reality" of the event.⁹ Nevertheless this transformation is less applied to the "promoted" events, as in the case of such event the construction of the news story is made publishable by the promoting bureaucracy or the institution.¹⁰

A comparison needs to be made between the first draft of the "messages", that is, the version sent by both rivals in the conflict over Jerusalem, on the one hand, and the reported news "messages" on the other. These messages are expected to represent all

⁴ Ibid., p.337.

⁵ J. Galtung & M.H. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign: News The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba, and Cyprus Crises in Four Foreign Newspapers", in J. Tunstall (ed.), *Media Sociology* (London: Constable, 1970) pp. 259-292.

⁶ McQuail, *MCT*, pp.226-7 ; P.J. Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991)p. 1-5. This theory is also applicable to news framing. See Section (2) of this Chapter.

⁷ Shoemaker & Reese., *Mediating the Message*, pp.5-6.

⁸ Ibid.; McQuail, *MCT*.

⁹ Huang, Li-Ning, & Kathrine McAdams, "Ideological Manipulation vis. Newspapers Accounts of Political Conflict: A Cross-National News Analysis of the 1991 Moscow Coup", in Abbas Malek & Adnan Kavouri (eds), *The Global Dynamics of News: Studies in International News Coverage and News Agenda* (Stamford, Connecticut: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 2000), p.59.

¹⁰ Harvey Molotch & Marilyn Lester, New as Purposive Behaviour: On the Strategic Use of Routine Events, Accidents and Scandals. Dan Berkowitz (ed.) *Social Meanings of News: A Text-Reader* (Thousand Oaks, California; Sage, 1997).

the claims made by both parties concerning the city and their accounts of the “event” being reported.¹¹

Since the original statements, documents, press releases, and contents of interviews and telephone calls are not available, the researcher needs to check how closely the news matches the claims made by one of the parties concerned. The result indicates the degree of “transformation” to which the news item has been subjected as well as the strength of the influence by each of the parties. This test can be carried out by examining various aspects of the news such as the lead of the story, the terminology used, the priority given to the news item for reporting and discussion, and the debatable points and issues, or what is called the “news-agenda”.¹²

The following section begins by describing the dominant tendencies in reporting the conflict over Jerusalem in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* between 1967 and 2000.

5.2 Dominant Tendencies in News Selection

Despite the differences between the time, event, correspondent and news organization, there are many trends in the reporting of the events in and concerning Jerusalem which can be classified under the heading of “mainstream coverage”.¹³ This section concentrates on those followed in the selection of news about the city. In particular, it examines what was and was not regarded as “newsworthy” by the three newspapers according to the “news value” theory.¹⁴ This theory is believed to highlight the socio-cultural influences on the news production in Western Europe.

There were found to be four categories of reported events concerning Jerusalem in the period under examination, according to the player: (1) action taken by Israel; (2) counteraction by the Palestinians; (3) reaction from the Arabs and Muslims; and (4) international opinion and action. Therefore, the city has witnessed a wide range of

¹¹ What is and is not mentioned constitutes the first stage in the selection of pieces of information.

¹² J.W. Dearing & E.M. Rogers, *Agenda-Setting* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1996).

¹³ For details of the differences, see Chapters One, Two and Three of this thesis and section 3 of this chapter.

¹⁴ Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”.

changes and events throughout the period under examination. Many of these events were ignored, whereas many others were reported.

The following sub-sections look at the eight main characteristics of the mainstream reporting on Jerusalem by the three newspapers in their selection of news.

5.2.1 Drama-Oriented Coverage (News Selection)

Chapter Four shows that the intensive coverage of the news about Jerusalem by all three newspapers was confined to the period of the confrontations and those events which could be portrayed as “violent” and “negative”. Examples are the torching of al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, the massacre at that mosque in 1990, the confrontations over the Tunnel in October 1996, and al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000.¹⁵ Of the total number of news items about Jerusalem published by all three newspapers over the thirty-three years, 65 covered these particular events.¹⁶ It could also be argued that although other events were not necessarily dramatic, there was a tendency to dramatize them. For instance, during the political dilemma of 1980 between Israel on the one hand, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other Arab countries on the other, the fear of another war erupting was emphasized in various ways. One method was the use of the term “holy war” when reporting the discussions and statements regarding the Israeli Bill¹⁷ and its consequences.¹⁸ This argument could be refuted by the assumption that it was the drama of the conflict that made it appear newsworthy. Furthermore, it is argued that it is precisely this characteristic that has made the conflict such a rich area for generating and reporting news.¹⁹

It is assumed, therefore, that the intensive coverage of events such as the examples listed above is the result of the escalation of violence and the loss of life. It can also be argued that the continuation of a confrontation stimulates the continua-

¹⁵ Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”, p.271.

¹⁶ See Chapter Four of this thesis, Table 4.2.

¹⁷ The Basic Law that was passed by the Knesset on 31 July 1980 was declaring Jerusalem ‘Israel’s eternal and indivisible capital’.

¹⁸ For further examples, see Chapter Two, section (1); also *The Times*, 15 August 1980, pp.1 & 15.

¹⁹ Interview with Richard Beeston, *The Times* Jerusalem correspondent (1993) and the newspaper’s editor of Foreign News at the time of conducting the interview, London, 29 May 2002.

tion of the reporting of news about it by holding the interest of both the news organizations and their correspondents: “[J]ournalists prefer to tell stories about conflict. News is first and foremost about conflict and disorder. Protests, violence, crime, wars, and disasters provide the most natural material for news reports.”²⁰ Presumably, if the Palestinians had not been in the streets, throwing stones in protest at the Israeli Defence Forces, there would have been no news about the Tunnel and so it would have been unlikely that it would have been reported. This assumption raises the question of how an event becomes news, which, in turn, refers to the concept of newsworthiness, for an event is not reported unless it is considered newsworthy by the news workers.²¹ The newsworthiness of an event is dependent on various characteristics and factors, which are discussed in Chapter Six.

It could be suggested that if the Palestinians had protested against the confiscation of their land, then the confrontation would have been regarded as an interesting event and having news value, and therefore it would have been worth reporting the drama and its consequences. Following the confiscation of the land, the construction of new Jewish settlements would also have been reported as a news item resulting, according to Galtung & Ruge, from the “dramatic” nature of the event.²² One can wonder why the “negativity” of these events and as a criterion of newsworthy event was not enough for the aforementioned events to get reported.

One of the characteristics is the time-span of a particular event. Protest marches, killings and confrontations are short-lived events. A single event of this kind takes place “between two successive issues” of the same newspaper.²³ Wolfsfeld suggests two reasons for the tendency to report dramatic events or to dramatize the reports of less dramatic events: (1) to excite the readers so as to ensure that the newspaper will “sell”; and (2) to present what will be seen as a “good story”. The fact is that

²⁰ Gadi Wolfsfeld, “The Varying Role of News Media in Peace Processes: Theory and Research”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA (August 2001), p. 8. (<http://pro.harvard.edu/papers/038/038003WolfsfeldG.pdf>)

²¹ McQuail, *MCT*; Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*; Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*.

²² Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.262.

“journalists become famous and win awards for covering such stories.”²⁴ Dramatic events enjoy many of the descriptions that were listed by Warren Breed “saleable”, “superficial”, “simple”, and “action centred”.²⁵

Many scholars reject the theory that drama orientation in the selection of news and the dramatization of news reporting are seen as organizational and professional criteria.²⁶ If a journalist decides to report an event containing confrontation and violence, this does not necessarily indicate his/her interest in dramatic stories. Nevertheless, the journalist does exemplify the first “gatekeeper”. The “newsworthiness” of an item of news is a decision that is made partly by the journalist’s organization at the second “gate”, where the messages (“news”) either are allowed to pass through or are rejected.²⁷ It can be assumed that the news organization has the stronger influence by locating its correspondents in a certain place at a certain time or during a particular course of events. All three newspapers had their correspondents in Jerusalem during and after the eruption of violence in the examples cited above. Moreover, it is argued that the journalists’ assessment, selection and reporting of particular events is based on their knowledge of the criteria of newsworthiness laid down by their news organizations.²⁸ Normally, the decision on the selection of news is discussed with the editors of the newspaper.²⁹ If there is no direct request from the newspaper’s management or editors, then the journalists select “newsworthy” events according to their own professional³⁰ and organizational experience.³¹ It can be said that if a newspaper has a correspondent in a flash point this does indicate that the newspaper concerned has in principle believed that news in that flash point is newsworthy.

²⁴ Wolfsfeld, “The Varying Role of News Media”, p.8.

²⁵ As cited in McQuail (2000), *MCT*, p. 338.

²⁶ See, for example, Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*; McQuail, *MCT*; H.J. Gans, *Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time* (New York: Vintage Books, 1980).

²⁷ Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*.

²⁸ For the influence of news routines and restraints, Chapter Six, section (1) of this thesis.

²⁹ Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*.

³⁰ Journalists’ professional values and experience are discussed on Chapter Six, of this thesis.

³¹ Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*.

5.2.2 Israeli-Oriented Coverage (News Selection)

Actions by Israel were usually considered “newsworthy”, for they were reported in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* throughout the thirty-three years covered in this study. Of all the news reported about the conflict over Jerusalem, Israel was presented as the main actor in terms of news selection. Its actions in the city were the focus of the coverage of news by all three newspapers, for it had the highest proportion of the total news items published on the topic (see Figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1 Proportion of Items per Party 1967-2000 (All Newspapers)

Although the proportion of the news about Israeli action concerning the city changed between 1967 and 2000, the interest in this topic did not vary dramatically. Throughout this period, almost every publicised official Israeli decision, action, government meeting, discussion and statement concerning Jerusalem was considered “newsworthy” by all three newspapers and was therefore reported. Included was Israel’s celebration of its occupation of East Jerusalem following the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of 1967.³² All three newspapers gave detailed accounts of the discussion by the Israeli government of its attitude towards the Israeli President’s visit to Cairo in response to President Sadat’s invitation following the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem.³³

Nevertheless, despite the three newspapers’ tendency to give intensive coverage of Israeli actions concerning Jerusalem, there were several instances that were not considered “newsworthy” and were therefore neither reported nor even men-

³² For other examples, see Chapter One of this thesis.

³³ See Chapter Two of this thesis.

tioned in news about the conflict. Israel's confiscation of Palestinian land for the construction of Jewish settlements was not reported, although other events taking place at the same time in the city did appear in the newspapers.³⁴ It is interesting to note that many of the events reported concerned Israeli politics.

Moreover, Israeli policies having an important effect on the future of the city were not reported in any of the newspapers. One example is that of the Israeli government surrounding East Jerusalem, which is in the heart of the West Bank, with Jewish settlements considered illegal not only by the international community but also by various UN resolutions. On the other hand, much greater attention was given by the newspapers to Israeli internal politics. Many of the journalists argued that this was more interesting to report. Richard Beeston of *The Times* explained this view as follows: "The Israelis are slightly more obvious [compared with the Palestinians] because they talk and it is a transparent democratic government, so you can get a lot of information that is sort of quite interesting."³⁵ This may indicate that no matter how Israel geographically was far away from Britain, according to the journalists it is culturally closer than not only the Palestinians, but also all of the so-called "Israel's neighbours", meaning other countries in the Middle East. "Cultural proximity" is one of the news criteria that are believed to affect the amount of news that published nationally about foreign countries.³⁶

However, it could be said that the newspapers' tendency to prefer reporting news about Israeli action reflects their view of Israel as an "elite nation".³⁷ The fact that many events which could be classified as "negative" were not reported contradicts the argument of Galtung & Ruge (1965), who suggest that "negativity" is a news

³⁴ See Chapter Four, section (1) of this thesis.

³⁵ Interview, Richard Beeston, 29 May 2002; interview, Anton La Guardia, Diplomatic Editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, London, 29 May 2002.

³⁶ Galtung & Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News"; Lutz Hagen, Reimar Zeh, Harald Berens & Daniela Liedner, Country Characteristics as News Factors: The Effect of the Structure of International Relations on the News Value in the Foreign News Coverage of Newspapers and Television in 28 Countries (the 49th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association) URL: <http://sunsite.unc.edu/newsflow/> ; and Winfried Schulz, Foreign News in Leading Newspapers of Western and Post-Communist Countries (Paper prepared for presentation at the 51st Annual Conference of the International Communication Association, Washington DC, USA, May 24-28,2001).

³⁷ Galtung & Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News", p.270.

value when applied to an event caused by an elite nation.³⁸ In that case, one can ask why these events were not reported. There seem to be two possible answers: (1) although the events were known to the correspondents in Jerusalem, they were considered to lack any news value that might qualify them for selection as news; or (2) that the events were not known to the correspondents, which indicates that perhaps an investigation should be made into the general methods used by the correspondents in searching for the stories of the day and the extent of their dependency on official Israeli sources. This leads to wonder about the professional qualities of these journalists and the level of knowledge about the region and the conflict that they have during their assignments in the city.

All three newspapers had their own correspondents in Jerusalem during and after the Six-Day War. They reported the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem on 28 June 1967 and the demolition on the following day of the wall separating the East and West Jerusalem. One could ask, therefore, why the Israeli confiscation of the Palestinian land in the East Jerusalem one day earlier was not reported as well. On the day following the confiscation of the Palestinian land, the Israeli government dissolved East Jerusalem's Municipality Council. This action was not reported nor even mentioned in passing in any of the news items covering Israeli policy in the city.³⁹ Possibly these two events were not considered newsworthy in comparison with other action taken by the Israelis. Nevertheless, these events were relevant to the aftermath of the Six-Day War, the first being illegal in that it was carried out by an occupying force, and the second being indicative of the Israeli policy in a city where the international community had interests.⁴⁰

Israel has been a particularly important political and military player in the Middle East. In 1967 it was more so than at any other time, for it was the victorious "Western-style" country – as pointed out by Richard Beeston – which defeated four of "its neighbours".⁴¹ Consequently, whatever Israel did was of interest to the three

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ See Chapter One of this thesis.

⁴⁰ M. Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) p. 15.

⁴¹ This has more significance if it is seen according to the Cold-War framework and the polarization in the region.

newspapers, for it was the subject of 80 per cent of their published news items covering the conflict over Jerusalem. The possible reasons for such intensive coverage were related to Israel's characteristics as a state and the power that it could wield in comparison with the other parties in the conflict: "Israel [is] a nation with greater political and cultural proximity to the USA" and Western Europe (Chang, 1998; Wall, 1997).⁴² According to the theory of the "country's characteristics", it was understandable that the newspapers gave greater attention to Israel than to the Palestinians or any of the other Arab countries that had been concerned with the conflict at some stage, for Israel had a far higher "power status" compared with the rest of the Arab countries.

The feature of Israel-oriented reporting of the conflict over Jerusalem raises important questions about the access available to Israel to the news organizations studied in this thesis. If the Israeli government, being one of the main rivals in the conflict, was also considered to be the main source of news about this topic, then the portrayal of events and the parties concerned was likely to support Israel's interests and provide it with a level of legitimacy as the controlling authority.⁴³

However, news about Israel was generally considered "newsworthy" throughout the period being examined, whereas news about the Palestinians did not acquire this status until the 1990s, as described in the following sub-section.

5.2.3 Changes in News Coverage of the Palestinians 1967–2000

First, it is important to examine the circumstances in which news of Palestinian action concerning Jerusalem was reported, for this was the only way in which the Palestinians could be linked with the city in the three newspapers. As a result of the absence of news about the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem besides the absence of news about their representative the PLO until later in the 1990s, their claims to the city were not heard and so from their point of view they were voiceless.

⁴² Cited in John A. Noakes & Karin Gwinn Wilkins, "Shifting Frames of the Palestinian Movement in the US News", in *Media, Culture and Society* (London: Sage, 2002). P.657. (<http://www.sagepub.co.uk/frame.html?http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journals/details/issue/abstract/ab026557.html>.)

⁴³ Huang & McAdams, "Ideological Manipulation".

News about the Palestinians began to be considered only during the 1990s. Of four events reported between September 1990 and October 2000, three were of a “violent” nature and dramatic. Many Palestinians were killed in 1990 and many others took part in public protest against Israel in October 1996 and September 2000.

It has been argued that public protest by the Palestinians gave them access to the British Press as well as to many other foreign media.⁴⁴ Wolfsfeld goes further by suggesting that the Palestinian Intifada was a news media event which brought the Palestinians into the international news arena. According to his framework, the weaker “antagonist” uses “deviant” means to gain access to the news media. The newsworthiness of an event is determined not only by “who you are”, but also by “what you do”.⁴⁵ Therefore, by indulging in “exceptional” behaviour – their public protest during the Intifada – the Palestinians gave their action a degree of newsworthiness, so that the event was reported because of what they did, rather than because of who they were.⁴⁶ This is not to suggest that ‘getting access’ to the news media was the purpose of the Intifada, but to point out that the Intifada was a factor that influenced the access that was given to the Palestinian people by the news media. One can go further arguing that the exceptionality of the occurrences being reported has given high score to them in their news value. The fact that young Palestinian boys and girls were throwing stones on the Israeli troops in their very modernised vehicles, equipped with ultra-modern weaponry created an exceptional situation that can be verbalise and visualise in an interesting way that can guarantee the audiences’ attention. It was a collective long-term action that cannot be ignored.

Galtung & Ruge argue that people in faraway places do not appear in newspaper reports except in certain cases, such as war or some other kind of violence, or as a result of their involvement in an unexpected event.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Wolfsfeld, “The Varying Role of News Media”. There is further discussion of access and its legitimacy in Chapter Six of this thesis.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.20–22.

⁴⁶ Ibid. It is not relevant here to discuss the reasons for the Intifada and whether it was a media event.

⁴⁷ Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”, p.266.

It should be noted that the Palestinians were of no interest to any of the three newspapers during and after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967, despite the fact this took place in wartime. Instead, the newspapers devoted their attention to Israel as the victor, with the result that not a single news item was published about the Palestinians.⁴⁸ No questions were asked about their identity, their reasons for residing in Jerusalem, or the effects of the Israeli occupation and policies on their daily lives. News about the Palestinians continued to be regarded as lacking “newsworthiness” during the torching of al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969 as well as the formal Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in July 1980.⁴⁹ However, there was a dramatic increase in the news coverage by all three newspapers of the Arabs with regard to the same events.⁵⁰ Up to that time, the Palestinians were neither an elite nation, nor did they carry out exceptional actions, and so there was no news about them.

The lack of news about the Palestinians in 1967 could be attributed to the fact that the Palestinians were considered part of the Arab people in general, for they had no recognized national identity nor a state. Moreover, Jerusalem as well as the West Bank had been under Jordanian control from the 1948 war up to the Israeli occupation in 1967. In all three newspapers the Palestinians were referred to as “Arabs”,⁵¹ despite the current activities of Palestinian movements such as Fatah and the PLO.⁵² It could be argued that it was logical to define the Palestinians in this way, since they were not distinguished from the rest of the Arab populations of Arab countries such as Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon. Nevertheless, although this reasoning might have been acceptable in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was no longer valid from the early 1970s onwards. At the Arab Summit in Rabat in 1974 the PLO was recognized by the Arab countries as the sole representative of the

⁴⁸ See Chapter One of this thesis.

⁴⁹ The Palestinians were mentioned in the course of this event when they demonstrated, in the *Guardian* they were not called either Palestinians or Arabs, it was refer to them as “mob”. *The Times* referred to them as “Arab mob”, whereas the *Daily Telegraph* presented them as “Arab Palestinians”. See *Guardian*, 30 August 1969, p.2; *The Times*, 23 August 1969; the *Daily Telegraph*, 25 August 1980, p. 17.

⁵⁰ See Chapter Four, section (1) of this thesis.

⁵¹ See Chapters One, Two and Three, under “Names and Terminology”, in this thesis.

Palestinian people, and on 13 December 1988 the presence of the PLO was accepted at the United Nations with observer status.




Figure 5.2 Proportion of News Items Published per Party vs. event (All Newspapers)

It is interesting to note that the news coverage of the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1990 and its consequences was the first occasion on which the three newspapers reported anything about the Palestinians in events concerning Jerusalem (see Figure 5.2). Here, the *Guardian*, unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, referred to the Palestinians as “Palestinians” rather than “Arabs”. It was a few more years before the other two newspapers followed this line. However, during the 1970s the three newspapers used the name “Palestinians” beside “Arabs” in their reporting of news about the planes hijacking and the actions that were committed by Palestinian groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Black September Group. One of the most reported events was Munich Massacre on 5 September 1972 that was committed by the Black September Group. During the newspapers’ coverage of this event the group was identified as Palestinian in the news reports, the editorials and the commentaries of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, however, the name “Arabs” was still dominant in the *Guardian*’s news reports if not in its editorials and commentaries.⁵³ The Palestinians were portrayed in the news reports concerning this event as “extremists”, “guerrillas” and “terrorists”.⁵⁴

⁵³ *The Times*, 6 September 1972, pp. 1,2&15; *Guardian*, 6 September 1972, pp.1,2&12 ; *Daily Telegraph*, 6 September 1972, pp.1,3,16&30.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

The tendency to report news about the Palestinians was consistent with the increase in the number of items about the conflict which were published during the 1990s, which can be attributed partly to the growing drama of these events.⁵⁵ Wolfsfeld and Noakes & Wilkins ascribe the reporting of Palestinian activities to the eruption of the Intifada on 7 December 1987.⁵⁶ Many of the journalists interviewed supported this hypothesis.⁵⁷

The next stage was the publication of news about the PLO. This might have been brought about by Yasser Arafat's speech at the UNGA in 1974⁵⁸ and the observer seat that was allocated to the PLO by this organization after the Intifada of December 1987. Another possible reason was the inclusion of the PLO at the Madrid Conference.⁵⁹ These hypotheses could also be applicable to the reporting of Palestinian action in 1990, 1996, the Camp David Summit II in July 2000 and the Second Intifada in September of that year.

The researcher assumes that the distribution of news items between the Israelis and the Palestinians reflects the imbalance of power between the two rivals, the former being seen and treated as a state and the latter as a population. There was no news coverage of the Palestinians during the conflict over Jerusalem in 1967.

After the Intifada, news coverage increased to a noticeable level and even more dramatically following the peace process in 1993.⁶⁰ The increase is exemplified in the newspapers' coverage of the first event concerning Jerusalem after the Intifada, namely, the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1990.⁶¹

⁵⁵ See Chapter Four of this thesis. The increase in the news coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be attributed also to the new technology and the tendency to visualize the news.

⁵⁶ Wolfsfeld, "The Varying Role of News Media"; Noakes & Wilkins, "Shifting Frames".

⁵⁷ Interview with Brian Whitaker of the *Guardian*, (London: 27 May 2002).

⁵⁸ William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000)

⁵⁹ Dumper, 1997, p.257.

⁶⁰ See Chapter Four, section (2).

⁶¹ See Chapter Four in this thesis.

As time passed, the Palestinians appeared more frequently in the news arena, particularly in 1996. By now, they were referred to as Palestinians, which occurred only after the Oslo Accords and the mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel. The United States recognized the PLO and Yasser Arafat when the latter visited the White House for the first time.⁶²

This event [Oslo Accords] not only garnered political capital for US President Bill Clinton, but, by having Arafat and Rabin appear at the White House as equals, raised the legitimacy of Arafat and, by extension, the Palestinian quest for independence.⁶³

The marked increase in news coverage of the Palestinians was not confined to the British Press, for a similar phenomenon was witnessed in the American news media:

The number of items appearing in the Associated Press nearly tripled between 1992 and 1993 (988 to 2,890) and nearly doubled in the *New York Times* (370 to 698)...In the post-Oslo years, US news coverage of the Palestinians remained high relative to earlier years.⁶⁴

It should be noted here that the circumstances in which Palestinian action was reported was overwhelmingly dramatic. This could be interpreted as a limitation on the reporting and presentation of the Palestinians' claims to the city of Jerusalem, for journalists and the news media in general were preoccupied with the escalation of the confrontations. Most of the background information to these events – when it was included in the main news coverage – was presented to show their sequence in the conflict, particularly the eruption of the confrontations.

According to the above discussion, it could be argued that Palestinian activity was newsworthy only in certain circumstances, such as when Palestinians were killed or were taking part in a public protest against the Israeli occupation. These two examples suggest and support the drama orientation in reporting the conflict over Jerusalem. Another newsworthy context was when the Palestinians were officially recognized by the United States and were participants in the peace process. Following this was the formal representation of the PLO, which, again, was considered worthy of media attention.

⁶² In an interview on 29 May 2002, Anton La Guardia, the Middle East editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, suggested that the British Press was being influenced by US interests.

⁶³ Noakes & Wilkins, "Shifting Frames of the Palestinian", p.652.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 658.

It was the American recognition of the PLO that caused the British Press to increase its news coverage of the organization after the Oslo Accords. The next section discusses how the United States influenced the portrayal of the conflict over Jerusalem and the parties concerned.

5.2.4 International Moves Regarding Jerusalem: Inconsistency in News Selection

International moves in response to the conflict over Jerusalem can be classified under four headings according to the source of the action (news actor): (1) actions carried out by the UN or any of its institutions; (2) those of the United States of America; (3) those of Britain or the European Union or any other European country; and (4) those of a Muslim people or a Muslim country.

International news about Jerusalem was of interest to all three newspapers during most of the period under examination. Nevertheless, the proportion of news coverage of the news actors did vary over time, perhaps owing to the power wielded by each of them or to its role in the conflict.

It should be mentioned here that the reporting of international news about Jerusalem reached its peak in September 1990, when 28 per cent of the total published items focused on the city, in particular, the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque and its consequences (see Figure 4.1). It could be argued that the high proportion of news coverage was due to the Gulf War and the tension in the Middle East. However, it is interesting to note that the international news mostly covered the UN, followed by Europe and then the United States. It is possible that the UN was presented vividly as a news actor in 1990 owing to its role in the Gulf War, for it was the UNSC's Resolution 678 that launched the military action.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ 29 November 1990 – The UNSC Resolution 678 authorizes the states cooperating with Kuwait to use "all necessary means" to liberate Kuwait. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/737483.stm)

It could be said that the United States was making every effort to contain its Arab allies within its coalition against Iraq.⁶⁶ This action could also indicate the influence of two factors on the flow of news about the conflict over Jerusalem: the international stance and the United States. Anton La Guardia argued that US politics and interests were particularly influential on the selection of foreign news in the British Press.⁶⁷

Although UN action concerning Jerusalem was allocated a large proportion of the international news coverage of the city during the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque, many of the resolutions passed by the UN institutions were not reported except where there was an official Israeli reaction to them.⁶⁸ For instance, only Israel's reactions to the UNSC Resolutions 298 and 478 passed on 25 September 1971 and 20 July 1970 respectively were reported.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the UNESCO announcement on 28 November 1978 that Jerusalem was to be designated an area of cultural preservation was not reported nor even mentioned in any of the newspapers under examination. A few days after the announcement, Eric Silver of the *Guardian* reported a story from Jerusalem about an Israeli plan to "settle 16,000 [Jewish] families".⁷⁰ Presumably, Israel had not reacted to UNESCO's announcement, which was why it was not reported. Another reason could be that the announcement lacked the required level of drama or the potential to be dramatized as the prototype news story about the conflict.⁷¹ Since it was not likely to provoke confrontation or protest, it did not contain the level of force like that of the UNSC resolutions concerning the Gulf War.

The differences and changes in the newspapers' priorities in selecting news about the international stance and moves concerning Jerusalem and the conflict over the city

⁶⁶ Susan L. Carruthers, *The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

⁶⁷ Interview, London, 29 May 2002.

⁶⁸ See Chapter Four in this thesis for more examples. The UN resolution condemning the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem in 1980 was not reported in *The Times*, although the Israeli reaction to the resolution was reported (see Chapter Two in this thesis).

⁶⁹ *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, 27 September 1971.

⁷⁰ *Guardian*, 24 July 1979, p.8.

⁷¹ The dramatic nature of news about Jerusalem is discussed earlier in this chapter.

could be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the formula of the country's characteristics.⁷² According to this model "the attention given to countries in foreign news is determined to a high degree by the structure of international relations."⁷³ Many characteristics are taken into account in this theory, particularly, the country's "power status", "socio-economic status", "cultural proximity" and other factors.⁷⁴ For the United States was the most reported international news actor on the subject in terms of the total published items. The reason for this situation could be that the United States had done more than other countries for the city. For instance, it was the host of and the broker for peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority at the Camp David Summit II in July 2000 as well as the Oslo Accord in September 1993.

Secondly, the "newsworthiness" of international events concerning Jerusalem was sometimes defined according to the significance that Israel attached to them and the level of that state's reaction. This in turn meant that varying levels of attention were accorded to international reaction from the UN, the United States, and Europe to many of the UN resolutions, depending on which Israel considered significant. An example was the reporting of the transfer of embassies, such as those of The Netherlands and many Latin American countries as the result of UNSC Resolution 478, which was passed on 20 August 1980.⁷⁵

5.2.5 Inconsistency in Reporting on the Arabs

A comparable inconsistency can be seen in the selection of news about the Arab countries regarding the conflict over Jerusalem. The Arab world, particularly Jordan, was considered to be the main rival to Israel until the Oslo Accords in September 1993, when the Palestinians signed an independent agreement with Israel, and later with Jordan in 1994 in Wadi Arabah. As a result of this definition, as well as the

⁷² The mother model of the **Country Characteristics** is the **News Values** for Galtung and Ruge (1965).

⁷³ Hagen, Zeh, Berens & Liedner, "Country Characteristics"
URL:<http://sunsite.unc.edu/newsflow/>, p. 15.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ See Chapter Two of this thesis.

Arab world being regarded as the representative of the Palestinians, who were not recognized as a people, the conflict was classified as the Arab–Israeli conflict.⁷⁶

It is interesting to note that the number of items about the Arabs began to decrease around 1990, which was when news coverage of the Palestinians began to appear. Moreover, there was a marked reduction in general Arab news in 1996, at which time occurred the first event under examination after the Oslo Accords (see Figure 5.1).

According to the Figure (5.1), the proportion of news items published about the Arab countries does not reflect their presumed role in the conflict, for it was less than 15 per cent of the selected news coverage during the period being studied. The highest proportion of news coverage about the Arabs was in 1969 and 1980, being 42 and 28 per cent respectively. In 1969, the selection of news about the Arab countries focused on the risk of “fighting Israel”, preparing for “holy war” or possible “terrorist” attacks.⁷⁷ This feature can be interpreted as an example of the drama-oriented coverage of the Arab moves concerning Jerusalem as well as the conflict over the city. The interpretation is supported by the later reduction to 28 per cent of the proportion of news selected about the Arab world’s response to Jerusalem as the drama also declined. However, in 1980 there was a report of threats of war made by the then Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia and a boycott of Europe and the United States.⁷⁸

It can be concluded that the two occasions when events in countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were selected were consistent with the image of these countries as a threat to Israel, as in 1969, or to European and American interests, as in the reduced availability of Saudi oil in 1980.⁷⁹ It could be argued that this attitude was attributable to the interests of the newspapers’ readership, as seen by the news organizations and, more specifically, the journalists. It is understandable

⁷⁶ Hamad, “Jerusalem and the Politics of Settlement”.

⁷⁷ *The Times*, 25 August 1969, p.4; and 26 August 1969, p.1; *Guardian*, 26 August 1969, p.2; and the *Daily Telegraph*, 25 August 1969, p.17; 27 August 1969, p.21; and 29 August 1969, p.1.

⁷⁸ *The Times*, 15 August 1980, pp.1, 10 & 15; *Guardian*, 15 August 1980, p. 4; and the *Daily Telegraph*, 15 August 1980, p.4.

⁷⁹ For more information about this event, see Chapter Four of this thesis.

that some readers might have been interested in following the news of events connected with the oil. It could have been directly relevant to their daily lives, owing to the direct influence of these events on fuel prices. However, it could be asked why journalists assumed that readers were interested in matters relating to Israel's security.

One interpretation is the general feeling of guilt in Europe towards the Jews, owing to the Holocaust, which presumably generates public concern for the security of the Jews in the "Jewish state" of Israel. Another interpretation is that of the Arabs, who see Israel as a "functional state" with the particular responsibility of guarding American and European colonial interests in the Middle East.

Although President Sadat of Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, yet he continued to present Egypt as a main party in the conflict over Jerusalem. In 1980 he took it upon himself to negotiate with Israel regarding Palestinian autonomy on behalf of the Palestinians – without their authorization – just before Israel imposed its official annexation of the city in July, 31st of that year.⁸⁰

President Sadat and the then Prince Fahd had the largest news coverage of all the Arab leaders in 1980. Prince Fahd's statement on 14 August 1980 regarding Jerusalem could be put into the "drama-threat orientation" category in the selection of news about the Arab world and its view of that city. However, the interest in selecting news about President Sadat could be interpreted differently. The Egyptian President was very popular with all three newspapers in the late 1970s owing to his visit to the United States and the Camp David peace treaty with Israel in 1979.⁸¹

Apparently, the interest in each Arab country and its leader was based on the newsworthiness of that leader's actions in relation to Israel. It should also be pointed out that the likelihood of a leader's action being reported depended on the nature of the action and, in particular, the level of drama that might result from it. Besides, its possible connection to West Europe or the US.

⁸⁰ See Chapter Two.

⁸¹ See Chapter Four.

5.2.6 Elite-Oriented Selection of News

The Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem were of no interest to the three newspapers because they were not regarded as an *élite*. To be considered “newsworthy” and so selected as news, they had to be killed or carry out an “unpredictable” action. According to the Galtung & Ruge model, if the Palestinians were ordinary people, that is, neither “*élite*” – so that they were reported for “who they were” – nor acting unpredictably – so that they were reported for “what they did”, news about them was unlikely to be selected because it was seen to be lacking newsworthiness.⁸²

It could be argued that there was no hope that events concerning the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem would be reported, because these people did not belong to an *élite* nation.⁸³ As shown in sub-section 5.2.3 of this chapter, even the events and actions concerning the Palestinian politicians “*élite*” were not reported until the 1990s because they were classified as “guerrillas” and “terrorists”.

Many scholars argue that people in distant places are not reported except in wartime, or when other violent and negative incidents or unpredictable events occur.⁸⁴ This principle could be applied to the case of the Palestinians in 1990 and 1996, and the Second Intifada in September 2000. These were the only events concerning the Palestinians and Jerusalem to be reported between 1967 and 2000.⁸⁵ It could be asked whether the confiscation of the Palestinians’ land by Israel and the establishment of illegal Jewish settlements therein could be classified as “negative” events and should therefore score high in newsworthiness. As clearly visible events connected with an “*élite*” nation (Israel) and with long-term negative consequences, they were worthy of being reported and given their place as episodes in the conflict over Jerusalem. They fulfilled all the newsworthiness criteria for selection as news to be reported – in other words, “news values”.⁸⁶

⁸² Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”.

⁸³ Ibid., p.271.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.266.

⁸⁵ See sub-section 5.2.3, regarding changes in the news coverage of the Palestinians, in this thesis.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Again in August 1970, when many hectares of Palestinian land were confiscated, there were no news reports nor even any mention made of these events. Nevertheless, there were two news stories from that area, including one from Tel Aviv regarding what was called the Israeli government's "peace policy".⁸⁷ On the six occasions when land was confiscated in East Jerusalem, other stories were published dealing with war or preparations for war,⁸⁸ or violence among the "Arabs" or against Israel,⁸⁹ or action by Israel or the United States.⁹⁰

It could be suggested that these events were not reported because they did not support the image of Israel as the "good guy" in the conflict over Jerusalem,⁹¹ although they could be classified as negative, despite their lack of violence and public protest.

The Palestinians of East Jerusalem were not on the newspapers' agenda. Although they were living under Israeli occupation and were subjected to military control, no attention was given to them, nor was there any investigation into their rights. Moreover, Israel had imposed a number of changes affecting the Palestinians' right to travel or own property.⁹² Although all three newspapers had correspondents on the spot in June 1967, immediately after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, not one of them reported any news about the evacuation of the residents of the Magharebah Quarter in the Old City.⁹³ The concerns of the Palestinians were of no interest to the newspapers because they were in a weak position compared with the

⁸⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 31 August 1970, p.12

⁸⁸ On 1 July 1982, Israel was preparing to invade South Lebanon. See *The Times*, 3 July 1982, p.4; *Guardian*, 2 July 1982, pp.6 & 13; and the *Daily Telegraph*, 2 July 1982, p.4, & 3 July 1982, p.5.

⁸⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 1970, pp.1 & 12, & 14 June 1991, p.14; *Guardian*, 4 February 1980, p.7.

⁹⁰ *The Times*, 29 June 1967, pp.1 & 4; *Guardian*, 29 June 1967, p.1, & 1 September 1968, p.7; and the *Daily Telegraph*, 29 June 1967, pp.1 & 32.

⁹¹ See section (4) of this Chapter.

⁹² Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem*, p.176; M Dumper, *The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

⁹³ See Chapter One of this thesis for more information.

Israelis, “[N]ews gives a partial view of the world: it offers an open door to the powerful and a closed door to the rest of us.”⁹⁴

None of the newspapers reported any event concerning the residents of East Jerusalem between 1967 and 2000. Moreover, even when they were mentioned in another news report, hardly any of them was interviewed. In other words, they were treated as a group without a voice, and as if they had no connection with the place.⁹⁵

The only news story about the residents of East Jerusalem before the 1990s was that contributed by Christopher Walker during the fierce debate following Israel’s formal annexation of Jerusalem in 1980. Surprisingly, it concerned the gypsy population of the East part of the city. Apparently, the overall aim of the story was to show the diversity of the social and religious composition of East Jerusalem.⁹⁶ The details and focus of the story could be classified as “infotainment”, which is believed to promote ignorance. This classification is based on the fact that readers were given a story about a group of people – three hundred gypsies – who happened to be in Jerusalem, though they had no connection with the city apart from it being their place of residence. The story included a description of the gypsies’ unusual customs, which was clearly aimed at attracting an increased readership. This was certainly irrelevant to the continuing saga of a hotly contested city with all its religious, historical and demographic complexities. Tactics of this kind are attributed to the growing commercialism of the Press.⁹⁷

It should be remembered that the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem were not part of the newspapers’ agenda nor considered worthy of their attention, even when there were discussions about the peace process and sovereignty over the city. However, in 2000 there was an increase in the reporting of news about the Palestinians, though the news items were “élite-oriented”, such as those about the Camp David Summit II. Not a single news item was published about the Pales-

⁹⁴ Glasgow Media Group, *Really Bad News* (London: Writers’ & Readers’ Publishing Co-operative Society, 1982).

⁹⁵ See Chapter One & Two in this thesis.

⁹⁶ See Chapter Two, section (1) in this thesis.

⁹⁷ McQuail, *MCT*, p.106.

tinians' preferences regarding who should govern them, nor was there any discussion of the possible consequences of the suggested solutions. There was not even any mention of their wishes, rights or preferences, just as if their community had no say in the matter.⁹⁸

The absence of any news about the residents of East Jerusalem during the period under examination might suggest that these people did not exist on the agenda of the conflict. However, Dumper disagrees with this view, for the demographic question was always part of the agenda. Over the years, Israel had created various policies to balance the population of Jerusalem in accordance with Israel's interests in the conflict. In summary, the Israelis' aim was a "united Jerusalem" as Israel's "eternal and undivided capital".⁹⁹ Yet the absence of any reference to the residents of the East Jerusalem implies that they had no place on the international agenda of the conflict, which, in short, was a reflection of Israel's efforts to neutralize the issue in accordance with Israeli interests.

5.2.7 Political/Religious-Oriented Coverage

History and religion have an important role in the conflict over Jerusalem. The alleged legitimacy of the state of Israel and its control of the city is based on religion, for the Old City in East Jerusalem contains the "Temple Mount" and the "Wailing Wall", both of which are sacred to the Jews. The Muslims have al-Haram al-Sharif, containing al-Aqsa Mosque – where many dramatic events have taken place¹⁰⁰ – the Dome of the Rock, and, for the Christians, the Church of Holy Sepulcher and the Church of the Resurrection. History was allocated very little attention or discussion by the newspapers during the thirty-three years. Only four long articles were written in the *Guardian* and *The Times* about the historical and religious significance of Jerusalem. Yet, there were many references to the city throughout this period as the "holy city", and the fact that it was sacred to the followers of the three monotheistic religions and that it contained the "Temple Mount", al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of

⁹⁸ See Chapter Three of this thesis for further details.

⁹⁹ Dumper, *Politics of Jerusalem*.

¹⁰⁰ The massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1990, the confrontations over the Tunnel in 1996, the eruption of al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000.

the Rock and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. It is interesting to note that two articles highlighted the religious significance of the holy city in Judaism, but not in Christianity nor in Islam. Despite the thirty-three years that separated the articles, both consistently focused on Jerusalem as a Jewish holy city, though there were references to the Muslim and Christian holy places in it.¹⁰¹ “Wailing Wall – Apex of Sanctity and Jewish Hopes” headed an article published in the *Guardian* a few days after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem. *The Times* wrote about the “Mount of Sorrow”. The day after the collapse of the Camp David Summit II, the *Daily Telegraph* published an editorial headed “Camp David and David’s City”. Yet, no article was devoted to the significance of Jerusalem for either the Christians or the Muslims, nor was the topic even mentioned or suggested in any of the newspapers during the period under examination in an individual article.

It could be argued that the writers’ ignorance of the Islamic aspect of the city’s history and their concentration on the Jewish aspect was due to their greater familiarity with Jews and Judaism, since more than 3 million Jews live in Britain.¹⁰² However, this argument is refuted by the fact that these writers are, if not Christian, at least familiar with Christianity. So, there remains the question of why the history and religion of the Jews were given greater attention than those of the Christians and Muslims.

The selectivity concerning the historical and religious emphasized importance of the city could indicate the newspapers’ priorities for discussion. Why should a secular Press in a secular state highlight the religious significance of Jerusalem, which related to an era three thousand years earlier, while ignoring the history of the city during the last two thousand years and its connection with modern realities? This concentration on the Jews’ rights over Jerusalem could be interpreted as reflecting the newspapers’ acceptance of Israel’s preoccupation with its legitimacy to control the city. Their acceptance was likely to be understood as being favourable to Israel and influenced by Israeli interests in and discourse in that area. This preference for

¹⁰¹ *Guardian*, 14 June 1967, p.9; *The Times*, 4 October 2000.

Israel's interests marginalized not only those of the Palestinians, Arabs, Christian, and Muslims, but also those of the international community.¹⁰³

The preoccupation with Jewish access to the holy places in Jerusalem while the city was under Jordanian control,¹⁰⁴ the ignorance of the Palestinian Muslims' right to access to their holy places and that of the Christians to Nazareth all follow the same line of argument. The newspapers' attitude could be interpreted as support for the alleged Israeli legitimacy over East Jerusalem. A comparable tendency could be seen in the terminology used to refer to the holy places and in the use of the description "Jews" and "Jewish State" instead of "Israelis" and "Israel" during times of crisis in the city, as in 1980.¹⁰⁵ This policy could be responsible for the marginalization of the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem,¹⁰⁶ as well as the lack of news of a legal nature about the conflict over the city, as discussed in the next sub-section.

5.2.8 Absence of News Stories re Legality

It is remarkable that during more than thirty-three years of occupation, the Israeli measures imposed on East Jerusalem were never subjected to questioning or even discussion according to International Law. As pointed out earlier, the resolutions of the UN institutions, including those of the Security Council, which sometimes referred to the legal aspect of the conflict, were not always even reported. Sometimes they were selected because of the anger that they provoked in Israel.¹⁰⁷ On other occasions, the resolutions were seen in the light of the Cold War as a conflict between the United States supporting Israel on the one hand, and the then Soviet Union supporting what were known as "its Arab allies" – particularly President Nasser of Egypt and later Iraq – on the other.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ Dumper, *Politics of Jerusalem*.

¹⁰⁴ For the aftermath of the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, see Chapter One of this thesis.

¹⁰⁵ See Chapter Two in this thesis.

¹⁰⁶ See section (4) this chapter.

¹⁰⁷ See Chapter Four.

¹⁰⁸ UNGA Resolution 2253, passed on 4 July 1967, is an example. See *The Times*, 5 & 6 July 1967, p.4; *Guardian*, 5 & 6 July 1967, pp.1 & 9; and the *Daily Telegraph*, 5 July 1967, pp.1 & 24.

Although Israel was violating the UNSC Resolution 452 every time that it allowed a new Jewish settlement to be built, the news of these events was never selected as a “negative” action carried out by an “élite nation”.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, in the report of the dispute over the Israeli Bill, in which Israel formally annexed occupied East Jerusalem, there was no mention of the inconsistency between the Bill and the UN resolutions concerning the city or even the international community’s stance on the matter.¹¹⁰

Although, generally speaking, stories about human rights were not selected as news, during the dispute of 1980 *The Times* published a brief report of a family in East Jerusalem, whose land was confiscated because it was adjacent to Prime Minister Begin’s new office. However, the report did not include any reference to the legitimacy of the confiscation.¹¹¹

It could be argued that human rights legislation and international law were not applicable to the Palestinians, who could be punished and labelled as “terrorists” and “guerrillas”, instead of being recognized as “freedom fighters”.

5.2.9 News Selection: An Overview

The decision concerning the selection of news by a particular newspaper about a particular event is influenced by many factors. Cultural, ideological, organizational and professional criteria are taken into account by each news organization in the assessment and prioritization of a certain event regarding its inclusion in or exclusion from the news of the day. McQuail states that studies of news by many scholars have uncovered these influences:

[T]he content of news media tends consistently to follow a predictable pattern and that different organisations behave in a similar way when confronted by the same events and under equivalent conditions (Glasgow Media Group, 1976; McQuail, 1977; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). There appears to be a stable perception on the part of news makers about what is likely to interest an audience and a good deal of consensus within the same socio-cultural settings (Hetherington, 1985).¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”.

¹¹⁰ See Chapter Two of this thesis.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² McQuail, *MCT*, pp. 277–278.

It could be argued that the same factors affected the presentation of Jerusalem and the conflict over the city by influencing the choice of news about these topics. Earlier in this chapter, it has been pointed out that the selection of news by the three newspapers about the numerous events concerning Jerusalem showed a bias in favour of Israel's claims and preferences. The researcher believes that the circumstances, such as the source and the event itself, do affect the selection. In line with this hypothesis, Reese states:

News producers do not have complete control over the issues and events that form the raw material for their product and depend on powerful, self-interested external sources for that material....these sources influence content by dictating and responding to organisational routines.¹¹³

Wolfsfeld's model goes further by stating that news is a product of the interaction and the balance of power between sources ("antagonists") and the news media ("journalists").¹¹⁴ Although it is agreed that the news source is a force in determining the news selection,¹¹⁵ it is argued that the degree of the influence does vary over time: "The powerful can manipulate the media, but under some conditions, the media assert their own power and agenda."¹¹⁶

This study does not assert that the selection of news about Jerusalem was dominated by the new sources throughout the period under examination. Nevertheless, it argues that powerful news sources, such as Israeli officials, did influence the prioritizing of news about the conflict over that about the Palestinians. This was achieved in various ways, though not at the same level over time. The strength of the influence was affected by the generation of news in accordance with the news criteria; routines and values; and the support of Israel by the superpower, that is, the United States – which was newsworthy in itself.

¹¹³ S.D. Reese, "Setting the Media's Agenda: A Power Balance Perspective", in J.A. Anderson (ed.), *Communication Yearbook/14* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991).

¹¹⁴ Wolfsfeld, *Media and Political Conflict*.

¹¹⁵ Shoemaker & Reese. *Mediating the Message*; McQuail, *MCT*; Dearing & Rogers, *Agenda Setting*; Wolfsfeld, *Media and Political Conflict*; Reese, "Setting the Media's Agenda"; Gans, *Deciding What's New*.

¹¹⁶ Reese, "Setting the Media's Agenda".

The harmony or standardized reporting across newspapers concerning particular stories during 1967 and 1980, as Patterson (1980), cited in Reese (1991), suggests, could have reflected a “campaign-style” news selection.¹¹⁷

At the macro level, concerning the quantitative findings of the study, the consideration of a “country’s characteristics” is used to explain the general tendencies in the news selection about the conflict, that is, the “power status” and “socio economic status”.¹¹⁸ However, the presumptions of news values as well as other considerations affecting news selection are applied at micro-level.

To distinguish between news worthiness and news selection on the one hand and news framing on the other is necessary for this study, however, it is different in reality. Journalists usually tend to select either ready-framed event or presentable event. Previous frames for similar events can influence the newsworthiness of an event. It is argued that the concept of newsworthiness is not independent from framing. Tamar Liebes argues that newsworthiness is often a “function of framing”.¹¹⁹

5.3 News Framing

This section examines the framing of news about the conflict over Jerusalem, in which the conflict, the rivals and their claims concerning the city are presented. The consensus among the newspapers’ prescriptions for the conflict during times of crisis as well as during negotiations is also discussed.

The framing of news is believed to entail “selection and salience”. Entman argues that frames “define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements, suggest remedies.”¹²⁰ In other words, the framing of news defines the problems, their causes, and their resolutions.¹²¹ Consequently, it is believed that framing affects the “content” of the news.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p.313.

¹¹⁸ Hagen, “Country Characteristics as News Factors”.

¹¹⁹ Tamar Liebes, “Inside a News Item: A Dispute Over Framing”, *Political Communication*, 2000, 17 (3).

¹²⁰ Cited in McQuail, *MCT*, p.343.

¹²¹ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, p.650.

Particular attention is given in this section to analysing the diagnosis of the reasons for the reported crisis over the city and the proposed solutions.

Out of the myriad ways of describing events in the world, reporters, editors, and producers rely upon frames to convey dominant cultural meanings, to make sense of the facts, to focus the headline, and to structure the story line. Although the specific details of a day's occurrences might be unique to that day – a plane crash, a presidential speech, a local murder – the way that journalists observe and report these occurrences has a lot to do with how similar events have been framed in the past. (Bird & Dardenne, 1997)¹²²

It is stated that a particular frame applied to the events and actions of the day provides a narrative that suggests a particular interpretation of those stories and makes sense of the news.¹²³

Media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organise the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports. Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol handlers routinely organise discourse, whether verbal or visual.¹²⁴

The researcher believes that where the conflict over Jerusalem is concerned, there were at least two types of narratives. Each narrative contradicted the other in the problems described, the remedies suggested, and the interpretation of who was responsible for the problems and who was entitled to take what action. This section examines the interpretations that were predominant in the reporting of news about this topic, each interpretation being embodied in a particular frame.

It could be said that the peace negotiations between the Arabs and the Palestinians on the one hand, and Israel on the other – concerning the Palestinian–Israeli conflict – broke down twice because of Jerusalem. The first occasion was in August 1980 between Egypt and Israel regarding Palestinian autonomy, and it was a consequence of Israel's formal annexation of East Jerusalem. The second occasion was between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat at the Camp David Summit II in July 2000. In both

¹²² P. Norris & S.J. Carroll, *The Dynamics of the News Framing Process: From Reagan's Gender Gap to Clinton's Soccer Moms* (2000), p.2.
URL:<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris.shorenstein.ksg/acrobat/carroll.pdf>

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 2–3.

¹²⁴ R.Warwick Blood, Peter Putnis, Trish Payne, Jane Pirkis & Catherine Francis., *Media Coverage of Suicide and Mental Illness: Theory and Methodology*, Canberra: University of Canberra; Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 2000.
URL:<http://www.sjc.uq.edu.au/jea/full-program.htm>)

cases the dispute over Jerusalem was held to be the main obstacle to continuing the peace negotiations.

Entman (1993: 25) offers a detailed explanation of how the media provide audiences with schemas for interpreting events. The essential factors, he says, are selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.¹²⁵

However, in the second round of negotiations, Yasser Arafat was said to be the “obstacle to peace”,¹²⁶ whereas Israel was not presented as such on the earlier occasion in 1980.¹²⁷ The researcher does not believe that there was an intended bias on the part of the journalists towards Israel’s frames. Nevertheless, it does indicate a consistency with Israel’s interpretation and suggested order of events.

Moreover, it is argued that the framing of an issue affects its news value, as in the reporting of the existence of the AIDS virus in the United States in the early 1980s.¹²⁸ Once a particular type of event was framed and published as news, it was more likely for similar events to be reported in the same way, for the same frame was used with subsequent news items: “These frames may be advanced in words, such as by specific descriptions of groups, or visually through presentation of photographs, cartoons or maps (Entman, 1991).”¹²⁹

To evaluate the amount of influence exerted by a particular group on the production of news, it is crucial to know whether the frames of the news are “fragmented” and “diverse” or “monopolistic” in “terms of meaning” in the final publication.¹³⁰ The frames used in the news reports can be identified by examining the headlines, the contextualization and decontextualization of an event, the frame of reference mentioned in the text, the interpretations, justification, and names and terminology used.

It is clear that a very large number of textual devices can be used to perform these activities. They include the use of certain words or phrases, making

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ See Chapter Three of this thesis.

¹²⁷ See Chapter Two of this thesis.

¹²⁸ Dearing & Rogers, *Agenda-Setting*, p.33.

¹²⁹ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, p.650.

¹³⁰ McQuail, *MCT*, p.344.

certain contextual references, choosing certain pictures or film, referring to certain sources and so on.¹³¹

5.3.1 Dominant Tendencies in News Framing

This section examines the mainstream framing of news about Jerusalem and the conflict over the city. Its main focus is on the consensus in the framing of news, the variance having been covered already in the previous chapter.¹³² According to Dearing and Rogers, framing is defined as follows,

Framing is the subtle selection of certain aspects of an issue by the media to make them more important and thus to emphasise a particular cause of some phenomenon (Iyengar, 1991, p.11). Frames are one means through which a particular meaning is given to an issue.¹³³

5.3.1.1 PERSONALIZATION

It is a common tendency in the news to personalize events and present them as personal actions. This could be due to the fact that many of the events are considered “newsworthy” owing to the news value of the actor, who is an élite person.¹³⁴ However, it is also argued that the tendency could be the result of the commercialization of the news media.¹³⁵

The thesis is that news has a tendency to present events as sentences where there is a subject, a named person or collectively consisting of a few persons, and the event is then seen as a consequence of the actions of this person or these persons. The alternative would be to present the events as the outcome of “social forces”, as structural more than idiosyncratic outcomes of the society which produced them.¹³⁶

Although it is believed that this tendency facilitates our understanding of the world, the quality of this understanding is open to question. “Personaliz[ed] events are seen as the actions of people as individuals. Individual people are easier to identify – and identify with – than structure, forces or institutions.”¹³⁷

Personification is promoted as a “news value in its own right”: “Leads and headlines are structured to put news actors first.”¹³⁸

¹³¹ Ibid., p.343.

¹³² See Chapters One, Two and Four, “Interpretation and Justification”, in this thesis,

¹³³ Dearing & Rogers, *Agenda-Setting*, pp.63–64.

¹³⁴ Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”, pp.268 & 269–270.

¹³⁵ McQuail, *MCT*, p.343.

¹³⁶ Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”, p.266.

¹³⁷ J. Hartley, *Understanding News* (London: Methuen, 1982), p.79.

¹³⁸ Alan Bell, *The Language of News Media* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p.194.

Bird (1998) looked at the “tabloidization” of American television news and concludes from her audience study that there has been a real trend towards personalization and dramatization that does not make news more accessible to the many, but it has also led to the trivialization of what people also learn from news.¹³⁹

It could be argued that personification resulted in the simplification of the conflict, the reasons for it and the complexities of both events: the formal Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980, and the Camp David Summit II in 2000.¹⁴⁰ However, it is interesting to see that it resulted in sympathy, and the identification of the Second Intifada in its first few weeks had a positive impact on the presentation of ordinary people.¹⁴¹ “Personification is a consequence of the need of meaning and consequently for identification: persons can serve more easily as objects of positive and negative identification through a combination of projection and empathy.”¹⁴²

Personification is achieved by following several techniques, one of which is naming the person, providing details of his/her age, personality, and life. It should be noted that during the first few months of the Second Intifada, the Israeli casualties were more personalized in the news than those of the Palestinians. The two Israeli soldiers killed in Ramallah were identified to the public, their names, photographs, details of their wives and other aspects of their lives being reported, whereas most of the Palestinians were mentioned only as numbers in the news.¹⁴³ Only one Palestinian casualty was identified in the news: the 12-year-old boy, Muhammad al-Durrah. It could be argued that the identification of this child was exceptional, for his death was

filmed and broadcasted from many news stations and satellites all over the world, thus providing a big story in terms of drama. However, the decision on the inclusion or exclusion of his name from a news report was said to be the cause of Sam Kiley’s

¹³⁹ McQuail, *MCT*, p.106.

¹⁴⁰ See Chapter Two and Three of this thesis.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., see Chapter Three.

¹⁴² Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”, pp.266–267.

¹⁴³ *The Times*, 7 October 2000, p.21.

resignation from *The Times*.¹⁴⁴ This could be interpreted to mean that decisions of this kind are not completely spontaneous.

In the newspapers' coverage of the collapse of the Camp David Summit II in July 2000, attention was directed at the past actions of Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat and what the future held for them, rather than the effect of the continuing conflict on the two populations concerned: the Palestinians and the Israelis.¹⁴⁵ Many of the news items included the leaders' names in the headings: "Clinton to fly home after offer by Israel on Jerusalem";¹⁴⁶ and "Levy walks out on Barak over division of Jerusalem".¹⁴⁷ The *Guardian* published: "Arafat seeks common Arab position on Jerusalem";¹⁴⁸ and "Barak 'agrees on Jerusalem compromise'".¹⁴⁹ This appears to be a reflection of the framing of news about the Summit, for Entman argues: "The headline signals the frame."¹⁵⁰ Under this headline, it was stated that,

[Barak's] concession could endanger his political future at home but it was dismissed as insufficient by Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, because it stopped short of offering the Palestinians full sovereignty over part of Jerusalem, which they claim as their capital.¹⁵¹

Revision of the headlines on numerous other occasions emphasized the same tendency in framing the events in terms of personalities. In 1967 and 1969 many of the news headlines about the conflict over Jerusalem referred to President Nasser of Egypt, his successor President Sadat – Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan, Israel's Foreign Minister Aba Eban, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister Golda Meir, Yitzhak Shamir, Presidents Bush and Clinton, British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, and so on.¹⁵² Although, Fowler argues that "[m]ost

¹⁴⁴ See Chapter Six, under "News Organization: Ownership", in this thesis.

¹⁴⁵ See Chapter Three of this thesis.

¹⁴⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁴⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, 13 July 2000.

¹⁴⁸ *Guardian*, 26 July 2000.

¹⁴⁹ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

¹⁵⁰ Blood et al., "Media Coverage of Suicide".

¹⁵¹ *Guardian*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁵² For example, the *Daily Telegraph*, 22 August 1969, p.24; 25 August 1969, p.1; 27 August 1969, p.14; 29 August 1969, p.1; 10 October 1990, p.18; 11 October 1990, p.16; *Guardian*, 9 October 1990, p.1; 26 August 1969, p.2; and *The Times*, 22 August 1969, p.4; 25 August 1969, p.4; 27 August 1969, p.1; 29 August 1969, p.5; 1 September 1969, p.4; 2 September 1969, p.5; 10 October 1990, p.1; 13 October 1990, p.10; 16 October 1990, p.1; and 18 October 1990, p.1.

commentators on the media, including myself, regard personalization as dangerous. The obsession with persons, and the media's use of them as symbols, avoids serious discussion and explanation of underlying social and economic factors."¹⁵³

Other names were used to present the stories, such as the Australian who set fire to al-Aqsa Mosque, and the first Palestinian to stab Israeli soldiers after the massacre there.¹⁵⁴ It is notable that this tendency was stronger in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* than in the *Guardian*, though it did increase over time in the latter.

[T]he world presented by the popular press, like the world we feel we live in, is a culturally organized set of categories, rather than a collection of unique individuals. If we imagined the world as a vast collection of individual things and people, we would be overwhelmed by detail. We manage the world, make sense of it, by categorising phenomena, including people. Having established a person as an example of a type, our relationship with that person is simplified: we think about this person in terms of the qualities that we attribute to the category already pre-existing in our minds, in so far as we regard the category person as displaying strongly predictable attributes or behaviour.¹⁵⁵

It is interesting to see that it was not only the frame, but also particular personalities that were the focus of the newspapers' interest and discussion, such as during the Camp David Summit II. After the failure of the Summit, the focus of attention – somewhat lessened – was diverted to the influence of this event on the political future of the leaders.¹⁵⁶

Personalization is promoted as a “news value in its own right”. Leads and headlines are structured to put news actors first.”¹⁵⁷

As it became clear that the talks were going to fail, the Barak government made a concerted effort to ensure that all of the blame would be placed on the Palestinians. This task proved to be fairly easy, especially when compared to the difficulties he faced convincing the press and the public of the necessity of making concessions to the other side. The Israeli press became full participants in what Barak came to describe as “the unmasking of Arafat”.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ Fowler, *Language in the News*, p.15.

¹⁵⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 October 1990, p.12; and 23 August 1969, p.15.

¹⁵⁵ Fowler, *Language in the News*, p.92.

¹⁵⁶ See Chapter Three of this thesis.

¹⁵⁷ Bell, *The Language of News Media*, p.194.

¹⁵⁸ Wolfsfeld, “The Varying Role of the Media”, p.16.

The newspapers' focus on personalities was used by Israel – and to some extent the US Administration to attribute the blame for the failure of the peace talks to Yasser Arafat.¹⁵⁹

Entman identifies traits of media texts that set a frame of reference and, therefore, have a critical impact on information processing: Importance judgements; Agency (or to answer the question: Who did it?); Identification with potential victims; and Categorisation, or choice of labels for incidents; Generalisations to a broader national context¹⁶⁰

5.3.1.2 EPISODIC FRAMING

“Episodic frames focus on specific events, such as individual acts of violence, and tend to attribute responsibility to individuals. Thematic frames, in contrast, include the social and historical conditions in which events occur (Gamson et al., 1982).”¹⁶¹

During the Camp David Summit II, the episodic story of peace had three main players: Prime Minister Barak, representing Israel; President Clinton, representing the United States as a peace broker; and Arafat, representing the Palestinians. The frame was not based on peace, the negotiations, the possibilities or the difficulties being considered. According to the headlines, it focused on “good” and “bad” intentions, in other words, who could be seen as peace-lovers, peace-haters, peace broker or peace partners. The “diagnosed problem” in the newspapers was whether Israel, as symbolized by Prime Minister Barak, and the Palestinian Authority, as symbolized by Arafat, did or did not want peace. Moreover, this framing of the news decontextualized the current peace negotiations at Camp David from the peace process as a whole, from earlier peace agreements, the UN resolutions concerning the conflict, and sometimes from the conflict itself. The problem presented was who chose peace and who chose violence.¹⁶² Consequently, the negotiations appeared nowhere. Ben Macintyre wrote in *The Times*:

The fate of the Middle East peace talks at Camp David swung on one man, Yasser Arafat, and one issue, Jerusalem.

Under intense pressure from President Clinton Ehud Barak, the Israeli Prime Minister, to accept a deal that would have provided free access

¹⁵⁹ See Chapter Three.

¹⁶⁰ Blood et al., “Media Coverage of Suicide”.

¹⁶¹ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames of the Palestinian”, p.652.

¹⁶² See Chapter Three of this thesis.

to the holy places but kept the Old City under Israeli rule, the Palestinian leader refused, saying that he would be killed if he agreed.¹⁶³

This statement might imply that the dispute would have been ended if Prime Minister Barak and Arafat had signed another agreement on the spot. Readers were not reminded of earlier experiences, nor was there any discussion of the reasons why the Oslo Accords had not been successful or how an expected peace treaty would have been implemented. The situation was presented simply – in President Clinton’s words – in the *Daily Telegraph*: “There’s been some progress, but I can’t say I know we’ll succeed. God, it’s too hard. It’s the hardest thing I’ve ever seen.”¹⁶⁴ The possibility that the agreement might fail – if it had been signed – was not even mentioned, although there was no guarantee of success, apart from the “good will” and courage of the peace broker and the rivals to reach a peace agreement.

It is believed that episodically structured news does not provide the background and explanations required for a particular reported event. For instance, the implementation of the Israeli Bill concerning Jerusalem in August 1980 was treated by the news report as an event, and the consequences were then followed up. Therefore, the meaning and practical results of the Bill were ignored. The reactions of President Sadat and Crown Prince Fahd were reported, though without any clear explanation of why these people – “the Arabs” – were not happy about the Bill.¹⁶⁵

Organizing news about the conflict over Jerusalem in an episodic manner restricted the possible interpretations of the events reported. The result was a lack of any frame of reference to the conflict apart from the day-to day events, actions, and counter-actions.

5.3.1.3 LACK OF OCCUPATION AND CITIZENSHIP FRAMES

It is interesting to note that a frame based on the occupation of East Jerusalem was lacking in the three newspapers’ reports on the conflict over the city. This frame could have been achieved just by adding the word “occupied” in front of “East

¹⁶³ *The Times*, 27 July 2000.

¹⁶⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 18 July 2000.

¹⁶⁵ See Chapter Two of this thesis.

Jerusalem” when reporting the Israeli measures implemented in that sector of the city, and it would not have bored the readers of those newspapers.

Another frame which was lacking was that of the citizenship of the residents of East Jerusalem. There was no reference to the fact that these people were connected to the city in any way throughout the period under examination. The population of the East sector was described merely as the “Arabs”, since they were of no interest to any of the newspapers during that time. Neither their rights nor the consequences of the Israeli measures and legislation which affected their lives were considered newsworthy by these newspapers.

For instance, although in 1967 the Palestinians, the Arabs, the UNGA, the United States, and Europe all considered the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem to be illegal and an “occupation”, none of the published news was framed on this basis.¹⁶⁶ According to the occupation frame, Israel would have been presented as the occupying force in East Jerusalem, which would have been inconsistent with its public image at that time as a modern Western-style nation.

It should be noted that during and after the Six-Day War, none of the Israeli deeds was reported as a “negative” event in any of the three newspapers.¹⁶⁷ It could be argued that Israel’s confiscation of land as a “negative” event was not reported owing to the newspapers’ tendency to publish only “positive” and “good” Israeli actions.¹⁶⁸ It could also be argued that the confiscation of land was not reported because it lacked the frame of occupation, and so was unlikely to be regarded as “negative”.¹⁶⁹ Yet, the common factor in all the missing frames is that each could have presented Israel as the party responsible for an illegal or unacceptable action.

5.3.1.4 THE FRAME OF JIHAD OR “HOLY WAR”

One of the frequently used frames in the conflict over Jerusalem was that of “holy war”, which was based on a warning by the Arabs or the Muslims of a jihad to

¹⁶⁶ See Chapter One of this thesis.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ See sub-section 5.2.2 of this thesis.

¹⁶⁹ Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News”, p.268.

protect the city. This frame was used after the torching of al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969 and Israel's formal annexation of East Jerusalem in August 1980.

On 23 August 1969, the *Daily Telegraph* published both a news and a leader. "Holy War Call by Arab Leaders" and "Islam Inflamed" were the respective headlines.¹⁷⁰ On the same day, Paul Martin sent to *The Times* a report headed "Islam Capitals Echo to Holy War Demands". A few days later, David Hirst of the *Guardian* contributed a news story from Beirut under the headline "A Holy War – the Nasser or the Faisal Way?"¹⁷¹

The frame based on a threat, which was used to report news about the oil trade between the Arabs, was presented on other occasions as a threat to the "West", after Israel's formal annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980. The Palestinians' Second Intifada was labelled a "holy war" in the headline of the *Daily Telegraph*'s first editorial on the subject.¹⁷² "Seen as a threat to western hegemony (Salame, 1993), Islam also seems increasingly difficult for western media to interpret and present in a comprehensive and fair manner (Adnan, 1989; Karim, 2000; Mowlana, 1995; Said, 1997)."¹⁷³

It is noteworthy that even when the Palestinians were given a voice in the newspapers during the 1990s, their connection to Jerusalem was not recognized nor even mentioned, nor was any clear argument put forward concerning their status there.

Elseewi's (1998) findings that Palestinians were more likely to be described as violent or as terrorists than Israelis is consistent with arguments that challenging groups are viewed through a protest paradigm which, among other things, demonizes the opponents of the status quo. Elseewi also attributed this framing in part to the geographical location of journalists, being more likely to be writing from Israel and the USA than from the Palestinian territories.¹⁷⁴

5.3.1.5 THE ABSENCE OF THE LEGALITY FRAME

¹⁷⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 23 August 1969, pp.10 & 15.

¹⁷¹ *The Times*, 23 August 1969, p.1; and the *Guardian*, 26 August 1969, p.2.

¹⁷² *Daily Telegraph*, 2 October 2000.

¹⁷³ Noakes & Wilkins, "Shifting Frames", p.654.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

There was an absence of news stories of a legal nature, that is, regarding the violation of human rights, international law and UN resolutions. There was no comment of this kind about the consequences of Israel's measures on East Jerusalem throughout the thirty-three year period. The previous chapters show that none of the newspapers held Israel responsible for any of the confrontations, nor was there any comment on the contradiction between the Israeli measures regarding East Jerusalem and the stance of the UN institutions towards the city. For instance, none of the correspondents or writers pointed out the inconsistency between the Israeli Bill and the view of the UN and its resolutions. There was not even any reference to the UN except when Israel defied or denounced one of the UNSC resolutions, as on 20 August 1980.¹⁷⁵ What was described as Israel's "sovereignty" over Jerusalem was highlighted in the newspapers without any questioning of its legitimacy.¹⁷⁶ Instead, the frame was based on peace, and the question that was of interest to the newspapers was whether this measure, the Bill, supported peace. However, the analysis would not be taken to the level that would present Israel as an obstacle to peace, or as a peace-hater. Nevertheless, the Bill was the reason given by President Sadat for suspending the negotiations between Egypt and Israel.¹⁷⁷ In line with the pro-Israel bias, there was no questioning of Israel's use of live bullets against the Palestinians during the early days of the Intifada. Indeed, the justification by the Israeli Defence Force spokesperson was always included in the first few lines of the news story.¹⁷⁸

5.3.1.6 THE RELIGIOUS FRAME

The frame based on religion relied on the concept that Judaism was a source of legitimacy for the Israeli presence and that Islam was a threat to that concept. Islam and Muslims were often framed as a threat in the three newspapers under examination, yet Judaism and the Jews were never portrayed in that way. There was seldom any mention of Christianity or Christians in the news. Judaism was thought to legitimize the state of Israel and the Jewish existence in Palestine as the "Promised

¹⁷⁵ See Chapter Two of this thesis.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ See Chapter Three of this thesis.

Land”. Jerusalem was considered to be central to this concept, for it was believed to contain the Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall, as well as other Jewish holy places.

Judaism appeared in the news when Israel needed to legitimize its actions in Jerusalem. When the Juma’a congregation was presented as a source of concern for Israel’s security, that justified the Israeli government’s measures to close off the city on several occasions and prevent the congregation in the West Bank from spreading into East Jerusalem. A link between the Juma’a congregation and the “clashes” or “violence” was assumed by the *Guardian* as well as the *Daily Telegraph* and *The Times* at the beginning of the Second Intifada.¹⁷⁹ This frame of the Juma’a congregation matches on the one hand the frame of Islam being considered a threat, and on the other the protest paradigm as illustrated by framing the Palestinians.¹⁸⁰

There was also a change to using the present-day or biblical name of al-Haram al-Sharif, for example, “Temple Mount”.¹⁸¹ The use of the biblical names, particularly during times of tension, indicated a bias in favour of Israel’s claims to the holy places in East Jerusalem. Moreover, the lack of the occupation as a frame emphasized these claims by not balancing them against the current juridical control by the Israelis over the city. For example, the reference to the “Temple Mount” by *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* when reporting on Ariel Sharon’s visit to al-Aqsa Mosque appeared to legitimize his action.¹⁸²

Furthermore, depriving the Palestinians of any connection with the city either as a population or as Muslims supported this bias. However, a few paragraphs after the biblical names were used, the holy places were given their present-day Islamic names in all three newspapers. Yet, the Palestinians were not identified nor even referred to as Muslims, although the Israelis were called “Jews”.¹⁸³ The tendency to contextualize Israel’s measures with Judaism was emphasized in the headlines of

¹⁷⁹ *Guardian*, 29 & 30 September 2000; *The Times*, 7 October 2000; see also Chapter Three.

¹⁸⁰ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”.

¹⁸¹ See Chapter Three.

¹⁸² *The Times*, 4 October 2000; *Daily Telegraph*, 30 September 2000.

¹⁸³ *The Times*, 30 September 2000; *Daily Telegraph* 30 September 2000. See also, Chapter One, and Chapter Three.

editorials and news items. After the failure of the Camp David Summit II, the *Daily Telegraph* published an article headed “Camp David and David’s City”, and the headline of the first comment in *The Times* on the eruption of the Second Intifada was “Mount of Sorrow”.¹⁸⁴

5.3.3 News Framing: An Overview

The analysis of the framing of news about the conflict over Jerusalem has revealed that Israel’s presentations, interpretations, and point of view were given “preference” in this respect. Israel’s actions were presented most of the time as “desirable”,¹⁸⁵ and its justifications, comments and interpretations were reported more often than those of the Palestinians.

The changes in events and attitudes that occurred over the thirty-three year period have been discussed in Chapters One to Four. The mainstream framing of news about the conflict over Jerusalem in the three newspapers showed a lack of frames that might have provided an understanding of the reported Palestinian’s actions and reactions by describing the circumstances in the context of the occupation, citizenship, and international law. These frames, in turn, might have viewed many of Israel’s measures as unacceptable or even illegal.

It is interesting to note that these frames were continually absent from the three newspapers’ “agenda” concerning the conflict. If the occupation or the legitimacy of Israel’s measures had been included, then the news sources would have been “obliged” to respond to it.¹⁸⁶ “The more distant the events, the easier it is to achieve some consensual framing, since the sources of alternative views have less access and the audience is less personally involved.”¹⁸⁷ Moreover, the tendency to frame much of the Israeli action in the context of Judaism could be interpreted as an attempt to understand it, if not to justify it.

¹⁸⁴ *The Times*, 4 October 2000; *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000.

¹⁸⁵ Gans, “*Deciding What’s New*”.

¹⁸⁶ Reese, “*Setting the Media’s Agenda*”, p.333.

¹⁸⁷ McQuail, *MCT*, p.344.

5.4 Characterizing Jerusalem: Differences in Presentation

This section investigates the differences between the *Guardian* on the one hand and *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* on the other in their portrayal of the conflict over Jerusalem. The investigation is carried out by comparing the presentation of the city in the news reports, commentaries and editorials in all three newspapers, and it gives examples of these differences rather than simply monitoring them.

Sub-section 5.4.1 highlights the significant role of the portrayals of events, places and parties in times of conflict. Sub-section 5.4.2 analyses the characterization of Jerusalem in the three newspapers and, in particular, their use of politically loaded language. Sub-section 5.4.3 discusses the differences between the newspapers regarding the sequence of the reported events, and therefore the presentation of “agency”. Sub-section 5.4.4 examines in greater detail aspects of concurrence and variation in the portrayal of the two actors in the conflict. Variations between the newspapers are analysed with particular attention to the names, language and textual choices used in the text of the news item. According to Entman, these are important points for comparison in frame analysis.¹⁸⁸

There was no variation in the overall pattern of reporting and presentation described in sections 5.2 and 5.3. However, there were differences in the details. These differences were clearly concentrated in the portrayals of the last two events of the period being studied, that is, the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000 and the Second Intifada in September of the same year.¹⁸⁹ Differences between the newspapers’ portrayal of other events prior to the Camp David Peace Summit are also covered where required to complete the illustration of a pattern.

Although there were no substantial differences between the *Guardian* on the one hand and *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* on the other concerning the selection of news, this was not true of their presentation of news reports and editorials. In a

¹⁸⁸ Robert M. Entman, “Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrast In Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents”, *Journal of Communication*, vol.41, no.4 (Autumn 1991) p.6.

¹⁸⁹ These events have been discussed in Chapter Three.

comparison of the news and comments of the same day and about the same event, differences between these newspapers are clearly noticeable. Usually they occur between the *Guardian* and either or both of the other two dailies, though occasionally they also appear between *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*.¹⁹⁰ It is worth mentioning here that numbers and statistics have been included only where they indicate a considerable difference.

5.4.1 Negotiating Presentation

Differences in the presentation of news in each newspaper may be the result of the framing of the event. These differences can be characterized by analysing and comparing the newspapers' choices, bearing the following factors in mind: (1) the choice of names and vocabulary, particularly in the headlines and, occasionally, the lead paragraph of the text; (2) the contextualization of the events; and (3) the description and emphasis.

The events under examination are complicated and open to conflicting interpretations. Robert Entman stresses the importance of comparing news texts and frames in analysing such events:

Comparing media narratives of events that could have been reported similarly helps to reveal the critical textual choices that framed the story but would otherwise remain submerged in an undifferentiated text. Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably, because many of the framing devices can appear as "natural", unremarkable choices of words or images. Comparison reveals that such choices are not inevitable [n]or unproblematic but rather central to the way the news frame helps establish the literally common sense (eg. widespread) interpretation of events.¹⁹¹

It could be argued that the differences between the newspapers in their portrayal of the conflict over Jerusalem are due to the differences in their policies.¹⁹² It is believed that the news organization's policy establishes the "editorial line", which, in

¹⁹⁰ For further discussion of the organizational policies of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, see Chapter Six.

¹⁹¹ Entman., "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News", p. 6.

¹⁹² See Chapter Six, section 6.1 in this thesis.

turn, affects the content of the news and the textual choices used in the news text.¹⁹³ The differences in the presentation are due to the choice of vocabulary, which is said to be influenced by organizational “policy” and management. This is consistent with Warren Breed’s definition of “policy”: “‘Policy’ may be defined as the more or less consistent orientation shown by a paper, not only in its editorial but in its news columns and headlines as well, concerning selected issues and events.”¹⁹⁴

Breed’s belief in the influence of the news organization’s policy on the news content contradicts the opinion of many of the journalists, correspondents and editors when they were interviewed. They insisted that they were independent in their news coverage, choice of vocabulary, and texts.¹⁹⁵ Nevertheless, it is consistent with Sam Kiley’s statement concerning *The Times*.¹⁹⁶

As producers of the texts, journalists and editors are partly responsible for its content.¹⁹⁷ They are believed to work in accordance with the news organization’s policy, which influences the differences between newspapers in their frames and texts. Nina Eliasoph points out: “In a normal news organization, a reporter who wants a promotion or to stay employed will not diverge too drastically from the director’s tacit views.”¹⁹⁸

The Camp David Peace Summit II marked a significant point in the presentation of the conflict: its essence – which is believed to be Jerusalem – the sequence of events, possible effects, and actors. The presentation created by the newspapers of the two parties was repeated and emphasized during the Second Intifada, when the cost of the conflict began to rise to an astonishingly high level in the number of casualties, particularly among the Palestinians. The framing of the Second Intifada was critical to both actors, for they were seeking international

¹⁹³ Warren Breed, “Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis”, in Dan Berkowitz (ed.), *Social Meanings of News: A Text Reader* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997) p. 111; Nina Eliasoph, “Routines and the Making of Oppositional News”, in Berkowitz, *Social Meanings of News*, p. 244-246.

¹⁹⁴ Breed, “Social Control in the Newsroom”, p.108.

¹⁹⁵ Interviews with Richard Beeston, Anton La Guardia and David Loshak (London: 27 & 29 May 2000).

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Sam Kiley (London: 22 August 2002).

¹⁹⁷ See Chapter Six, sections (1&2).

¹⁹⁸ Eliasoph, “Routines and the Making of Oppositional News”, p.245.

¹⁹⁹ Entman, “Framing U.S. Coverage of International News”, p.55.

support, empathy and legitimacy. They were concerned with “winning” what was called the “war of words”. So it was crucial for the actors to try to control and manage the way in which events were reported and presented. Complaining about the expressions and images used in a particular news outlet was one method of managing their images. The portrayal of events is not necessarily a “zero-sum” process. However, in a political conflict the inclusion of one characteristic must entail the exclusion of others.

The same principle could be applied to the level of importance. If an idea was presented as the dominant aspect of a problem, then other definitions of that problem, although mentioned in the same text, had no influence on the overall interpretation. Entman emphasizes this situation as follows:

Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions. Politicians seeking support are thus compelled to compete with each other and with journalists over news frames (Entman, 1989; Riker, 1986). Framing in this light plays a major role in the exertion of political power, and the frame in the news text is really the imprint of power – it registers the identity of actors or interest that competed to dominate the text.¹⁹⁹

The content of the news texts about the Palestinian–Israeli conflict can be understood from the imbalance in the power of the actors. The dominance of Israel’s formal presentation, particularly in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, was the result of its power and efficient apparatus in this area. It was subject to a resurgence in the conflict during the Second Intifada. Language, choice of vocabulary and names were at the heart of the dispute between Israel, pro-Israel groups, organizations and individuals on the one hand and between several news organizations and outlets in Britain on the other.

The Israeli Embassy in London, pro-Israel lobbies, news organizations, politicians and commentators were criticizing the way in which news about the Intifada was reported in particular news outlets. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the *Independent* and the *Guardian* were criticized and labelled “pro-Palestinian”, “anti-Semitic”, “biased”, “subjective” and “emotional” in their reporting of news about the Intifada.

Robert Fisk, the *Independent*'s correspondent in the Middle East, was labelled an "Arabist". Suzanne Goldenberg was depicted as a "naïve, self-hat[ing] Jew" and of being emotionally involved, which is a criticism of her professional qualities.²⁰⁰ Furthermore, together with other journalists, she has been threatened with the removal of her accreditation.²⁰¹ The *Guardian*'s editor, Alan Rusbridger, was reported to have admitted the possible influence of the "intensity" of the pro-Israel lobbying in Britain. One of its effects might have been his two "fact-finding missions to Israel after the row and complaints about Suzanne Goldenberger's news reports of the Intifada."²⁰²

These complaints were coming from Israel's supporters in tandem with Israeli government officials, who were seeking a particular presentation that suited their interests and was consistent with the state's self-image. So, in their view, the confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinians should have been called "Palestinian [or] Islamic violence", the assassination of Palestinian political activists is called "targeted killings" and the Palestinian freedom fighters is called "terrorists" (see section 5.3).

While the *Guardian*, the *Independent* and their correspondents were criticized for their news reports about the Intifada, Conrad Black was awarded a prize for his support of Israel.²⁰³ "Honestreporting.com" is a pro-Israel web site that was monitoring media coverage – including that broadcast by the United Kingdom and the United States – of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict during the Intifada.²⁰⁴ Black was awarded the prize for "lashing out against 'rabidly anti-Israel' journalists and governments", according to Honestreporting management.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁰ *Guardian* on-line. This criticism was particularly strong in Israeli news outlets.

²⁰¹ Ibid. Suzanne Goldenberg had to change her e-mail address after it was bombarded daily with hundreds of complaints about her coverage.

²⁰² Interview with Brian Whitaker, 27 May 2002; *Guardian* on-line.

²⁰³ Conrad Black is the proprietor of Hollinger Media Group, which owns the *Daily Telegraph* and *Sunday Telegraph* newspapers and the *Spectator* magazine.

²⁰⁴ URL:<http://www.honestreporting.com>

²⁰⁵ *Guardian* on-line. A Palestinian web-site was launched afterwards for monitoring the media coverage of the Intifada, commenting and complaining about the way in which events were reported in news outlets in the United Kingdom and particularly in the United States: URL:<http://www.electronicintifada.com>

The condemnation resulted from the fact that in many cases these news outlets, including the *Guardian*, began to present the conflict somewhat differently from the conventional portrayal of it followed by news organisations in Britain, the United States and other countries internationally. Criticism was aimed at the shifts in the presentation of the events and the actors, particularly in the early weeks of the Intifada (see sections 5.2 and 5.3). Unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian* began to emphasize more than one dominant frame in a news text that was to have implied a single definition of the problem, as had been portrayed in the three newspapers, which was understood as a challenge of the conventional portrayals.

It should be mentioned, however, that although the three newspapers were restricted to the official sources and accounts in their coverage of the Camp David Peace Summit II as well as other events, there were variations in their news stories. One would imagine that Israel had been expecting the Second Intifada or a similar confrontation to follow the Peace Summit. According to Wolfsfeld, Israel's public relations campaign and political discourse at Camp David was influenced by this expectation (see section 5.3).

During the Camp David negotiations, Israeli officials declared that confrontation, that is, "violence", was the alternative to reaching a peace agreement. In their view, the Palestinians were expected to resort to "violence" if no peace settlement was signed.²⁰⁶ Therefore, should the negotiations break down, the Palestinians were to be held responsible, which would then justify the Israelis in taking their own measures to guarantee "Israel's security". In other words, the Palestinians were portrayed as the "agency [of] violence", which was "undesirable".

It looked as if Israel's management of the situation at Camp David had been quite successful, particularly the presentation of the events and actors. Nevertheless, there was a shift during the coverage of the Intifada, at least in the first few weeks. One of the reasons for this occurrence was that the coverage of the Intifada was inherently different from that of the peace negotiations at Camp David. At the Summit, the

²⁰⁶ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

journalists were kept at a distance from events on the ground and were told what the actors wanted them to know and broadcast. During the Intifada, however, the journalists were closer to the events and witnessed what they were reporting.

Whereas the important aspect of the Camp David Peace Summit was the characterization of the two parties, that of the Second Intifada – from the point of view of this study – was the portrayal of Jerusalem. What was described as a “new wave of violence” was called “al-Aqsa Intifada”. Since Jerusalem was portrayed in the same way as during the peace negotiations, there was more emphasis on the claims to the city than on its composition. The vocabulary and expressions used in the frame analysis would have had “political significan[ce]” according to Entman’s framework.²⁰⁷

5.4.2 The Characterization of Jerusalem

5.4.2.1 EAST JERUSALEM

The description of Jerusalem can change according to the purpose of those who produce it and according to the policy of the newspapers. Once that description is fixed, it becomes subject to codes and regulations, and therefore has far-reaching implications than merely producing a narrative of Jerusalem’s identity.

Identities are represented and reproduced symbolically by means of vocabulary, images and cultural practice. Language as a system of symbols produces meaning from the written text rather than the writer.²⁰⁸ Therefore, language was important for the production of Jerusalem’s identity. From the language of the narrative, readers knew the identity ascribed to the city, and its presentation was affected by the policy of the newspapers.

The portrayal of Jerusalem during the coverage of Camp David and the Second Intifada was of crucial importance to the actors. It could support and validate or counter, challenge and undermine their claims to the city. Furthermore, it could affect the public image of their religious and national connections with the city and therefore the legitimacy of their presence, moves, action or control.

²⁰⁷ Entman, “Framing U.S. Coverage of International News”, p.8.

²⁰⁸ Kath Woodward, *Understanding Identity* (London: Arnold, 2002), p.74.

It is interesting to note that during the Camp David Peace Summit, in contrast with previous events, contradictory descriptions and identities began to be ascribed to Jerusalem by all three newspapers. The *Guardian* was now more likely to use, repeat and stress vocabulary indicating the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem as well as the Jewish, though not the Christian.²⁰⁹ Prior to the Peace Summit and the Second Intifada, the *Guardian* placed far greater emphasis on the Jewish religious identity of the city than did the other two newspapers.²¹⁰ The emphasis on one identity of Jerusalem unavoidably excludes the others.

The presentation of the city during the events in 2000 was ambivalent, for its mixed identity was neither clarified nor highlighted. Whereas East Jerusalem was presented as a Jewish city throughout the rest of the period under examination, during the Camp David Peace Summit and the Second Intifada, it was sometimes presented as Jewish and at other times as Arab or Islamic. The differences were indicated by the frequency and repetition of and stress on the vocabulary and names used for one or other of these identities. Entman points out that news texts can provide contradictory information:

By providing, repeating, and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference some ideas but not the others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so – and others entirely invisible. The frame does not eliminate all inconsistent information; texts inevitably contain some incongruent data. But through repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others.²¹¹

The presentation of East Jerusalem as Arabic, Palestinian, Israeli, or Islamic, Jewish or Christian city changed the framing of the news and the identification of the city. In addition, it affected the given interpretation of events. If Jerusalem were presented as an Arab/Palestinian occupied territory, containing Islamic and Christian holy places, and populated by a Muslim and Christian Palestinian majority plus a few hundred Jewish settlers, then this would emphasize and probably legitimize the Palestinians'

²⁰⁹ The religious status of Jerusalem was one of the *Guardian*'s concerns throughout the period under examination.

²¹⁰ See Chapter One, section (2)

²¹¹ Entman, "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News", p.7.

claims to the city, undermining those of the Israelis and their right to control it. However, if Jerusalem were presented as a Jewish city containing Jewish holy places with a majority of Jewish citizens under Israeli control with no reference to its legal status and population, then there was no need for Israel to negotiate it with the Palestinians or any other party, or to make any “compromises”. If Israel did so, then the Palestinians should accept whatever it offered them and be grateful. This was a completely different interpretation from that of Jerusalem as a contested city with holy places for the followers of the three religions, playing a vital role in a possible Palestinian state and thus acquiring a new characterization.

Each of the above portrayals signified and replicated one of the rivals’ conflicting accounts and could lead to a specific narrative. A neutral presentation of Jerusalem would not be easy to achieve.²¹²

It is remarkable that the news produced in the three newspapers centred only on East Jerusalem, for there was no reference to West Jerusalem at any stage.²¹³ The negotiations at Camp David concerned East Jerusalem and so did the news about the Second Intifada. As described in Chapter Three, the focus of the news was on the Old City, more specifically, the holy places.²¹⁴ This method of reporting as well as generating news exclusively about East Jerusalem implied that this was the “negotiable” part, whereas West Jerusalem was not. If Jerusalem had been presented as a whole city, then it would have been possible to imagine the city being divided into two entities: West Jerusalem for the Israelis, and East Jerusalem for the Palestinians. However, this did not happen during the Camp David Peace Summit or the Intifada. The city had been regarded as a complete entity by Israel ever since the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in June 1967, and this idea was emphasized by Israeli

²¹² Between Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem on 8 June 1967, after the Six-Day War, and the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000, the city had been presented and promoted in the three newspapers in a particular way. It was depicted as a Jewish city under Israeli control, containing a few hundred Arabs, and to which Israel’s Arab neighbours, particularly allies of the West and the United States such as President Sadat after 1978 and King Fahd, were presenting claims. See Chapters One and Four for further details.

²¹³ In the headlines, the name “Jerusalem” was used in a general sense. On most occasions, the texts referred to East Jerusalem and there was no reference to West Jerusalem as part of the negotiations.

²¹⁴ See Chapter Three.

government officials at every opportunity.²¹⁵ The perception of Jerusalem as a divisible entity did not match Israel's interests or its aspirations of keeping the whole city under its control.

The portrayal of Jerusalem can be analysed according to the choice of names, descriptions and vocabulary. Danuta Reah states: "Naming, context and relationship operate together to create a complex series of meanings."²¹⁶ The use of certain names and descriptions when referring to East Jerusalem reflected an attitude towards this part of the city. It could also be interpreted as support for the narrative or discourse of one of the rivals, from which their claims would be seen as lawful or unlawful. Using the term "Arab" or "occupied" to describe East Jerusalem was "laden with political implications" challenging Israeli claims.²¹⁷ These two descriptions, besides others, revealed a political position as well as a questioning of the validity of Israeli rule over the city.

The use of the name "Arab" reflected a recognition of the Arab identity of East Jerusalem.²¹⁸ However, although it indicated the presence of the "Arab population", it did not recognize and present them as Palestinians.²¹⁹ According to Menachem Klein, the name "East Jerusalem" was "habitually" used by the Israelis when referring to the part of the city inhabited by the Palestinians, "since it lies on the east side of a large single city, Jerusalem."²²⁰

In contrast, the Arab/Palestinian narrative had a certain level of international recognition, though it was not represented in the newspapers to the same extent as that of Israel. It could be argued that this situation could make the Palestinian narrative seem a potential reality. During the newspapers' coverage of the Camp David

²¹⁵ See Chapter One; and Chapter Two.

²¹⁶ Danuta Reah, *The Language of Newspapers* (London: Routledge, 1998), p.56.

²¹⁷ Menachem Klein, *Jerusalem: The Contested City* (London: C. Hurst, 2001), p7.

²¹⁸ This identity was ignored by the newspapers during events prior to the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000.

²¹⁹ The *Guardian* had been more likely to show interest in the population since 1967, when it published a full-page feature and cartoons about Mea Sherim in East Jerusalem. See Chapter One, section (2).

²²⁰ Klein, *Jerusalem*, p. 7.

Peace Summit and the Second Intifada, East Jerusalem was not described as “Arab East Jerusalem” at all in the *Daily Telegraph*, and there was only one such reference to it in *The Times*. However, the *Guardian* used it in 9 out of 99 references, which makes 10 per cent of the total references to the city during the newspaper’s coverage of these events.

This finding reveals that the *Guardian*, unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, was the only newspaper to present East Jerusalem as Arab territory, even though only occasionally. The other two newspapers relied more on the official Israeli reference to East Jerusalem, which did not indicate its Arab identity. On the contrary, it emphasized the image of Jerusalem as a Jewish city.²²¹ Bearing this in mind and the fact that the Palestinian population had not been presented as residents by any of the newspapers, there were more news reports about them as “Arabs” in the *Guardian*. It could be argued that although the accounts in the three newspapers were more representative of the Israeli point of view of Jerusalem and portrayed the city as Jewish, yet the *Guardian* was emphasizing the characteristics of two identities, even if the Jewish identity was given greater emphasis.

The more frequent presentation of East Jerusalem as “Arab East Jerusalem” in the *Guardian* probably ranged the pro-Israeli groups against the newspaper, as shown in the previous section. The descriptions of the holy places were of particular significance in identifying East Jerusalem.

5.4.2.2 THE HOLY PLACES

It is interesting to note that East Jerusalem was not given a clear identity by the three newspapers, for a variety of names were used to refer to the city’s holy places. These were occasionally described as Islamic shrines or Islamic holy places, though more often as Jewish holy places. Biblical as well as Islamic names were used to identify them. During the Camp David Peace Summit II and the Second Intifada, the names Haram al-Sharif, al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock were sometimes used,

²²¹ The use of Israeli names for Jerusalem was common to all three newspapers throughout the period under examination. What the Arabs called the Ramadan War or the October War was referred to as “Yom Kippur” by the Israelis.

though there was more frequent reference to names such as Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall.

The name al-Aqsa Mosque was used in the news reports of the fire at the Mosque in August 1969 and on several occasions afterwards. Yet, throughout the period under examination, the name Temple Mount was the most commonly used by *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* to refer to that area. Meanwhile, the *Guardian* was using Haram al-Sharif as well as al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock in its references to the compound, particularly in news items covering the Camp David Peace Summit and the Second Intifada.²²² The *Guardian* was more likely than *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* to use Islamic names, which were mostly replaced with Jewish names by the other two newspapers. The name Temple Mount was most commonly used by the latter to refer to the holy sites, especially in their headlines during the Second Intifada.

This method of characterizing the city was of major importance during the coverage of the two events under examination. If it was the control or sovereignty over the “Temple Mount” that was negotiable at Camp David, then there was no reason for the Palestinians to reject the Israeli offer. Israel was supposedly going to cede its holiest shrine, the “Temple Mount”, and the Palestinians were “reluctant” to accept it because they wanted more “concessions” from Israel. If Jerusalem was not an occupied territory, then there was no reason why Israel should be required to leave. If there were no identified non-Jewish residents in the city, then there is no reason for Israel to leave, except that it was being too generous and willing to pay the price for peace with the Palestinians who “use violence for their political ends”.

The newspapers’ reports on the first day of the Intifada were interesting, for the headlines showed varying degrees of ambiguity. However, none of the headlines mentioned the name of al-Aqsa Mosque. Instead, they referred to the “Jerusalem site” (*The Times*), the “holy shrine” (*Daily Telegraph*), and “Islam’s holy shrine”

²²² See Chapter Three, section (2).

(*Guardian*).²²³ The last was the only newspaper to use the term Islam to refer to al-Aqsa Mosque. A few days later, *The Times* referred to al-Aqsa Mosque by name in a photograph caption: "Ariel Sharon visits al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, a move which sparked clashes across Israel and the occupied territories". However, the next morning's edition contained a photograph of the same place with a caption referring to the "Temple Mount".²²⁴ The change in name might indicate a correction in accordance with a "policy" or it might have been the result of a complaint.

If Ariel Sharon, as a Jewish leader, had visited the "Temple Mount", then the Palestinians' protest against the visit would not have been in any way understandable. However, if he had visited al-Aqsa Mosque, a holy place for the Muslims including the Palestinians, and located in East Jerusalem, where the national aspirations of the Palestinians were centred on the city as the capital of their future state, then the Palestinians' protest might have made sense.

Among the first news in detail about events affecting Jerusalem, the only newspaper to refer to the holy places in the Old City by their Islamic names was *The Times* in its news reports and comment about Crown Prince Fahd's statement following Israel's official annexation of East Jerusalem.²²⁵ The newspapers referred to al-Aqsa Mosque when reporting on events before the Camp David Peace Summit, though it was in the Holy War frame, as in 1969, in their coverage of the diplomatic crisis following the torching of the Mosque (see Chapter Two). This indicates a shift in *The Times*, which is inconsistent with the general development in the newspapers' coverage of events in the 1980s and early 1990s, when the Palestinians began to be called Palestinians. In 1967, *The Times* was referring in its editorials to the holy places by different

²²³ *The Times*, 30 September 2000; *Guardian & the Daily Telegraph*, 29 September 2000.

²²⁴ In the newspapers' coverage of the events in Jerusalem during 1967, *The Times*' editorials were using the Islamic names when referring to the holy places, unlike its news reports where the biblical names were used. This situation might indicate the influence of the official Israeli news sources over the content of the news, for they were the only ones to be interviewed and quoted. It could even be suggested that at the time the co-editors of *The Times* had not changed the names in the news.

²²⁵ During its coverage of events concerning Jerusalem in 1967, *The Times* used Islamic names in its editorials to refer to the holy places, but biblical names in its news reports. This could indicate the influence of the official Israeli news sources on the content of the news, for they were the only people to be interviewed and quoted at the time. It was also possible that the co-editors of the newspaper had not changed the names in the news.

names from those used in its news reports. However, after that date, all three newspapers were using biblical names.

Before 2000, the *Guardian* used the Islamic names for the holy places in 1996, during its coverage of the confrontations over the Tunnel under al-Aqsa Mosque. The Islamic identity was mostly used in photograph captions, though not in the headlines of the news reports.²²⁶ An example was the following caption to a photograph of the Dome of the Rock during the Camp David negotiations: “Shrines such as al-Aqsa Mosque make Jerusalem Islam’s third holiest place”.²²⁷ However, in their coverage of the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque in October 1990, all three newspapers referred to the Temple Mount in their headlines.²²⁸

In its reports about the eruption of the Second Intifada, the *Daily Telegraph* referred to the “Temple Mount” instead of al-Aqsa Mosque.²²⁹ In this newspaper, Jerusalem was mostly presented as a Jewish city in both the news reports and the editorials. The day following the collapse of the Camp David negotiations, the newspaper’s editorial was headed “Camp David and David’s city”.²³⁰

It is interesting to note that al-Aqsa Mosque was not mentioned in any of the headlines of the *Guardian*’s coverage of the confrontations that followed the Israelis’ opening of the Tunnel under the Mosque. The name of the Mosque appeared in only one photograph caption, which included the comment that it was the third-holiest place in Islam. In contrast with the *Guardian*’s photograph captions a few years earlier, al-Aqsa Mosque, like the Dome of the Rock, was now called Temple Mount in the headlines as well as in the captions.²³¹

²²⁶ *Guardian*, 28 September 1996; 2 & 5 October 1996.

²²⁷ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

²²⁸ *Guardian*, *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, 9 October 1990.

²²⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, 29 September 2000.

²³⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2000. For further details about the newspaper’s attitude, see Chapter Three, section (3) of this thesis.

²³¹ *Guardian*, 28 September 1996. The caption said: “Bloody footprints among worshippers’ shoes at Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa Mosque, the third-holiest place in Islam, where troops killed three Palestinians yesterday.”

It should be mentioned that the shift might have been made by the photographer, for at the time the *Guardian*'s policy to refer to the holy places by their biblical names had not changed. The contributor of the 1996 photograph, mentioned above, whose caption identified the mosque as Islamic, was Khaled Zighari. He was a Palestinian and had been well-known as a photographer since the Intifada of 1987. The photographs of 1990, in which the Mosque was described as a Jewish temple, were by Jim Hollander. Only one photograph, presented in the same way, was by Sean Smith.²³² However, there is no information available about these photographers.

It could be argued that the shift in naming the holy places did not reflect the *Guardian*'s policy so much as that of the journalist and the photographer. In particular, there was no indication in the *Guardian*'s headlines of such a shift between its coverage of 1990 and 1996. To verify or refute this assumption, an examination of the photographs published during the Camp David negotiations and the Second Intifada revealed that the naming of the Mosque in the photograph captions did not reflect any particular policy except that of using Islamic as well as biblical names. This finding parallels the changes in the photographers.

It could be said that an emphasis on the religious framing of the conflict over the city would undermine any practical and pragmatic solution and exclude the practical concerns of its residents.

5.4.3 Sequence and Contextualization of Events

It is assumed that the sequencing and contextualization of events affect their presentation. The chosen order of the events determines what has happened. Likewise, it defines the cause and the result, action and reaction, and consequently, what is expected. It also defines the problem and attributes the responsibility for its cause to an "agency". According to Entman: "Agency answers the question of exactly who did it – what causal force created the newsworthy act? By convention, agency is an especially common attribute of headlines."²³³

²³² *Guardian*, 26 October 1990.

²³³ Entman, "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News", p.11.

Ariel Sharon's visit was pre-planned and known, yet there was no mention of it in any of the three newspapers on the day before the eruption of the Second Intifada.²³⁴ It was the confrontations, killing and general drama that attracted the newspapers' attention to the holy places and allowed them to be presented as the main cause of the crisis.²³⁵

All three newspapers presented the "riots", "protests" or "confrontations" as taking place before Ariel Sharon's visit to al-Aqsa Mosque, thus contradicting the real sequence of events. The *Guardian* was the only newspaper to present the protest as a consequence of the visit. However, in its headline and news text, the visit followed the confrontations.²³⁶ Surprisingly, Ariel Sharon's visit was not mentioned in the headlines in either *The Times* or the *Daily Telegraph*, or even in the first two paragraphs of their news reports.²³⁷

This interpretation appears to sideline Ariel Sharon's visit and highlight the Palestinians' protest, which was diagnosed as the cause of the "violence" that was being reported. The reasons for the "violence", according to *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* were the failure of the Camp David Peace Summit, as well as the Palestinians' "frustration" with the "corruption" of their authority. *The Times'* editorial on the Second Intifada stated that it was the consequence of

the frustration of the Palestinians at falling living standards, corruption within the Arafat administration and continuing Israeli restrictions; and the intense distrust of many Israelis of a peace process that they see as eroding their security and historic claim to the land.²³⁸

This logic in arranging the sequence of events had been used most of the time since 1967. Israel, particularly during times of confrontation and the heavy reporting of

²³⁴ *The Times*, *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, 27 September 2000.

²³⁵ See Chapter Five, section (1).

²³⁶ For further details of the newspapers' coverage of the Second Intifada, see Chapter Three.

²³⁷ The headlines that day were as follows: "Muslims Shot in Clash at Jerusalem Site" (*The Times*); "Riot Police Clash with Protesters at Holy Shrine" (*Daily Telegraph*); "Rioting as Sharon Visits Islam's Holy Site" (*Guardian*). See *The Times*, 30 September 2000; the *Daily Telegraph* & the *Guardian*, 29 September 2000.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *The Times*, 4 October 2000.

“violence”, was presented as reacting to the Palestinians’ “protest” and “riot”, and to the Arabs’ “rage”, “anger”, “suspension of talks”, etc. (see Chapter Two).

At the Camp David Peace Summit II in 2000, the way in which events were unfolded and presented implied the following sequence. During the negotiations, high-ranking Israeli government officials revealed the news about a forthcoming “concession” concerning Jerusalem by Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Then followed the news about Yasser Arafat’s reluctance to accept the “concession”. Finally, the reporting of the Summit concluded with criticism by Israel and the United States of the Palestinian leader’s rejection of Israel’s peace offer and their holding him responsible for the collapse of the negotiations. That was how the events were arranged in the three newspapers.

Even if this presentation of events did not imply the next step, it did prepare readers for it in terms of scenario or expectation. The first event was the reason for the second and subsequent events. The circle of action and reaction was repeated on different occasions, as in the following examples.

President Sadat, an Arab leader, suspended the negotiations on Palestinian autonomy from Israel, so there would be no rapid end to the Arab–Israeli conflict. However, President Sadat’s action was never connected to Israel’s formal annexation of East Jerusalem.²³⁹ The peace negotiations at Camp David twenty years later caused a change in the roles, for Israel was to offer the Palestinians a “compromise” over Jerusalem. The Palestinians “reluctantly” rejected the offer, so they had to face the consequences of their own decision, which were expected to be of a “violent” nature.²⁴⁰ Although both events unfolded in a similar way, for each can be seen to have been provoked by Israeli action, they were arranged differently for a particular purpose: to emphasize Israel’s positive image as the “peace maker”, and the Palestinians’ negative image as “protesters”, “rioters” and “violent” people.

²³⁹ See Chapter Two of this thesis.

²⁴⁰ Chapter Three, and Chapter Five, section (2).

The headline is believed to be of focal significance for the news text, because it is said to have “the capacity to encapsulate a story”.²⁴¹ Moreover, it is understood to represent the policy of the news organization. Reah supports this assumption, as follows:

The headline will rarely, if ever, be written by the reporter who wrote the news story. It should, in theory, encapsulate the story in a minimum number of words, attract the reader to the story and, if it appears on the front page, attract the reader to the paper.²⁴²

The logical “policy” of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* in presenting the sequence of events during Camp David was the same for all three newspapers during earlier events, as in the headlines of their news reports about the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque. However, the *Daily Telegraph* was the only newspaper to identify the “subject” – Israel: “Fresh Tension Erupts in Middle East: Wave of Protest after Israelis Kill 21 Arabs”.²⁴³ The headlines in the *Guardian* and *The Times* were as follows, respectively: “Intifada’s Bloodiest Day Claims 19 Lives”, and “Violence Condemned at the UN Meeting: 18 Arabs Killed in Rioting on Temple Mount”.²⁴⁴ It is noticeable that the “subject” becomes an important item in the headline when s/he is a Palestinian. In a front-page news story in the *Guardian* a few days after the massacre, the headline was “Palestinian Kills Three in ‘Temple Mount Revenge’”.²⁴⁵

Contextualization and decontextualization mean the inclusion and highlighting of particular aspects of the reality and the exclusion of others, as explained by Entman:

[F]rames select and call attention to particular aspects of the reality described, which logically means that frames simultaneously direct attention away from other aspects. Most frames are defined by what they omit as well as include, and the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience.²⁴⁶

²⁴¹ Reah, *The Language of Newspapers*, p.14.

²⁴² Ibid., p.13.

²⁴³ *Daily Telegraph*, 9 October 1990.

²⁴⁴ *Guardian* and *The Times*, 9 October 1990.

²⁴⁵ *Guardian*, 22 October 1990.

²⁴⁶ Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Featured Paradigm”, *Journal of Communication*, vol.43, no.4 (Autumn 1993), p.54.

It could be argued that the significance of the holy places and the emphasis placed on them and on religion generally by the newspapers was due to their being presented by Israel and to some extent the Palestinian Authority, as the cause of the conflict.

In its first news reports on the Second Intifada, the *Guardian*, unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, highlighted the callousness of Ariel Sharon's character. The report pointed out that the Palestinians hated this person and considered him a "criminal", for he was believed to have plotted the massacre of their fellow Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatela Refugee Camps in southern Lebanon on 12 September 1982.

It was misleading to decontextualize the Camp David negotiations, including the "concessions", and the Intifada from the peace process and the Israeli occupation, which were the reality that affected the everyday life of every single member of the anonymous Palestinian population. Adherence to this policy meant that the newspapers did not produce what should have been considered relevant, if not essential, for making sense of the news. Furthermore, the newspapers showed their ignorance of Israel's breaches of its obligations according to the earlier peace process (the Oslo Accords of 1993), and its violations of several UN resolutions requiring an end to the illegal settlements in the occupied territories.

The complexity of the issues related to the Camp David Peace Summit and the Second Intifada was not clarified in any of the newspapers. It could be argued that it was due to the "format" of the news as a genre. A limitation is placed on the space devoted to a particular news story and on the type of information that can be included in a news item, for news is said to be mainly for orientation rather than knowledge.²⁴⁷

5.4.4 Portrayal of the Actors

It is to be expected that the antagonists in a conflict tend to hold each other responsible for undesired occurrences. They wish to present the preferred images of themselves as the "good party", and the other – their rival – as the "bad party" that is the cause of the problems. Since this aim cannot be achieved without one blaming the

²⁴⁷ McQuail, *MCT*, p.338.

other, it requires the distortion of the other's image and affects the presentation of him/her.

Since they have to deal with actors and their representatives, the sources, with agendas that frequently conflict each other, provide in turn conflicting accounts of the events to be reported. Therefore, both journalists and newspapers need a mechanism for judging the credibility and quality of the information delivered to them. A scrutiny of the presentation of the two main actors in the conflict over Jerusalem during the Camp David Peace Summit and the Second Intifada reveals a certain level of influence by Israel, particularly in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*.

Israel's preferred images were more open to question by the *Guardian* than by the other two newspapers. Moreover, the roles ascribed to the two rivals were not that static in the *Guardian*. Roles that can be shown as desirable or undesirable can demonize one party while enhancing the other, which results in the identification of the self with one party but against the other.

According to all three newspapers, the "diagnosed" cause of the failure of the Summit was the "unwillingness" of Arafat to make any concessions for peace as Barak had made "concessions". This refusal was singled out as the only barrier to the signing of the peace agreement. Moreover, the bone of contention was Jerusalem, and, more precisely, the holy places. It is argued that this method of describing the problem was a distortion of the reality of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In fact, the conflict over Jerusalem, despite its substantiality, constituted only one of a list of problems that needed to be solved before any workable peace formula could be achieved between the Palestinians and Israel.²⁴⁸ According to the Israeli government officials, the "likely effect" of the failure of the Summit was "violence".²⁴⁹ In the *Guardian*, however, other issues were included in the news, such as the refugee question.²⁵⁰

5.4.4.1 PORTRAYAL OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THEIR ROLE

²⁴⁸ Michael Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem*.

²⁴⁹ *Guardian* 22 July 2000.

²⁵⁰ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

Condemning the Palestinians and defining them as the “causal force” of the undesirable events, in addition to ignoring them as victims, necessarily affected their presentation in the newspapers.

The Palestinians continued to be characterized in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* as, at best, a “reluctant” group of people who did not like peace, which was how their leader, Arafat, was depicted during the Camp David negotiations.²⁵¹ At worst, they were represented as “rioters”, “protesters”, and possibly “terrorists” during the Second Intifada. In their coverage, both newspapers based their reports on the protest frame, the only one used ever since the Palestinians had begun to appear in the news during the First Intifada in 1987.

The *Guardian* was the only newspaper to report Israel holding Arafat responsible for the collapse of the negotiations as an Israeli accusation, rather than a matter of fact. Its news report was headed: “Barak Rushes to Blame Unyielding Arafat”.²⁵²

According to the *Daily Telegraph*’s news report during the Camp David Peace Summit – before it collapsed – the Palestinians were capable of committing bloodthirsty action and willing to do so:

Some Palestinian leaders were speaking openly about their desire to christen their state in blood. If Israel did not accept their state, they planned to send human waves to march on Jewish settlements built on occupied territory and challenge the army to fire on them.²⁵³

However, in the *Guardian* during the same period, both the Palestinians and the Israelis were presented in a similar manner. When the two parties were facing difficulty in reaching agreement over Jerusalem, the *Guardian* reported: “Both sides might be able to stave off these difficulties.”²⁵⁴ The *Guardian* was likely to use similar vocabulary for Barak and Arafat, such as “agree” and “goodwill”.²⁵⁵ Yet,

²⁵¹ This was the beginning of what turned out to be an official Israeli campaign against Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA). During the Intifada, the Israelis accused them of instigating the “violence” and using it as a political means to force Israel to make concessions. It was the first stage of demonizing Arafat, declaring the PA illegal, and describing the Palestinian Intifada, which was a form of resistance to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land, as mere “violence” and “terror” against Israeli “civilians”.

²⁵² *Guardian*, 26 July 2000: Goldenberg’s report on the failure of the Summit.

²⁵³ *Daily Telegraph*, 6 July 2000.

²⁵⁴ *Guardian*, 21 July 2000.

²⁵⁵ *Guardian*, 20 & 21 July 2000.

differences between the presentation of the two sides began to appear when the news was sourced mostly from Israeli and American officials.

Expressions such as “rock and petrol bomb throwers”, “militant”, “gunmen”, and “terrorists” were used to describe the Palestinians during the Second Intifada, though more often in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* than in the *Guardian*.²⁵⁶ In the first two newspapers, special emphasis was placed on the Palestinian discourse about “martyrdom”. Since a number of Palestinians, particularly the young, were being killed by Israeli troops, there was growing discussion of the Palestinians’ “wish” and “will” to die. *The Times* published a news story headed “Child Martyrs Graduate from Arafat’s School of Death”.²⁵⁷ Twenty days earlier the *Daily Telegraph* had published a similarly framed story. According to the caption, 68 Palestinians had been killed by the Israeli Defence Forces since the beginning of the Intifada a week earlier. The following sensational image was presented:

The broken, blooded and unwashed body of Muhammad Abu Aasi was borne through the streets of his village by a howling crowd. As the open box with her 13-year-old son’s remains approached, his mother sat surrounded by other women dressed in their black *chadors* and calmly announced that she was glad her son was dead.

The boy had died in clashes with Israeli soldiers at the Netzarim junction on Wednesday afternoon. If his family are to be believed, he had gone out of his way to get himself killed.²⁵⁸

This was the lead paragraph of the story. The killing of the Palestinians by the Israelis was used to prove the Palestinians’ “cruelty”, “brutality”, and their impulse for “self-destruction”. According to the *Daily Telegraph*, although the child had died, the Israelis had not killed him. The Israelis were depicted as genuinely different from the Palestinians, so no undesirable act should be ascribed to them:

Representation is crucial to the making of both difference and sameness. It is through all the different aspects of representation, including language, practice, performance and display, that we mark ourselves out as belonging. This is an everyday process, not only one which is part of macro-level exchange, for example, which differentiates between nations and cultures.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ *The Times*, 28 September 2000, 7 & 14 October 2000; *Daily Telegraph*, 13 October 2000.

²⁵⁷ *The Times*, 25 October 2000.

²⁵⁸ *Daily Telegraph*, 6 October 2000.

²⁵⁹ Woodward, *Understanding Identity*, p.75.

The mother's view and the assumed behaviour of the boy could be presented as a justification of the killing of the child by the IDF. By ignoring the boy as a victim with the argument that he wanted to die, and by glossing over the Israeli troops as killers with the use of the verb "died" instead of "killed", the framing of this piece of news emphasizes the responsibility of the Palestinians, the child himself, his mother and the value of martyrdom for the child's death. A presentation of this kind can make the killing of the child morally "defensible" and can therefore exonerate the Israeli troops of their guilt.²⁶⁰ According to Entman, agency "answers the question of exactly who did it – what causal force created the newsworthy act?"²⁶¹

5.4.4.2 PORTRAYAL OF THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR ROLE

Since its occupation of East Jerusalem, Israel had been consistently presented in the three newspapers under examination as the "good guys".²⁶² Its actions were never described as unfair or illegitimate. Indeed, its concerns were carefully considered and strongly represented. In addition, its official account of events was believed to be accurate, and so it was more likely to be transmitted.²⁶³

The *Guardian*, unlike *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, was the only newspaper that began to question Israel's measures as well as its account of the events being reported. However, the newspaper did not raise doubts about the legitimacy of Israeli action. A few days after the eruption of the Second Intifada, Brian Whitaker, currently the *Guardian*'s Foreign News editor, wrote an article criticizing Ariel Sharon's visit to al-Aqsa Mosque. The heading was: "Ariel Sharon: The Blood-stained Past that Inflames Palestinians: 'Super Hawk' Blamed for Sparking Battles

²⁶⁰ This story coincided with a campaign by the Israeli government to defend themselves against the accusation of killing small children. Their argument was that Palestinian mothers were sending their children to be killed. Indeed, the Palestinians were a group of people who wanted to be killed. Therefore, Israel was not guilty of killing them. The campaign was the result of international criticism of the IDF as the number of children being shot by them was increasing. The Israelis also stated that the Palestinians were pushing their children to "the front line" to attract the attention of the media while the TV crews were filming and the journalists were reporting the events. This statement was to emphasize the Palestinians' image as "deviant".

²⁶¹ Entman, "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News", p.11.

²⁶² See Chapters One, Two and Four of this thesis.

²⁶³ See Chapter Six, section (2) (under "Sources").

after Visit to Holy Shrine”.²⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the other two newspapers continued to condemn the Palestinians for the Intifada and the confrontations, which were presented as “bloodshed” and “violent” action.²⁶⁵ According to their account, the agent responsible was the Palestinians, for the Intifada was the “expected” outcome of the failure of the Camp David Peace Summit. This situation had arisen because the Palestinian leader was “reluctant” to make peace and incapable of being a peace partner by making “concessions” in line with his Israeli counterpart.²⁶⁶ During the Second Intifada, as in previous events, when members of the IDF killed Palestinians, the latter were held responsible, since the former’s action was presented as self-defence and the preservation of Israel’s security. Unlike that of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian*’s coverage of the Second Intifada tended to condemn Israel for the “unrest”:²⁶⁷ “Day of Rage Brings More Deaths: Storming of Muslim Site by Israeli Police Adds to Unrest”.²⁶⁸

The news about Prime Minister Barak’s compromise was presented with caution. Although it was included in the headline, it was placed between quotation marks: “Barak ‘Agrees Jerusalem Compromise’”. *The Times* carried the heading “Israel Accepts Compromise on Jerusalem”.²⁶⁹

When the action being reported was “desired”, expressions such as “acceptance”, “compromising for peace”, and “agreement” were part of the headline, which attributed these desirable actions to Israel by name.²⁷⁰ Yet when the action was “undesirable”, even though Israel was the actor, it was rarely mentioned in the headline. Therefore, when this happened, no actor was specified. The following two headlines from *The Times* exemplify this strategy: “Holy Site Stormed as 11 Die in a

²⁶⁴ *Guardian*, 3 October 2000.

²⁶⁵ For more discussion of this point see Chapter Three of this thesis.

²⁶⁶ Chapter Two; Chapter Five of this thesis.

²⁶⁷ There was some variation in the words used by the newspapers when referring to the Israelis and the Palestinians, according to the actor. This has been discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis.

²⁶⁸ *Guardian*, 7 October 2000. See also an article by Brian Whitaker in the *Guardian* of 3 October 2000.

²⁶⁹ *Guardian & The Times*, 21 July 2000.

²⁷⁰ *The Times*, 7 October 2000.

‘Day of Rage’”; “Israel Clashes Claim Third Child Victim”.²⁷¹ The victims are rarely named or even specified, except in a *Guardian* comment.²⁷²

However, the *Guardian* was more critical of Israeli action, and in its coverage, Israel was made to look less righteous. Different sets of terminology were used to describe the actions of the two parties, such as “violence” and “unrest”. However, in the three newspapers, the Palestinian civilian, adult or child, dies or is shot, whereas the Israeli soldier is murdered.²⁷³ Again, in all three newspapers, Islam, and Friday prayers in particular, were presented as a “threat” to Israel’s security and a source of violence.²⁷⁴ Israel, the Israeli police and the IDF were ignored as the “agency” of the negative “undesirable” events, for the grammatical construction of the headlines describing them was in the “passive”.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ *The Times*, 3 & 7 October 2000.

²⁷² *Guardian*, 4 October 2000.

²⁷³ Chapter Three, section (1&2) of this thesis; *Guardian*, 13 October 2000; *The Times*, 6 October 2000.

²⁷⁴ *Guardian*, 6 October 2000. See also, Chapter Three, section (2) of this thesis.

²⁷⁵ The passive voice was used in reference to the Israelis, as shown in Chapter Three, of this thesis.

Chapter Six

Forces in the Process of News Production

Introduction

This chapter covers the second stage of analysing aspects of news production in the British Press, namely, *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, particularly the reporting of news about Jerusalem and the conflict over the city from 1967 to 2000. It analyses many of the professional, individual and organizational factors that are believed to have influenced the ways in which news was reported in this area as well as the mainstream coverage of the conflict as described in Chapter Five.

The chapter investigates two of the main forces affecting news production: news selection and news framing. It consists of three sections: (1) a description of the roles of the interacting forces in the news selection; (2) an analysis of the forces affecting the framing of news; and (3) an overview of the factors affecting production, in particular, the shaping of news about Jerusalem.

News is believed to be a product of the interaction between various forces. These forces first define an event as “newsworthy”, and then influence its reconstruction as a publishable news item. Bell states that news can never be seen as the product of an individual effort:

The news is seldom a solo performance ... [T]here are many instances where production of a stretch of language involves a dozen or more people with different roles. News media offer the classic case of language produced by multiple parties. Journalists, editors, printers, news readers, [and] sound technicians ... are just some of the people who contribute to the publication or broadcast of a news story.¹

It is thought critical for rivals in a conflict to try to influence the news that is broadcast about them. Their aim cannot be achieved without gaining access to the news media and being given the opportunity to speak for themselves. Wolfsfeld asserts the vitality of access for the rivals having their messages distributed:

The news media have become the central arena for political debate in Western countries and those who hope to promote their ideas to the public

¹ Alan Bell, *The Language of News*, p.33.

have few alternative channels. It is the news media who determine who gets to speak and what is considered an appropriate form of argument It is a procrustean bed in which ideologies and positions must be reduced to slogans and sound bites.²

Chapters One, Two and Three describe the portrayal of Jerusalem and the conflict over it – which was subject to many variables – in an analysis of the news published about a range of events that took place there during the thirty-three year period. An analysis of the criteria applied to the selection of foreign news is particularly important for explaining the context in which the city was portrayed and the angles from which the events were described. One should also bear in mind the exclusion of events not considered newsworthy, though constituting a different context and therefore a different picture of the city had they been included. When examining a particular event, it is important first to answer the question of who is communicating with the newspapers about Jerusalem at the time of the event and at which stage of the conflict over the city.

Section 1 of this chapter examines the factors and forces generating the main trends in news selection, examples of which have been given in Chapter Five. The section tries to pinpoint the reasons for the decisions made concerning news selection, particularly the inclusion and exclusion of pieces of information, events and news stories in the newspaper reports. However, it does not investigate in detail the interaction of the forces determining the selection of each piece of news, focusing rather on the mainstream tendencies demonstrated in Chapter Five.

6.1 Forces in Determining News Selection

This section examines the possible influence of the journalists, news sources, news values and routines, and news organization practices and policy on the selection of news about Jerusalem during the period under study. In particular, it looks at several limitations and types of pressure applied to the journalists in their choices and decisions regarding the selection of news.

² Wolfsfeld, “The Varying Role of News Media”, p.6.

The empirical data in Chapters One to Four reveal an interesting interaction between the different factors that determine the selection of news about Jerusalem. The material does not pinpoint any single force as the sole influence. Rather, it reveals differences according to the degree of the influence exerted by each of the forces. These factors vary, depending on whether they are organizational, professional, ideological, personal or circumstantial.

This section investigates the relative power of each of these forces in influencing the news selection, and thereby the news agenda.³ In addition to Shoemaker's model of Gatekeeping,⁴ the study considers other examples of influential forces.

6.1.1 News Actor & Event

The news actor here is either of two types: (1) the élite individual, whose words and actions are considered "newsworthy". Examples are those in charge, such as national leaders, presidents, party leaders, as well as news experts and advisers, and, to some extent, government spokespersons. This is of course varies from one elite individual to another depending on whether we are talking about national or international media. Concerning the international news it varies even between presidents and countries leaders, as the President of the United States can achieve the higher proportion of coverage in the international media after the national leader in the country where the news organisation is. (2) The institutions whose actions and statements are regarded as news actors by the news media. According to Gans, news actors are news media "interviewees who appear on the air or who are quoted in articles, and those who only supply background information or story suggestions."⁵ The influence of news sources is discussed in a separate sub-section of this chapter.

It is believed that news actors influence the content of news. Their influence is attributed partly to their experience in manipulating the news media so that they can expect a favourable presentation of their actions, élite institutions, and countries and so avoid criticism. News actors use different methods to achieve their aim. Examples

³ Dearing & Rogers, *Agenda-Setting*.

⁴ Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*.

⁵ H.J. Gans, *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time* (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), p.80.

are (1) their experience in expressing themselves in “newsworthy” language and publishable statements; and (2) reproducing events in a way that makes them seem newsworthy to the media and therefore likely to be selected as news. McQuail emphasizes this aspect as follows:

At times [news] also has to be internally manufactured and constructed. Such a process of construction, like the selection of news, is not random and subjective. It takes place largely according to schemes of interpretation and of relevance, which are those of the bureaucratic institutions that either are sources of news or process events.⁶

News is, in theory, a “valid reflection of reality”;⁷ however, in practice, it might be seen as reflecting the priorities of the party with easier access to the news media with a particular news item, if not over a period of time. Hartley states that news reflects an intended picture of the event.⁸ Fowler also points out: “News...in the press is not self-defining. News is not ‘found’ [n]or even ‘gathered’ so much as made. It is a creation of a journalistic process, an artefact, a commodity even.”⁹ However, one could ask which of the parties in the conflict was the creator (event reproducer) of the news about Jerusalem. It could be argued that Israel was the main news actor both in June 1967 after annexing Arab land from Syria, Egypt and Jordan, including East Jerusalem, and during the events surrounding Israel’s formal annexation of East Jerusalem and the Camp David Summit II.

During these events, more precisely those of 1967 and 1980, Israel had the highest proportion of news reports of all the rivals, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Israel was the main actor or creator of the events concerning Jerusalem after the Six-Day War for two reasons. It was the victorious party, and so had the louder voice and greater access to the media because it was in control of the city itself, and the nature of its actions and measures after the war made it newsworthy.¹⁰ This becomes clear when one compares the proportion of news items published about Israel and this particular

⁶McQuail., *MCT*, p.279.

⁷ Ibid., p.286.

⁸ Harley., *Understanding News*.

⁹ Fowler., *Language in the News Media*, p. 13.

¹⁰ See Chapter One of this thesis.

event with those published about earlier events, especially the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque, which took Israel by surprise.

Fowler suggests that the “official authority” and “financial power” present “convenient sources” for the news media.¹¹ The greater the influence of a party, the more likely it is to be recognized by the news media and given easier access to them, and therefore quoted by them.

One of the basic and most influential tools to facilitate access to the media is “the initiation and control of events”. It is asserted that the initiator of a particularly newsworthy event is the one who “set[s] the media’s agenda” nationally and internationally.¹² This could be a very useful tool for analysing the type and level of access to the media which is given to each party, and which, in turn, affects each party’s level of control over events and over the presentations of events (see sections 6.1.3 and 6.2.3). This could be seen quite clearly after Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem following its victory in the Six-Day War. During that time Israel benefited from its high level of control over the events.¹³ In the following fortnight, the Israeli government carried out several actions and implemented a range of measures affecting East Jerusalem. These events brought Israel to the forefront of the news arena where the whole city was concerned. It is interesting – though it was predictable, according to Wolfsfeld’s thesis – to note that these events were presented in the newspapers in line with Israel’s terms as the initiator.¹⁴

It could be argued that, as a new authority, Israel acted as expected. It began by legitimizing its control over Jerusalem and invalidating that of Jordan, the previous authority. There are two possible reasons for this action: (1) Israel was trying to promote its image of a modern state, which would not be expected to invade and

¹¹ Fowler, *Language in the News Media*, p.22.

¹² Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East* (Cambridge, UK: 1997), p.125. The example here is the Palestinian Intifada 1987–1993. Israel’s main problem, as defined by the scholar, is “what should be done” about the media, which was discussed in the Knesset (see p.127).

¹³ See Chapter One of this thesis.

¹⁴ For more details about the implementation of the Israeli measures in Jerusalem, see Chapter One in this thesis.

occupy other people's land, so it re-created the situation by initiating bills;¹⁵ and (2) more importantly, it was emphasizing its existence as a legitimate power over East Jerusalem – specifically the Old City, where the holy places were situated – by justifying its control so as to eternalize it, and highlighting the relevance of Jewish history and the holy places.

It appears, therefore, that the religious framing of the news at that time would have provided Israel with the legitimacy required for its control over the city.¹⁶ The Israeli government's measures after the Six-Day War, which were reported in *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, support this argument. For instance, all three newspapers reported Israel's new law on the holy places. Moreover, they reported Israel's criticism of Jordan's policy, which had prevented the Jews from visiting their holy places in the areas under its control, including East Jerusalem, since 1948.¹⁷

It is arguable that, by generating newsworthy events, Israel was influencing the selection of news about the conflict over the city. Yet, during and after the Six-Day War, the attention of the international community was focused on East Jerusalem, particularly the holy places. The occupation of the Old City provoked an atmosphere of concern about the fate of the holy city. Israel was aware of this reaction and acted accordingly. Another factor is that the correspondents of the three newspapers – like others – were still in Jerusalem. They had been brought with Moshe Dayan on the eve of the occupation of the city to report Israel's celebration of its victory in front of the Western Wall.¹⁸ The celebration itself revealed much of the attitude of Israel's leaders, for one of Moshe Dayan's advisers commented on the event: “[Dayan] was a first-class public-relations man.”¹⁹

It has been argued: “There is a self-fulfilling effect from the location of reporters and equipment in particular places.” This means that the presence of a news

¹⁵ See Chapter One in this thesis.

¹⁶ See Chapter Five, section 5.4.6 in this thesis.

¹⁷ *The Times*, 10 June 1967, Diary; *Guardian*, 8 June 1967, p.1; 12 June 1967, p.1; 15 June 1967, p.9; 19 June 1967, p.9; 30 June 1967, p.1. See also, Chapter One, section 1.2.8 in this thesis for more examples.

¹⁸ BBC, *Fifty Years of Arab–Israeli Conflict*, Documentary (1997).

¹⁹ Ibid.

media correspondent in a specific place – or his/her absence from it – plays a major part in the decisions on news selection, since they depend on the available news of the day.²⁰ Yet, the correspondents' choices could have been limited. Their absence from Amman and the presence of three of them in Israel, particularly in the company of members of the Israeli government and the military, would have made it difficult for them to report any news about the Jordanian reaction to Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem and easier to report the celebrations and the implementation of Israeli measures.²¹ Moreover, the location of the correspondents reflects to some extent the priorities of the news organizations as well as their expectations.

News is essentially about "events", which suggests that initiating newsworthy events influences decisions on news selection by providing a limited set of choices. It can be argued that a source or party's awareness of what makes an event newsworthy increases the ability to produce newsworthy events and therefore the likelihood of their being selected and published in these newspapers.

It could be assumed that the official Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in August 1980 was in the first place a news event, in the sense that it could be viewed as having been deliberately engineered to publicize Israel's intention of maintaining its control over that area of the city. This argument is supported by the fact that Israel was then – and still is – seeking international recognition of Jerusalem, including the occupied East Jerusalem, as the Israeli capital. It is also supported by Israel's reported anger over the relocation of numerous embassies to and from the city.²² With the Bill of 1980 concerning Jerusalem, Israel succeeded in broadcasting the message of its claims to the city, thereby informing international public opinion of the Israeli view of the situation.

The timing of Ariel Sharon's heavily armed visit to al-Haram al-Sharif after the failure of the Camp David Summit II also appears to be an invitation to the news media, including photographers, to report the event. Since the visit was made during

²⁰ McQuail., *MCT*, p.278.

²¹ See Chapter One.

²² See Chapter Two in this thesis.

a period of extreme tension, there were numerous warnings of the possibility of an eruption of what was to be called a “new wave of violence”.²³ Moreover, the visit took place on Thursday, the eve of the Islamic Juma’a prayer at al-Aqsa Mosque, where most Palestinian Muslims preferred to pray.²⁴

Prince Fahd’s statement and President Sadat’s correspondence with Israel after the passing of the Israeli Bill on Jerusalem in August 1980 were seen as newsworthy because both of these public figures were élite people and therefore influential news actors.²⁵ One could go further and suggest that more action of this kind from the Arab and Muslim parties would have given them greater access to the three newspapers regarding Arab and Muslim claims to Jerusalem.

6.1.2 News Workers: Journalists

News workers comprise, on the one hand, the journalists in a news organization, including correspondents, editors and sub-editors, and, on the other hand, the outside communicators (sources). This sub-section discusses only the role of the journalists within the confines of the news media organization. The source as a communicator and news maker is covered in sub-section 6.1.4 of this chapter.

Many scholars consider journalists the first party responsible for decisions on news selection. It has been suggested that their personal ideologies, beliefs, values, ideas and attitudes in addition to their professional experience and convictions influence their decisions of what is and is not news, according to their judgement of what appeals to their newspapers’ readers and the level of their interest.²⁶

News workers, including correspondents, editors and sources personify the physical “gatekeepers” of the news messages. However, they represent different

²³ This possibility was suggested by Ehud Barak and many Israeli spokespersons, directly after the failure of the Summit, as the only option left for the Palestinians. The two possibilities suggested by Israel – and hence reported – were either a “Palestinian concession”, or a “new wave of violence” that was supposed to be the action of the Palestinians to “blackmail Israel” and push it to make more concessions.

²⁴ See Chapter Three in this thesis.

²⁵ This is consistent with the news value of an élite person’s actions. For further discussion of this point, see Chapter Six, section 6.1, and this chapter under News Values and Routines.

²⁶ Shoemaker & Reese., *Mediating the Message*, p. 53-84.

parties with, presumably, diverse agendas. The news source of a particular party presents and emphasizes the messages on behalf of his/her institution, whereas the news organization workers seek “newsworthy” messages on a different basis, that is, their professional, organizational and personal judgement.²⁷

One of the factors influencing news selection as well as news presentation or framing is the journalists’ assumption that their readers are not interested in international news. This view could result in fewer news reports on the conflict and encourage the tendency to report what is considered an “attractive” or appealing news story.²⁸ Richard Beeston, *The Times*’ Foreign News editor, pointed out that readers had had enough news reports on the conflict. This statement appears to support the general assumption.²⁹

However, Dearing & Rogers argue that “newspeople”, that is, journalists, do not necessarily know what interests their readers, for they “operate in a special kind of environment, without much contact with their audience members. So they take their clues about an issue’s priority from other media.”³⁰ The co-ordinated coverage of news between the three newspapers can be explained – according to Crouse – partly by the news workers’ “ever-present” need to “validate” their own news selection by bearing in mind what is reported by other journalists.³¹ Bernard Cohen suggests that this practice is particularly applicable to foreign correspondents.³² Dearing & Rogers go further in illustrating the “cross-checking” between journalists from different news organizations:

This is intermedia agenda-setting at work. In addition to daily cross-checking of each other’s news prioritization of stories, there is a high degree of similarity in professional values among national newspapers.... There is a high degree of job mobility in the news media. So, it is hardly surprising that national newspeople generally agree on the news value accorded to a particular issue.³³

²⁷ Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*, p.75.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.28.

²⁹ Interview, 27 May 2002. Richard Beeston was formerly *The Times*’ correspondent in Jerusalem between 1990 and 1993.

³⁰ Dearing & Rogers, *Agenda-Setting*, p.33.

³¹ T. Crouse (1972) in Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*, p.29.

³² Bernard Cohen (1963) in Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*, p.30

³³ Dearing & Rogers, *Agenda-Setting*, p.35.

Therefore, if an event was considered “newsworthy” by the correspondent of one newspaper and was subsequently reported, then, in most cases, the correspondents of the other two newspapers also reported it. This practice could explain the similarities between *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* in their inclusion and exclusion of events to be reported.³⁴

There was also a consensus among the correspondents in the three newspapers regarding events considered to be lacking news value (value-free) and therefore not selected for reporting. The repeated confiscation of Palestinian land and the construction of new Jewish settlements therein was a typical example.³⁵ Dearing & Rogers put forward the following reason for this type of consensus: “[The journalists] operate in a professional world inhabited mainly by news sources, public-relations specialists, and other journalists (Neuman et al., 1992, p.3)”.³⁶ These are the very people with whom the correspondents socialize.³⁷ Anton La Guardia of the *Daily Telegraph* supported the idea that British correspondents report events in a similar manner because they move around together most of the time in Jerusalem, as in many other areas abroad.³⁸

It could be concluded that this consensus in reporting and withholding news of events might, to some extent, stem from the argument that journalists “write primarily for themselves, for their editors, and for other journalists.”³⁹ In selecting news, “what professional journalists decide [is] most relevant” is one of the main concepts or criteria of “what counts as relevant” in the view of the journalists, and therefore considered for inclusion in a newspaper.⁴⁰

According to Shoemaker, the consensus among foreign correspondents in reporting news can be attributed to two influences: (1) the socialization experienced

³⁴ These similarities have been noted in Chapters One, Two and Three.

³⁵ For more details, see Chapter Four, section (1).

³⁶ Dearing & Rogers., *Agenda-Setting*, p. 33.

³⁷ Johnstone et al. (1972) in Shoemaker., *Gatekeeping*, p. 29.

³⁸ Interview, 28 May 2002.

³⁹ Shoemaker & Reese., *Mediating the Message*, p.96.

⁴⁰ McQuail., *MCT*, p.321.

by journalists in their news organizations; and (2) the news values as criteria for selecting foreign news.

Nevertheless, despite the apparent consensus described above, differences do sometimes exist, especially when there are no newsworthy events such as a violent public protest, war, or an official Israeli statement or action to be reported. During the reporting of news about the Camp David Summit II, Sam Kiley, unlike Suzanne Goldenberg, Alan Philips and Ohad Gozani, wrote in *The Times* about what he perceived to be a real division in many senses between East and West Jerusalem.⁴¹ Suzanne Goldenberg, unlike the Jerusalem correspondents for *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, reported news about a Palestinian family in one of the Bourij refugee camps in Gaza during the early days of the Second Intifada.⁴²

It could be argued that these differences are more likely to arise when there are no events considered newsworthy by all the journalists, since foreign correspondents are encouraged to generate news as long as they are located abroad. Moreover, these stories are reported only during a course of newsworthy events, such as the examples given above.

Sources can constitute a limitation to the journalists' selection of news on a particular day by emphasizing one aspect of the news over another. An example is the highlighting of Israel's security concerns by generating publishable material on the subject, which would make it more difficult for the other journalists to refuse to write about it.

News actors can assume the same role and manipulate the news agenda by producing statements on the conflict at a convenient time, which will be considered the news of the day. A typical example of this practice is Israel's statements during the 1980 crisis over Jerusalem after the passing by the Knesset of the Bill concerning the city. When President Sadat suspended the peace negotiations as a result, the Israeli government emphasized his action instead of discussing the reasons for the

⁴¹ See Chapter Three, section (1) in this thesis.

⁴² *Ibid.*, section (2).

suspension.⁴³ If President Sadat or any of the Arab leaders had been more experienced in managing the foreign media, there would have been more statements and emphasis on the legal aspect of the story and Israel's violation of the international stance on East Jerusalem as an occupied territory. Dearing & Rogers point out that any news agenda is limited, and that there are a large number of issues competing for a place on it. In addition, they describe the competitive nature of the proponents of various issues in their efforts to be included: "Agenda-setting can be a 'zero-sum game' because space and time on the media agenda are scarce resources."⁴⁴

6.1.3 Access to News:⁴⁵ Power and Legitimacy

The "struggle" over access to news media in every political conflict is seen as a "struggle over ... the international agenda."⁴⁶ It can be argued that the Press "may not be successful in telling its readers what to think, but ... [it] is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about ... (Van Ginneken, 1998: 87)."⁴⁷

For the rivals in a conflict, access to the news media is essentially about being heard. It is an opportunity to have a voice and to speak out for oneself, to put forward one's point of view, to communicate, emphasize and clarify one's claims, rights and argument.

Access by the parties concerned can be measured by comparing the total of the news items reported about each of them as well as by comparing the number of sources in each news story. It could be argued that the imbalance in the totals of news items indicates an imbalance in the access given to each party.⁴⁸

⁴³ See Chapter Two in this thesis.

⁴⁴ Dearing & Rogers., *Agenda-Setting*, p.3.

⁴⁵ As McQuail (2000) states: Access – in communication – "can refer either to the possibility for a sender to reach a chosen audience or for an audience to receive certain messages or channels. In practice it mainly relates to the degree of openness of media channels to a wide range of voices, especially those with little power or limited resources." (p.490) This study examines only that access that was given to the sender, although the latter part is significant as well.

⁴⁶ Wolfsfeld., *Media and Political Conflict*, p.13.

⁴⁷ Susan L. Carruthers, *The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.8.

⁴⁸ See Chapter Five. Section (1) in this thesis.

Israel had access to *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* throughout the period under examination. However, the Palestinians were unable to tell their story to the British broadsheet press until the First Palestinian Intifada erupted, twenty-three years after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem. Even then, Palestinian access was restricted to the *Guardian*, which published the running story of “al-Aqsa massacre” in 1990.⁴⁹ During all the events preceding that date, only Israel was given a voice in all three newspapers.⁵⁰ It could be argued that the protest by the Palestinians enabled their access not only to the British Press but also to many other news outlets.⁵¹

According to Wolfsfeld, Israel was given access to the British Press because of what it was considered to be – namely, a legitimate state – not because of its actions. Indeed, Israel’s control of Jerusalem was illegitimate according to various UN resolutions and in the eyes of the international community, for not a single country recognized it.⁵² The Palestinians were eventually given a voice in the British broadsheet Press because of their action – the Second Intifada – which was not considered legitimate. Therefore, the Palestinians were reported, not for what they were, but for what they did, namely, “deviant acts”.⁵³ It could be argued that they were given access to the Press only after they were considered a legitimate authority by Israel and the United States following the Oslo Accords. Noakes & Wilkins support this argument in their examination of the changes in framing the Palestinian Movement in *The New York Times* and the Associated Press between 1984 and 1998:

Our data suggest that the [Palestinian] threat to a culture and political ally of the USA [Israel] appears to have outweighed the movement’s lack of institutional legitimacy in determining the access that the Palestinians gained to the US news media during 1988–9.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ *Guardian*, 11 October 1990, p.1; 12 October 1990, p.8; 18 October 1990, p.1. However, the Palestinians were presented as a threat.

⁵⁰ As described in Chapters One to Four of this thesis.

⁵¹ Noakes & Wilkins., “Shifting Frames of the Palestinian Movement in the US News”, 655-6.

⁵² The United States was the only country to do so in October 2002.

⁵³ For further details, see under Israeli & Palestinian Tendencies, sub-sections 5.3.1.2 & 5.3.1.3. in this thesis.

⁵⁴ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, p.567.

The tendency to deprive the Palestinians of any means of presenting to the British Press their cause and claims to Jerusalem was accompanied by a routine access to the Israeli officials and institutions. Consequently, the access given to the rivals in the conflict was in favour of one party – Israel – at the expense of the other – the Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims and Christians.

One of the reasons given for this situation is the presumed official influence on the news media, where official sources constitute the main “routine channel” for the flow of news. Sigal’s study of *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post* shows that the US government was the source of half of the items reported in both newspapers.⁵⁵ However, this argument can be refuted by the fact that the level of news coverage of the Jordanian government was not as high as that of the Israeli government regarding either the same event or those which followed.⁵⁶ Here, the country’s characteristics formula seems to have been applied.⁵⁷ “[M]edia attention appeared to follow the emerging international legitimacy of Arafat and, by extension, the granting of quasi-statehood to Palestine.”⁵⁸ It is argued that this policy contradicts the basic criteria of “equality” for access to the news media. The principle of “equality” as a normative expectation in the performance of the news media has been described as follows:

In relation to communication and political power, equality requires that no special favour be given to power-holders and that access to the media should be given to contenders for office and, in general, to oppositional or deviant opinions, perspectives or claims.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, gaining access cannot guarantee a favourable presentation or further influence on the selection of news. It merely provides an opportunity for presenting one’s point of view and assertions concerning a particular issue, though this opportunity is more valuable to rivals in a conflict than to anyone else.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ L.V. Sigal (1973) in Shoemaker., *Gatekeeping*, p.20.

⁵⁶ See Chapter One of this thesis. Further discussion is included under Access and Sources, Chapter Six.

⁵⁷ Further discussion of the Press coverage of other Arab countries, including Jordan, is given in Chapter Five, section 5.3.1.4, “Inconsistency in Reporting the Arab Countries”.

⁵⁸ Noakes & Wilkins., “Shifting Frames”, p.659.

⁵⁹ McQuail., *MCT*, p.169.

⁶⁰ Wolfsfeld., *Media and Political Conflict*, p.13-30.

The expected consequence is a news story coloured with the priorities and concerns of one of the rivals. This kind of bias is necessarily at the expense of the other rivals in the conflict:

The political effect of this division between the accessed and the unaccessed hardly needs stating: an imbalance between the representation of the already privileged, on the one hand, and the already unprivileged, on the other, with the views of the official, the powerful and the rich being constantly invoked to legitimate the status quo.⁶¹

It is argued that the greater the access given to a particular country or group of people, the stronger the presentation of their point of view.

With regard to the conflict over Jerusalem, access was given and withheld over the thirty-three years to the main parties concerned: Israel, the Palestinians,⁶² many Arab and Muslim countries, as well as Europe, the United States and the supposedly neutral UN institutions. It should be noted that the Arab countries, particularly Jordan, could have been considered a rival in the conflict during the Six-Day War in June 1967 and afterwards,⁶³ up to the Arab Summit in Rabat on 28 October 1974,⁶⁴ and 1988. Fowler believes that the degree and frequency of access that is given to the parties concerned necessarily affects not only the choice of news, but also its discourse and framing: "So specific powerful institutions, frequently accessed ... provide the newspapers with modes of discourse which already encode the attitudes of a powerful élite."⁶⁵ Since these élite sources affect not only what is reported but also how it is reported, it is a "matter of form or style, and therefore, I would claim, of ideological perspective."⁶⁶

⁶¹ Fowler, *Language in the News Media*, p.22.

⁶² The term "Palestinians" is used to refer to the formal international representative of the Palestinian people. Before the Oslo Accord of 13 September 1993, the representative was the PLO, and then became the Palestinian Authority (PA).

⁶³ East Jerusalem was annexed from Jordan on 8 June 1967. For further details, see Chapter One of this thesis.

⁶⁴ At this Summit, the PLO was recognized by the Arab countries as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

⁶⁵ Fowler, *Language in the News Media*, p.22.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.23.

One of the main questions at the micro level here – that is, in each news story – is whether critical and alternative voices and narratives are also given access to news media organizations.⁶⁷ Other questions could also be asked about the parity given to the rivals, and which of them, or their sources, and hence claims occupy the headlines and the leading or first paragraph of a news item.

It could be argued that, where international news is concerned, the less the correspondents as “gatekeepers” know about a particular country and conflict, the less they are able to control the level of access to their home newspapers. Easier access and more space would be given to the more efficient and powerful party, where correspondents would find publishable material at “the right moment”. Consequently, correspondents here need an informed background to enable them to present explanations and interpretations, for they depend on what is provided by their sources, who are frequently advocates for one or other of the parties concerned. And *vice versa*, for the weaker party in the conflict will have less access to the newspapers’ readership.⁶⁸

It is interesting to note that the population of East Jerusalem was not given any access to the British broadsheet Press. The reason for this omission could be that a story about a population of ordinary citizens in a “distant” country had a “lower news value”: “[t]he more distant the nation, the higher the tendency to report élite action”.⁶⁹ Moreover, not only were ordinary people – “the population” – deprived of any access to the newspapers’ readership, but the events that affected them were not reported either, however they were done by an elite nation.

One could ask why the demolition of the Maghrebah Quarter in 1967 was not reported, since the action was carried out by élite “Israel”, it was “negative”, and therefore had two “news values” according to Galtung & Ruge’s thesis.⁷⁰ There are two possible explanations: either the correspondents did not know about it, or they were aware of the event but considered it value-free and therefore irrelevant.

⁶⁷ McQuail, *MCT*, pp.284–285.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.286.

⁶⁹ Galtung & Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News, p.277.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 267-70.

6.1.4 News Sources as a Force in News Selection

The source is an important factor in news production, that is, the flow of news as well as its selection. As a “communicator”, the source has an influence over the news content (“news selection”) as well as the news “frame”.⁷¹ Sources are also considered the first “gatekeeper” in the process. It is even argued that:

[T]he news agenda is in fact done by the media’s primary sources ... the political élite, fond of representing themselves as led by powerful mass media, actually tend to play a determining role in the communication process, as routine initiators of news stories and often as primary “definers” or “framers” of those stories (Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Bennet, 1990).⁷²

News sources can withhold as well as release a news story as a whole or in stages as bits and pieces of information.

Wolfsfeld states that it is not only the journalists who take the news criteria into account when putting their message across, but also the politicians.⁷³ This argument could explain the bias in the three newspapers’ selection of news about the conflict over Jerusalem. Both the correspondents and the newspapers were, to a certain extent, dependent on the Israeli diplomats and political leaders as official sources, a dependence that is professionally understood, though criticized.⁷⁴ For instance, it could explain, if not justify, the absence of news about the population of East Jerusalem.⁷⁵ It should be noted that there was less of this kind of dependence during the coverage of events in 2000 than in 1980. It could be argued that the difference was the result not of the increasing independence of the correspondents, but rather, of the shift that was made in the news media after the Intifada in December 1987 and the Oslo Accords in 1993 to consider the Palestinian account of the conflict.

As shown in Chapters One, Two and Three of this thesis, Israel was presented as the main source of news about Jerusalem for three of the four running stories under examination. Unlike during the Six-Day War of 1967, the Peace Summit at Camp David in 1980, and the Second Intifada, the Palestinians were now

⁷¹ See this chapter, section 6.2.4.

⁷² Carruthers, *The Media at War*, p.8.

⁷³ Wolfsfeld, “The Varying Role of News Media”, p.11.

⁷⁴ McQuail., *MCT*, pp. 287-91.

⁷⁵ See Chapter Five, section (2) of this thesis.

formally presented as a legitimate source of information concerning Jerusalem. As described in Chapter Three, the Palestinians were quoted more often during the Second Intifada than during the Peace Summit.⁷⁶ The news selection of the Peace Summit was overshadowed by Israel's point of view, particularly after "Barak's concession over Jerusalem", and so the American Administration's full support for Israel was presented instead.⁷⁷

The question of the PLO's presumed lack of legitimacy as the representative of the Palestinians could be the reason for the absence of news about them. However, this view cannot explain two other tendencies in the newspapers' selection of news about the conflict: (1) the lack of news coverage of both the Palestinians and the PLO even after UN recognition of the PLO by giving it observer status at the UNGA; and (2) the imbalance in the proportion of news published about Jerusalem between Israel, on the one hand, and the Arab states such as Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, on the other.⁷⁸ Jordan had formerly been considered the main rival for East Jerusalem until King Hussein's declaration of severing the connection between his country and the West Bank in 1988, following the Palestinian Intifada. Egypt was regarded as the leader of the Arab world, Saudi Arabia the representative of the Muslim world where the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem were concerned. Figure 5.3 shows that the selection of news about the Arab states was at its height during the "running story"⁷⁹ of the torching of al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969.⁸⁰

The predominance of Israeli sources of news over those of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular is due to the fact that Israel provides the needed "supply" of material for the news organizations.⁸¹ It facilitates the work of foreign correspondents in the country via the Government Press Office (GPO), which offers them many services.⁸²

⁷⁶ See Chapter Three of this thesis.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ These countries were considered rivals for East Jerusalem, since the conflict had been regarded as the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1967 to 1988.

⁷⁹ Gans, *Deciding What's New*, p.91.

⁸⁰ See Chapter Four, section (1).

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Including help at the personal and family levels.

1. The GPO offers daily translations of all major news items, features, and editorial columns in the Israeli Press, including material that is hostile to the government.⁸³
2. It is a distribution point for all the Press releases and official statements from government ministries, as well as providing access to a photographic bureau and a photo-archive.
3. The GPO has a “bleeper” system, which enables it to make rapid contact with accredited foreign correspondents to alert them to “upcoming stories”.⁸⁴

According to Ericson (1987), the GPO can be classified as “source media whose main activity is to supply journalists with what they are looking for on behalf of source organisations.”⁸⁵ Gans (1979) also suggests: “[T]he sources who are most successful in gaining access to (élite) news media are likely to be powerful, well resourced and well organised for supplying journalists with the kind of “news” they want at the right moment of time.”⁸⁶

According to Molotch & Lester, these sources are said to be “authoritative” and “efficient”, and so benefit from a “habitual access” to the news media. International news depends on the flow of information from the media organizations and news workers, who judge the newsworthiness of events as they take place and so become the “habitual sources”. It could be argued that the GPO might fall into the same category,⁸⁷ and therefore included as another factor influencing the news selection in favour of the Israeli sources, who are believed to be efficient and well resourced.

The level of power and the richness of resources on the Israeli side⁸⁸ are expected to be influential, particularly in comparison with the inferior situation of the Palestinians and their lack of experience with international media organizations such as those being examined in this thesis. The resulting imbalance and the

⁸³ This explains why Israeli sources are easier to contact.

⁸⁴ G. Mungham, “Israel: Fog Over Lebanon”, in Derek M. Mercer & K. Williams (eds), *The Fog of War: The Media on the Battlefield* (London: Heinemann, 1987), pp.264–266.

⁸⁵ McQuail, *McQuail’s MCT*, p.288. “Source media” here include Press conferences, Press releases, public relations, and other tools.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.289.

⁸⁷ McQuail, *McQuail’s MCT*, p.289.

⁸⁸ Mercer & Williams, *The Fog of War*, pp.264–266.

correspondents' dependency on the more efficient and "powerful" (Israeli) system⁸⁹ might develop into a "suppression or manipulation of information in the interest of certain actors or institutions", for they are expected to highlight and publicize news and events that support their claims.⁹⁰

While the news workers and correspondents look for a "suitable content" for news reports during assignments, Israel – or the GPO – looks for an "outlet in the news".⁹¹ Here it could be argued that Israel would guarantee that a high proportion of the news stories recommended by the GPO would make their way past the first "gatekeeper" and partly on Israel's terms. This procedure could explain many points in the news selection, such as the inclusion and exclusion of news about the conflict over Jerusalem up to the 1980s. After Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem, news reports in all three newspapers were praising its actions. The newspapers' reaction was the result of their dependence on Israeli sources concerning the state's measures in East Jerusalem.⁹²

An example was the demolition of the wall separating the East and West parts of Jerusalem on 29 June 1967. The event was presented in all three newspapers as a "further step" in Israel's "unification of the city of Jerusalem".⁹³ Furthermore, both the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* praised the mixing of Arabs and Jews as a consequence of Israel's action.⁹⁴ It was not surprising that this was typical of Israel's presentation of events following the 1967 war, for the state was seeking legitimacy for the recognition of its control over occupied Jerusalem.

At the time, the correspondents, as the first "gatekeeper" did not even take the trouble to ask other formal Arab sources or the city's population about their thoughts, fears and hopes regarding the new area under Israeli control as any objective reporter

⁸⁹ The term "power" is used in different senses, but it mainly refers to the level of finance and experience.

⁹⁰ McQuail, *MCT*, pp.289–290.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.287.

⁹² See Chapter One of this thesis.

⁹³ *The Times*; *Guardian*; and *Daily Telegraph*, 30 June 1967.

⁹⁴ See Chapter One, section (2&3), of this thesis.

would do.⁹⁵ This fact might be borne out by the proposition that news sources as well as the news workers have an influence on the content of “messages” – news reports in this case.⁹⁶ Consequently, Israel’s argument regarding its occupation of the city was not even challenged, for no other “voices” had access to the news media.

Power can be defined as understanding the procedure of news production, the news values and routines, and the action required to have one’s message broadcasted or printed. As Shoemaker & Reese point out:

Many of the same bureaucratic routines that are functional for the media organisation are also used by external sources for their advantage. Routines of newswork provide levers that power centres on the outside can grasp to influence content. Some metaphors, in fact, describe the press as strait-jacketed or handcuffed by its own routines. The more powerful sources can lead the press to adapt to their own bureaucratic structure and rhythms. Less advantaged sources must conform to the media routines, if they are to have any chance of getting into the news.⁹⁷

6.1.5 (Ideological) Professional Factors: News Values & Routines

This sub-section examines the influence of these factors on the news selection, in particular, the applicability of these routines and values to the inclusion and exclusion of news about Jerusalem in the three newspapers being studied. It analyses the influence of two major journalistic assumptions about the readership on the content of news, namely, the selection of news stories and the type and level of information about the conflict over the city: (1) the assumption that the readership is not interested in international news;⁹⁸ and (2) the assumption that it prefers material that is easy to consume.⁹⁹

The first assumption creates another assumption that the international news pages should provide “attractive” or “interesting” and “relevant” news for readers. The concept of news value “refers to the criteria of relevance and interest to the news

⁹⁵ Eric Silver and David Loshak were respectively the *Guardian*’s and the *Daily Telegraph*’s correspondents in Jerusalem during the Six Day War 1967. They are both believed to be Jews. One can assume that their personal belief may have affected their performance during that period.

⁹⁶ McQuail, *MCT*, p.287.

⁹⁷ Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*, p.112.

⁹⁸ S.D. Moeller, “Four Habits of International News Reporting” (USA, 1999) p.1.

⁹⁹ McQuail., *MCT*, pp. 337-47.

public.”¹⁰⁰ Stories about the conflict over Jerusalem are reported only when they fulfil the “news value” criteria for international news.

One of the results of the second assumption is a simplified presentation of events, which influences the content for it has a bearing on the selection of news about the conflict. According to Galtung, news values are based on cultural or ideological criteria that stem from the philosophy of individualism and materialism.¹⁰¹

As Chapter Five illustrates, news about the conflict over Jerusalem was predominantly negative, violent and dramatic. It concerned an “élite” nation (Israel) or “élite” people (political leaders).¹⁰² “News is often reports of what prominent people say about events rather than reports on the events themselves.”¹⁰³ Galtung suggests that negative news is more likely to be reported because it “satisfies” many criteria of “news values” such as: “frequency”; being “consensual and unambiguous”; and being “more consonant with at least some predominant images of our time”; in addition, negative news is “unexpected”.¹⁰⁴ According to this theory, there was no news about the population of East Jerusalem except when events were particularly “negative” and “dramatic”.¹⁰⁵ Examples are the confrontations over the Tunnel and the Second Intifada, when the newspapers published details of the deaths and injuries among the population as well as the congregation at al-Aqsa Mosque.¹⁰⁶

It is interesting to note that the study reveals a paradox in the functioning of the “mainstream” coverage of the conflict over the city. There is not always a clear reason for the selection, inclusion or exclusion of news, for many important events were not reported, such as Israel’s confiscation of Palestinian land, the construction of new Jewish settlements inside and around Jerusalem, and other changes. These events cannot be included in the schedule of Israel’s policies regarding the demo-

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.278.

¹⁰¹ McQuail, *MCT*, p.278.

¹⁰² For example, the Peace Summit II at Camp David in 2000, where the three newspapers concentrated on President Bill Clinton, Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat. See Chapter Three.

¹⁰³ McQuail, *MCT*, p.279.

¹⁰⁴ Galtung & Ruge, “Structuring and Selecting News”, pp.58–59.

¹⁰⁵ See Chapter Five, section (2) of this thesis.

¹⁰⁶ See Chapter Four of this thesis.

graphic question,¹⁰⁷ nor that of many other Israeli measures such as the progressive expansion of the city's boundaries.¹⁰⁸ Although many of these events had "human interest" (news value), were "frequent",¹⁰⁹ and "meaningful",¹¹⁰ and the opponents considered them to be important aspects of the conflict, they were not selected as news by any of the newspapers under examination.

The confiscation of Palestinian land, followed by the construction of Jewish settlements is an example of news that would have appealed to the readership, yet it was not reported nor even included in any news item.¹¹¹ It could be suggested that these events were not reported because there was no news correspondent in the area at the time. This argument is partly acceptable, for sometimes that was the situation. Nevertheless, at other times there were correspondents in either Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, who were contributing news stories, yet not a single sentence was included regarding the confiscation of land or the new settlements. It could also be argued that the correspondents might not have been aware of the significance of these events. This is possibly a valid explanation, though it raises the question of the type of background required for the correspondents. One could query the standard of the correspondents' performance and consequently the news reports about the conflict, which were published in all three newspapers.

It could be concluded, therefore, that the application of news values or news criteria affecting the selection of news about the conflict over Jerusalem resulted in an unbalanced presentation of the events.

The practice of validating news reports generally gives most weight to established authority and conventional wisdom. This is almost an inevitable form of bias in mainstream news media, but it can end up as a consistent ideological bias, concealed behind the mask of objectivity.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Dumper., *The Politics of Jerusalem*.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.3.

¹⁰⁹ "By the 'frequency' of an event we refer to the time-span needed for the event to unfold itself and acquire meaning", in Galtung & Ruge, "Structuring and Selecting News", p.53.

¹¹⁰ "Meaningful": "interpretable within the cultural framework of the listener or the reader". Ibid., p.54.

¹¹¹ For further details, see Chapter Four, section (1) of this thesis.

¹¹² McQuail, *MCT*, p.288.

6.1.6 News Organization, Routine, Budget & Ownership

6.1.6.1 NEWS ORGANIZATION, ROUTINE

These elements are seen as decisive in the Gatekeeping model according to Shoemaker.¹¹³ The main task of the news media organization is to generate news. With regard to international news, these organizations usually cover events in distant places. “Unlike almost all other forms of authorship or cultural creation, news-making cannot be done privately or even individually. The institution provides both the machinery for distribution and the guarantee of credibility and authority.”¹¹⁴ It seems, therefore, that the selection and framing of the content of the news as an organizational product is influenced “systematically and distinctively by organisational routines, practices and goals rather than either personal or ideological values”.¹¹⁵ McQuail points out that a news organization has a “systematic influence on [news] selection”,¹¹⁶ for the “fittest” event is most likely to be selected as news. “Aside from their intrinsic content, some events are more likely to become news than others, because they lend themselves to the formal procedures of gathering and processing.”¹¹⁷

It could be argued that these organizational considerations limit the selection of news about the conflict over Jerusalem as described in section 5.1 of this chapter.¹¹⁸ They could have been responsible for the overwhelmingly dramatic and negative reporting about the city and the lack of any discussion of the possible grounds for the conflict. “There appears to be a stable perception on the part of news decision-makers about what is likely to interest an audience and a good deal of consensus within the same social-cultural settings (Hetherington, 1985).”¹¹⁹

With regard to the collaboration between the three newspapers in their reporting of events about Jerusalem, McQuail makes the following statement:¹²⁰

¹¹³ Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*, pp. 53-59.

¹¹⁴ McQuail, *MCT*, p.337.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.245.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 277.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.278.

¹¹⁸ See Chapter Five of this thesis.

¹¹⁹ McQuail, *MCT*, pp.277-278.

¹²⁰ See Chapter Five, section (2)

The content of the news media tends consistently to follow a predictable pattern and that different organisations behave in a similar way when confronted by the same events and under equivalent conditions (Glasgow Media Group, 1976; McQuail, 1977; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991).¹²¹

The collaboration between the news media in this area can be explained in different ways. It could be influenced by the ideological and cultural frameworks of the three newspapers, or by professional beliefs and practices. Another explanation is the assumption that news values are the basis for a “subjective individual judgement”, particularly where international news is concerned.¹²² Nevertheless, many of these values could be classified as organizational criteria, which reported news is required to fulfil.¹²³

6.1.6.2 BUDGET

The news organization’s budget and priorities seem to be another factor that influences news selection. The scanty resources that news organizations devote to international news, owing to their belief in an uninterested readership, means that few correspondents are located in the area. This policy could have resulted in less attention being given to the conflict over Jerusalem during times of relative peace or a complete halt to hostilities, and so only dramatic news is reported.¹²⁴

6.1.6.3 OWNERSHIP

The diversity in the practice of power by the owners of the news organizations is supported by Shoemaker & Reese (1991), McQuail (2000), together with other scholars: “Of course, the ultimate organisation-level power lies with owners, who set policy and enforce it.”¹²⁵

¹²¹ McQuail, *MCT*, pp.277–278.

¹²² McQuail, *MCT*, p.278.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

¹²⁴ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, pp.655 & 658. The authors state: “Combined with the limited resources most US news media devote to international coverage, one of these restrictions was to reduce media attention to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in late 1989, when journalists were assigned to cover events in Eastern Europe.”

¹²⁵ Shoemaker & Reese., *Mediating the Message*, pp. 136–44.

Sam Kiley, *The Times*' correspondent in Jerusalem during the Camp David Peace Summit II and al-Aqsa Intifada, has stated that the newspaper's editors and journalists were scared of annoying its owner, Rupert Murdoch. This explains why many of his stories were excluded or terminologically changed. The newspaper is owned by News International, headed by Rupert Murdoch, who is said to be a friend of Ariel Sharon and to have investments and interests in Israel.¹²⁶

Knowing these details, and that Murdoch has invested heavily in Israel, *The Times*' Foreign Editor and other middle managers flew into hysterical terror every time a pro-Israel lobbying group wrote in with a quibble or complaint, and then usually took their side against their own correspondent – deleting words and phrases from the lexicon to rob its reporters of the ability to make sense of what was going on.¹²⁷

Although it could be argued that this example does not show a direct role by the owner of *The Times* in decision-making, he clearly has a certain amount of influence on the newspaper:

[T]here is an inevitable tendency for owners of news media to set broad lines of policy, which are likely to be followed by the editorial staff they employ. There may also be informal and indirect pressure on particular issues that matter to owners (for instance, relating to their other business interests) (Turow, 1994).¹²⁸

Sam Kiley presented a typical example during the Second Intifada, when he spent 24 hours with the Israeli soldiers of the military unit that was responsible for the killing of 11-year-old Muhammad al-Durrah.¹²⁹ He interviewed the soldiers to investigate this particular story, which, being so dramatic, received world-wide coverage. Then the editor asked the correspondent to remove the name of the child, which he refused to do. He wrote: "I was asked to file the piece 'without mentioning the dead kid'. After that conversation, I was left wordless, so I quit."¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Sam Kiley stated that this was the reason for his resignation in the summer of 2001.(Interview, 22 August 2002)

¹²⁷ Sam Kiley, "The Middle East's War of Words", August 2001. URL: www.gwb.com.au/2000/Israelnews.htm

¹²⁸ McQuail, *McQuail's MCT*, pp.269–270.

¹²⁹ Sam Kiley, interview, September 2001.

¹³⁰ Sam Kiley, "The Middle East's War of Words".

According to Pasadoes & Renfro, Murdoch's influence extends to the *New York Post*.¹³¹ "[The] amount of space devoted to visuals increased substantially" in the *Post* after it was purchased by Murdoch. Chapter Four describes a similar trend in *The Times* when it came under the ownership of the same person. There was a remarkable increase in the proportion of photographs published about the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1990 and the confrontations at the Tunnel in 1996, compared with previous events.¹³² However, this increase was common to the three newspapers under examination, which might reflect a new trend in greater visual coverage in the British Press or that the intense drama of the events increased their visual interest. A comparison of the proportion of visual material to the total items about these two events with the proportion of visual material to the total items published about similar dramatic events at a different time shows that the torching of al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969 refutes the latter argument. Although there was a similar increase in the proportion of visual material in 1969, it was even greater during the 1990s. In 1969 the proportion of visual material was 11 per cent, compared with 24 per cent and 30 per cent in 1990 and 1996 respectively.¹³³ Many scholars attribute this trend to the commercialization of the news.¹³⁴

According to many journalists, Conrad Black, the owner of the *Daily Telegraph*, and his wife have influenced the content of the newspaper's news reports.¹³⁵ However, the Middle Eastern Affairs editor, Anton La Guardia, contests this statement, asserting that the news reports in the British newspapers have usually been the same, with the exception of the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, which reported in favour of the Palestinians.¹³⁶ Conrad Black himself wrote an article in *The Spectator*¹³⁷ about the British media coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular, what he saw as a writer's bias against Israel in an earlier issue of the magazine.

¹³¹ Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*, p.72.

¹³² For further details, see Chapter Four, section (1) of this thesis.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, Table 4.1.

¹³⁴ Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*, p.72; McQuail., *MCT*, pp.105-7.

¹³⁵ Barbra Amiel, Conrad Black's wife, is known to be pro-Zionism. She has written many articles for various British newspapers in favour of Israel, and she supported the Israeli government's measures during the Intifada of al-Aqsa Mosque.

¹³⁶ Interview with Anton La Guardia, London: 27 May 2001.

¹³⁷ A British right-wing magazine owned by Conrad Black.

It could be said that this article shows that Black has no direct control over the material produced by the news organization owned by him. Nevertheless, it could be put forward as proof of a personal interest, which is likely to influence the journalists employed by him, and is the basis of an informal code of what is acceptable – in his view – regarding the reporting of news about the Arab–Israeli conflict. “Although news departments may be organizationally buffered from the larger firm, [as is true of *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*], content is still controlled indirectly through hiring and promotion practices and through self-censorship.”¹³⁸

It should also be noted that Conrad Black is the owner of the *Jerusalem Post* (1990–2000), a right-wing Israeli newspaper. Therefore the treatment and presentation of the Arab–Israeli conflict by the *Daily Telegraph* might influence his business relations with his clients, who are likely to be mainly Israeli in the *Jerusalem Post*. This interpretation is supported by the way in which such corporations give priority to profit.

The primary goal sought by media organisations is economic profit. News organizations, in particular, have faced a greater role in dictating journalistic decisions. The way organisations are structured influences content by affecting occupational culture and by determining the degree of independence media organizations have from the larger corporate enterprises, of which many are now a part.¹³⁹

Whether or not Rupert Murdoch or Conrad Black do have a personal influence, a certain level of control over the business interests is to be expected, according to McQuail. The influence is likely to be obvious and taken into consideration, if not by the *Daily Telegraph*’s and *The Times*’ correspondents, then certainly by the editors.

6.2 Forces in Determining News Framing

This section analyses the forces that contribute to the framing of the news about the conflict over Jerusalem during the period under examination. It discusses the level of influence by news workers, news sources (extra-media), news values, routines, and the news organizations’ considerations on the content of the news. The personal,

¹³⁸ Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*, p.144.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p.121.

professional, organizational, and circumstantial factors are covered, as well as the presentation of each rival's actions concerning the city.

The discussion includes the causes of the presence or absence of particular frames in the news. It highlights the connection between the perceived legitimacy of the rivals in the conflict and the access that they are granted to the media, the selective emphasis of religion, and the contextualization of newsworthy events concerning the city during periods of tension. The section considers the influence of each rival – the Palestinians, Israelis and other parties concerned in the framing of the news – as well as the factors governing it. “Framing is a way of giving some interpretation to isolated items of fact. It is almost unavoidable for journalists to do this and in so doing departing from pure ‘objectivity’ and introducing some (albeit unintended) bias.”¹⁴⁰

One of the most important aspects of the process is the contribution of each rival in giving a frame to the reported event by proposing a particular interpretation, the order in which the story is presented, and its contextualization. The news sources stand as a leading force in framing the news, particularly that from overseas, as McQuail states: “The more distant the events, the easier it is to achieve some consensual framing, since the sources of alternative views have less access and the audience is less personally involved.”¹⁴¹

6.2.1 News Actor and Event as a Force in News Framing

It is believed that news actors have a particular influence on the framing of the news. This influence can be seen the language that is used and the interpretation that is made to a given event. Tarrow (1994) argues that media actors “do as much if not more to control the construction of meaning than state or social actors”.¹⁴²

It could be argued that the Camp David Summit II was not a media event in itself, rather that the current Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, called for it to be arranged. However, the American President, Bill Clinton, thought that it was not a

¹⁴⁰ McQuail, *McQuail's MCT*, p.343.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.344.

¹⁴² Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, p.650.

suitable time for a summit, perhaps because it would not produce a useful result. The Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, was not enthusiastic about the idea, probably owing to the lack of any clear proposal or even agenda, in addition to other possible reasons. As a result of Israel's diplomatic moves, Clinton invited the two leaders to Camp David for a summit. Arafat was obliged to attend, though it was unlikely that he was well prepared. In contrast, Prime Minister Barak and his team, and probably Clinton, had prepared their agenda. Consequently, Barak and his spokespersons were acting, the United States was commenting, and the Palestinians were supposed to respond to the Israeli "offer" or "proposal". The sequence of the events at the summit could be interpreted as providing a ready frame for the news. Since Barak had originally called for the summit, he was therefore seen as making peaceful overtures, whereas Arafat did not respond. This situation was thoroughly exploited by all three newspapers in their reports about the summit ¹⁴³

It is interesting to note that Israeli officials in Israel had generated a considerable proportion of the news that was reported in the newspapers, although the negotiations were actually taking place in the United States. Wolfsfeld, in his analysis of the Israeli reporting of news about the summit, points out the following:

Interestingly, however, Barak's staff was already preparing for the day after Camp David. Many had significant doubts that the summit would end in success and thus a number of scenarios were developed to deal with possible outcomes. One of Barak's chief spokespersons talked about the public relations strategies that were prepared for the summit.

We prepared public relations [Hasbara] strategies for three scenarios: Scenario one: that there is an agreement that includes painful concessions on the one hand but tremendous achievements on the other. The second scenario was that there is an agreement but it is a partial agreement and it will have an additional stage of negotiations that will come. The third scenario is that the summit does not give birth to an agreement. Naturally each of these scenarios was possible and we built a strategy with each one. And in the end the result – because of our deployment during the summit – proved that while the summit failed politically, from a public relations perspective, Israel's position was the dominant position in the international, American, and national media. (Interview; August 8th, 2001).¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ See Chapter Three of this thesis.

¹⁴⁴ Gadi Wolfsfeld, "Mobilizing the News Media for the Other War on Terror: Norms, Routines, and Dilemmas for Israeli Journalists Covering the Second Intifada". Paper presented at the Harvard Symposium on *Restless Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism*, 8 August 2002, p.5.

Not unpredictably, the summit ended in failure, and the second scenario, described above, was put into action. All three newspapers in this study, as well as many other news outlets all over the world, reported that the summit had broken down over Jerusalem. Prime Minister Barak was presented as a peace initiator who made “compromises”, and Arafat was seen to be “reluctant” to make any sort of “concession”, so he was held responsible for the failure. Moreover, the alternative put forward by Israel’s spokespeople was a confrontation or “violence”.

6.2.2 News Workers (Journalists)

In addition to their role as judges of the content of the message to pass the gates of their news organizations, journalists, as communicators, also control its “frame”.

It should be noted that there are three aspects of the news about Jerusalem that have not been clearly defined in the news items or even in the commentaries in any of the newspapers.

1. The differentiation between the past and present identity of the holy places.
2. The connection of the Palestinians and the pre-Arab era on the one hand and Jerusalem and its holy places on the other.
3. The fact that Israel’s control of East Jerusalem, including the Old City, was illegal according to international law and classified as “occupation”.

As gatekeepers, both the news sources and the journalists – as “representatives of their media organisations” – are considered the dominant force in this model.¹⁴⁵ It could be assumed here that the news sources – unlike the journalists – represent their institutions, which might not necessarily be media organizations, although in some cases that might be so, such as the Government Press Office (GPO) (see section 6.1). The two categories of news workers are seen to have control over the content and frame of the news.¹⁴⁶ However, their control is limited, for although they enjoy a certain degree of independence in their work, there are also many factors influencing their decisions. For the news sources there are the goals of their institutions, besides reservations about releasing particular pieces of information, and the interests of the

¹⁴⁵ Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*, pp.33-41; McQuail, *MCT*, pp. 272-3.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

journalists. The journalists' performance, decisions and selection is constrained by various conditions, including the events (of the day), deadlines, budget, organizational routines, criteria, and other restrictions concerning the work environment.

It could be argued that there exists a mutual dependency between the sources and journalists.¹⁴⁷ Certain correspondents representing news organizations were criticized for not being objective in their news reports in the British Press about the conflict over Jerusalem. The criticism of Suzanne Goldenberg and Robert Fisk's news reports was stronger during the Intifada of al-Aqsa Mosque and was extended to their news organizations, that is, the *Guardian* and the *Independent* respectively, as well as to the BBC and others. The source of the criticism was not only the Israeli government as represented by its embassy in London, but also pro-Israeli groups and advocates within the British media circles as well as outside them.¹⁴⁸ "Self-censorship can be an extremely effective means of filtering out unpopular viewpoints."¹⁴⁹ Gans says that journalists try hard to be objective, although neither they nor anyone else can in the end proceed without values. Furthermore, reality judgements are never altogether divorced from values.¹⁵⁰

6.2.3 Access to News as a Force in News Framing

Sub-section 6.1.3 describes how a powerful rival is likely to have greater access to the news media and exert a strong influence on the selection of news. The power consists of authority, resources, the ability to produce newsworthy publishable material on time, besides a thorough understanding of the news routines and practices, and the ability to take them into consideration when dealing with the news media. It is believed that a powerful rival can affect not only the selection of news but also its framing: "Those who recognize and accommodate the ends of media

¹⁴⁷ Wolfsfeld, *Media and Political Conflict*.

¹⁴⁸ Dennis Sewell & John Pilger, "A Kosher Conspiracy", *New Statesman* (14 January 2002), pp.15–17.

¹⁴⁹ Wolfsfeld, "The Varying Role of the Media", p.16.

¹⁵⁰ Gans, *Deciding What's News*, p.40.

professionals and industries improve their chances of gaining media access and favourable coverage.”¹⁵¹

It could be said that the Israeli officials, as news actors and news sources, had easier access than the Palestinians to all three newspapers during the period under examination. An analysis of the published news items about various events over more than three decades reveals the influence of the Israeli officials on the frames, particularly the headlines, lead paragraphs, emphasis, priorities for discussion and the salience in the news.¹⁵² The Israeli domination resulted in a favourable presentation of the Israelis in most of the events under examination. An example was the description of Ehud Barak as a peace-lover at the Camp David Summit II. The first occasion when the Palestinians had access to the newspapers and were given an apparently good presentation – as shown by many studies – was the beginning of the Intifada.¹⁵³ This situation was brought to an end a few months later by the Israeli government, which restricted access by journalists to the West Bank. Thus, the journalists were obliged to resort to the narratives of the Israeli sources, which, in turn, changed the presentation of the Palestinians in the newspapers, as highlighted by Wolfsfeld (1997), and Noakes & Wilkins. According to the latter:

The Intifada, of course, was not the only change in the political context of the middle East. In the same way that changes in the Palestinian protests affected media frames, so did Israeli countermeasures. Griffin (1990), for example, established that journalists’ use of Israeli sources increased while their use of Palestinian sources decreased after the Israeli government restricted journalists’ access to the West Bank and Gaza in March 1988.¹⁵⁴

According to Noakes & Wilkins, the Palestinians’ access to the news media during the Intifada of December 1987 affected the framing of the news about them. The authors add that the preferred presentation of the Palestinians in turn provided the news media with interesting, dramatic and therefore newsworthy stories.

¹⁵¹ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, p.652.

¹⁵² According to Dearing & Rogers, *Agenda-Setting*, p.22, salience is “the degree to which an issue is perceived as relatively important.”

¹⁵³ Wolfsfeld., *Media and Political Conflict*, p.15-41; Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, pp.256-59.

¹⁵⁴ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, p.655.

6.2.4 Role of the News Sources in Framing the News

Hartley suggests that news is the “account” or “report” of an event, rather than the event itself. It is someone’s account of what has happened. That person – source in the first place – makes many decisions according to the account: basic choices (“selection”) in the account – including or excluding pieces of information; the sequence of the stages of the “event”; the actors, including who is responsible; the priorities and debatable points; and the salience. These decisions are the basis of the initial “frame” of the news reports, which is said to be formulated by the news source.¹⁵⁵ “[P]owerful groups are consistently able to articulate their preferred frames in media discourse, thus preventing the collective action frames of challenging groups from gaining a media voice.”¹⁵⁶

News sources shape the first frame of the news by presenting it in various ways, choosing the terminology, and providing explanations, meanings and context for the events. Quoting the sources is one way of presenting the news in an already “built-up frame”. One example was the newspapers’ reports of the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, which was described as the “unification” of the city. Moreover, much of the terminology was used in lead paragraphs in the news reports, with quotations from official Israeli statements and spokespersons, such as the headline about the Israeli legislation covering the holy places: “Israel Guarantee on Worship”.¹⁵⁷ In this news story, which was framed in the same way in all three newspapers, the problem, according to Israel, was that the Jews were prevented from visiting their holy places in East Jerusalem. The same frame suggested that Jordan, as the authority in control, was responsible for this situation. Consequently, the proposed solution was for Israel to pass legislation to provide free access to the holy places for the followers of the three monotheistic religions. There was no explanation of the position of Jordan, which was at war with Israel, nor was there any reference to the question of whether the Christian Palestinians had access to their holy places in Nazareth, for example, where Israel was in control.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ This point is discussed under “Sources”: see this section below.

¹⁵⁶ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, p.451.

¹⁵⁷ *The Times*, 10 June 1967.

¹⁵⁸ See Chapter One of this thesis.

Ariel Sharon's visit to al-Aqsa Mosque provided the news media with an opportunity for good "visuals" (photographs), as well as an interesting story. An Israeli political leader, supported by a numerous and heavily armed guard, entered a beautiful and ancient mosque, which the followers of two religions believe to be the site of one of their holiest places.¹⁵⁹

Israel's tendency to create newsworthy events, and to publish statements and Press releases matched the news organizations' need to generate news. This would have presumably resulted in the news organizations asking for further details about an event and thus guarantee access for various news sources to the news outlets. One possible result was that Israel was the creator or initiator of an event, which gave its sources an advantage over the Palestinians, for the stories and details were already prepared. McQuail states: "When information is supplied to news media by sources (as much often is), then it often arrives with a built-in frame that suits the purpose of the source and is unlikely to be purely objective."¹⁶⁰

The framing of the news could be influenced by the sources in different ways, such as mentioning or withholding pieces of information, implying an association by recalling another occasion of a similar event, emphasizing a particular piece of information, and determining the lead of the news story. The fact that the official Israeli sources of news, including politicians and institutions, are more widely recognized, indicates that Israel dominates the supply and framing of news concerning Jerusalem. "The media are 'structurally dependent upon dominant power institutions both for definitions of problems and for information' (Olien et al., 1989: 198)."¹⁶¹

6.2.5 News Values and Routines

It is argued that the news values themselves influence the framing of the news, for these features are likely to be emphasized to produce a more interesting news story.

¹⁵⁹ For the Jews, this is the site of the Temple Mount; it is also the site of al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.

¹⁶⁰ McQuail, *McQuail's MCT*, p.343.

¹⁶¹ Noakes & Wilkins, "Shifting Frames", p.451.

It is worth noting here that the assumption by the news media workers (that is, journalists, including correspondents and editors) that their readership is not interested in international news¹⁶² did affect the news selection and frames about the conflict over Jerusalem.

The tendency of the news organizations to report only those events which fit the criteria means that there was much that was not reported in the international domain, despite its significance and relevance to the overall picture of the conflict. Moreover, it indicated a greater dependency on the government officials, who, consequently, gained the advantage of better access to the news media as well as a limit to the range of possible interpretations.

Journalists, for example, have multiple incentives to use government officials as sources of stories, including the prestige they add to a story, their assumed objectivity, and their ready availability in the time-sensitive cycle of news production (McLeod and Hertzog, 1998). Thus they tend to rely on government officials as sources of information on protests and protesters (Fishman, 1980; Paletz and Entman, 1981; Sigal, 1973; Soley, 1992). This frequent invitation to comment and the ease with which the activities and statements of state officials “make news” – both elusive perquisites for most social movements – give greater volume and ubiquity to official interpretations of events.¹⁶³

Fowler’s argument that news selection entails “an ideological act of interpretation” seems to be valid here, and hence news about Jerusalem was not reported except where there was a clear frame into which to place the event. Examples were confrontations (violence), negotiations (peace), threat (oil, holy war, the interests of the United States and Europe in the Middle East), democracy (Israeli politics), and so on.¹⁶⁴

The high level of attention that was concentrated on dramatic events might have made it more difficult for journalists reporting on Jerusalem to discuss or report relevant news stories that lacked this characteristic, such as the confiscation of Palestinian land by the Israelis.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, such marked attention could have influenced

¹⁶² Moeller, *Four Habits*, p.1.

¹⁶³ Noakes & Wilkins, “Shifting Frames”, pp.651–652.

¹⁶⁴ Fowler, *Language in the News Media*, p.19.

¹⁶⁵ See ChapterFive, section (2) in this thesis.

the framing by emphasizing the drama of the event as well as dramatizing other events with visual or descriptive material.

A caption for a photograph of Arafat in the *Daily Telegraph*'s report of the Oslo Accords in 1993 said: "Armed Yasser Arafat leaves Tunis: The gun had vanished when he reached the US".¹⁶⁶ The headline of the news report was "Seven Die on Eve of Israel Peace Signing".¹⁶⁷

One of the news values on which the rating of newsworthiness is based is "unambiguity".¹⁶⁸ Clarity is sometimes interpreted as one-dimensionality, the requirement for a clearly-defined problem, specific causes, and a particular suggestion for the remedy. Negative events and consequences related to the conflict over Jerusalem, such as the failure of the peace negotiations, the eruption of violence, or even a political crisis, required the diagnosis of what had happened, which in turn

indicated a specific individual or party that was responsible. This news value was more applicable to the events concerning the conflict over Jerusalem than to most of the other reported news, for various factors, like politics, religion, history and security, have a role here. "Clarity in this connection must refer to some kind of one-dimensionality, that there is only one or a limited number of meanings in what is received."¹⁶⁹ "Unambiguity" appears to be the main cause of the simplification of the news reports and is also related to their personification.¹⁷⁰

6.2.6 News Organization: Budget, Priorities, Routines, Ownership and Editorial Policies

According to Shoemaker & Reese, news organizations "hire, fire and promote workers and pay their salaries."¹⁷¹ This view indicates that when a news organization recruits journalists, it takes into account the degree of harmony between the appli-

¹⁶⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 13 September 1993, p.1.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Galtung & Ruge, "Structuring and Selecting News", p.54.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p.54.

¹⁷⁰ Personification is discussed in Chapter Five, section 5.3.1 of this thesis.

¹⁷¹ Shoemaker & Reese, *Mediating the Message*, p.115.

cants and the organization's editorial staff in terms of ideology. The news organization states that it has the right to promote or dismiss journalists, who are presumably aware of and possibly influenced by this fact. The promotion or dismissal of journalists depends partly on their performance. Their awareness of the situation may result in a performance that is influenced by their employers' policies and interests if they want to be promoted or even remain in the employment of the organization. Another way of influencing the news content is the space devoted to the item and the timing of its publication.

In addition, news organizations can restrict the number of events that can be reported in a day by locating correspondents in particular places and guiding their search for news stories. The stationing of correspondents in Israel could be interpreted as an organizational restriction of the frames by limiting the possible news sources available to the correspondents. A news organization's budget for international news also controls the selection and framing of news by limiting the sources and number of correspondents as well as the latter's freedom of movement in the region.

The competencies described above, in addition to others, are the reason why many scholars believe in the power of the news organizations over their journalists in the selection of the news of the day and, to a certain extent, its presentation.

The commercial goal of the news organizations is stated as the main force behind several news norms, routines, and practices that affect the framing of the news.¹⁷² In the view of numerous scholars, this tendency of the news organization "to sell", besides the highly competitive atmosphere and the increase in their concern about "profit", affects many aspects of framing. The result of these commercial concerns is said to be the "tabloidization" of the broadsheet newspapers.¹⁷³ One of the possible effects is the "episodic" rather than the "thematic" framing of the news.¹⁷⁴ According to Noakes & Wilkins, "Episodic frames focus on specific events, such as individual acts of violence, and tend to attribute responsibility to individuals. Thematic frames,

¹⁷² McQuail., *MCT*, p. 23.

¹⁷³ McQuail uses the terms "tabloidization" to refer to the smaller and popular newspapers such as *The Sun* and the *Daily Mail* in Britain.

¹⁷⁴ Noakes & Wilkins, "Shifting Frames", p.652.

in contrast, include the social and historical conditions in which events occur (Gamson et al., 1982).”¹⁷⁵ They add that “episodically” framing an event “obscures [the] broader issues underlying the collective action the movement hopes to promote.”¹⁷⁶ The “personalisation”, “dramatisation”, “trivialisation” and the general tendency of the news media to generate “vivid”, rather than “pallid”, news stories is also considered to be the effects of commercialism and the pursuit of profit.¹⁷⁷

It could be argued that the profit motive reduces the presentation or the framing of the news. The dramatization, personalization and episodic framing of the news are based on the minimum of necessary information in a news story, any excess being considered irrelevant, ambiguous or pallid with regard to the frame being used. This may result in reducing the number of possible interpretations of the news almost to one. It could explain the absence of “pallid” news, such as that of many of the UN resolutions concerning Jerusalem, which were considered “pallid” until Israel reacted to them. According to this logic, the occupation could be seen as abstract. Therefore, if it were to be reported, then it should be in terms of the action taken by the Israeli soldiers or the Palestinians. An event or accident had to be considered dramatic to be “vivid”, since neither side contained elite individuals. This line of thinking reduced the choice of events that could be reported as well as the possible news frames. The events were chosen according to their ability to fit into already constructed frames. The framing itself was controlled by routines and values, which could result in the decontextualization of the event and constraints on any interpretations other than those presented.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter argues that no single factor can explain how the news about the conflict over Jerusalem was reported. It should be noted that Israel’s version of the events – those which were reported in the news – was predominant in the newspapers under examination. Although the dominance of the official Israeli view could be seen as

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 652.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 659.

¹⁷⁷ McQuail., *MCT*, pp. 105-7

sheer bias, it was based on a variety of professional, organizational and circumstantial factors. Many of these factors were journalistic, whereas others were related to the journalists' working conditions, the nature of the conflict over the city or the parties concerned.

This chapter emphasizes the control by the official institutions and sources over the content of the reports by influencing both the selection and framing of the news about a particular event. This control was based on two advantages: (1) previous experience and knowledge of news production: how to produce a publishable newsworthy piece of news and how to publicize particular events; and (2) access to the news media. The fact that the sources were official meant that they were considered by the news workers to be more trustworthy and were therefore recommended by the news media. This in turn entitled the official sources to access the newspapers and therefore to present their version of the events. The result was a more favourable presentation in the news media of their point of view and greater emphasis on their priorities.

The researcher thinks that the favourable presentation of Israel, its leaders and their actions in the British Press was partly due to the institutionalized efficiency of Israel in dealing with the news media, and to its trained and experienced apparatus. The Israeli institutions, officials and spokespersons had made life easier for the foreign media in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Moreover, the vagueness of the Palestinian point of view and the lack of reports on its version of events in the newspapers under examination were partly due to the predominance and efficiency of Israel's apparatus as well as the lack of equally efficient institutions and trained, skilled and experienced professionals on the Palestinian side.

It could be said that the training and experience of the Israeli apparatus constituted a kind of power over the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular. The efficiency of this apparatus seemed to be the main reason for the well-presented Israeli point of view in addition to the favourable impression of Israel given by the newspapers. The dynamics of news reporting apparently supported the *status quo* by

giving the powerful party an advantage over the weak. This is not to suggest a clear-cut bias, but rather an analysis of the requirements for gaining access and therefore a favourable presentation in the news outlets.

Conclusion

This thesis has investigated the presentation of Jerusalem in the British broadsheet Press between 1967 and 2000, namely, *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*. The presentation consisted mainly of news reports about the conflict over the city. Jerusalem was considered newsworthy only when it was the subject of a political crisis, peace negotiations, or confrontations. In other words, Jerusalem appears in the news when a relevant dramatic event coincides with the interests of one of the actors in bringing the city to public attention. This fact has been quantitatively indicated in Chapter Four of this thesis.

The content analysis of the news in the three selected newspapers has demonstrated a degree of consistency among them in the presentation of the city. Generally speaking, this situation is believed to exist over time and across the Press. In this case, it characterizes the news in all three newspapers from the occupation of East Jerusalem in June 1967 to the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000.¹

The inclusion of one narrative is, unavoidably, at the expense of others. The presentation, prominence and repetition of Israel's official narrative concerning the city and the conflict reduces the possibility of the Palestinians' narrative being given the same treatment, for the latter contradicted what has already been established as the reality of the city, the conflict and the actors.

The empirical data has revealed that the priorities of one of the actors in the news, presentation of the city and the claims over it dominated those of the others. As suggested by the content analysis of the news items in the three newspapers, Israel is presented as the main actor in the reports as well as in other verbal and visual material. Clearly, since the Palestinians are almost absent from the news and the discussions in the newspapers until the 1990s, they are not presented as an actor. In addition, Israel is given greater prominence than the Arabs, Muslims, Christians, and

¹ See Chapter Five, section 5.1 for a discussion of these characteristics.

the international community concerning Jerusalem for the same period, and even more than the United Nations and other international actors. Consequently, it was represented in the newspapers as the official voice of the city. That is why the Israeli account is the basis of the published view of not only the city but also the Palestinian population and, to some extent, the Arabs. This has been clearly verified both quantitatively in Chapter Four and qualitatively in Chapters One, Two and Three. Nevertheless, variation could occur during the period under examination and across newspapers.

The selection of news affects the framing of news. The inclusion in the three newspapers of Israeli-promoted news to the exclusion of that from other sources resulted in reports largely based on the contributions of Israeli officials – with the inevitable Israeli bias. News reports on Jerusalem, the conflict over the city, and the Palestinians drew heavily on the language, vocabulary, interpretation, justifications, comments and expectation of the politicians,² and were therefore strongly coloured by the official Israeli view. Moreover, the lack of news coverage of the Palestinians, in particular, and action by the Arabs concerning the city meant that there is no alternative interpretation of events. The absence of any reports on the occupation of East Jerusalem and any legal framing of the news indicated that there were no grounds for the action taken by the Palestinians. Moreover, the religious framing of Jerusalem and Israel as the Jewish state helped Israel's public image and treatment of the city and its residents in 1967, 1980 and afterwards. This manoeuvre emphasizes the connection between the state and the holy city and gives the Israeli claims the appearance of a rational and even a legitimate and acceptable basis. The absence of the frame of occupation prevents the protest of the Palestinians from being seen as a reaction to the injustice that they are suffering. News about Jerusalem either did not represent clearly the complexity of the issues constituting the essence of the city or it was contextualized with other aspects of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, such as the return of the refugees, water supply, borders and Jewish settlements. Not surprisingly, this method of reporting news could not give a true picture of the different dimensions of the conflict.

² As shown in Chapters One, Two and Four.

This presentation of Jerusalem may be interpreted as a contradiction of the journalistic principle of objectivity, which is the essential criterion for evaluating news and on which the news organizations and personnel believe they base their judgement. It is normal practice for a news organization in reporting a particular conflict to deal with different actors, who are expected to promote conflicting messages, interests and claims. These actors are said to be struggling for a prominent place on the international news agenda. Therefore, a journalist is likely to be faced with two or more conflicting interpretations and messages of the same event, and so an objective report should reflect that situation.

Objectivity in this sense means that, in theory, a news report should give a balanced account of the event without favouring a particular actor. Any prominence or overrepresentation of a party and its messages in a conflict would be given at the expense of the other party's version. This principle is also applicable in reverse. Any underrepresentation of an actor's claims is believed to mean indirect support for the claims of the opposing party.

Because Jerusalem is presented via dramatic, personalized or promoted events based on religious legitimacy, religion presented as a threat, symbolized the city and restricted it to the holy places. This method of reporting prevents any realistic and rational discussion of the city, its citizens, the conflict over it and the actors' behaviour.

The fact that for a long time the Palestinians have been recognized and introduced as Arabs obscures their claim to East Jerusalem, which was presented as a Jewish holy city. The promotion of the Jewish identity of Jerusalem by all three newspapers since the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 had prevented the recognition and presentation of the Arab Muslim and Christian identity of the city.³ In addition to presenting its religious character, the Israelis began to emphasize religion itself after 1967 as a means of legitimizing their control over the city and its Arab Muslim and Christian majority. This kind of portrayal made it more difficult for the newspapers

³ As demonstrated in Chapter Five, section 5.3.

to consider and contextualize the Palestinian claims and position during the Camp David Peace Summit II and the Second Intifada to be partly based on national identity rather than solely on a religious connection.

Shifts in the selection and framing of news about Jerusalem do take place during three stages of the period under examination. The first phase is when the Palestinians are not recognized nor legitimized, that is, up to the First Intifada in 1987. During this phase, the Palestinians are completely absent from the international arena except as “terrorists” and “trouble-makers”. The situation is the result of the hegemony of Israel’s official narrative about the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, after its occupation of these areas in the summer of 1967, in addition to the actions carried out by the Palestinians during the 1970s. In this case, the Palestinians are deprived of any presentation in the broadsheet news media not only in Britain but also in the United States and other countries.⁴ Moreover, they are denied access of any kind to these news outlets.

The second phase is marked by the First Intifada of 1987. This is the first time that the Palestinians are mentioned by name and given access to the Western non-Muslim/Arab news media.⁵ This can be seen from the examination in this thesis of the first event after the First Intifada, that is, the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque in October 1990.⁶

The Oslo Accords marks the beginning and basis of the third phase. After being recognized by the United States and Israel at the Oslo Accords, the Palestinians, especially the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA), begins to be regarded as a legitimate actor capable of representing their people, which gives them greater access to the broadsheet news media. During this phase, however, although the PA has a voice, there is still no questioning in the newspapers of Israel’s actions. In particular,

⁴ Noakes & Wilkins., “Shifting Frames”, p. 654.

⁵ This fact is supported by Gilboa (1993) and Said (1994), as cited in Noakes & Wilkins., “Shifting Frames”, p. 654.

⁶ The number and proportion of items with headlines referring to Palestinians and Arabs is an indication of this shift, particularly if these numbers are compared with similar statistics of previous events.

Israel's actions are never framed and contextualized according to the UN resolutions or the wishes of the international community.⁷

According to the empirical data (quantitative analysis), the only dramatic change during the second phase is that the Palestinians are given a name and identity, that is, they are now distinguished as Palestinians rather than Arabs in the news.⁸ However, there is still no connection made between them and Jerusalem. Moreover, Israel's official account of the situation continues to dominate the news of the city, Israeli priorities and agenda, and therefore the representations of the Palestinians, for Israeli sources are considered by the Press to be the "accredited sources".

These variations in the presentation can be seen in the newspapers' coverage of the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque in 1990, the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000 and the Second Intifada in September of that year. It is only during the latter two events that marked differences begin to appear in the newspapers' portrayal of Jerusalem and the conflict over the city. More attention begins to be given to the Palestinian point of view, particularly in the *Guardian*. This is the only newspaper, however, to question Israel's actions.⁹

The trend in the unbalanced representation of Jerusalem, the conflict and the actors by the newspapers under examination could be due to the interaction of a range of forces and circumstances. Various arguments have been applied to empirical data to explain both the consistencies (including selection and framing) and the dynamics of change in the representation.

At the micro level, the thesis has proved that professional ideology and organizational policy as well as other factors influence the news content. This

⁷ Other political international and regional contexts can be regarded as dynamics in the shifts of the presentations. One example is the Second Gulf War, which can be seen as the reason for the quantitatively high proportion of presentations of the Arabs as an actor in the conflict over Jerusalem. However, the influence of this event on the presentation of the city and the parties concerned is not examined in this study. Indeed, the degree of influence imposed by the regional context and by other regional and international events and circumstances during the period under examination should be fully investigated.

⁸ Israel's influence on the reference to the Palestinians as "Arabs" can be seen in a comparison of the news items with the editorials. One example was in *The Times* and the *Guardian's* editorials during the political crisis of 1980, in which the name "Palestinians" was used, in contrast with the use of the description "Arabs" in the news stories.

⁹ See Chapter Four and Chapter 5, section 5.3.

contrast with objectivity is partly systematic rather than a deliberate aim in itself. It is the outcome of the routinization of news production and the transformation of news into a commercial commodity.

This study has given examples of these forces. Yet a deeper and more detailed investigation into the influence of other factors is required, specifically that of the routinization and standardization of news, the professional ideology of the journalists and the policies of the news organizations. Other significant factors are not discussed in this study due to their complexities and delicate nature and because the study concentrates more on operative criteria. One of these factors is the cultural dimension of the news. In other words, the influence of the culture in which news is produced on the news content concerning the conflict over Jerusalem. It could be argued that Britain as part of Europe shares the European legacy of guilt towards the Jews as a result of the Holocaust and the European attitude of over-compensating the state of Israel for that. These attitudes might be seen to have an influence on the ways in which news about Israel is now presented.

Chapter Five has shown how a large proportion of items about Jerusalem is concentrated around the times of dramatic events, tension and violence. It also illustrates the effect of élite-centred and drama-centred news values on the news content and the presentation of the city and the actors. Meanwhile, the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem were – and are still – omitted from the news and the commentaries because they are ordinary people, not the élite, and because their representatives have been delegitimized.

The news values and routines limit the choice of events to be selected as news and so prevent a fully illustrative and representative discussion of the conflict in the newspapers. Although the tendency to report only dramatized and personalized news stories help to decontextualize the events selected, nevertheless it do bring about an increase in the number of news items published about the city during the 1990s.¹⁰ The élite-centred criteria for foreign news decreased the likelihood of the Palestinian concerns and claims to the city being represented in the news. Moreover,

¹⁰ As shown in Chapters Three and Five.

these criteria are the grounds for the exclusion of any news about significant geographical, demographic and administrative changes that took place in the city during the period under examination.

However, although journalists do have a certain level of autonomy in their day-to-day reporting, they are constrained by their professional beliefs and practices, as well as the policies of their organizations. Commercialization, which has led to the routinization of news production, has also influenced the news content by limiting the autonomy of the journalists in producing their news stories. Section 5.3 in Chapter Five illustrates how the *Guardian* amended its organizational policy and so modified the mainstream method of presentation which was still predominant in the other two newspapers. This change of policy shows how it is possible for a different framing of the news to be available to readers.

Setting the news agenda requires access to the news media in the first place. This access is the expression of power or the provision of events that fulfil the needs of the news media. Israel's power over the news was as a news promoter, for it was setting the news agenda by promoting certain events for news consumption. The events selected affected their framing. Jerusalem was presented by means of news reports about the conflict, that is, by reporting and promoting certain events in a particular way which conveyed the required images and policies.¹¹ The promotion of events stems from the needs of the news promoters.¹² News about Jerusalem in the British broadsheet Press focuses on conflict and negativity, because this is the kind of topic that makes news in a liberal democratic society as that in Britain.¹³

Most of the news published about the city can be classified under two headings: (1) spot news, such as the dramatized reports of the events of 1969, 1990, 1996, and September 2000; and (2) promoted news, such as the events following the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and the official Israeli annexation of that sector of the city in 1980.

¹¹ See Chapters One, Two and Four.

¹² Molotch & Lester., "News as Purposive Behaviour", pp. 196-9.

¹³ McNair., *News and Journalism*, pp. 3-21.

Where the selection of news is concerned, it is clear that Israel is its main promoter. This was exemplified in the reports of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and Israel's measures imposed on the city afterwards, as well as the Israeli legislation for Jerusalem in 1980.¹⁴ Most of the Israeli-promoted events were reported in the newspapers, whereas other Israeli actions were excluded. Furthermore, news about the Palestinians and the Arabs were only occasionally selected and reported (as shown in Chapter Five).

However, the data reveal that there was no similar promotion of news about the Arabs' view of the situation in Jerusalem. Crown Prince Fahd's statement about Israel's Bill on Jerusalem in 1980 was one example that could be classified as event promotion in this regard. This resulted in the lack of a comprehensive portrayal of the relevant issues and an alternative framing of events. Consequently, it is believed that there was a high level of consensus between Israel's interpretation, which was biased towards Israeli interests and needs on the one hand, and the type of newspaper coverage of events on the other.

Moreover, another aspect of the imbalance was the efficiency of the actors' apparatus and personnel or bureaucracy and level of resources in dealing with the news media. Research has shown that Israel was far superior to the Palestinians and the Arabs in this regard. Israel's power as the official source of news about Jerusalem was enhanced by the delegitimization of the Palestinians and their representative. The image of the Palestinian population was initially constructed in the news by Israeli officials, who, in the first place, did not recognize the former's national identity and rights as citizens.

Actors with easier or "habitual access" to the news media have greater influence on the selection and framing of news. Israel was more influential than the Palestinians, or any other Arab or international actor, in setting the news agenda about the conflict and in interpreting and framing the events being reported in the newspapers during the period under examination. However, the situation was somewhat modified after the Oslo Accords of September 1993. This event was the turning-point when the Palestinians began to be seen as a legitimate actor, which

¹⁴ See Chapters One and Two.

enabled their official body, the PLO, and later the Palestinian Authority, to gain access to the news media.

Israel's institutionalized efficient and specialist apparatus for dealing with the foreign news media could be said to be one of the main reasons for its easier access to the British Press in order to contribute news about Jerusalem. The state had a strong influence on the management of the news media not only because of its political and economic power, but also because of its experts' knowledge of the routines and dynamics of news production. This level of official power enabled Israel to contribute news not only to promote its own agenda, but also bar that of other concerned parties. Such a policy had a drastic effect on the selection and framing of international news, in particular, when the news selection about a certain place was a zero-sum game.

The "country's characteristics" model partly explains the imbalance in the access granted to the actors – namely, Israel and the Palestinians or the PLO – as "accredited" news sources. According to this model, "[c]ountry characteristics can be considered as [*sic*] dominant factors in shaping foreign news."¹⁵ It signifies the position or status of any country in the network of the international relations in influencing the proportion of news that is published about it internationally. These characteristics are thought to vary: it could be the power status of the country, its economic strength, cultural proximity, and so on. According to this model, the imbalance described above is a result of the difference in "power status" between these actors.

The power of a given antagonist (actor) over a given news medium is based on the antagonist's level of perceived news value on the one hand and the antagonist's need for the news media on the other: the higher the value and the lower the need, the greater the likelihood of an antagonist having an influence on the press. This influence will be manifested in terms of more access and an increased ability to have one's preferred frames adopted by the news media.¹⁶

¹⁵ Hagen, Zeh & Berens, "Country Characteristics as News Factors", p.1. This model is derived from the news values model of Galtung & Ruge (1956).

¹⁶ Wolfsfeld., *News Media and Political Conflict*, p.16.

In addition to other factors, the absence of any equal institutionalized Palestinian body concerned with the media increased the dependency of the Press on Israel's institutionalized apparatus for their news about the conflict. There was no similar level of efficiency on the Palestinian side.

Changes in presentation did take place as a result of shifts in the balance of power between the actors. Jerusalem was not portrayed in the newspapers outside the framework of the balance of power. The change in the "legitimacy" of the PLO after the Oslo Accords of 1993 could be assumed to be the reason for its participation as a formal source of news for the three newspapers about the events concerning the city at the Camp David Peace Summit II in July 2000.

Power status was a key factor in the dynamics of change in the portrayals of the city, the conflict and the actors. In this case, it could be political, economic, military or bureaucratic.

With regard to political power, firstly, Israel is an internationally recognized state that has been in control of the city since June 1967. Consequently, it can implement changes, enact laws and take action concerning the city and its future. Secondly, the United States supports Israel. This support is revealed in the speeches and statements made by American top rank politicians, who do not contradict Israel's interests concerning many aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Jerusalem (see Chapter Three).

This study has investigated the influence of various aspects of news production on the news content. Further investigation should be made into the influence of other factors on the reporting of news about Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli conflict during the period under examination. Many of these factors can be grouped into two categories.

News about Jerusalem in the British broadsheet Press was coloured by the Israeli point of view and was simplified. The Israeli narrative dominated to a large extent the news content, the presentation of the city and the conflict over it as well as the actors. In any political conflict, it is believed that the actor with a higher power status

is more likely to have a greater influence on the news content. This aim is achieved by means of the actor's role in setting the news agenda – that is, by influencing the news selection – and providing frames by designing texts that suggest that actor's interpretation of events. Chomsky & Herman argue as follows:

The élite domination of the media and marginalization of dissidents that results from the operation of these filters occurs so naturally that media news people, frequently operating with complete integrity and goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news “objectively” and on the basis of professional news values. Within the limits of the filter constraints they often are objective; the constraints are so powerful, and are built into the system in a fundamental way, that alternative bases of news choices are hardly imaginable.¹⁷

My intention here is not to stress that this model was more applicable than others to the presentation of Jerusalem, but to emphasize that empirical data, content analysis and frame analysis were open to the application of various models and theories

¹⁷ Noam Chomsky & Edward S. Herman, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), p.2.

Bibliography

Primary sources:

Daily Telegraph:

5-30 June 1967; 20-25 May 1968; 1-3 September 1968; 20 August- 5 September 1969; 25-28 September 1971; 18-30 November 1977; 28 November-5 December 1978; 20- 24 July 79; 30 July –23 August 1980; 1-3 July 1982; 9-31 October 1990; 1-3 April 1993; 10 September-7 October 1993; 23 September-10 October 1996; & 17 July-31 October 2000.

Guardian:

5 June-6 July 1967; 20-25 May 1968; 1-3 September 1968; 20 August- 5 September 1969; 25-28 September 1971; 18-30 November 1977; 28 November-5 December 1978; 20- 24 July 79; 30 July –23 August 1980; 1-3 July 1982; 9-31 October 1990; 1-3 April 1993; 10 September-7 October 1993; 23 September-10 October 1996; & 17 July-31 October 2000.

The Times:

20 April-18 June 1948; 5 June-8 July 1967; 20 August –5 September 1969; 20 August- 5 September 1969; 30 August- 1 September 1971; 25 September- 2 October 1971; 18 –30 November 1977; 17-19 September 1978; 29-30 August 1978; 20-22 July 1979; 1-3 July 1980; 30 July-22 August 1980; 8-31 October 1990; 12 June 1991; 1-3 April 1993; 10 September-7 October 1993; 23 September-10 October 1996; & 17 July-31 October 2000.

Interviews:

Anton La Guardia (London: May 28, 2002)
Brian Whitaker (London: May 27, 2002)
Christopher Walker (Telephone interview: August 28, 2002)
David Loshak(London: May 28, 2002)
Prof. Greg Philo (Glasgow: October 13, 2002)
Martin Wollacott (London: May 27, 2002)
Richard Beeston (London: May 29, 2002)
Sam Kiley (Telephone interview: August 22, 2002)
Suzanne Goldenberg (Telephone interview: June 11, 2002).

Secondary Sources:

Ashkenasi, A., (ed.)(1999) *The Future of Jerusalem*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Aziz, M. (2001) *Analysing Arabic Political Discourse: Anwar Sadat's Speech in Israel, 1977*. Salford, Lancs, UK: University of Salford.

BBC, (1997) *Fifty Years of Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Documentary.

Bell, A. (1991) *The Language of News Media*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Berger, M. & Ahimier, O. (eds.) (2002) *Jerusalem: A City and its Future*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Blood, R., Putnis, P., Payne, T., Pirkis, J. & Francis, C. (2000) "Media Coverage of Suicide and Mental Illness: Theory and Methodology" Canberra: University of Canberra; Melbourne: University of Melbourne.
(URL:<http://www.sjc.uq.edu.au/jea/full-program.htm>)

Breed, W. (1997) "Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis". In Berkowitz, D. (ed.) *Social Meanings of News: A Text-Reader*. London: Sage, pp. 107-122.

Brennen, B., & Duffy, M., "If A Problem Cannot Be Solved, Enlarge It": an ideological critique of the "Other" in Pearl Harbor and September 11 *New York Times* Coverage, pp. 3-14, *Journalism Studies*, Volume 4, Number 1, 2003, Routledge.
URL:<http://dandini.ingentaselect.com/vl=1591181/cl=108/nw=1/fm=docpdf/rpsv/catchword/routledg/1461670x/v4n1/s1/p3>

Budd, R., Thorp, R. & Donohew, L. (1967) *Content Analysis of Communications*. New York: Macmillan.

Carruthers, S. (2000) *The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*. London: Macmillan.

Chibnall, S., (1977) *Law and Order News*. London: Tavistock.

Chomsky, N. & Herman, E. (1994) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books.

- Cleveland, W., (2000) *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Oxford: Westview Press.
- Cohen, B., (1963) *The Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Curran, J., & Seaton, J., (1997) *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*. London: Routledge.
- Daniel, A., (1995) U.S. Media Coverage of the Intifada and American Public Opinion, pp. 62-72. In Kamalipour, Y., (ed.) *The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception*. London: Praeger Publishers.
- Dearing, J & Rogers, E. (1996) *Agenda-Setting*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Dumper, M. (1997) *The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dumper, M. (2002) *The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Eliasoph, N. (1997) "Routines and the Making of Oppositional News". In Berkowitz, D. (ed.) *Social Meanings of News: A Text-Reader*. London: Sage, pp. 230-253.
- Entman, R., (1989) *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Entman, R. (1991) "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrast I Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents", *Journal of Communication*, vol.41, no.4, Autumn, pp. 6-27.
- Entman, R. (1993) "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Featured Paradigm", *Journal of Communication*, vol.43, no.4, Autumn, pp. 51-58.
- Ericson, R., (1989) *Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources*. Milton Keynes: Open Press.
- Fishman, M. (1997) News and Nonevent: Making the Visible Invisible. Dan Berkowitz (ed.) *Social Meanings of News: A Text- Reader*. Thousand Oak, CA: Sage.

- Fowler, R. (1991) *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press*. London: Routledge.
- Friedland, R., & Hetch, R., (1996) *To Rule Jerusalem*. US: Cambridge University Press.
- Galtung, J., (1960) *Theory and Methods of Social Research*. London George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Galtung, J. & Ruge, M. (1965) "The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba, and Cyprus Crises in Four Foreign Newspapers". In Tunstall, J. (ed.) (1970) *Media Sociology*. London: Constable.
- Gans, H. (1980) *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Ghareeb, E. (ed.) (1983) *Split Vision: The Portrayal of the Arabs in the American Media*. Washington, DC: American-Arab Affairs Committee.
- Gilboa, E., (1933) American Media, Public Opinion, and the Intifada. In A. Cohen & Wolfsfeld (eds.), *Framing the Intifada: People and Media* (pp. 93-115). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Giltin, T. (1980) *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the new left*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Glasgow Media Group (1982) *Really Bad News*. London: Writers' & Readers' Publishing Co-operative Society.
- Glasgow Media Group (1985) *War and Peace News*. England: Open University Press.
- Goldfarb, M. (2001) All Journalism is Local: Reporting on the Middle East How the U.S and European Media cover the Same Events Differently? *Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics*. Summer 2001, Vol. 6, November 3.
- Golding, P., & Elliott, P., (1979) *Making the News*. New York: Longman.
- Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison notebook* (Q. Hoare & G. N.,Smith, Eds & Trans.) New York: International Publishers.
- Gunther, K., & Hodge, R., (1979) *Language as Ideology*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.

- Gunther, R. & Mughan, A. (2000) *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hagen, L., Zeh, R., Berens, H. & Liedner, D. "Country Characteristics as News Factors: The Effect of International Relations on the News Value of Countries in the Foreign News Coverage of Newspapers and Television in 28 Countries". Paper presented at the 49th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association: URL: <http://sunsite.unc.edu/newsflow/>
- Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. & Brian Roberts (1999) "Policing the Crisis". In Tumber H. (ed.), *News: A Reader*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 249-256.
- Hamad, A. (2002) "Jerusalem and the Politics of Settlement in the Middle East" (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK).
- Hansen, H., Cottle, S., Negrine, R., & Newbold, C., (1998) *Mass Communication Research Methods*. London: MACMILLAN Press Ltd. 1998.
- Harriman, E., (1987) *Hack: Home Truth About Foreign News*. London: Zed Books Ltd.
- Hartley, J. (1982) *Understanding News*. New York: Methuen.
- Hess, S., (1996) *International News and Foreign Correspondents*. Washington: The Brookings Institution.
- Jones, M. & Jones, E. (1999) *Mass Media*. London: Macmillan.
- Kirkpatrick, D. *New York Times*, 7 April 2003.
- Klein, M. (2001) *Jerusalem: The Contested City*. London: C. Hurst.
- Latif, O. (2000) Covering the Intifada. *Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line*. 23-29 November 2000.
- Lavie, A. (2002) The War Looks Different Abroad and May be so do the Facts. *Ha'aretz*. April 3, 2002.

Liebes, T., (1997) *Reporting the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How hegemony works*. London: Routledge.

Liebes, T., & Curran, J. (eds.) (1998) *Media, Ritual and Identity*. New York: Routledge.

Liebes, T., (2000) "Inside a News Item: A Dispute Over Framing", *Political Communication*, 17 (3).

Li-Ning, H. & McAdams, K. (2000) "Ideological Manipulation vis. Newspapers Accounts of Political Conflict: A Cross-National News Analysis of the 1991 Moscow Coup", in Malek, A. & Kavouri, A. (eds) *The Global Dynamics of News: Studies in International News Coverage and News Agenda*. Stamford, Connecticut: Ablex Publishing Corporation, pp.57-73.

Lippmann, W. (1922) *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Maclean, E., (1981) *Between the Lines: How to Detect Bias and Propaganda in the News and in Everyday Life*, Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Manning, P. (2001) *News and News Sources: A Critical Introduction*. London: Sage.

McGregor, O., (1977) *Royal Commission on the Press*, Final Report, London: HMSO.

McManus, J. (1994) *Market Driven Journalism: Let the Citizen Beware?* Thousand Oak, CA: Sage.

McNair, B. (1994) *News and Journalism in the UK: A Textbook*. London: Routledge.

McQuail, D. (1991) "Media Performance Assessment in the Public Interest: Principles and Methods". In Anderson, J. (ed.) *Communication Yearbook/14*. London: Sage, pp. 111-145.

McQuail, D. (2000) *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*. London: Sage.

Mervin, D. (1998) *The News Media and Democracy in the United States*. Vicky Randall (ed.) *Democratization and the Media*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Moeller, S. (1999) *Four Habits of International News Reporting*.
URL:<http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/products/fourhabits.pdf>

Molotch, H. & Lester, M. (1997) "News as Purposive Behaviour: On the Strategic Use of Routine Events". In Berkowitz (ed.), *Social Meanings of News: A Text-Reader*. London: Sage, pp.193-209.

Moore, B., (1969) *Workers in World News*. Great Britain: Pergamon.

Mowlana, H., (1995) "Images and the Crisis of Political Legitimacy", pp. 3-15. In Kamalipour, Y., (ed.) *The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception*. London: Praeger Publishers.

Mowlana, H., (2000) The Renewal of the Global Media Debate: Implications for the Relationships between the West and the Islamic World, pp. 105-118. In Kai Hafez (ed.) *Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World*. Gresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Mungham, G. (1987) "Israel: Fog Over Lebanon". In Mercer, D. & Williams, K (eds), *The Fog of War: The Media on the Battlefield*. London: Heinemann, pp.264–266.

Musallam, S. (1985) *Zum Araberbild in Der Bundesrepublikanischen Presse Am Beispiel Des IV. Nahostkrieges*. Beirut: Markaz Dirasat el-Wahdah al-Arabeyah.

Negrine, R. (1994) *Politics and the Mass Media in Britain*. London: Routledge.

Noakes, J. & Wilkins, K. (2002) "Shifting Frames of the Palestinian Movement in the US News". In *Media, Culture and Society*, vol.24, pp. 249-271. (URL:<http://www.sagepub.co.uk/frame.html?http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journals/details/issue/abstract/ab026557.html>).

Norris, P. & Carroll, S. (2000) "The Dynamics of the News Framing Process: From Reagan's Gender Gap to Clinton's Soccer Moms". (URL:<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris.shorenstein.ksg/acrobat/carroll.pdf/>)

Olien, C. & Donohue, G. (1989) Media Coverage of Social Movements. Pp. 139-163 in Salmon, C. (ed.) *Information Campaigns*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989.

Pasadeos, Y. & Renfro, P.(1988) Rupert Murdoch's Style: The New York Post. In *Newspaper Research Journal*, vol. 9, pp. 25-34.

Pedelty, M., (1995) *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents*. New York: Routledge.

Philo, G., & Miller, D., (2002) *Circuit of Communication and Power: Recent Developments in Media Sociology*. In *Developments in Sociology*. (London: Causeway Press.

Pinn, I., (2000) Right-Wing Movements, Islam, and the media: the influence of the media on ethnic –religious integration in Europe, pp. 89-104. In Hafez, K. (ed.) *Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World*. Gresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Poole, E., (2000) Framing Islam: An Analysis of Newspaper coverage of Islam in the British press, pp. 157-179. In Hafez, K. (ed.) *Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World*. Gresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Poole, E., (2002) *Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims*. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

Powntree, D., (1991) *Statistics Without Tears: A Primer for Non-mathematicians*. London: Penguin.

Priest, S. (1996) *Doing Media Research: An Introduction*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Reah, D. (1998) *The Language of Newspapers*. London: Routledge.

Reese, S. (1991) "Setting the Media's Agenda: A Power Balance Perspective", in Anderson, J. (ed.), *Communication Yearbook/14*. London: Sage, pp. 309-340.

Roach, T. (1995) "Competing News Narratives, Consensus, and World Power", in Yahya R. Kamalipour (ed.), *The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception*. London: Praeger Publishers.

Robson, C. (1996) *Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ruby, K. (2002) Framing, Tactics and the Media: Operation Save America and the Summer Mercy Renewal. Paper presented at the Workshop on Organization and State Building. Chicago, 22 April 2002.

Said, E. (1978) *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Said, E. (1994) *The Politics of Dispossession*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Said, E. (1997) *Covering Islam*. New York: Vintage Books.

Sarantakos, S. (1994) *Social Research*. Hampshire, UK: The MacMillan Press LTD.

Sari, H. (1988) *Sūrat al-'Arab fi'l Sahāfa al Brūtāniyya*. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wahdah al-'Arabeyya.

Sayigh Y, & Shlaim, A. (eds.) (1997) *The Cold War and the Middle East*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Schaefer, T. (2002) Targeted Globally, Covered Locally: Mediated Terrorism in Comparative Context. Harvard Symposium on *Restless Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism*, 8 August 2002.

Scheufele, D. (1999) Framing as a Theory of Media Effects. *Journal of Communication*. Winter 1999. International Communication Association.

Schudson, M., (1989) The sociology of News Production. In *Media, Culture and Society*, v.11, London: Sage.

Schulz, W. (2001) "Foreign News in Leading Newspapers of Western and Post-Communist Countries". Paper prepared for the Presentation at the 51st Conference of the International Communication Association (Washington DC, USA, May 24-28 2001).

Shlaim, A., (2000) *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*. London: Penguin.

Shoemaker, P. (1987). Building a theory of news content. *Journalism Monographs*, 103, June 1987.

Shoemaker, P. (1991) *Gatekeeping*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Shoemaker, P., & Reese, S. (1991) *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*. New York: Longman.

Siapera, E., (2000) Journalists, Discourse, and the News. Paper presented at the workshop *Analyses of Discourse and Ideas in European and International Affairs*. EUI Florence 12/13 May 2000.

Sigal, L., (1986) Sources Make the News. In *Reading the News*, Manoff, R., & Schudson, M., (eds.) pp. 9-37. New York: Pantheon.

Soderlund, W., Wagenberg, R., & Surlin, S. (1998) The Impact of the End of the Cold War on Canadian and American TV News Coverage of Cuba: Image Consistency or Image Change? *Canadian journal of Communication*. Vol. 23, November 2, 1998.

Soloski, J., (1997) News reporting and Professionalism: Some Constraints on the Reporting of the News, pp. 138-154. In Berkowitz, D., (ed.) *Social Meanings of News: A Text-Reader*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Spitzberg, B., & Cadis, M. (2002) The Media Construction of Stalking Stereotypes. *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture*. 9 (3) pp. 182-249.

Street, J., (2001) *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy*. Hampshire: Palgrave.

Swanson, G., (1991) Representation, pp. 123-145. In David Lusted (ed.) *The Media Studies Book*. London: Routledge.

Treize, J., Stovall, G, and Mowlana, H., (1980) *Watergate: A Crisis for the World: A Survey of British and French Press Reaction Toward an American Political Crisis*. Great Britain: Pergamon Press 1980

Tuchman, G., (1978) *Making News*. New York: Free Press.

Tumber, H. (ed.) (2000) *Media Power, Professionals and Policies*. London: Routledge.

Tunstall, J., (1971) *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents: Their News Organisation, News Sources, and Competitor-Colleagues*. London: Constable.

Tunstall, J., (1996) *Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain*. Oxford University Press.

Tunstall, J., (1997) The United Kingdom, pp. 244-295. In Ostergaard, B., (ed.) *The Media in Western Europe: The Euromedia Handbook*. Second edition. London: Sage.

Walker, M., (1982) *Powers of the Press: The World's Great Newspapers*. London Quartet Books.

Whitaker, Brian., (1981) *News Limited: Why you Can't Read All About It*. London: Minority Press Group.

Wolfsfeld, G. (1997) *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wolfsfeld, G., (2001) Political Waves and Democratic Discourse: Terrorism Waves during the Oslo Peace Process, pp. 226-251. In Bennett, W., & Entman, R., (eds.) *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolfsfeld, G, (2001) "The Varying Role of the News Media in Peace Processes: Theory and Research". Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA (August 2001). (<http://pro.harvard.edu/papers/038/038003WolfsfeldG.pdf>)

Wolfsfeld, G, (2002) "Mobilizing the News Media for the Other War on Terror: Norms, Routines, and Dilemmas for Israeli Journalists Covering the Second Intifada". Paper presented at the Harvard Symposium on *Restless Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism*, 8 August 2002.

Woodward, K. (2002) *Understanding Identity*. London: Arnold.

Wykes, M., (2001) *News, Crime and Culture*. London: Pluto Press.

Zaharna, R., (1995) The Palestinian Leadership and the American Media: Changing Images, Conflicting Results, pp. 37-49. In Kamalipour, Y., (ed.) *The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception*. London: Praeger Publishers.

The British Library Newspaper Library:

[URL:http://www.bl.uk/collections/nwspapers.html](http://www.bl.uk/collections/nwspapers.html)

Sam Kiley, "The Middle East's War of Words", August 2001.

[URL:www.gwb.com.au/2000/Israelnews.htm](http://www.gwb.com.au/2000/Israelnews.htm)

[URL:http://www.honestreporting.com](http://www.honestreporting.com)

[URL:http://www.electronicintifada.com](http://www.electronicintifada.com)

[URL:www.guardianunlimited.co.uk](http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk)

[URL:www.gpo.gov.il](http://www.gpo.gov.il)

[URL:http://www.bitterlemons.org/](http://www.bitterlemons.org/)

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/737483.stm